Supreme Court: Substantial-Evidence Standard for Asylum Persecution Determinations

1 (Slip Op inion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the t ime the opin ion is issue d. The syllabus constitutes no par t of the op inion of the Cour t but has been prepared by t he Report er of Decisions for the conve nience of the reader. See United States v. Detr oit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNI TED STATES Syllabus URIAS-ORELLANA ET AL. v. BONDI, ATT ORNEY GENERAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT No. 24–777. Argued December 1, 2025—Decided March 4, 2026 This case presents the qu estion whether the courts of appeals must apply substantial-evidence review to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ de- termination whether a given set of undisputed facts constitutes “per- secution” under 8 U. S. C §1101(a)(42). Petitioners Douglas Humberto Uria s-Orellana, his wife Sayra Iliana Gamez-Mejia, and their minor child G. E. U. G., are natives of El Sal- vador who entered the United States withou t authorization in 2021. After being placed in removal proc eedings, petitioners applied for asy- lum. Under the Immigration and Nati onality Act (INA), the U. S. Gov- ernment “may grant asylum” to a noncitizen if it “deter mines” that he “is a refugee.” §1158(b)(1)(A). An asylum seeker qualifies as a “r efu- gee” if he “is unable or unwilling to return” to his country of nationality “because of persecution or a well-fo unded fear of persecution on ac- count of race, religion, nationalit y, membership in a particular social group, or political opinio n.” §1101(a)(42)(A). In support of petitioners’ app lications for asylum, Urias-Orellana testified that he was being targeted by a h itman in El Salvador. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Urias- Orellana’s testimony credible but concluded that it did not esta blish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution under the INA. The IJ a ccordingly denied the petitioners’ asylum applications and ordered their removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. On petitio n for review, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also affirmed, holding that, under the substantial-evidence standard of review, the re cord did not compel a contrary findin g. Held: The INA requires application of the substantial-evidence standard

2 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI Syllabus to the agency’s determination whethe r a given set of u ndisputed facts rises to the level of persecution under §1101(a)(4 2)(A). Pp. 5–13. (a) Sec tion 1252(b)(4) sets forth the scope and stan dard of review for courts of appeals evaluatin g IJ and BIA removal orders; subparag raph (B) provides that “administrative find ings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudica tor would be compelled to conclude to t he con- trary.” The Court has previously interpreted this provision to pre- scribe a deferential, “ substantial-evidence stand ard,” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 584, meaning “ ‘such relevant evide nce as a rea- sonable mind might acc ept as adequate to support a conclusion,’ ” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U. S. 97, 103. The courts of appeals have split over the extent to whic h this standard applies to the ag ency’s determi- nation that an asylum applic ant has established persec ution. Pp. 5–7. (b) Though the courts of appeals apply varying standards, the Court has already conc luded that the pe rsecution determination—including both the underlying factual findings and the application of the INA to those findings—receives substa ntial-evidence review. In INS v. Elias- Zacarias, 502 U. S. 478, th e Court held that to obtain ju dicial reversa l of the agency’s persecu tion determination, an asylu m applicant must show that the evidence presented was “so compelling that no reasona- ble factfinder could fail to find th e requisite fear of persecution.” Id., at 484. Congress amended the INA shor tly after the Court’s decision, but those amendments—and the addition of §1252(b)(4)(B) in particu- lar—codified the Elias-Zacarias standard. The statute as it reads to- day therefore requires substantia l-evidence review. Pp. 7–11. (c) The Court rejects peti tioners’ arguments that de novo review should apply because §1252(b)(4)(B) requires deferenc e only for “find- ings of fact” and no subpar agraph explicitly addr esses the mixed ques- tion of law and fact that is the dete rmination of persecution. However, Elias-Zacarias and the subsequent statu tory history su ggest that Con- gress meant for the entirety of this “mixed” determination to receiv e deference under §1252(b)(4)(B). The Court’s decisions in Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U. S. 209, and Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 5 89 U. S. 221, are not to the contrary. Those cases addressed whether a mixed ques- tion qualifies as a “question of law” exempt from §1252(a)’s bar on ju - dicial review, 601 U. S., at 212, 589 U. S., at 225; but wh ether a given issue is treated as a question of la w exempt from the INA’s jurisdiction- stripping provisions says nothing abo ut the type of review the court must afford to that issue under othe r provisions of the statute. Pp. 11– 13. 121 F. 4th 327, affirmed. J ACKSON, J., d elivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

