United States v. Aryeetey - Felon in Possession of Firearm Conviction Affirmed

1 25-499- cr United S tates v. Ary eetey In the United Sta tes Cou rt o f Appeals f or the Second C ircuit ___________ A ugust T erm 202 5 Argued: Februar y 6, 202 6 Decided: March 3, 20 26 No. 25-499- cr __________________ _ U NITED S T A TES OF A ME RICA, Appellee, v. I V ANJ OEL A R YEETEY, Defendant-Appell a nt. _______________ Appeal f rom the United Stat es District Court for the Southern District of New Y ork No. 1:23- cr -561-1, Joh n P. Cronan, Jud ge. ___________ Before: C ABRAN ES, N A RDINI, and K AHN, Circuit Judges. ________________

2 Defendant- Appe llant Iv an joel Aryeetey appeals from a judgmen t of conviction and sentence entered in the United States Distr ict Court for the Southern Distr ict of New Y ork (John P. C ronan, J.). A j ury convicted Aryeetey of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Judge Cronan sentenc ed Aryeetey to a bel ow - Guidelines sentence of 78 months’ imprisonm ent followe d by three y ears of supervised release. On a ppeal, Aryeetey asserts: (1) that the district court abused its discretion by permitting the g ov ernment to introduce DNA evi dence at trial despit e its mis si ng the court’s Rule 16 di sclosure deadline and (2) that his sente nce is substantively unreasonable. W e find Ar yeetey’s arguments unp ersuasive and accord ingly AFF IRM his conviction and sentence in all respects. ________________ W ILLIAM K. S TO NE (Ryan T. Ne e s and Jacob R. Fiddelman, on the brief), Assistan t Un ited S tates Attorneys, f or J ay C layton, United States Attorney for the South ern District of New Y ork, New Y ork, NY, for Appellee. M ARTIN S. B EL L (Andrew W. Marrero, on the brief), Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New Y ork, N Y, for Defendant-Appell a nt. ________________ Maria Araújo Kahn, Circuit Judge: Defendant- App ella nt Iv an joel Aryeetey appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered in the United State s Dist rict Cour t for the Southern Di strict of New Yo r k (John P. Cronan, J.). A j ury convicted Aryeetey of being a felon in possession of a firearm in v iolat ion o f 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Judge

3 Cronan sentenc ed Aryeetey to a belo w - Guid elin es s ente nc e of 78 months’ impr isonme nt follow ed by thre e y ears of s upervis ed release. On appe al Ary eetey asserts: (1) that the district court abused its discretion by permitting the gov ernment to introduce DNA evidence despite its missing the cour t’s Rule 16 expert dis closure deadline, and (2) that his s entence is substantively unreasonable. W e find Ary eetey’s arguments unpersuasiv e and accordingly AFFI RM his conviction and sentence in all respects. BACKGROUND I. O FFENSE C ONDUCT In the late afternoo n of September 5, 2023, Ar yeetey w as driving on W ashington A venue in the Bronx. He w as accompanied by a friend who was sitti ng in the fro nt passenger seat. NYPD officers observed Ary eetey driving without a seatbe lt an d attempte d to pull him ov er. Ary eetey, who w as servi ng a term of f ederal sup ervised rel ease a t that ti me, sped away until, about two minutes later, he crashed into a par ked car. Upon crashing, Aryeetey climbed out of the car ’s window and fled on foot. While fleei ng, two bys tanders saw Aryeetey throw a dark green b ag over a fence into a constructio n lot. The c onstr uction l ot was located across the str eet from a schoo l. After tossing the bag, Aryeetey bri efly hid

