Corona-Montano v. United States - Alien Transport Sentencing Appeal

United Sta tes Court of Appeals f or the Fifth Circuit ________ ____ No. 25 - 50033 ________ ____ United States of America, Plainti ff — Appellee, versus Luis Fr ancis co Cor ona - Mon tan o, Defendant — Appell ant. ________ ____ ___ _____ _______ ___ Appea l fr om the United State s District Co urt for the Western District of Te xas USDC N o. 3:2 4 - CR -1170 -1 ________ ____ ___ _____ _______ ___ Before C lemen t, D ougl as, a nd Ram irez, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: Appellan t Luis F ranciso Co rona - Montano was s entenced t o 71 month s of imprisonmen t for conspir acy to trans port alien s and transportin g aliens, in cluding a se ntencing enhancemen t for transpo rting an unaccomp anied minor. Corona - Mo nta no urges our court to fin d that the district cou rt erre d in applying the senten cing enhanceme nt because he d id not know ingly tran sport an un accompanied min or. Holding th at the Senten cing Guide lines do not imp ose a scien ter requ irement for th e transp ortat ion of a minor, we hereby A FFI RM the dis trict court’ s orde r imposing Corona - Mon tano’s s entence. United S tates Court of A ppeals Fifth Circuit FILED March 2, 2026 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 25-50033 Document: 73-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/02/2026

No. 25 - 50033 2 I In June of 2025, Ap pel lant Luis Fra ncisc o Corona - M ontan o was indicted for consp iracy to transpo rt aliens under 8 U. S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), (A)(ii), and (B)(i) (C ount One) and transporting alie ns under 8 U.S.C. § 13 24(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (B)(ii) (Count Two). Corona - Montano pleade d guilty to b oth coun ts without a p lea agre ement. Officers arrested Corona - Montano after witn essing a gr oup of s uspecte d undocume nted p ersons emerge fr om t he des ert brush along a road in Fort Hancock, T exas, and enter h is vehicle. During the ir pursu it of Corona - Montan o’s vehi cle, the officers observed two passenge rs exit the vehicle a s it was s till m oving and ro ll to th e groun d, includ ing a fem ale undo cum ent ed immigran t who was lat er disco vered to be an un accompan ied minor. Because one of t he undoc ume nted i mmigra nts Corona - Monta no transpo rted was an una ccompa nied mi nor, t he prese ntenc e report (“ PSR ”) included a four - lev el enha nc ement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(4). Section 2L1.1(b)(4) mandate s a four - l evel enha nc ement if t he c harg ed offense “i nvolv ed the smugg ling, trans porting, or ha rbori ng of a minor who was un accompanied by the minor’ s parent, adult re lative, o r legal guard ian.” Id. Arguing t hat he had no knowledg e that the femal e pas senger was a minor, Corona - M ontan o contest ed the imposi tion o f the enhanc ement. Sectio n 2L1. 1(b)(4) is silent on the issue o f inten t. See id. Findin g that the Guideline s hold a de fendant “ strictly liab le” fo r the transpo rtation of an unaccomp anied mino r, the district co urt impo sed the § 2L1.1(b)(4) enhance ment. Duri ng the sentenc ing heari ng, Cor ona - Montano argued th at the enh ancement sh ould not be applied because he did not know that the passen ger was a minor. The district court aske d Coro na - Montan o’s couns el if § 2L1.1(b)(4) imp oses a scienter requireme nt, and counsel responded that h e belie ved that it d oes. The court comme nted that Case: 25-50033 Document: 73-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/02/2026

