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March 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Rihanna Buddi

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-5953
• Panel: Jane Branstetter Stranch, John Kenneth Bush, Chad Andrew Readler

• Judges: Jane Branstetter Stranch; John K. Bush; Chad A. Readler

• Opinion

• Authorities (41)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.7K)

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Combined Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0059p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
│
Plaintiff-Appellee, │

   No. 24-5953

│
v. │
│
RIHANNA BUDDI, │
Defendant-Appellant. │
┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Greeneville.
No. 2:24-cr-00018-1—Clifton Leland Corker, District Judge.

Argued: December 11, 2025

Decided and Filed: March 2, 2026

Before: STRANCH, BUSH, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

---

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Conrad Benjamin Kahn, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN
TENNESSEE, INC., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Conrad
Benjamin Kahn, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC.,
Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

---

OPINION

---

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Rihanna Buddi pleaded guilty to failure to register
as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 2

In advance of sentencing, and over Buddi’s objection, the district court classified her as a Tier II
sex offender under SORNA. She was sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment, followed by
twenty years of supervised release, which was fifteen years over the applicable advisory
Guidelines range of five years flat. Because we find that Buddi is a Tier I offender under
SORNA and that the district court erred procedurally in imposing her twenty-year term of
supervised release, we REVERSE the district court’s ruling on Buddi’s objection regarding her
SORNA classification, VACATE her supervised release sentence, and REMAND for
resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts relating to the underlying conduct in this case are undisputed. In 2017, Buddi
was convicted under Florida state law of lewd and lascivious battery and transmission of harmful
materials to a minor. In December 2023, she relocated from Florida to Bulls Gap, Tennessee,
and, as she stipulated, “knowingly failed to register as a sex offender in Tennessee and
knowingly failed to properly notify Florida of her move to Tennessee in accordance with
SORNA.” R. 12, Factual Basis, PageID 24–25. Buddi pleaded guilty to failure to register as a
sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (a).

The PSR classified Buddi as a Tier II sex offender based on her conviction for lewd and
lascivious battery and, accordingly, calculated her base offense level as 14; this led to a
Guidelines range of 21–27 months of imprisonment. The PSR also calculated the Guidelines
range for Buddi’s supervised release term as a flat five years. Buddi filed an objection to the
SORNA classification, contending in relevant part that Florida lewd and lascivious battery does
not have a comparable mens rea requirement to 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (b), meaning that she should be
treated as a Tier I sex offender with a resulting base offense level of 12. In a Memorandum
Opinion and Order issued on the day of Buddi’s sentencing hearing, the district court overruled
her objection. The district court ultimately sentenced Buddi to 24 months of imprisonment,
followed by twenty years of supervised release.
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 3

II. ANALYSIS

Buddi contends the district court erred in sentencing her as a Tier II sex offender and,
separately, that it erred procedurally in imposing the twenty-year term of supervised release.

We pause to note that, while this appeal was pending, Buddi completed her sentence of
imprisonment and has now begun her sentence of supervised release. When a defendant is
released from prison, that release does not moot an appeal related to her custodial sentence if the
district court would have discretion to reduce her sentence of supervised release on remand. See
United States v. Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d 345, 355 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Genschow,
645 F.3d 803, 813 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Maken, 510 F.3d 654, 656 n.3 (6th Cir.
2007). Thus, because Buddi’s appeal of the district court’s ruling on her SORNA tier
classification “potentially implicates the length of [her] supervised release term,” Maken, 510
F.3d at 656 n.3 (citation modified), her appeal of the SORNA issue is not moot.

A. SORNA Classification

SORNA imposes registration requirements on convicted sex offenders. See 34 U.S.C.
§ 20913 (a). Failure to register, or update one’s registration, under SORNA is a crime punishable
by up to ten years of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (a). SORNA also provides a three-tier
system for classifying sex offenses, in which offenses generally progress in severity from Tier I
to Tier III. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911 (2)–(4). When a person is convicted for failing to register
under SORNA in violation of § 2250(a), the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range for a
violation of § 2250(a) varies based on the defendant’s “tier” classification.

