US v. Simpson - Affirmation of Wire Fraud Conviction

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH C IRCUIT No. 25-4149 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. WILLIAM AMBROS E SIMPSON, II, Defendant - Appella nt. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle Distric t of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Cather ine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:24- cr -0 0141-CCE-1) Submitted: February 2 6, 2026 Decided: March 2, 2026 Before NIEMEYER and QUATTLE BAUM, Circuit Judges, and FL OYD, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublish ed per curiam opini on. ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defen der, Stacey D. Rubai n, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFI CE OF THE FED ERAL PU BLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Car olina, for Appellant. Clifton T. Barrett, Uni ted States Attorney, Julie C. Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, O FFICE OF TH E UNITED STATE S ATTORNEY, Greensb oro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding prec edent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM: William Ambrose Simpson, II, pled guilty to one count of wire frau d, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Simpson was charge d with defraudi ng the United States of over one million dollars in COVID - 19 relief funds. The district court varied downward from Simpson’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range and sentenced him to 36 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Simpson cha llenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Specifi cally, Simpson argu es that, in fashioning his sentence, the court fa iled to consider hi s nonfrivolous argu ments for a nonc ustodial sentence and that it relied too heavily on the loss amount an d the seriousness of the offense, to the exclusion of the other relevant 18 U. S.C. § 3553(a) factors. We affirm. We review a sentence for reasonablen ess, applying “a defere ntial abuse -of- discretion standard.” United States v. Mc Coy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4 th Cir. 2015) (citati on modified). In doing so, we first evaluate the sentence for any procedural errors, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range, insufficient ly considering the § 35 53(a) factors, or inadequately explaining the ch osen sentence. United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020). If the sentence is p rocedurally reasonable, we then revi ew the substantive reasona bleness of the sentenc e, considering “the tot ality of the circumstance s to determine whether the sentencing co urt abused its discreti on in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standa rds set forth in § 355 3(a).” Id. (citation modified). “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines ra nge is presumptively reasona ble, ” and the “presumption can only be rebutte d by showing that the

3 sentence is unreasonabl e when measured again st the 18 U.S.C. § 3 553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). “A district court is req uired to provide an in dividualized assessment based o n the facts before the court, and to explain adequately the sentence i mposed to allow for meaningful appellate r eview and to promote the perceptio n of fair sentencing.” United States v. Lewis, 958 F. 3d 240, 243 (4t h Cir. 2020) (c itation modifi ed). “As part of this individualized assessm ent, the distr ict court must ad dress or consi der all non -frivolous reasons presented for imposing a different sentence and explain wh y it has rejected those arguments.” United St ates v. Fowler, 58 F.4t h 142, 153 (4th Cir. 2023) (citation modifie d). So long as the district court “has fully a ddressed the defendant ’ s central thesis durin g sentencing, it need not address separ ately eac h supporting data point marshalled” on the defendant’ s behalf. Id. (citation modified). Measured against th is standard, we conclude that the di strict court adequately addressed Simpson’s nonfrivolo us argument s for a lower sentence. First, the cour t concluded t hat, in co nsidering the § 3553(a) factors, the “mitigating fa ctors, of which there [were] many” did not “outweigh the need to emphasize the seriousness of the offense, an d. . . need for specific deterrence.” (J.A. 85). Moreover, the court en gaged with Simpson ’s arguments for a nonc ustodial sentence an d acknowledged the mitigating factors tha t Simpson’s counsel o utlined. Simps on’s central thesis at sentencin g was that his personal characteristics and history — inclu ding his education, militar y service, family obliga tions, as well as the fact that some of the funds were used f or legitimate pur poses — warranted a greater downward var iance. The court dir ectly addressed Sim pson’s request for a

4 probationary se ntence, specific ally considering Simpson’s lack of criminal history, ag e, education, and military service, but fou nd that the serious nature and circumstances of the fraud weighed against a probationar y sentence. The court hig hlighted that Simpson use d funds for persona l gain and that his conduct was not a one - time offense. From t he give-and- take exchange at the sentencing h earing, coupled with the court’s explicit acknowledgement of t he many mitigating factors, the full context of the hearing suppor ts a finding that t he cour t adequately conside red Simpson’s nonfrivolous arg uments for a lower sentence. We further conclude that not hing in the record rebuts the presumption of substantive reasona bleness accorded Simp son’s below-Guideline s-range sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the f acts and legal co ntentions are adequately presented in the mater ials before this court and ar gument would not aid the decisional proces s. AFFIRMED