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Feb. 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Claire Depasquale and Christopher Mueller v. Orange Peel Bakery, LLC and Julianne G. Vanderhoop

District Court, D. Massachusetts

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:24-cv-10231

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (1)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (6.4K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CLAIRE DEPASQUALE and *

CHRISTOPHER MUELLER, *

*

Plaintiffs, *

*

v. *

* Civil Action No. 24-cv-10231-ADB

ORANGE PEEL BAKERY, LLC and *

JULIANNE G. VANDERHOOP, *

*

Defendants. *

*

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER                                  

BURROUGHS, D.J.

Before the Court are Defendants’ motion to reschedule the pretrial conference and trial,
[ECF No. 111], Magistrate Judge Levenson’s Report and Recommendation concluding that the
Court should deny the motion, [ECF No. 116], and Defendants’ objections thereto, [ECF No.
117 (“Defs.’ Objs.”)]. After de novo review of the portions of the Report and Recommendation
to which Defendants object, Defendants’ objections are overruled, the Report and
Recommendation, [ECF No. 116], is ADOPTED in its entirety, and Defendants’ motion, [ECF
No. 111], is DENIED.

I. ENFORCEABILITY OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

The Court fully agrees with the reasoning set forth in Judge Levenson’s Report and
Recommendation, [ECF No. 116], and adopts it without alteration. For the avoidance of doubt,
the Court adds a few additional observations. Defendants sought to reopen this case and
schedule it for trial, claiming that (1) they never reached an agreement to settle the case, and (2)
if they did reach an agreement, that agreement was unenforceable because it “violate[d] a federal
statute,” namely, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19. See [ECF No.
111 at 1–2].

First, as to the argument that no agreement was reached, only weeks ago, the First Circuit
reiterated the rule that neither a “refusal to sign a subsequent writing memorializing the orally

agreed upon terms” nor “a party’s later change of heart” is adequate to “undo a knowing and
voluntary” oral settlement containing all material terms. Maccarone v. Siemens Indus., Inc., 165
F.4th 640, 644 (1st Cir. 2026). The record of proceedings before Judge Levenson reflects an
enforceable oral agreement, containing all material terms, to which all parties assented. See
[ECF No. 116 at 2].

Defendants argue that the agreement was not binding because the parties exchanged
subsequent written drafts that, if signed, would have superseded their prior oral agreement, [ECF
No. 111 at 1–2], but none of those draft agreements were in fact signed, and, more importantly,
the parties’ subsequent negotiations over a written memorialization of their agreement do not
affect whether the oral agreement itself was enforceable; nor do they provide a legal basis to void

that agreement. Cf. Shapiro v. Cynosure, LLC, No. 23-cv-10947, 2024 WL 967594, at *4–5 (D.
Mass. Mar. 6, 2024) (concluding that there was no binding settlement agreement where, unlike
here, the parties only made an “unenforceable ‘agreement to reach an agreement,’” id. at *5
(quoting Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Bos. Redev. Auth., 694 N.E.2d 820, 826 (Mass. 1998)), that
lacked “precision” and “did not specify the amount to be paid”).

They further assert that Judge Levenson viewed the settlement negotiations as a
mediation, that “[m]ediations are non-binding unless reduced to writing and signed by both
parties,” and that Judge Levenson confused Defendant Vanderhoop by stating that he was
“inclined to treat” the parties’ settlement as off the record. [Defs.’ Objs. at 2–3]. But the
transcript of the hearing before Judge Levenson makes clear that the judge asked counsel for
both parties if he had correctly stated the terms of the agreement before asking Ms. Vanderhoop
if she “agree[d] to be bound by th[e] agreement,” to which she answered “[y]es.” See [ECF No.
116 at 3]. These facts are indistinguishable from those on which the First Circuit concluded an

enforceable agreement existed in Maccarone. See 165 F.4th at 642–44.

Defendants next argue that because the FLSA permits the Court to award attorney fees to
a plaintiff who obtains a judgment in litigation, but requires those fees to be “reasonable,” 29
U.S.C. § 216 (b), the Court must review the parties’ settlement agreement to determine whether
the attorney fees that Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiffs are reasonable, and then set it aside if
they are not. See [ECF No. 111 at 2]; [ECF No. 117 at 1–2, 4–6]. Judge Levenson’s analysis is
thorough and accurate on this point, and the Court will not repeat his analysis here. See [ECF
No. 116 at 4–7]. The Court emphasizes, however, that the basic flaw in Defendants’ argument is
that the FLSA’s reasonableness requirement applies to fees awarded by the Court after a
judgment is entered, not to fees agreed upon by the parties in a settlement contract.1

II. OTHER OBJECTIONS

A. Failure to address issues raised in Defendants’ motion

Defendants object that “Judge Levenson failed to address most of the issues in
Defendant[s’] motion.” [Defs.’ Objs. at 2]. The Court reads the Report and Recommendation to
resolve all dispositive issues raised by Defendants, because as the Report and Recommendation
makes clear, the dispositive issue is the enforceability of the contract between the parties. See

1 For the same reason, Defendants’ objections that (1) Plaintiffs have not established themselves
as the “prevailing party,” [Defs.’ Objs. at 4], and (2) statutes “cannot be overridden by
contracting parties,” [id.], are unavailing. The issue of attorney fees was resolved by an
agreement of the parties, not pursuant to the fee-shifting provision of the FLSA. Plaintiffs did
not need to establish themselves as the prevailing party, and the parties’ agreement was not
contrary to any statute.