4 in a nearby a uto - bo dy shop. O nce discovered by the shop owner, he j umped ov er a fence and ran a wa y. Following the pursuit, NYPD officers recovered the bag, which contained a loaded 9- milli m e ter T aurus firearm with a defaced se rial number, from the construction lot. They a lso searched the car and fou nd Aryeet ey’s photo ID and cell phone. That same day, an NY PD e vide nce c olle ctio n te ch nician swabb ed th e firearm for DNA. Ary eetey w as arrested on October 5, 2023, after reporting for a scheduled visit with prob ation. On Oct ober 31, 2023, a grand j ury returned an indictment against Aryeetey, ch arging hi m with one count of possessi on of a firear m after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). II. R ULE 16 E XPERT D ISCLOS UR E On June 17, 2024, the distric t court ente red a pretrial sche duling orde r, setting October 28, 2024, as the tria l da te, and setting A ugust 16, 2024, as the “ deadline for the Governmen t ’ s expert discl osures pursua nt to Federal Rule o f Civil Procedure 1 6(a)(1)(G). ” App’x 17. On September 13, 2024, fo ur week s after the expert di sclos ure deadlin e, the gov ernment, pursuant to a search warrant, colle cted Ary eetey ’s DNA and sent it to the New Y ork City Office of the C hief

5 Medical Examiner (“OCME”) for tes ting. Before the OC ME comple ted testing, on October 7, 2024, Aryeetey filed a motion in limine seekin g to ad mit the anticipated DNA results a rguin g that “ ev idence of another person’s DNA on the firearm ” would un dermine th e governm ent’s case. Mot. in Lim., United States v. Aryeetey, 23- cr -00561- JPC (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2024), EC F No. 55, at 2. The gov ernment received the OCME report o n October 17, 2024, two months after the court’s ex pert disclosure deadline, and provided the report t o the defense that same day. The report stated, among other things, th at a DNA s ample from the gun contained a mixture of DNA fr om four sources that was rough ly “ 3.4 8 billio n.. . times more probable ” to hav e com e fr om “ Ary eetey and three unknown persons ” than “ four unknown persons. ” App’x 1038. Th e day after receiving th e report Aryeet ey moved to excl ude the evidence. On October 21, 2024, seven days before tria l, the g overnment opposed A ryeet ey’s motion and provided formal written notice of it s p roffered expert t estimony. A t a pretr ial confer ence on Octob er 23, 2024, the district court den ied Ary eetey’s motion to e xclude. The court found that the gov ernment w as neg ligent in meetin g the discl osure deadli ne and had failed to explain w hy it “waited until after [the court’s] expert disclosure deadli ne to even begin the DNA testing.”

6 App’x 82. How e ver, the court found that Aryeetey w as not substantially prejudiced because h e “was on notice of the pending DNA a nalysis for s ix weeks” and had previously mov ed in limine to ad mit the e videnc e. Id. at 83. Non etheless, to remedy the government’ s late disclosure, the court o ffered Ary eetey a continuance of 21 da ys or 42 days, or to “ find other poss ible d ates” if necess ary. App’x 79. Aryeetey d ecline d an d in stea d asked only for a on e-day cont inuance, which the court granted. III. T RIAL AND S ENTENCING Trial commenced on October 29, 2024. In his defense, Aryeetey attempted to establish that the gre en bag belonged to the passenger of the car and that he did not know it conta ined a gu n when he fled. On Nov ember 6, 2024, the jury found Aryeetey guilty of being a felon in possess ion of a firearm. Without objection from the parties, the court found that the app licab le Guidelines rang e of imprisonment w as 110 to 137 months. The court sentenced Ary eetey to 78 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three y e a rs’ supervised release, and imposed a $100 mandatory s pecial assess ment. This app eal followed.

7 DISCUSSION I. R ULE 16 V IOLA T ION Federal R ule of Crimi nal Procedu re 16(a)(1)(G) requires the g ov ernment to disclos e “ to the defendan t, in writing. . . any testi mony that the government intends to use at tria l under Fede ral Rule of Evidence 702, 70 3, or 705.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G)(i). The Ru le also requires the court to “ set a time for the gov ernment to make its di sclosures,” which “ must be sufficiently before trial to provide a fair opportuni ty for the def endant to meet t he gov ernment's ev idence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G)(ii). This latter provision w as adde d in 2022 to “ ensure enforceable dead lines that the pr ior provisions lacked.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G)(ii) a dvis ory c om mittee’s n ote to 2022 a mend men t. Ary eetey contend s that the 20 22 amend ment emphasizes the necessit y of timely pretrial di sclosures and that, in ligh t of the rule change and the circumstances of this case, an y remedy short of exclusion of the DNA evidence re presents an abu se of discreti on. W e are unpersuaded that the 2022 amend ment to R ule 16 in an y w ay cur tail s the district court’s discretion to fashion an appropr iate r emedy for noncompliance with disc overy orders. The new dead line s do n ot set a r igid timeframe f or part ies to make expert discl osures. Rather, Rule 16(a)(1)(G)(ii) and 16(b)(1)(C)(ii) impose