No. 25 - 50033 3 it unders tood it was a matte r of “str ict liabi lity,” the n noted th at the tex t of the gu ideline was silent regard ing the def endant’s know ledge. Co unsel then “sug gest [ed]. . . that, under general princip les of law, that wh eneve r there’ s an allegatio n of so me miscondu ct, [the pr osecut ion] ha[s] to sh ow a m ens r ea requ irement min imum.” Noting that such an a rgument has merit at the guilt - inno cent phase o f trial but not at sen tencing, th e district co urt overr uled Corona - M ontan o’s ob jecti on. Corona - M ontan o was sent ence d to 71 mo nths of i mprisonme nt foll owed by t hre e year s of s uperv ised relea se. Cor ona - Montano tim ely appealed. II Befor e proc eedi ng to the m erit s, we pause to ou tline the standard of revi ew. Beca use Cor ona - Mont ano pr eserved error by rai sing the same argume nt before th e district court, our cour t review s de novo the district court’ s interpr etation o f the Se ntencing G uideline s and re views its f indings of fact for clear error. Uni ted Sta tes v. Wesley, 123 F.4t h 423, 426 (5t h C ir. 2024); Unite d St ates v. William s, 610 F.3 d 271, 29 2 (5t h Cir. 2010). III The so le issue on appeal con cerns w hether the district co urt err ed in findin g that the se ntencing en hancemen t did not includ e a sciente r requir em ent. 1 For th e reaso ns articula ted be low, the district court did not err in hold ing that § 2 L1.1(b)(4) is a stric t liability enh ancement. We an alyze the Sen tencing Guid elines usin g standard statutory constru ction rules. U nited Sta tes v. Raban al, 508 F.3 d 7 41, 7 43 (5th Cir. ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 1 C orona - Mon tano does n ot contest th at one of the undocu mented imm igran ts he transpo rted w as an unaccomp anied minor as defined in § 2L1.1(b)(4). Case: 25-50033 Document: 73-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/02/2026

No. 25 - 50033 4 2007). “When the la nguage of t he g uideline is u nambiguo us, the plain mean ing of that langu age is con trolling un less it creates an absurd r esult.” Unite d State s v. Ser fass, 684 F.3d 5 48, 551 (5th C ir. 20 12). Further, thi s court has observ ed that “[t]he [G] uidelines drafters h ave bee n explic it when th ey wished to import a m ens rea req uirement. ” United State s v. Sin glet on, 946 F.2d 23, 25 (5t h Ci r. 1991). Her e, t he g uidelin e is un ambiguous; t hus, t he plain me aning co ntrols. Section 2L1.1(b)(4) rea ds, “ [i ]f the offense i nvolv ed the smugg ling, transp orting, or harbor ing of a minor who was una ccompa nied by t he minor ’s paren t, adult relat ive, or legal g uardian, incre ase by 4 levels. ” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(4). Our cour t has held that Gu idelin es languag e that is silent on the issu e of mens rea is unambi guous. Sing leton, 946 F.2d at 25. Here, the plain langu age of th e g uide line “con tains no exp ress men s rea requ irement, which suggests that no sciente r is required. ” U nited S tates v. Gut ierrez - Jaramill o, 467 F. App’x 30 1, 303 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpubli shed) (ob serv ing that that silen ce as to m ens rea su ggests abse nce o f a sciente r requ irement in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2)); s ee als o Si ngleton, 94 6 F.2d at 24 – 25. Further, our court h as hesitate d to read a m ens re a require ment into a gu ideline absent explicit dir ection to do so. See, e.g., United States v. Brutey n, 686 F.3 d 318, 325 (5 th Ci r. 201 2) (holdi ng tha t sent ence enhanc ement f or vi olati on of securitie s law did not requir e knowle dge that defendant was requi red to registe r as a broke r or deale r); S erfas s, 684 F.3d at 553 (holding that s entence enh ancement re lated to possessi on of im ported met hamph etami ne wit h inten t to distribute did not req uire knowle dge that the meth amphetamine had been impor ted); S ingleton, 946 F.2d at 2 5 (holding that se ntenc e enh ancement re lated to un lawful po ssessio n of a stole n firearm d id not Case: 25-50033 Document: 73-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/02/2026