_________________ _________________ 1 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is s ubject to f ormal revision before publicat ion in the United States R eports. Readers are req uested to notify the Rep orter of Decisions, S upreme Court of the United Sta tes, Washing ton, D. C. 20543, pio@supr emecourt.gov, of any t ypographica l or other f ormal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNI TED STATES No. 24–777 DOUGLAS HUMBERTO URIAS-ORELL ANA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. PAMELA BONDI, ATT ORNEY GENERAL ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT [March 4, 2026] J USTICE J ACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, his wife Sayra Iliana Gamez-Mejia, and their minor child G. E. U. G. are Salvadoran natives who sought asylum af- ter entering the United States without authorization. An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their applications and or- dered their removal, determin ing that they had neither demonstrated past “persecuti on” nor established a “well- founded fear” of future “persecution” as required under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(42)(A). After unsuccessfully challenging their removal order with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), petitioners sought review in federal court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA’s ruling, holding that “substan- tial evidence” supported the agency’s persecution determi- nation. Urias-Orellana v. Garland, 121 F. 4t h 327, 335– 338 (CA1 2024). We granted certiorari to de termine whether the Court of Appeals applied the appropriate standard of review under the INA. We conclude that the statute requires application of the substantial-evidence standard to the agency’s

2 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI Opinion of the Court conclusion that a given set of undisputed facts does not con- stitute persecution. Accordingly, we affirm. I A Petitioners entered the United States without authoriza- tion in 2021. Soon after they arrived, the Government served petitioners with notice s to appear in federal immi- gration court for a removal hearing. When they appeared as scheduled in an immigration court in Boston, petitioners conceded their removability but claimed asylum (along with other forms of relief from removal that are no longer at is- sue). Petitioner Urias-Orellana was the sole witness at the re- moval hearing. He testified that a “sicario” (i. e., hitman) from his hometown had been targeting him since 2016. That year, the sicario shot two of Urias-Orellana’s half- brothers and vowed to kill every member of his family. Id., at 332. To escape the sicario’s threats, Urias-Orellana, Gamez-Mejia, and G. E. U. G. relocated within El Salvador several times over the next fe w years. After each move, Urias-Orellana was threatened by men who demanded money and warned that they would leave him like his brothers if he did not pay up. One of the men even physi- cally assaulted Urias-Orellana when he returned to his hometown for a brief visit. Id., at 333. The last straw came soon after Urias-Orellana’s fourth and final move in 2021, when he learned that men had been asking around town about the arrival of any newcomers. It was at this point that Urias-Orellana, Gamez-Mejia, and G. E. U. G. left El Salvador for the United States. Under the INA, the U. S. Government “may grant asy- lum” to a noncitizen if it “deter mines” that he “is a refugee.” 8 U. S. C. §1158(b)(1)(A). An asylum seeker qualifies as a “refugee,” and is thus eligible for asylum, if he “is unable or unwilling to return” to his country of nationality “because

3 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) Opinion of the Court of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac- count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic- ular social group, or political opinion.” §1101(a)(42)(A). An asylum seeker can submit an affirmative application to the Department of Homeland Security, see §1158(a), or raise asylum eligibility as a defense to removal proceedings be- fore an IJ, see §1229a(c)(4). Urias-Orellana and his family chose the latter path: When the Government initiated re- moval proceedings against them, they defended by assert- ing asylum eligibility. The IJ credited Urias-Orellana’s account of the facts but concluded that those facts were insufficient to establish ei- ther past persecution or a well-founded fear of future per- secution. The IJ explained that, under First Circuit prec e- dent, death threats may establish past persecution only when they are “ ‘so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a (quoting Bonilla v. Mukasey, 539 F. 3d 72, 77 (CA1 2008)). The IJ concluded that Urias-Orellana’s past-persecution claim failed under that standard, as he had not su bmitted any medical, psychiatric, or psyc hological evaluations indicat- ing that he had experienced such suffering or harm. App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a–32a. The IJ further found the evidence regarding Urias-Orellana’s alleged fear of future persecu- tion to be lacking. He ob served that Urias-Orellana had successfully escaped danger after many of his relocations and that any risk resurfaced only when Urias-Orellana re- turned to his hometown or nearby areas. Id., at 32a–35a. Given the dearth of evidence establishing past or future persecution, the IJ determined that Urias-Orellana did not qualify as a refugee eligible for asylum under §1101(a)(42). See id., at 44a. The IJ determined that Gamez-Mejia and G. E. U. G. were likewise ineligible for asylum, as their claims were “derivativ[e]” of Urias-Orellana’s. Id., at 28a. So, the IJ ordered all three petitioners’ removal. Id., at 44a.