Under the tier classification system, offenders who do not qualify as Tier II or III default
to Tier I. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911 (2). To trigger Tier II or III status, an offender’s qualifying
offense must be punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. See § 20911(3)–(4).
SORNA defines Tiers II and III primarily by reference to specific federal sex crimes named and
cited in the statute: if the crime of which an offender is convicted “is comparable to or more
severe than” a Tier II comparator, the offender is a Tier II sex offender under SORNA; if the
crime “is comparable to or more severe than” a Tier III comparator, the offender is Tier III. Id.
If a qualifying offense is not “comparable to or more severe than” those offenses listed for Tier II
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 4

or III, it may still qualify for heightened tier status if it involves certain aggravating factors—for
instance, an offender is Tier II if their qualifying offense involves “(i) use of a minor in a sexual
performance; (ii) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution; or (iii) production or distribution
of child pornography.” § 20911(3)(B). Finally, if a Tier I or II offender commits another sex
crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, that elevates their status to the next
tier. See § 20911(3)(C), (4)(C).

In United States v. Barcus, we adopted the “categorical approach” to evaluating when
state-law sex crimes trigger heightened tier status under SORNA. See 892 F.3d 228, 231–32 (6th
Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118, 1130–35 (10th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Morales, 801 F.3d 1, 6 (1st
Cir. 2015)) (“To answer whether Tennessee aggravated sexual battery is a Tier III sex offense,
we join other circuits in applying the categorical approach.”). Under the categorical approach, a
court must compare “what the state law offense requires—not what an individual defendant
did—to” the relevant federal offense listed for Tier II or III in SORNA. Barcus, 892 F.3d at 232.

At issue here is whether the district court erred by treating Buddi as a Tier II sex offender
based on her conviction for lewd and lascivious battery under Florida state law, rather than as a
Tier I sex offender, when it sentenced her for failing to update her sex offender registration.
Under the categorical approach, this issue turns on whether Florida lewd and lascivious battery is
“comparable to or more severe than” the relevant Tier II-qualifying crime, which the parties
agree is “coercion and enticement” under 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (b). The district court’s legal
conclusions regarding the relevant statutes and Buddi’s SORNA status are subject to de novo
review1; its imposition of Buddi’s sentence, which here involved Guidelines calculations based
on those legal conclusions, is subject to review for procedural and substantive reasonableness.
See United States v. Xu, 114 F.4th 829, 844–45 (6th Cir. 2024).

1The Government contends plain error applies instead of de novo review because Buddi failed to make
precisely the same argument in her objection to the PSR that she now makes on appeal. Yet “[a]s long as a claim or
issue was raised before the district court, a party may formulate any argument they like in support of that claim on
appeal.” Berry v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 115 F.4th 528, 541 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). Buddi filed a
written objection to the PSR’s classification of her as a Tier II offender on the ground that, under the categorical
approach, § 2422(b) is narrower than Florida lewd and lascivious battery because it contains a higher mens rea
requirement; she raises the same issue and advances essentially the same argument on appeal, with added rigor and
precision. Thus, de novo review applies.
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 5

1. The Statutes at Issue

Under the categorical approach, we compare the relevant crimes—Florida lewd and
lascivious battery and federal coercion and enticement—according to their statutory definitions;
the circumstances of Buddi’s individual offense conduct are irrelevant. See Barcus, 892 F.3d at
232. If “the elements of [the state offense] are the same . . . or are defined more narrowly” than
those of the federal offense, id., the state offense is considered “comparable to or more severe
than” the federal offense under SORNA, § 20911(3)–(4), and thus qualifies for heightened tier
status. On the other hand, if the elements of the state offense “sweep more broadly than” those
of the federal offense, such that a person could be guilty of the state offense but not the federal
offense, a conviction for the state offense does not trigger heightened tier status under SORNA.
Barcus, 892 F.3d at 232 (citation modified).

Florida law defines the offense of lewd and lascivious battery as “[e]ngaging in sexual
activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age” or “[e]ncouraging,
forcing, or enticing any person less than 16 years of age to engage in sadomasochistic abuse,
sexual bestiality, prostitution, or any other act involving sexual activity.” Fla. Stat.
§ 800.04 (4)(a). Some courts have described this offense as a strict liability crime, akin to
statutory rape. See United States v. Harris, 608 F.3d 1222, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2010); Leger v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 101 F.4th 1295, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 2024); State v. Sorakrai, 543 So. 2d 294,
295 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). It has also been described as a general intent crime, in the sense
that the perpetrator must have intended to engage in the prohibited sexual conduct. See
Straitwell v. State, 834 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). There is no dispute, however,
that a person need not have known the minor’s age to be guilty of Florida lewd and lascivious
battery, as a neighboring provision of Section 800.04 provides that that “[t]he perpetrator’s
ignorance of the victim’s age, the victim’s misrepresentation of his or her age, or the
perpetrator’s bona fide belief of the victim’s age cannot be raised as a defense in a prosecution
under this section.” Fla. Stat. § 800.04 (3).