No. 25 - 50033 5 requ ire knowled ge that the fir earm was sto len). 2 The Ele venth Circu it Court of Ap peals has likew ise fou nd that the p lain language of § 2L1.1(b)(4) does not impos e a kno wledg e requir ement. United S tates v. Ruiz - Hern andez, 260 F. App’ x 1 88, 189 – 90 (11th Cir. 2 007) (unpubli shed). Nor wo uld the plain meanin g of the statute lead to an absur d result. First, o ur court h as note d that strict liability sente ncing enh ancements do n ot violate du e proc ess. See Serfas s, 684 F. 3d at 553 (citing Si ngleton, 9 46 F.2d at 26); cf. Stap les v. United State s, 511 U.S. 60 0, 60 6 (199 4) (observing th at criminal “ offen ses that re quire no mens rea generally are disfavo red”). In holdin g that the guideline at issue in Singleton did no t impose a sciente r requ irement, ou r court note d that “S ingleton was not convicte d of a stri ct liabili ty crime bu t instead w as subje ct to a strict l iability sentencing enhanceme nt.” Singl e to n, 946 F.2d at 26; see U nited States v. Fry, 51 F.3d 543, 546 (5 th Cir. 1995) (distinguishin g cases con cerning strict liabili ty crimes from th ose relate d to strict liab ility sente ncing enhancem ents). Second, findin g strict liab ility i n the enhancem ent is con sistent w ith the purp ose underlyi ng it: protecti on of smu ggled minor s due to an increase in the smuggl ing of una ccompa nied mi nors and t he dange rs associate d with smuggling. S ee U.S. S. G. A pp. C, a men d. 80 2 (Nov. 2016) (noting “that an individu al defen dant is likely to be aw are of the risk that unacco mpanie d minors ar e being smug gled as part of the off ense”). In ot her cont exts, our court h as recogn ized the deterren t effect in sente ncing a defendant f or the ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 2 Corona - Mo ntano attemp ts to turn in terpre tation of the sentencing enhan cement at iss ue in Si ngleton on its head by p ointing to th e app lication n ote that c larifie s the enhancement “applies r egardless o f whether the def endant knew or had reason to believe t ha t the firea rm wa s stolen. ” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 comme nt. (n.8) (empha sis add ed). This argum ent is ina ppos ite. Th e applic ation n ote was issu ed after Singleton was publishe d; thus, the Singl eton c ourt relied on the guid eline’s plain langu age, not th e applic ation n ote discus sing mens r ea. The subsequ ent inc lusion of the note c larify ing the s cien ter does no t foreclos e our con clusions here. Case: 25-50033 Document: 73-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/02/2026

No. 25 - 50033 6 drug h e actually po ssessed r ather than the drug he thought he possessed. Serfass, 6 84 F.3d a t 55 2 (stating that “‘ exposing a d rug trafficker to liability for the full consequenc es, b oth expec ted and u nexpec ted, of hi s own u nlawful behavi or ’ ” does not vi ola te due process) (quoting Unit ed States v. Valenc ia - Gonzales, 17 2 F.3d 3 44, 346 (5t h Ci r. 19 99)). Thus, apply ing the plain mean ing of the en hancement d oes not le ad to an absurd result. Furth er, a neighbo ring spe cial offe nse ch aracteristic, w hich co ntains an expr ess mens rea r equi rem ent, buttresses our conclusion that the draf ters did not i ntend to imp ose a mens rea r equir ement i n § 2L1.1(b)(4). The neighbori ng pr ovisi on, § 2L1.1 (b)(6), states that the o ffense leve l shall be increas ed “[i]f t he offense invol ved intent ionall y or r ecklessly creating a substantial risk of death o r seriou s bodily inj ury to anoth er person. ” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6) (emphasi s added). Thus, “[t]he i nclus ion of a knowledg e requir ement in one p ort ion of the gu ideline c onfirms t hat its omissi on from anothe r portion of the same guid eline was in tentional. ” Ser fass, 6 84 F.3 d a t 552 (citing Leatherm an v. Tar rant C nty. Nar coti cs Int el. and Coo rdi natio n Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 1 68 (1 993)). Our co urt took a sim ilar appr oach in determi ning wheth er anot her enhancem ent in § 2L1.1 requ ires sci enter. See Un ited State s v. Garci a - Guerrero, 313 F.3d 8 92, 89 8 (5t h Cir. 2002). There, our court held tha t because the neighbo ring enhancem en t (which i s now codified at § 2L1.1(b)(6)) explicitly incl uded a mens rea requir ement, si lence as to mens rea in th e en hancement at issue th ere (which is now cod ified at § 2L1.1(b)(7)) indicates that the guidelin e doe s not req uire inten t. 3 Id. (citing Un ited S tates v. Herrera - Rojas, 243 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2001)). Appl ying the same ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 3 The subsect ions of § 2L1.1(b) have been rearra nged since the Garcia - Guerrero decis ion was p ublish ed. Case: 25-50033 Document: 73-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/02/2026

