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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Richard L. Jackson, et al. v. William Burton Jones, in his personal capacity, and in his official capacity as the Lieutenant Governor of Georgia, et al.

District Court, N.D. Georgia

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:26-cv-00782

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (30)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (46.7K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

RICHARD L. JACKSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL ACTION FILE

NO. 1:26-CV-782-TWT

WILLIAM BURTON JONES, in his

personal capacity, and in his official

capacity as the Lieutenant Governor of

Georgia, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

This is a civil rights action. It is before the Court on Plaintiffs Richard
L. Jackson and Jackson for Governor, Inc.’s Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order [Doc. 14]. For the reasons that follow as well as those stated on the
record at the February 20, 2026 hearing on the motion, the Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order [Doc. 14] is GRANTED.

I. Background

This case addresses yet another constitutional challenge to O.C.G.A.
§ 21-5-34.2 (the “LC Statute”). 2026 is an election year in Georgia for the
position of Governor. Candidates for state-wide offices are generally subject to
certain contribution limits imposed by Georgia law. Specifically, Georgia law
provides that a candidate and their campaign committees may not “receive
from any [person, corporation, political committee, or political party]
contributions . . . which in the aggregate for an election cycle exceed” $8,400
for the primary election and $4,800 for the primary runoff election. O.C.G.A.
§ 21-5-41(a); ( Compl. ¶¶ 10, 10 n.1, 50 [Doc. 1]).

But in 2021, the Georgia Legislature passed a law allowing certain
candidates to circumvent the limits imposed by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41. Ga.
Laws 2021, Act. 219 eff. July 1, 2021. Now codified as the LC Statute, the law
allows for the creation of “leadership committees” to operate within certain
Georgia statewide elections, subject to regulations. O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34.2.
A “leadership committee” may only be created by and chaired by the Governor,

the Lieutenant Governor, or the nominee of a political party for Governor or
Lieutenant Governor. O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34.2(a); ( Compl. ¶ 9). These
“leadership committees” may receive contributions and make contributions
toward certain candidates’ election campaigns without any dollar limitation
that would otherwise be imposed by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41. O.C.G.A.
§ 21-5-34.2(d), (e); ( Compl. ¶¶ 11-12).

In the 2026 Georgia gubernatorial election, Defendant William Burton

Jones, the current Lieutenant Governor of Georgia, is seeking the Republican
nomination for Governor.1 ( Compl. ¶ 28). In 2022, Defendant Jones
organized a leadership committee, Defendant WBJ Leadership Committee,

1 Defendant Brian Kemp, the current Governor of Georgia, is ineligible
for re-election. Ga. Const. Art. V, § 1.

2

Inc. (“WBJLC”). ( ¶ 14). Since the creation of Defendant WBJLC, the
leadership committee has been permitted to raise unlimited contributions from
donors. ( ). As of June 30, 2025, Defendant WBJLC reported a $14,299,337.43

ending monetary balance. ( ¶ 14 n.3). Furthermore, Defendant WBJLC has
received multiple contributions of $100,000. ( ). Defendant Jones has been
tapping into the funds collected by Defendant WBJLC to facilitate his
campaign for Governor. ( ¶ 15). Plaintiff Richard L. Jackson is a new

entrant to the Republican primary in the last month. ( ¶¶ 15, 21). As a
candidate for Governor, Plaintiff Jackson is subject to the contribution limits

imposed by O.C.G.A. § 25-1-41 and is not entitled to create a “leadership
committee” as a private citizen. ( ¶ 16).

To remedy this alleged inequality, the Plaintiffs filed this Complaint
with the Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments against the Defendants. ( ¶¶ 57-72).

Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that the LC Statute is unconstitutional
because it imposes an unequal playing field within the Republican primary,

where Defendant Jones may circumvent contribution limits while Plaintiff
Jackson is still subject to them. ( ). A day later, the Plaintiffs filed an
Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction. ( Pls.’ Emergency

Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [Doc. 12]).