4 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI Opinion of the Court B Petitioners appealed the IJ’s ruling to the BIA. See 8 CFR §1003.1(b) (2025) (providing authority for such an ap- peal). But the BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that Urias- Orellana’s testimony “did not establish that he suffered past harm in the aggregate rising to the level of persecu- tion.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a. It also agreed that because Urias-Orellana “only had problems when he returned to his hometown,” his testimony did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Id., at 22a. Petitioners then sought further review in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit pursuant to 8 U. S. C. §1252(b)(2). See 121 F. 4th, at 331. Petitioners did not dis- pute that death threats may establish past persecution only when they are “so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.” Opening Brief for Petitioners in No. 24– 1042 (CA1), pp. 9–10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, they argued that the undisputed facts of this cas e met that standard. The Court of Appeals emphasized that its review was “cabin[ed]” to “whether the A gency conclu- sion [that petitioners] had not demonstrated past persecu- tion or a well-founded fear of future persecution was sup- ported by substantial evidence.” 121 F. 4th, at 335. Under that standard, reversal was warranted only “if, in reviewing the record as a whole, any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Ibid. (internal quo- tation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, concluding that Urias-Orellana’s testimony did not compel a finding of either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future per- secution. See id., at 336–338. In particular, it determined that “[t]he Agency reasonabl y concluded that the threats experienced by Urias-Orellana” were not “so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.” Id., at 336 (in- ternal quotation marks omitted). It similarly determined that, because “Urias-Orellana was able to live in towns

5 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) Opinion of the Court across El Salvador for years without harassment and only encountered difficulties once he returned to his hometown,” a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to find a well-founded fear of future persecution. Id., at 338. We granted certiorari, 606 U. S. 903 (2025), to evaluate whether the Court of Appeals applied the appropriate standard of review when evaluating Urias-Orellana’s asy- lum claim. 1 II Section 1252(b)(4) does not use the phrase “substantial evidence.” But it does specifically address the “[s]cope and standard for review” that the courts of appeals must apply when evaluating IJ and BIA removal orders. As relevant here, each of §1252(b)(4)’s four subpara- graphs truncates the court’s review in a particular manner. Subparagraph (A) states that “the court of appeals shall de- cide the petition only on the administrative record on which the order of removal is based.” Subparagraph (C) says that “a decision [by the agency] that [a noncitizen] is not eligible for admission to the United States is conclusive unless manifestly contrary to law.” And, per subpa ragraph (D), “the Attorney General’s discre tionary judgment whether to grant relief under section 1158(a) of this title shall be con- clusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.” This case involves subparagraph (B), which provides that “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless —————— 1 Because petitioners have not challenged the standard of persecution that the agency applied— i. e., that death threats are suffic ient to estab- lish past persecution only when they are s o menacing as to cause signif- icant actual suffering or h arm, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a—we con- sider only the appropriate standard of review for the agency’s applicati on of t ha t st a nd ar d to t he f ac t s. We note the Solicitor General agrees with petitioners that “purely legal questi ons about the appr opriate standard” of persecution are subject to de novo review. Brief for Respondent 40; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 48.