[ECF No. 116 at 2]. The parties entered into a binding agreement, and Defendants have not put
forth any legal reason for the Court to set it aside. Still, for the avoidance of doubt, the Court
writes to clarify two points emphasized in Defendants’ objections: the public policy and
“unclean hands” arguments raised in Defendants’ motion. See [Defs.’ Objs. at 6 (“Judge

Levenson failed to address the Public Policy or the ‘Unclean Hands’ doctrine as outlined in
Defendant(s)’ motion.”)]. These objections seem rooted in Defendants’ belief that Plaintiffs’
position on certain issues in this case, namely whether Plaintiffs were salaried employees or
wage earners, [ECF No. 111 at 3], and whether Plaintiffs were properly paid overtime and tips,
[Defs.’ Objs. at 1], are dishonest and amount to misconduct on the part of their counsel. [ECF
No. 111 at 2–3]. The fact, however, that Plaintiffs dispute Defendants’ version of facts or
interpret the law differently does not constitute misconduct.2

B. Bias

Defendants object that Judge Levenson was biased “in favor of the Plaintiffs and against
the Defendant[s].” [Defs.’ Objs. at 1]; see also [id. at 1–3 (elaborating)]. First, they allege that
Judge Levenson exhibited palpable hostility to defense counsel, [id. at 1], specifically by

“remind[ing] Defendant[s’] counsel of his obligations as an officer of the Court,” [id. at 2], and
by failing to consider defense counsel’s attempt to orally offer a citation into the record, [id. at
3]. Second, they allege that Judge Levenson’s failure to question Plaintiffs’ counsel at the
hearing on Defendants’ motion supports an inference of bias. [Id. at 2]. Neither Judge

2 Defendants raise a variety of related objections: that Plaintiffs should bear the burden of
proving the truth of their claims despite the fact that Defendants settled the lawsuit, [Defs.’ Objs.
at 1–2], that Judge Levenson “failed to address the frivolousness of Plaintiffs’ false claims,” [id.
at 1], that Defendants should not “be responsible for Plaintiffs[’] legal fees” because Plaintiffs’
claims are false, [id. at 1–2], and finally that “Plaintiffs and their counsel . . . have violated their
obligation to the Court to be candid,” [id. at 2]. All of these objections are premised on the
falsity of Plaintiffs’ allegations, and all are unpersuasive for the same reasons.
Levenson’s conduct toward defense counsel—which was well within his authority to manage the
proceedings and conduct of the parties before him—nor his failure to question Plaintiffs’ counsel
during the hearing is evidence of bias.

Defendants further aver that in light of “how the courts have treated indigenous people in

the past,” Ms. Vanderhoop, an elder in her tribe, grew anxious and fearful as trial approached.

[Defs.’ Objs. at 3]. They argue that such fear amounted to duress impacting her decision to agree
to settle the case. [Id.]. The Court does not dispute the history to which Defendants refer or the
anxiety that can accompany a trial; it recognizes that the legal system can be confusing and
intimidating to those without legal training. That said, these things are not grounds for undoing a
valid settlement. Given the complexities of the legal process, it fell to defense counsel to ensure
that Defendants’ interests were adequately represented during the course of these proceedings.

Mass. Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.1 (Mass. 2022). If Defendants feel that their counsel did not
provide minimally competent representation and that this failure resulted in an unsatisfactory
settlement, their recourse is against him.

C.   Entitlement to adjudication of claims                           
Defendants assert that they are entitled to “reschedule the trial to have all of the facts 

adjudicated.” [Defs.’ Objs. at 1]; see also [id. (“[Plaintiffs’ claims] have not been adjudicated
and continue to be in dispute.”)]. This conclusory statement lacks any basis in law and overlooks
the fact that by settling, the parties resolved the claims at issue in this case without a trial.
D. Constitutional issues

Defendants object that the Report and Recommendation “violates [their] 6th Amendment
‘equal protection under the law’ rights”; that Judge Levenson’s Report and Recommendation
would “take[] away [their] right to have a jury decide whether the claims against [them] are true
or false”; and that enforcement of the settlement agreement would mean that Defendants “giv[e]
up [their] constitutional rights,” [Defs.’ Objs. at 3, 5], though they do not explain which rights or
how they would be given up. The Court does not see any equal protection issue here, and
Defendants have not explained the basis for their other arguments. As explained above, the
parties’ settlement resolved the dispute and there is nothing left to try. The Constitution does not

prevent parties from settling cases; nor is there anything about this settlement that raises
constitutional issues.

III. CONCLUSION

Judge Levenson’s Report and Recommendation accurately analyzes the issues presented
by this motion. The Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED in its entirety and Defendants’
objections are OVERRULED. Defendants’ motion, [ECF No. 111], is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.                                                          

February 23, 2026 /s/ Allison D. Burroughs

ALLISON D. BURROUGHS

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE