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Feb. 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Hyh’nes Hidiyah Bakri v. Cruz Management Company, Incorporated, et al.

District Court, D. Massachusetts

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-12807

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (0)

• Cited By (0)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

HYH’NES HIDIYAH BAKRI, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

v. * Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-12807-IT

*

CRUZ MANAGEMENT COMPANY, *

INCORPORATED, et al., *

*

Defendants. *

            MEMORANDUM AND ORDER                                 

                 February 25, 2026                               

TALWANI, D.J.

Plaintiff Hyh’nes Hidiyah Bakri, proceeding pro se, has initiated an action in this court
against multiple Defendants. In this Memorandum and Order, the court addresses Bakri’s
Request for Clerk’s Entry of Default [and] Motion for Default Judgment [Doc. No. 35] and
related issues concerning service.

I. Background

On September 29, 2025, Bakri filed a Complaint [Doc. No. 1] against Cruz Management
Company, Inc. (“Cruz Management”) and others. On October 1, 2025, the court granted Bakri
leave to proceed in forma pauperis but directed her to file an amended complaint. Mem. & Order
4–5 [Doc. No. 5].

On October 9, 2025, Bakri filed her Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 7] naming multiple
Defendants, including, as relevant here, Rosa Caraballo, Krystal Gately, Jessica Rojas, Ben
Sostek, Soraya Dominguez, and the Boston Housing Authority (the “BHA”). Summonses were
issued on October 21, 2025, and the court advised Bakri that service must be completed within
ninety days. Order ¶ 4 [Doc. No. 9]; see also Notice to Pl. Doc. No. 10. The U.S. Marshals Service subsequently filed receipts attesting to
service at the addresses provided by Bakri as to Caraballo and Gately on October 29, 2025, and
as to BHA, Rojas, Sostek, and Dominguez on November 4, 2025. See U.S. Marshal Process
Receipt and Return [Doc. Nos. 13, 14, 15, 18, 21, 22].

On November 17, 2025, Cruz Management’s counsel informed Bakri via email that
Gately and Caraballo “no longer work at Cruz and therefore service has not been properly
made.” Am. Mot. for Preliminary Injunction, Ex. 7, at ECF 1 [Doc. No. 27-7]. A November 18,
2025 filing by Cruz Management and certain other Defendants (but not Defendants Caraballo
and Gately) also noted that Caraballo and Gately “are former employees of Cruz Management . .
. and do not appear to have been properly served as of the time of the filing of this Motion.
Plaintiff attempted to effectuate service at the address of their former employer.” Cruz Mgmt.
Defs’ Special Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. No. 23].

In a subsequent filing, Bakri acknowledged receipt of the November 17, 2025 email and
stated that she performed an “email test” to confirm Caraballo and Gately were no longer

employed by Cruz Management by sending messages to their workplace email addresses. Am.
Mot. ¶ 12 [Doc. No. 27]. Bakri “confirm[ed]” that Gately no longer worked for the company
where Bakri’s email to Gately resulted in “an immediate automated reply.” Id. Bakri stated
further that she received no such reply from Caraballo’s email account but acknowledged that
she “understands that this email test does not definitively disprove the claim that Rosa M.
Caraballo is no longer a Cruz Management Company employee.” Id. The docket reflects no
efforts by Bakri to re-serve Caraballo and Gately.

On December 1, 2025, the BHA filed its pending Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 33].1 Also
on December 1, Bakri filed her Default Motion [Doc. No. 35], in which she alleged that
Defendants BHA, Jessica Rojas, Soraya Dominguez, and Benjamin Sostek were “officially
served by the United States Marshal on November 4, 2025” but failed to respond. Id. at 2.

II. Discussion

A. Defendants Carabello and Gately

Where a defendant is not served within ninety days after summonses are issued, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure direct that “the court––on motion or on its own after notice to
the plaintiff––must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that
service be made within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). If, however, a plaintiff “shows
good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.”
Id. Local Rule 4.1, in turn, provides that “[i]f on the 14th day following the expiration of the
ninety (90) day period good cause has not been shown [by motion for enlargement of time], the
clerk shall forthwith automatically enter an order of dismissal for failure to effect service of the

process[.]”