6 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI Opinion of the Court any reasonable adjudicator woul d be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” §1252(b)(4)(B). This Court has previously interpreted subparagraph (B) to prescribe a deferential, “substantial-evidence standard” for review of agency fac- tual findings. Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 584 (2020). Substantial evidence, we have long emphasized, is “ ‘more than a mere scintilla,’ ” but “means—and means only— ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U. S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938)). Or, to come full circle, “ ‘findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable ad- judicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. ’ ” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 584 (quoting §1252(b)(4)(B)). Whether a given agency determination fits within the purview of subparagraph (B)—and is thus reviewed for sub- stantial evidence—is not always clear. Indeed, the courts of appeals have split over th e standard of review that should apply to the agency’s determination that an asylum applicant has not established past “persecution” or a “well- founded fear of [future] persecution” within the meaning of §1101(a)(42)(A). Some courts review the entire inquiry (both the underly- ing factual findings about what happened to the applicant in her home country and the agency’s application of the statute to those findings) under the substantial-evidence standard. 2 Other courts break down the inquiry into two parts, reviewing the agency’s factua l findings for substan- tial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. 3 Yet even —————— 2 See Gómez-Medina v. Barr, 975 F. 3d 27, 31, 33 (CA1 2020); Ai Hua Chen v. Holder, 742 F. 3d 171, 177–178 (CA4 2014); Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F. 3d 700, 702–70 3 (CA6 2004); Ahmed v. Gonzales, 467 F. 3d 669, 673 (CA7 2006); Vicent e-Elias v. Mukasey, 532 F. 3d 1086, 1091 (CA10 200 8). 3 See Diallo v. INS, 232 F. 3d 279, 287 (CA2 20 00); Herrera-Reyes v. Attorney Gen., 952 F. 3d 101, 106 (CA3 2020); Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 263 F. 3d 442, 444 (CA5 2001) (per curiam); Njong v. Whitaker, 911 F. 3d

7 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) Opinion of the Court those courts are not always careful when differe ntiating be- tween factual findings and the application of the law to those findings, sometimes applying substantial-evidence review to the entire inquiry. 4 Today we resolve the proper-standard question as it re- lates to the courts of appeals’ review of the agency’s perse- cution determination. As explained in Part III, infra, we hold that §1252(b)(4)(B) requires courts to review the en- tirety of the agency’s conclusions—both the underlying fac - tual findings and the application of the INA to those find- ings—for substantial evidence. Thus, in the language of the statute, the agency’s determi nation whether a given set of undisputed facts rises to the level of persecution under §1101(a)(42)(A) is generally “conclusive unless any reason- able adjudicator would be compel led to conclude to the con- trary.” §1252(b)(4)(B). III Though the courts of appeals apply varying standards to the agency’s persecution determination, we have already concluded that these determinations receive substantial- evidence review. Specifically, in INS v. Elias-Zaca rias, 502 U. S. 478 (1992), we held that “to obtain judicial reversal” of the agency’s persecution determination, an asylum appli- cant “must show that the evidence he presented was so com- pelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Id., at 483–484. To be sure, Congress amended the INA shortly after our decision. But those amendments—and the addition of §1252(b)(4) in par- ticular—codified the Elias-Zacari as standard. As such, the —————— 919, 922 (CA8 2018); Kaur v. Wilkinson, 986 F. 3d 1216, 1221 (CA9 2021); Mejia v. Attorney Gen., 498 F. 3d 1253, 1256 (CA11 2007). 4 See Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F. 3d 316, 328, 336 (CA2 2020); Thayalan v. Attorney Gen., 997 F. 3d 132, 137–138, n. 1 (CA3 2021); Gjetani v. Barr, 968 F. 3d 393, 396–397, an d n. 2 (CA5 2020); Brizuela v. Garland, 71 F. 4th 1087, 1093 (CA 8 2023); Sharma v. Garland, 9 F. 4th 1052, 1060 (CA9 2021); Martinez v. Attorney Gen., 992 F. 3d 1283, 1292 (CA11 2021).