The federal offense of coercion and enticement is defined as follows:

Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign
commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 6

States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has
not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so,
shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.

18 U.S.C. § 2422 (b). This statute has a clear mens rea term, “knowingly,” but the parties
disagree on the scope of its application. Buddi contends “knowingly” applies to the element of
the minor’s age (“any individual who has not yet reached the age of 18 years”), meaning that an
individual must know that the object of their “persua[sion], induce[ment], entice[ment], or
coerc[ion]” is a minor to violate § 2422(b). The Government disagrees, arguing that § 2422(b)
does not require knowledge of the victim’s minor status.

1. Whether § 2422(b) Requires Knowledge of the Victim’s Age

The statute begins with a jurisdictional hook, “[w]hoever, using the mail or any facility or
means of interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (b). It then provides a series of
crucial components, in this order: (1) an adverb and mens rea term, “knowingly”; (2) a series of
transitive verbs that describe the offender’s affirmative conduct, “persuades, induces, entices, or
coerces”; (3) a direct object of that conduct, “any individual who has not attained the age of 18
years”; and (4) an infinitive clause functioning as an object complement, “to engage in
prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.”
Id. The parties disagree on how many subsequent components “knowingly” reaches. The
Government contends it reaches only the verbs (component 2 above), while Buddi argues it
“modifies the entire action” (components 2 through 4). The parties do not dispute the meanings
of the remaining portions of the statute, which provide the attempt offense (“or attempts to do
so”) and the punishment (“shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or
for life”). § 2422(b).

The plain text supports Buddi’s interpretation. “In ordinary English, where a transitive
verb has an object, listeners in most contexts assume that an adverb (such as knowingly) that
modifies the transitive verb tells the listener how the subject performed the entire action,
including the object as set forth in the sentence.” Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S.
646, 650 (2009). For instance, “[i]f we say that someone knowingly ate a sandwich with cheese,
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 7

we normally assume that the person knew both that he was eating a sandwich and that it
contained cheese.” Id. at 651. This observation supports the interpretation that “knowingly” in
§ 2422(b) not only modifies the transitive verbs but “tells the listener how the subject [the
offender] performed the entire action.” Id. at 650. It is difficult to understand how “knowingly”
could modify a transitive verb like “persuades, induces, entices, or coerces” without also
modifying the grammatical object, an “individual who has not attained the age of 18 years.”
§ 2422(b). How could a person knowingly entice without knowing the object of her enticement
or, indeed, what she is enticing that person to do? In Flores-Figueroa, the Supreme Court held
that a statute defining aggravated identity theft as “knowingly transfer[ring], possess[ing], or
us[ing], without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person” required the
offender to know the identification “in fact” belonged to another person. 556 U.S. at 647
(emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)).

Flores-Figueroa explained that this result is consistent not only with ordinary use but
with courts’ construction of similar statues: “courts ordinarily read a phrase in a criminal statute
that introduces the elements of a crime with the word ‘knowingly’ as applying that word to each
element.” 556 U.S. at 652 (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); United States
v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 79 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring)). In Liparota, the
Court construed a statute criminalizing food stamp fraud, “[w]hoever knowingly uses, transfers,
acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by
[law],” as requiring knowledge that the manner was “not authorized by [law].” 471 U.S. at 420,
433 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024 (b)(1)). X-Citement Video held the adverb “knowingly” reached
the element of a victim’s minor status when the statute criminalized “[a]ny person who—
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any means including by
computer or mails, any visual depiction, if—(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves
the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 513 U.S. at 68, 72 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252). The rule Flores-Figueroa articulates in reference to these examples—that “knowingly”
should “ordinarily” be construed as “applying that word to each element”—is a broad
interpretive principle. 556 U.S. at 652. It is not limited, for instance, to the relationship between
a transitive verb and its direct object, nor even to a particular subsection of a statute, as Flores-
Figueroa explained that X-Citement Video held that “knowingly” reached “the use of a minor”
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 8

even though it “was not the direct object of the verbs modified by ‘knowingly’” and “it appeared
in a different subsection.” 556 U.S. at 652–63 (citing X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68–69).
These precedents support reading § 2422(b) as requiring knowledge of the minor’s age.