Here, summonses issued on October 21, 2025, and needed to be served within ninety
days, or by January 19, 2026. Although Plaintiff attempted to direct service on Defendants
Caraballo and Gately at their workplace, see Caraballo Process Receipt & Return Doc. No. 21; Gately Process Receipt
& Return Doc. No. 22, that attempt failed, as they were no longer at that address at the
time of attempted service. See Cruz Mgmt. Mem. ISO Mot. to Dismiss 1 n.1 [Doc. No. 24]; see
also Am. Mot., Ex. 7, at ECF 1 [Doc. No. 27–7] (email from Cruz Management’s counsel

1 Defendant’s Motion will be addressed in a separate order.

informing Bakri that, at least as of November 17, 2025, Gately and Caraballo “no longer work at
Cruz [Management]”). Bakri apparently took note, as she acknowledged receipt of the
aforementioned e-mail from Cruz Management’s attorney in a later filing, see Am. Mot. ¶ 12
[Doc. No. 27], and did not include Gately and Caraballo in her subsequent Default Motion [Doc.

No. 35].

Where Bakri has provided no cause for the failure to timely serve Caraballo and Gately
within the ninety days required for service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) or under
the fourteen-day grace period set forth in Local Rule 4.1, these two Defendants are dismissed
from the action without prejudice.

B. Defendants Rojas, Dominguez, and Sostek

Bakri asks this court to direct the clerk to enter default against Defendants Jessica Rojas,
Soraya Dominguez, and Benjamin Sostek and for the court to enter default judgment. See
Default Mot. 2 [Doc. No. 35].

Under Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, service of process on an

individual within a judicial district in the United States may be effectuated by:
(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual
personally;

(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with
someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or

(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). In the alternative, service may be effectuated as authorized by the law of
the state in which this court is located. Fed. R. Civ. P. (4)(e)(l). Accordingly, under
Massachusetts law, an individual may be served

by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally; or by
leaving copies thereof at his last and usual place of abode; or by delivering a copy
of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by
statute to receive service of process, provided that any further notice required by
such statute be given.

Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).

Here, Bakri provided the U.S. Marshals Service with Rojas, Dominguez, and Sostek’s
purported work address rather than their home addresses. See Am. Compl. 2 Doc. No. 7; Rojas
Process Receipt & Return Doc. No. 15; Sostek Process Receipt &
Return Doc. No. 14; Dominguez Process Receipt & Return Doc. No. 13.
Where Bakri has made no showing that the BHA was the authorized agent for service of process

as to these individuals, and where service of individuals at their place of employment is not
otherwise authorized under the applicable rules, the court finds that Rojas, Dominguez, and
Sostek were not properly served. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2); Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1); see also
Hewes v. Pangburn, 162 F.4th 177, 199–200 (1st Cir. 2025) (finding service improper where
plaintiff attempted to serve an individual police officer by delivering summons to the sergeant
authorized to accept service on behalf of the police department). Bakri’s Default Motion [Doc.
No. 35] is therefore denied.

Where Bakri is proceeding pro se, and where her belief that service was effective appears
to have been a good faith mistake, the court finds good cause to allow Bakri an additional thirty
days to properly serve Defendants Rojas, Dominguez, and Sostek. Failure to complete service

within thirty days will likely result in the dismissal of this action without prejudice as to
Defendants Rojas, Dominguez, and Sostek.

D. Defendant Boston Housing Authority

Bakri’s Default Motion [Doc. No. 35] also seeks entry of default against Defendant BHA.
See id. at 2–4. Bakri is correct that BHA’s responsive pleading was several days late. But where
a clerk’s entry of default, let alone the court’s entry of default judgment, had not yet entered
when BHA filed its responsive pleading, the court will not default BHA based on its late filing.2

III. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, Bakri’s Request for Clerk’s Entry of Default [and] Plaintiff’s
Motion for Default Judgment [Doc. No. 35] is DENIED. If Bakri seeks to proceed against
Defendants Dominguez, Rojas, or Sostak, she shall arrange for service within the next thirty days
in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.

Bakri’s Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 7] is DISMISSED without prejudice as to
Defendants Caraballo and Gately.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

February 25, 2026 /s/ Indira Talwani

United States District Judge

2 Bakri asserts further that BHA’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 33], which was electronically
docketed at 2:29 p.m., “was filed within three hours of the Plaintiff filing her Request for Clerk’s
Entry of Default and Motion for Default Judgment[.]” Pl.’s Reply to Mot. to Dismiss 3 [Doc. No.
39]. Bakri is technically correct, as her motion was time-stamped by the clerk’s office at 12:05
p.m. But BHA would not have received her motion until it was electronically docketed on
December 2, 2025, and thus the BHA’s pleading was not filed in response to Bakri’s filing.