US v. Jamie Ewings - Affirmation of Sentence

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH C IRCUIT No. 25-4501 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JAMIE EWINGS, Defendant - Appella nt. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle Distric t of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thom as D. Schroeder, Distr ict Judge. (1:25- cr -001 41-TDS-1) Submitted: February 2 0, 2026 Decided: March 2, 2026 Before WILKINSON, GREGOR Y, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circ uit Judges. Affirmed by unpublish ed per curiam opini on. ON BRIEF: Eugene E. Lester, III, LESTER LAW, Greens boro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Julie Caro l Niemeier, Assista nt U nited States Attorne y, Karla E. Painter, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED ST ATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding prec edent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM: Jamie Ewings pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreemen t, to a single -co unt criminal information c harging her w ith theft of gover nment property, in violation of 1 8 U.S.C. § 641. Th e district court sentenced Ewi ngs to 13 months’ imprisonment, below h er advisory Sentencing G uidelines range of 18 to 24 months’ impriso nment. On appea l, Ewings’s counsel has f iled a brief pursuant to Anders v. Cal ifornia, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there a re no meritorious grou nds for appeal but quest ioning whether Ewings’s guilty plea was knowin g and voluntary and whether Ewings’s se ntence of imprisonment is procedurally and substa ntively reasonable. Although not ified of her right to do so, Ewings has not filed a pro se su pplemental brief. For the reasons stated b elow, we affirm. Counsel first questi ons whether Ewi ng’s guilty plea is valid. Because Ewing s did not attempt to withdraw her guilty plea or oth erwise challenge the knowing and vol untary nature thereof in the di strict court, we review the district court’s acc eptance of Ewing s’s guilty plea for plain error only. United State s v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). “Under the pla in error standard, [we] will correct an unpreserved error if (1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substanti al rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integr ity, or public reputatio n of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Harri s, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Our review of the rec ord leads us to conclude that the dist rict court conduct ed a thorough Fed. R. Cri m. P. 11 colloquy an d that Ewings’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and sup ported by an independent f actual basis. Ewings is thus not enti tled to relief from h er guilty pl ea.

3 Counsel next question s whether Ewin gs’s 13 - month s entence is pro cedurally and substantively reasonabl e. “W e review the reasonablenes s of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an abu se -of- discretion stan dard, regardless of ‘whe ther [the sentence is] inside, just outside, or s ignificantly outside the Guidelines range.’” Un ited States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4 th Cir. 2020) (alter ation in original) (quoting Gall v. Uni ted States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). In perform ing that review, we first “ evaluate procedural reasonableness, determining whether the distr ict court committed any procedural error, such as improperly ca lculating the Guidelin es range, failing to consider the § 3 553(a) factors, or failing to ad equately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. If “the district c ourt has not committed pr ocedural error,” we then assess the substantive reasonable ness of the sentence. Id. O ur substantive re asonableness review “takes into account the totality of the c ircumstances to determin e whether the sentencin g court abused its discret ion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standard s set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guideline s range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable. Such a pr esumption can o nly be rebutted by sh owing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against th e ... § 3553(a) factors.” Uni ted States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation om itted). We are satisf ied that E wings’s sentence of imprisonment is procedurally reas onable. The district court correctly calculated th e Guidelines range, thoroughly consid ered the § 3553(a) factors, provided a meaningf ul explanation for its chosen sente nce, and

4 extensively addressed defense cou nsel’s argu ments for a lower sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-51. We also conclude that nothing in the record rebuts the presum ption of substantive reasonableness afforded to Ewings’s below-Guidelines 13- month sentence of imprisonment. See Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306. The di strict court em phasized that Ewing s stole more than $200,000 from a governme nt program intended to help people in need during the COVID - 19 pandemic. The district court also stres sed the need to deter o thers from engaging in si milar theft schemes. Against the aggravating f acts of this ca se, the district court weighed the mitigating fac ts, including Ewi ngs’s family life, her lack of criminal history, her e ducation and work history, her use of some government funds to actually help others, and her agreemen t to pay restitution. After considering t he aggravating and mitiga ting facts in the context of the § 355 3(a) factors, the district court reasonably arrived at a sentence of 13 months. See United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing tha t “district courts have extr emely broad discretion whe n determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factor s”). We therefore conclude that Ewings’s sentence of imprisonment is sub stantively reasonabl e. In accordance with And ers, we have revie wed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds f or appeal. We th us affirm the dis trict court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Ewings, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of t he United States f or furth er review. If Ewing s requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolo us, then counsel may

5 move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion mus t state that a copy thereof was served on Ewings. We dispense with or al argument because the facts and legal c ontentions are adequately presented in the material s before this court and argume nt would not aid th e decisional process. AFFIRMED