8 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI Opinion of the Court statute as it reads today requires substantial-evidence re- view for the entirety of the persecution determination. A Like this case, Elias-Zacarias began with an IJ’s deter- mination that a noncitizen was ineligible for asylum. Id., at 480. Elias-Zacarias had test ified that he feared retalia- tion in his home country of Guatemala after he refused to join a group of guerillas who had attempted to recruit him. Id., at 479–480. But the IJ concluded that this testimony “failed to demonstrate persecut ion or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem- bership in a particular social group, or political opinion” as the INA requires. Id., at 480 (citing 8 U. S. C. §§1101(a)(42), 1158(a)). After the BIA affirmed, Elias-Zac- arias sought review in federal court. 502 U. S., at 480. The Court of Appeals sided with Elias-Zacarias, holding that “a guerilla organization’s attempt to conscript a person into its military forces necessa rily constitutes ‘persecution on account of ... political opinion,’ because ‘the person re- sisting forced recruitment is expressing a political opinion hostile to the persecutor.’ ” Id., at 481 (quoting Elias-Zaca- rias v. INS, 921 F. 2d 844, 850 (CA9 1990)). We reversed the Court of Appeals, however, reading the IN A to require substantial-evidence review. See 502 U. S., at 481, 483– 484. The version of the INA in place at the time of our decision did not contain what is now §1252(b)(4)(B). But it con- tained a similar provision, which specified that agency “findings of fact, if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whol e, shall be conclusive.” 8 U. S. C. §1105a(a)(4) (1988 ed.). We interpreted that provision to require substantial-evidence review of the BIA’s determination that Elias-Zacarias was ineligible for asylum. More sp ecifically, we explained that the provision set forth the substantial-evidence standard

Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 9 Opinion of the Court for review, allowing reversal “o nly if the evidence presented... was such that a reasonable factfinder would have to con- clude that the requisite fear of persecution existed.” 502 U. S., at 48 1. Though we did not explicitly use the term “substantial evidence,” our explanation accorded with how we have long understood that st andard to apply in the ad- ministrative context. See Consolidated Edison, 305 U. S., at 229 (explaining that a statute providing that an agency’s “findings . .. as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive” means “substantial evidence” and requires only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion” (internal quo- tation marks omitted)). We then went on to apply the substantial-evidence stand- ard to the entirety of the agency’s persecution determina- tion—including its conclusion that Elias-Zacarias’s testi- mony did not satisfy the legal st andard for persecution. We explained that Elias-Zacarias had failed to establish a “well-founded fear” that the guerillas would “persecute him because of ” his political opinion “with the degree of clarity necessary to permit reversal of a BIA finding to the con- trary.” 502 U. S., at 483 (internal quotation marks omit- ted). In other words, even accepting his allegations as true, they were not “so compelling t hat no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisi te fear of persecution.” Id., at 484. Elias-Zacarias thus clarified that the INA’s provision for substantial-evidence review encompassed not only the agency’s factual findings but also the application of those findings to the statutory standard for persecution. Indeed, following our decision, the courts of appeals overwhelm- ingly understood it to require substantial-evidence review of the entirety of the persecution determination. See, e. g., Klawitter v. INS, 970 F. 2d 149, 152 (CA6 1992) (“According to the Supreme Court, the Board’s determination [a noncit- izen] is not eligible for asylum must be upheld unless the

10 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI Opinion of the Court [noncitizen] shows that the evidence he or she presented was ‘so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution’ ” (quoting Elias- Zacarias, 502 U. S., at 483–484)). 5 B Just a few years after we decided Elias-Zaca rias, Con- gress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi- grant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), amending sev- eral provisions of the INA governing judicial review. §306(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3009–607. Among other things, IIRIRA added §1252(b)(4), clarifying the relevant stand- ards of review for IJ and BIA removal orders. But §1252(b)(4) did not depart from our decision in Elias-Zaca- rias. To the contrary, §1252(b)(4) stayed the course. Indeed, subparagraph (B) largely tracks our opinion in Elias-Zacarias. Compare §1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”) with 502 U. S., at 483–484 (stating that, if an asylum applicant “seeks to obtain judicial reversal of the BIA’s determination, he must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution”). Thus, §1252(b)(4)(B) effectively restates the pre-IIRIRA practice of applying the INA’s deferential standard for factual find- ings to the persecution determination. Cf. Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U. S. 69, 80 (2023) (“This Court generally as- sumes that, when Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of this Court’s relevant precedents” (internal quotation marks omitted)). —————— 5 See also Huaman-Cornelio v. BIA, 979 F. 2d 995, 999 (CA4 1992) (c it- ing Elias-Zacarias, 502 U. S., at 483–484); Chun v. INS, 40 F. 3d 76, 78 (CA5 1994) (per c uriam) (same); Milosevic v. INS, 18 F. 3d 366, 370 (CA 7 1994) (same); Yacoub v. INS, 999 F. 2d 1296, 1297 (CA8 1993) (per cu- riam) (same); Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F. 3d 902, 905 (CA9 1995) (same).