Following X-Citement Video, a pair of decisions from our sister circuits adopted this
same interpretation. See United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 718 (9th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Coté, 504 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 2007). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Meek, “[f]ollowing
our canons of statutory interpretation, it is apparent that the term ‘knowingly’ refers both to the
verbs—‘persuades, induces, entices, or coerces’—as well as to the object—‘a person who has
not achieved the age of 18 years.’” 366 F.3d at 718. Meek and Coté concerned convictions for
the attempt part of § 2422(b) (“or attempts to do so”), both following sting operations in which
law enforcement agents posed as minors in online communications with Meek and Coté. See
Meek, 366 F.3d at 709–11; Coté, 504 F.3d at 683–84. In this context, the knowledge mens rea
applied to the minor’s age in that Meek and Coté committed the attempt offense when they
coerced or enticed a person whom they believed to be a minor. See Meek, 366 F.3d at 722; Coté,
504 F.3d at 688.2 Coté also reaches beyond the attempt context because, in addition to
challenging his conviction for the attempt offense, Coté brought a facial challenge to the statute,
“contend[ing] that Section 2422(b) is unconstitutional on its face because the statute does not
contain a scienter requirement with respect to the age of the victim.” 504 F.3d at 684. The
Seventh Circuit, observing “that the approach of our colleagues in the Ninth Circuit in Meek is
compatible with the approach of the Supreme Court in X-Citement Video,” held “that Section
2422(b) is not unconstitutional on its face and that, in order to ensure the requisite criminal
intent, the statute should instead be interpreted to require proof of the defendant’s knowledge of
the age of the victim.” Id. at 686.

The Government objects that a neighboring statute criminalizing the sex trafficking of
children, 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (a), has been interpreted consistently to not require knowledge of a
minor’s age. That statute criminalizes “knowingly transport[ing] an individual who has not

2 In another appeal of a § 2422(b) attempt conviction, United States v. Hart, we stated that, “[t]o convict
Hart under 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (b), the jury had to unanimously agree . . . that Hart believed [the victim] was less than
18.” 635 F.3d 850, 855 (6th Cir. 2011). Unlike in Meek and Coté, though, Hart’s appeal did not challenge the scope
of the knowledge mens rea. See id. at 854.
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 9

attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent that the individual
engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a
criminal offense,” id., and courts of appeals, including ours, have uniformly held it does not
require knowledge of a victim’s minor status. See United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399, 410
(6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Jones,
471 F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir. 2002);
United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4,
20 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Tyson, 947 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v.
Moreira-Bravo, 56 F.4th 568, 570 (8th Cir. 2022); United States v. Lacy, 904 F.3d 889, 898
(10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Morgan, 45 F.4th 192, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2022).

Yet while there is widespread consensus that the child sex trafficking statute, § 2423(a),
does not require knowledge of the victim’s minor status, few circuits have weighed in on
whether, or if so how, this construction of § 2423(a) should inform coercion and enticement
under § 2422(b). When the Ninth Circuit decided Meek, it made no mention of § 2423(a) or its
prior holding in Taylor, 239 F.3d at 997, that § 2423(a) does not require knowledge of the
victim’s age. See generally 366 F.3d 705. When the Seventh Circuit reached the consensus
interpretation of § 2423(a) in Cox, after it had already held in Coté that § 2422(b) does require
knowledge of the victim’s age, it made no mention of Coté or § 2422(b). See generally 504 F.3d
682. But two other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, have reached the
opposite interpretation of § 2422(b), holding that coercion and enticement does not require
knowledge of the victim’s age—and in doing so, each relied heavily on the comparison to the
child sex trafficking statute, § 2423(a). See United States v. Daniels, 685 F.3d 1237, 1248–49
(11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); United States v. Banker, 876 F.3d 530, 537–38 (4th Cir. 2017).
As the Fourth Circuit put it in Banker,

These are adjacent statutes, both part of the amended Mann Act, and use the same
syntax prohibiting individuals from ‘knowingly [engaging in proscribed behavior
toward] an[] individual who has attained the age of 18 years.’ Thus, absent an
indication that we should do otherwise, the Court should interpret these states in
pari materia, that is, in a consistent manner.
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 10

876 F.3d 537–38 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). The Government’s
argument here relies on the same reasoning.