8 a reciproc al requi rement on both the govern ment and the defense to m ake expert disclos ur es “suffic ie ntly before trial to pr ovide a fair oppor tunity” for each party to meet the adv ersar y’s evidence. See Fed. R. C rim. P. 16(a)(1)(G)(ii); F ed. R. Cri m. P. 16(b)(1)(C)(ii). Th e advisory co mmittee notes m ake c lear th at “ the amendment does not itsel f set a specific t ime for the disclosures,” but rathe r “ allow s co urts to tailor disclosure deadlines to local con dit ions or specific cas es.” Fe d. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committe e’s note to 2022 amendment. If district cou rts have discretion to set deadlines, sur ely they retain d iscretion to mod ify the m and to fashion a remedy for Rule 16 violati ons. Indeed, the advisory committee notes expressly state that d istri ct cour ts “ retain [] di scretio n under Rule 16(d). .. to alter deadlines to ensure ad equate trial preparatio n. ” Id. Moreov er, Rule 16(d), which w as unchange d by the 2022 amen dment, ve s t s district courts with b road remedial discre tion. It provid es that a court may order a noncompliant part y to permit discovery, “grant a con tinuance,” “pr ohibit [a noncompliant] p arty from introducing the undisc losed ev idence,” or “ enter any other order t hat is just under t he circumstances.” Fed. R. Cri m. P. 16(d)(2). We hav e consisten tly reiterated, pursuan t to Ru le 16(d)(2), th at “[w ] hen the gov ernment has fail ed to comply with Rule 16, the d istrict court has br oad

9 discretion to determine what r emedial action, if any, is appropriate.” United State s v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 681 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2)); see also United States v. W alker, 974 F.3d 193, 204 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[W]hen the government violates Rule 16, the distr ict court has broad d iscretion in fashioning a remedy, including by granting the defense a continuance.” (c itations an d interna l quotation marks omitted)). That the court must now “ set a time for the gov ernment to make its d isclos ur es,” Fed. R. Cr im. P. 16(a)(1)(G)(ii), does not limi t the court’s remedial discretion pursu ant to Ru le 16(d), an d certainly does not indi cate th at unti mely disclosure s must always, or even usua lly, res ult in ex clu sio n. Preclusion rem ains “ a drastic r emedy a nd is not warranted where. .. the n ondisclosure w as not a product of bad faith. ” United States v. Wynder, 147 F. 4th 200, 215 (2d C ir. 2025). Accordingly, we reject Aryeet ey ’s suggestio n that exclusion is w arranted here in light of the addition of Rule 16(a)(1)(G)(ii). Cf. United State s v. Eby, No. 24 -3716, 2025 WL 3688925, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025) (find ing no abuse of d iscretion in admitt ing bela tedl y dis close d tria l e xh ibits whe re the defendant “fa iled to establi sh prejudi ce”). W e further ho ld that the dist ric t co ur t ope rat ed well w ith in its dis cre tion in admitting the DNA e vidence subject to a continuan ce. Ne ither party dis putes that