No. 25 - 50033 7 analysis h ere, b ecause § 2L 1.1(b)(6) e xplicitly include s a mens rea requir em ent a nd § 2L1.1(b)(4) does no t, the tran sportation - of -a - minor enha ncem ent do es n ot requi r e kno wledg e. While this is our f irst time addres sing this issue in a p ublish ed decisio n, o ur court has tw ice found in unpu blished decisio ns that § 2L1.1(b) (4) do es not inc lud e a knowled ge r equir emen t. United S tates v. Flores- Avila, 783 F. Ap p’x 440 (5t h Ci r. 201 9) (unpubl is hed); United State s v. Cordova - Bris eno, N o. 21 - 510 63, 20 22 WL 5 422 400 (5 th Ci r. Oct. 7, 202 2) (unpublished). Cor ona - Montano cont ends that these cases “h a[ve] no prece dential value” because they ar e unpublish ed; to the contrar y, thes e decisio ns are “high ly persuas ive” because the y “explicitly r eje cted the identical ar gumen t that [the appellan t] advance s,” United States v. Pino Gonzalez, 636 F.3d 157, 160 (5th Ci r. 2011). 4 Face d with th e same question on app eal as we are here, our court i n Flores- Av ila r ejecte d the ap pellant’s claim that “the district court im properly applied a ‘strict liability ’ standard. ” 783 F. App ’x at 440 –41. Lik ewise, in Cordova- Bris eno, our court he ld that Section 2L1.1(b)(4) “appl ies. .. witho ut conside ration of [the de fendant’s] knowl edg e.” 20 22 WL 542 2400, at *1. While Corona - Montano argue s that the applicability of the se decisions to th e pre sent case i s fur ther under mined beca use there ou r court revie wed th e district court’s in terpre tat ion of the g uidelin e for cle ar error, rather th an de n ovo as w e do her e, our c ourt clearly held th at the e nhancemen t did not impu te a knowledg e requirem ent, Flores- Avila 783 F. App ’x a t 440; Cordova- Br iseno, 20 22 W L 542 2400, at *1. Ther e is no in dication th at the clear e rror stan dard manipulated the outcome. Even ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 4 Unpublish ed opin ions iss ued on or afte r Janu ary 1, 199 6, are not bind ing precedent, but they may be persuasive authority. Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (c iting 5th C ir. R. 47.5.4). Case: 25-50033 Document: 73-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/02/2026

No. 25 - 50033 8 if it had, our reas oning abov e independ ently s upports our concl usion tha t § 2L1.1 (b)(4) is a str ict liabili ty enhancemen t. Finally, Corona - M ontan o’s argum ent that the district co urt fai led to engage in a fore seeability analysis is un availing. As ou r court h as expl ained, the fo reseeability of a mino r’s prese nce is on ly relevant whe n it applie s to the consp iracy charge. Flores- Avila, 783 F. App ’x at 440. Un like the gu ideline accompa nying the conspiracy of fense in Count One, w hich e xpressly mentio ns a f oreseeabili ty req uirement, the e nha ncement a t i ssue her e makes no menti on of fores eea bili ty. Contras t U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)(iii) with id. § 2L1.1(b)(4). Furt her, the gui deline ac companyi ng Count O ne invol ves the “acts and o mission s of others.” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1) (B) (emphasis added); Flores- Avila, 783 F. App’x at 4 40 ((holding th at “no such [foresee ability] stan dard applies to acts comm itted by the defendant”). Here, Corona - Mont ano is sentenc ed und er Count Two for his ow n acts; it is not allege d that the unaccom panied min or was il legally transp orted b y anoth er per son involve d in the conspiracy su ch that Corona - Montano’s fore seeability o f an unaccomp anied minor’s invol vement woul d be r elevant. We, t heref ore, reject C orona - M ontan o’s arg ument. IV For the f oregoi ng rea sons, the district co urt did no t err in findin g that § 2L1.1 (b)(4) is a str ict liabi lity sentencin g enh ancement. We hereby AFFIRM the district court’s decision. Case: 25-50033 Document: 73-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/02/2026