There are, however, meaningful distinctions between § 2422(b) and § 2423(a). First,
recall the structure of the coercion and enticement offense, § 2422(b): it begins with a
jurisdictional hook, then names a single mens rea, “knowingly,” and then provides the key
elements of the criminal conduct at hand. This structure makes it possible to read § 2422(b) in
the way Flores-Figueroa suggests, with “a phrase . . . that introduces the elements of a crime
with the word ‘knowingly’ as applying that word to each element” that follows it. 556 U.S. at
652. Not so with § 2423(a), because that statute incorporates two distinct mental states.
Subsequent to its use of “knowingly,” § 2423(a) pauses its recital of the elements of the offense
to introduce a second mens rea—intent—that applies to the result of the conduct: “with intent
that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be
charged with a criminal offense.” Unlike § 2422(b), then, the text of § 2423(a) is not consistent
with the statutory pattern Flores-Figueroa contemplates. See 556 U.S. at 650–52.

Another crucial factor distinguishing the coercion and enticement offense at issue here
from child sex trafficking under § 2423(a) is that the victim’s age is often the only thing that
makes § 2422(b) conduct criminal. “[W]ith few exceptions, the inducement of a person over the
age of 17 into sexual activity is generally not illegal,” Meeks, 366 F.3d at 721–22; the victim’s
age is often the only thing separating conduct punishable under § 2422(b) from, say, messages
exchanged on dating apps between consenting adults. In § 2423(a), however, the minor’s age is
not what makes the conduct criminal—it is what triggers an increased criminal penalty as
compared to another provision of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, which criminalizes the sex
trafficking of adults. When we held that § 2423(a) does not require knowledge of the victim’s
age, we emphasized this relationship to § 2421: “age in § 2423(a) is not a factor that
distinguishes criminal behavior from innocent conduct, but rather serves to justify a harsher
penalty when a victim is underage.” Daniels, 653 F.3d at 410 (citation modified). In this
respect, § 2422(b) has more in common with the statute at issue in X-Citement Video, § 2252,
where “the age of the performers [was] the crucial element separating legal innocence from
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 11

wrongful conduct.” 513 U.S. at 73; see also Lacy, 904 F.3d at 897 (distinguishing X-Citement
Video from § 2423(a) on the same basis).

That the minor’s age is often the only fact to render § 2422(b) conduct illegal also sounds
in the presumption in favor of scienter, which presumes a scienter requirement “should apply to
each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” X-Citement Video,
513 U.S. at 71–72 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255, 260 (1952); Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994)).

The Supreme Court recently invoked this rule of construction in Rehaif v. United States, a
2019 decision that postdates the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Daniels and the Fourth Circuit’s
in Banker. See 588 U.S. 225, 228–29 (2019). The defendant in Rehaif was convicted under two
related statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(5)(A), which prohibits “an alien [who] is illegally or
unlawfully in the United States” from possessing a firearm; and § 924(a)(2), which provided at
the time that anyone who “knowingly violates” the provisions of § 922(g) faced a fine or up to
ten years of imprisonment.3 See id. at 227–28. Rehaif held “that the word ‘knowingly’ applies
both to the defendant’s conduct and the defendant’s status,” such that the Government “must
show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant
status when he possessed it.” Id. at 227. Under the relevant statutes, the Court explained, “the
defendant’s status is the ‘crucial element’ separating innocent from wrongful conduct,” which
“assures us that the presumption in favor of scienter applies.” Id. at 233 (quoting X-Citement
Video, 513 U.S. at 73). Rehaif also distinguished cases where the presumption applies from
those “involving statutory provisions that form part of a ‘regulatory’ or ‘public welfare’ program
and carry only minor penalties,” noting that the provisions under which Rehaif was convicted
“are not part of a regulatory or public welfare program” and “carry a potential penalty of 10
years in prison.” Id. at 232. This context suggests that § 2422(b), which criminalizes conduct
based on the minor’s status and carries a minimum term of ten years of imprisonment, requires
knowledge of that “‘crucial element’ separating innocent from wrongful conduct.” Id. at 233
(quoting X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 73).