11 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) Opinion of the Court Supporting this reading of §1252(b)(4)(B) are IIRIRA’s other amendments to the INA, which tend to restrict (ra- ther than expand) review of immigration-related determi- nations in federal court. IIRIRA added, for instance, §1252(a)(2)(D), which strips courts of jurisdiction to review certain types of removal orders entirely, restoring jurisdic- tion only for “constitutional cl aims or questions of law.” IIRIRA similarly limited the scope of review under §1252(b)(4), even in the areas where courts retain their ju- risdiction over removal orders. Not only does subparagraph (B) require deference toward “administrative findings of fact,” but subparagraphs (C) and (D) mandate that certai n agency determinations are “conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law.” Against this backdrop, it would make little sense to interpret subparagraph (B) as expanding ju- dicial review beyond the pre-IIRIRA practice of applying deference to agency persecution determinations. IV Given the force of Elias-Zacarias and IIRIRA’s enact- ment history, we cannot accept petitioners’ arguments about the applicable standard of review. Petitioners pri- marily contend that Congress meant for de novo review t o apply to persecution determinations because §1252(b)(4)(B) requires deference only for “findings of fact” and no subpar- agraph of §1252(b)(4) explicit ly addresses the “mixed ques- tion of law and fact” that is the determination of past per- secution and fear of future persecution. See Brief for Petitioners 15–16. With their focus on the metaphorical trees, we think pe- titioners have missed the forest. It is certainly true that the required persecution determination turns on more than just the facts: The INA’s legal standard for “persecution” must be applied to the IJ’s findings of fact. But Elia s-Zac- arias and the subsequent statutory history suggest tha t Congress meant for the entirety of this kind of “mixed”

12 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI Opinion of the Court determination—including both the IJ’s factual findings and the application of the statute to those findings—to receive deference under §1252(b)(4)(B). That makes sense because the overall determination of refugee status primarily re- quires the IJ to make critical factual findings about a given applicant’s experiences in his country of nationality. And even where, as here, the IJ accepts the applicant’s testi- mony as true, the IJ must make an antecedent determina- tion on the factual question of the applicant’s credibilit y. See Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U. S. 357, 373 (2021) (ex- plaining that, during immigration proceedings, the IJ “makes findings of fact, including determinations as to the credibility of particular witne ss testimony”). Given that Congress has required the courts of appeals to give signifi- cant deference to IJ factfindi ng throughout §1252(b)(4), it would be anomalous indeed to conclude that courts can re- view substantially similar persecution-related findings de 6 novo. Our decisions in Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U. S. 209 (2024), and Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221 (2020), are not to the contrary. In those cases, we held that a mixed question of law and fact could qualify as a “question of law” exempt from §1252(a)’s bar on judicial review. 601 U. S., at 212; 589 U. S., at 225. But unlike §1252(b), §1252(a) does not speak to the standards of review for re- moval orders; rather, it addresses a court’s ability to review removal orders at all. As a result, whether a given issue is treated as a question of law exempt from the INA’s —————— 6 Our conclusion that §1252(b)(4)(B) applies to the persec ution deter- mination and sets fort h a deferential standard of review means we need not address petitioners’ ar gument about Loper Bright Enterprises v. Rai- mondo, 603 U. S. 369 (2024). See Brief for Petitioners 23–24 (main tain- ing that Loper Bright requires de novo review under these circum- stances). That decision is not applicable “when a pa rticular statute” mandates deferential review or othe rwise “delegates authority to an agency consistent with constitutional li mits.” 603 U. S., at 413.

13 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) Opinion of the Court jurisdiction-stripping provisions tells us nothing about the type of review the court must afford to that issue under other provisions of the statute. See Wilkinson, 601 U. S., at 222 (recognizing that the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping pro- visions do not govern the standard of review); Guerrero- Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 228 (same). Neither case, then, re- quires de novo review here. * * * Because the Court of Appeals applied the appropriate standard under §1252(b)(4)(B) when it reviewed the agency persecution determination for substantial evidence, the judgment below is affirmed. It is so ordered.