10 t he dist rict court correctly found that t he government acted n egligentl y, but without bad fa ith in failing to meet the co urt’s d isclosure deadline. Addition all y, the un time ly d isc los ure did no t sub st antia lly prej udic e Aryeet ey’s defense because, as the dist rict court found, he “w as on notice of the pending DNA analys is for six we eks ” and w as thus aw are that “ the gov ern ment would seek t o introduce the r esults at tri al if the y w ere favorable to the prosecution. ” App’x 83 – 84. Given the lack of bad faith and undue surprise, a continuance w as more than adequate to remedy the governm ent’s late disclosure. See, e.g., United States v. Felder, 993 F.3d 57, 7 4 (2d Cir. 2 021) (affir ming that “the d istri ct cour t fashioned a satisfactory remedy by granting [the de fendant] a six - day continuance” wher e the government disclosed during trial i ts inte nt to elici t expe rt test imony); Mill er, 116 F.3d at 681 (finding no abuse of discretion for admitting doc ument the government disclosed “shortly before calling its final d irect - case witnesses” in part because the court ind icate d that it “ would entertain a request for a continua nce if need ed ”); United States v. Canada, 858 F. App’ x 436, 439 (2d Cir. 202 1) (summary or der) (finding no abuse of discretion for adm itting expert testi mony disclosed “the night before the las t day of tria l” because ther e was “no bad faith a s the government

11 notified the defense as soon as it beca me aw are that [the d efendant]’s cell s ite reco rds might stil l be available”). Aryeetey cla ims that a continuance was i neffectiv e and that it placed him betw een the proverbial rock and hard place: he cou ld either go to trial on schedule and unprepared, or altern atively, accept a contin uance and give the gov ern ment extra ti me to prepare wh ile he l anguished in the M etropo litan D etentio n C enter. His position is not unreasonab le. Rule 16’s discov er y obligations are “intended to minimize surprise” a nd “reduce the need for con tinuances.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory com mittee’s note to 1993 ame ndment. The government’s dilator y disclos ur e frustrated that purpose. Although the gov ernment explained that its delay w as b ecause the par ties were engaged in discussions that would have resu lted i n a pre - tr ial re soluti on, 1 it o ffered no explana tion for failing to see k a br ief extension of the co urt’s disc losure dead line as th at deadline approached. To b e clear, t he gov ern ment may not i gnore court orders ev e n if it believes it has a good reason for its delay. When the government or defense fail to heed the discovery 1 See Oral Arg. A udio Recording at 17:15 – 20:05 (expla inin g that th e gov ern ment w as attemp ting to negotiat e a plea, a nd that in such situati ons, the governmen t does not alw ays expend th e res ource s to con duct DN A testin g, bu t acknow ledging tha t the governm ent should hav e requested a continuan ce before the deadline l apsed).

12 deadlines, as here, the district court re tains discretion to remedy m anifest discov ery m isconduct as “ is just under the c ircumstances.” Fed. R. C rim. P. 16(d)(2). How ev er, the prejudice Aryeetey points to o n appeal — his prolonged detention at th e MD C and the addition al preparation tim e for the gov ernment — are in suffici ent to merit reversal. “Reversal is w arranted only where t he nondisclosure ‘result s in substantial prejudice to the defendant.’ ” See Wynder, 147 F.4th at 215 (quoting United States v. Sa nchez, 912 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1990)). “Substantial prejudice” in this context “means more than that the [evidence] was damaging to the def endant: the defen dant mus t demonstrate that the untime ly disclosure of the [evidence] adversel y affected some aspect of his trial strategy.” United States v. Lee, 834 F. 3d 145, 158 (2d Cir. 2016) (al terations adop ted an d internal quotation marks omitted). The de lay ed disclosure did not impair Ary eetey’s trial strategy. Ary eetey fails t o argue, ei ther here or below, that he had insuffici ent time to meet the gov ern ment’s belated evidence; indeed, that he requested only a one - day continuance cuts against any such argument. App’x 118 (“[W] e believ e that we are go ing to b e able to effectiv ely addres s the issue and the DNA witness in a r elatively short space of time. . . .”). Absent s uch a showin g, we