3The statute now provides a maximum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924 (a)(8).
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 12

The Government offers a few additional arguments against this conclusion, all of which
are unconvincing. First, it contends the victim’s age is not the only thing that makes otherwise
innocent conduct illegal because § 2422(b) criminalizes coercing or enticing the victim to engage
in prostitution or “any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal
offense.” § 2422(b) (emphasis added). This argument ignores that, in many cases, the sexual
activity in question would be something “for which any person can be charged with a criminal
offense” simply because sex with a minor is statutory rape. As we explained in United States v.
Hart, Congress “made a clear choice in 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (b) to criminalize persuasion and the
attempt to persuade, not the performance of the sexual acts themselves,” such that the
“underlying sexual activities” associated with that persuasion must be illegal as defined by state
law. 635 F.3d at 854 (citation modified). So as long as there is a relevant statutory rape offense
in a state’s law, the victim’s minor status is all that is needed to make the would-be sexual
activity criminal.

Second, the Government suggests that a common-law tradition of “strict-liability age
elements in child sex crimes,” Moreira-Bravo, 56 F.4th at 573, counsels that knowledge does not
apply to the age element of § 2422(b). It points to precedents excepting “sex offenses, such as
rape,” from the presumption of scienter, see Morissette, 342 U.S.at 251 n.8, because “if anyone
does this wrong act he does it at the risk of the girl turning out to be [underaged],” R v. Prince,
(1875) 13 Cox C.C. 138 (AC) at 142 (Eng.). But as we have already explained, the minor’s age
is often the only thing that makes § 2422(b) conduct illegal, so it cannot be described as already
wrongful conduct that becomes more blameworthy based on age. The Government further
argues that the purpose of § 2422(b) suggests strict liability as to the victim’s age, because
Congress enacted the current version of the statute “to protect children from sexual abuse and
exploitation,” Pub. L. No. 105-314, 112 Stat. 2974, 2974 (1998). While such language is a clear
expression of Congress’s purpose, that purpose does not compel the Government’s interpretation
of the statutory text over Buddi’s, especially when either interpretation would serve to protect
children and other issues of construction, such as the presumption in favor of scienter, are at
play. Both of these arguments (regarding common-law approaches to rape statutes and
Congress’s purpose) also fail to account for the Supreme Court’s holding in X-Citement Video,
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 13

which applied “knowingly” to the element of minor status in a statute that criminalized the
sexual exploitation of children. See 513 U.S. at 78.

The Government argues in the alternative that, even assuming § 2422(b) requires
knowledge of a victim’s age, Florida lewd and lascivious battery is still comparable under
SORNA. The Government urges that “[c]oercing or enticing a person who is actually under 16
years of age to commit illicit sexual activity is not any different than coercing or enticing a
person whom one believes to be under 18 to commit such activity. In both cases, the perpetrator
is targeting an obviously young individual.” Appellee’s Br. 25–26. This argument is
unpersuasive. Child sex offenses do not criminalize conduct toward “obviously young”
people—they criminalize conduct directed toward minors, sometimes (as with Florida lewd and
lascivious battery) minors of specific ages. This argument is also plainly inconsistent with the
Florida legislature’s express contemplation of “ignorance of the victim’s age,”
“misrepresentation,” and “bona fide [mistaken] belief” as possibilities—and its provision that a
person may be guilty even if one of those circumstances applies. See Fla. Stat. § 800.04 (3). It is
a fundamental principle of criminal law that distinctions among culpable mental states are
meaningful; this is no less true in the highly sensitive and difficult area of criminal law this case
presents.

We hold that § 2422(b) requires knowledge of a victim’s minor status and, as a result,
that Florida lewd and lascivious battery is not a comparable offense to § 2422(b) under the
categorical approach. See Barcus, 892 F.3d at 232. Buddi is therefore a Tier I sex offender
under SORNA.

B. Supervised Release Sentence

“Procedural reasonableness requires the district court to properly calculate the Guidelines
range, treat that range as advisory, consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a), refrain
from considering impermissible factors, select the sentence based on facts that are not clearly
erroneous, and adequately explain why it chose the sentence.” United States v. Morris, 71 F.4th
475, 481 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). Buddi argues her twenty-year supervised release
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 14

sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court miscalculated, or otherwise
misunderstood, the applicable Guidelines range.

Sentencing courts have an affirmative responsibility to understand applicable Sentencing
Guidelines ranges. As the Supreme Court has put it, “[f]ederal courts understand that they
‘must begin their analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant of them throughout the
sentencing process.’” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 198 (2016) (quoting
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541 (2013)). The Guidelines provide the necessary tools
to “anchor both the district court’s discretion and the appellate review process.” Peugh, 569 U.S.
at 549. “Even if the sentencing judge sees a reason to vary from the Guidelines, ‘if the judge
uses the sentencing range as the beginning point to explain the decision to deviate from it, then
the Guidelines are in a real sense the basis for the sentence.’” Id. at 542 (quoting Freeman v.
United States, 564 U.S. 522, 529 (2011)). As a result, when a district court begins with an
incorrect Guidelines calculation, that error is often enough to taint the rest of the sentencing. See
id.; Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. at 199 (“The Guidelines’ central role in sentencing means that an
error related to the Guidelines can be particularly serious.”).

Here, the parties agree that the advisory Guidelines range for Buddi’s supervised release
sentence was a flat five years. They also agree that the PSR correctly calculated the Guidelines
range as a flat five years. But Buddi was sentenced to 20 years—four times the applicable
Guidelines range. She contends this sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district
court referred at sentencing to the statutory range, which was five years to life, and treated that as
if it were the Guidelines range. Buddi points first to the beginning of the sentencing hearing,
when the district court recounted her offense level and criminal history calculations, then stated,
“that produces an advisory [G]uideline range of 21 to 27 months of imprisonment, five years to
life on supervised release, and a fine range between $5,500 and $55,000 and a special assessment
of $100.” R. 51, Sentencing Tr., PageID 352 (emphasis added).

There is some ambiguity as to what standard of review should apply to this issue because
Buddi may not have properly preserved an objection regarding the district court’s calculation of
the Guidelines range for her supervised release term. After the district court recited the ranges
above, it asked whether “there [are] any objections to those findings,” and defense counsel
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 15

replied, “no, your honor, other than the previous ones we’ve lodged about the tiers” (referring to
Buddi’s SORNA classification). Id. Once the district court announced the twenty-year
supervised release sentence and again invited counsel to state any objections, however, defense
counsel stated, “we would object to the 20 years of supervised release as substantially and
procedurally unreasonable.” Id. at PageID 374. If Buddi forfeited her objection, plain error
review applies; if she preserved it, abuse of discretion applies. See United States v. Gardner,
32 F.4th 504, 529 (6th Cir. 2022).

Regardless of the sufficiency of counsel’s objection, though, the standard of review does
not drive the outcome here, because sentencing a defendant under incorrect Guidelines often
warrants relief under either plain error or abuse of discretion review. To prevail on plain error
review, a defendant “must show (1) an error, (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected his
substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Sears, 32 F.4th 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation
modified). As the Supreme Court explained in Molina-Martinez, “[w]hen a defendant is
sentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—whether or not the defendant’s ultimate sentence
falls within the correct range—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a
reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error.” 578 U.S. at 198. And in
Rosales-Mireles v. United States, the Court held that a plain Guidelines error “particularly
undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings . . . because of the
role the district court plays in calculating the range and the relative ease of correcting the error.”
585 U.S. 129, 140 (2018). We have therefore instructed, citing Molina-Martinez and Rosales-
Mireles, that the third and fourth prongs of plain error review “typically favor correcting
Guidelines errors.” United States v. Montgomery, 998 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 2021).

The district court’s opening summary of the applicable Guidelines ranges provides clear,
affirmative evidence of a misunderstanding regarding the applicable Guidelines range for
Buddi’s supervised release term. Here is that summary again, with a bit more context:

[T]his is what I’m going to calculate her advisory [G]uideline range to be. She is
total offense level [] 12. She has 8 criminal history points, which puts her in
category IV. And that produces an advisory [G]uideline range of 21 to 27 months
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 16

of imprisonment, five years to life on supervised release, and a fine range between
$5,500 and $55,000 and a special assessment of $100.

R. 51, PageID 352. Everything about this excerpt suggests the district court understood “five
years to life” to be the Guidelines range, not the statutory range. First, the court introduced the
topic, “I’m going to calculate her advisory [G]uideline range.” Then, it reviewed Buddi’s
offense level and criminal history scores—measures that pertain to a defendant’s individual
Guideline ranges, not generally applicable statutory ranges. Finally, “five years to life on
supervised release” is sandwiched between two other ranges that the district court certainly
would have understood to be Guidelines ranges: “21 to 27 months of imprisonment” and “a fine
range between $5,500 and $55,000.” All these signs suggest that the Guidelines range was
misstated as five years to life. The record reflects that, for the remainder of the sentencing, the
district court never corrected this error or even revisited the topic of the Guidelines range for
Buddi’s supervised release sentence.

A fuller view of Buddi’s sentencing, including the term of imprisonment, further supports
her position on this issue. When the district court imposed Buddi’s sentence of imprisonment, it
engaged in an extended, substantive discussion of the 21-to-27-month Guidelines range and its
procedural implications and, ultimately, explained its reasoning that the most appropriate
outcome based on the sentencing factors was to “split the difference” with an exact middle-of-
the-Guidelines sentence of 24 months. R. 51, PageID 359–67. In light of the court’s well-
reasoned and thorough explanation for imposing this middle-of-the-Guidelines sentence of
imprisonment, it defies credulity to think that the court knowingly imposed a supervised release
sentence fifteen years over the Guidelines range with no acknowledgement of or explanation for
that decision.

The Government offers a few arguments in response, all of which are unavailing. It
characterizes the district court’s recitation of “five years to life on supervised release” as “one
comment from the sentencing hearing [taken] out of context.” Appellee’s Br. 29. Yet “one
comment” in this context can be awfully significant, especially when it suggests a court has
neglected to “begin [its] analysis with the [correct] Guidelines.” Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. at
198 (citation modified). The Government also urges that the district court formally adopted the
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 17

PSR, and its calculations of Buddi’s Guidelines ranges were correct. But PSRs contain many
details that inform sentencing, and district courts do not produce PSRs. A PSR’s correct
calculation of the Guidelines cannot be a basis to presume the district court “remain[ed]
cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process.” Peugh, 569 U.S. at 541. Third, the
Government notes that the district court did consider a five-year term later in the sentencing
when, having pronounced Buddi’s sentence of imprisonment, it turned to supervised release,
stating, “the term of supervised release is an issue that is very important to the court. And your
attorney has indicated that five years is sufficient. In my estimation five years is not sufficient.”
R. 51, PageID 368. But these comments do not demonstrate a clear understanding that the
Guidelines range was five years—they are instead consistent with the district court responding as
if defense counsel was advocating a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence.

Finally, the Government argues that “even if the court had miscalculated Buddi’s
supervised-release Guidelines range,” “that error did not affect [her] substantial rights” because
the district court based the twenty-year term on the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Appellee’s Br.
30. In support of this argument, the Government cites United States v. Tobias, where we held
that a district court’s failure to calculate a Guidelines range “did not affect Tobias’s substantial
rights because his sentence was not based on the Guidelines range.” 101 F.4th 473, 483 (6th Cir.
2024). But the sentence in Tobias was based on a mandatory minimum. Id. at 479. The district
court there sentenced Tobias to a mandatory-minimum sentence of 120 months and omitted a
Guidelines calculation altogether. See id. On appeal, we concluded that the district court “clearly
erred” by failing to calculate a Guidelines range, but we nonetheless affirmed the sentence
because the failure to perform a Guidelines calculation could not have affected Tobias’s
substantial rights (and thus failed to satisfy plain error review) when the mandatory minimum
sentence was the lowest sentence possible. See id. at 481–83. Tobias emphasized that such a
sentence “can be affirmed . . . only in . . . limited circumstances.” Id. at 482. Such
circumstances do not apply here.

At bottom, the record shows that the district court operated under a misunderstanding of
the applicable Guidelines range for Buddi’s supervised release sentence, which ultimately
resulted in a sentence that was four times greater than the Guidelines range of five years flat. We
No. 24-5953 United States v. Buddi Page 18

hold that the district court erred procedurally in imposing Buddi’s twenty-year term of
supervised release. This error warrants vacating and remanding for resentencing, regardless of
whether plain error or abuse of discretion applies. See Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. at 198–99;
Rosales-Mireles, 585 U.S. at 140; Montgomery, 998 F.3d at 700.

Buddi also contends that the district court erred procedurally by relying on an
impermissible factor—“the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,”
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(2)(A)—when it imposed her sentence of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583 (c); Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 188 (2025).4 We need not decide this issue,
however, having already found procedural error in the imposition of Buddi’s twenty-year
supervised release sentence, and we decline to do so here.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s ruling on Buddi’s objection
regarding her SORNA classification and VACATE her supervised release sentence. This case is
REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

4The Supreme Court recently discussed this constraint in Esteras, which offers guidance on how sentencing
courts should avoid relying on § 3553(a)(2)(A), notwithstanding that they may consider the “nature and
circumstances of the offense,” § 3553(a)(1), in other capacities. See 606 U.S. at 200.