13 affirm. Compare W alker, 974 F. 3d at 198, 20 4 (finding no substan tial prejudice where gov ernment d isclo sed incriminating fingerprint ev idence “just days before trial w as scheduled to begin” in part because the court offered the defendant “a lengthy continuance” which the defendant “decli ned” and rejecting the argumen t “ that a continuan ce w as an insufficient remedy b ecause it would have interfered with [the defendant’s] liberty in te rest [s ] ”) with Unit ed States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 11 5–16 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding substantial prejudice where the opponent w as “due to rest the following day” a nd had “no time to prepare to resp ond to the exper ts” and where “a continuanc e might have caused the court to lose” tw o jurors), overruled on other grounds by C arpenter v. Unit ed States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018). II. S ENTENCING Ary eetey also challenges the substantive reasonabl eness of his below - Guidelines se ntence of 78 months ’ i mprisonment, arguing that it s hocks the conscience because the evidence sho wed only that h e “ kno wingly po ssessed th e gun for a couple of minutes before tossing the bag into a v acant construct ion y ard.” Appellant Br. 22. “ Our review of a sentence for subst antiv e reasonabl eness is parti cularly deferential, and we will set aside only th ose sentences that are so shockingly h igh,

14 shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law that al lowing them to stand would damage the administrat ion of justice.” United States v. Muzi o, 966 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2020) (alterations adopted an d internal quotati on marks omitted). “ The particular weight to be affo rded aggrav ating and mitigating factors is a matter firmly comm itted to the discr etion of the sentenc ing judge.” Un ited States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 289 (2 d Cir. 2012) (in tern al quo tat ion ma rks omitted). W e wil l “ set as id e a dis trict co urt ’ s sub stantive d et ermin atio n on ly in exceptio nal cases where t he tria l court ’ s decision cannot be located within the rang e of pe r miss ible de cision s. ” United States v. Cavera, 5 50 F.3d 180, 189 (2d C ir. 2008) (en banc) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Ary eetey’s below - Guidelines se ntence falls comfor tably w i thin the permis sib le range. A s the distr ict co urt correctly observ ed, “ the conduct here w as serious and dangerous.” App’x 990. Wh ile serving a term of supervised r elease, Aryeetey fl ed from the police in a b usy a rea during rush hour, p utting “[a]n yone in the area . . . at risk of serious injur y, if not death, from his r eckless actions.” Id. at 991. Afte r crashin g into a parked car, h e pr oceeded to throw a “loaded firearm with a defaced s erial number,” id., into a construction lot located “acr oss from a school,” id. at 973. T he seriousness of this conduct was “all the more troubling

15 because it w as not the first time Mr. Aryeetey unlawful ly possessed a firearm,” id. at 993, “further reflect[ing] an ongoing n eed for deterrence to protect the public and ins ti ll in h im res pect for th e la w,” id. at 99 8. These factor s readily “ bear the weight assigne d [to them b y the distric t cour t ] under the totality of [the] circumstances.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 191. The durat ion of Ary e etey’s illeg al possession does not chan ge this ana lysis. The distri ct court consid ered this argumen t, App’x 991 –93, before imposing Ary eetey’s below - Gui delines sent ence. See, e.g., id. at 993 (“[T he] brief period of possessio n by Mr. Aryeetey do[es] inform the seriousness of the offense and the need for ju st punishment.”). But see id. at 991 (“ I d o e a s i l y fi n d, a t a minimum, that Mr. Aryeet ey learned of t he gun whil e in the c ar, took pos session of the gun knowingly, and atte mpted to fle e from the police in possession of the gun. ”). How ev er, Aryeetey’s “ disagreement with the dis trict court ’ s weighing of [th e Section 3553(a) ] fac tors alone does n ot re nder his sente nce substantively unreasonable. ” Unit ed States v. Rivera, 115 F.4th 141, 153 (2d Cir. 2024). Instead, c onsideri ng all the reaso ns set fort h by the distri ct court, and with d ue deference to its decision, w e conclude that Ary eete y’s sentenc e is w ithin the “ ov erwhelming majority of cases ” w here a Guideli nes sentence “fall [s] comfor tably within the

16 broad range of s entences that would be reasonab le in the par ticular circumstances.” United States v. I ngram, 72 1 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Unit ed States v. Perez -Frias, 6 36 F.3d 3 9, 4 3 (2d Ci r. 2011) (“ It is... difficu lt to find that a below - Guidelines senten ce is unrea sonable.”). CONCLUSION Accordingly, the jud gment of the distr ict cour t is AFFIRM ED.