                        3                                         

The Plaintiffs then filed their Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
before the Court, requesting an immediate hearing. ( Pls.’ Mot.

for Temp. Restraining Or. [Doc. 14]). In the attached briefing, the Plaintiffs

requested a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) because, since filing their
Complaint, Defendant WBJLC made reservations for more than $2.26 million
in linear broadcast advertising spots in support of Defendant Jones’s
campaign, which is a marked uptick in campaign spending from Defendant

WBJLC compared to the Defendant’s spending prior to the filing of the
Complaint.2 ( Br. in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Temp. Restraining Or., at 4-5

[Doc.14]). The Plaintiffs seek a TRO that (1) immediately enjoins Defendant
WBJLC from raising and spending any money in support of Defendant Jones’s
Georgia gubernatorial campaign and (2) orders Defendant WBJLC to cancel
any advertising contracts entered into by Defendant WBJLC that support

Defendant Jones’s campaign. ( at 9). The Court held a hearing on the

TRO on February 20, 2026 and granted the Plaintiffs’ motion from the bench
with this written order to follow.

                II.  Legal Standards                              

A TRO is a drastic remedy that should be granted only in limited
circumstances and upon a showing of clear necessity.

2 Prior to the filing of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defendant WBJLC only
spent $456,911 on the Jones campaign. ( Br. in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Temp.
Restraining Or., at 4-5 [Doc.14]).

4

, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998). “The standard for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are
identical.” , 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2020)

(citing , 379 F. App’x 912, 916-17 (11th Cir. 2010)).
The movant must show that (1) its claims have a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) it will suffer irreparable injury absent injunctive
relief; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any potential harm
that might result to the opposing party; and (4) granting the injunction will
not disserve the public interest. , [742

F.3d 1319, 1329](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2653400/americas-health-insurance-plans-v-ralph-hudgens/#1329) (11th Cir. 2014). The movant must “clearly establish” all four
elements. , 989 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir.

1993).

III. Discussion

A. Standing

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to
actual cases or controversies.

     , [858 F.3d 1362, 1365](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4397136/the-florence-endocrine-clinic-pllc-v-arriva-medical-llc/#1365) (11th Cir. 2017) (citing U.S. Const. Art. III, 

§ 2). This means that any plaintiff filing a complaint in federal court must
establish that they have standing to sue within the complaint. at 1365-66
(quoting , 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). A plaintiff must
demonstrate three elements to establish Article III standing: “[t]he plaintiff

                        5                                         

must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision.” at 1366 (quoting , [578

U.S. 330, 338](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3203762/spokeo-inc-v-robins/#338) (2016)). “Standing is not dispensed in gross.”

, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (citation modified). “Rather, ‘a
plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press’ and ‘for
each form of relief’ that is sought.” (citation modified).

1. Injury in Fact

“To establish an injury in fact, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he

suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”
, 996 F.3d 1110, 1113 (11th Cir. 2021)

(quoting , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). “An injury is

particularized when it ‘affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’”
(quoting , 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1). “To be concrete, the injury must be
‘real, and not abstract.’” (quoting , 578 U.S. at 340).

Here, the injury in fact alleged in the Complaint arises out of a violation
of the First Amendment as recognized in . In , the Supreme Court

considered a constitutional challenge to Section 319(a) of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, otherwise known as the “Millionaire’s
Amendment.” , 554 U.S. at 729. The Millionaire’s Amendment

                        6                                         

provided that, when a candidate used personal funds in excess of $350,000 in
their campaign, an opposing candidate could receive individual contributions
three times the normal limit and could accept coordinated party expenditures

without any limit. In considering whether the candidate had standing

to challenge the Millionaire’s Amendment, the Supreme Court found that he
satisfied the injury in fact element of standing because the operation of the
statute would allow “his opponent to receive contributions on more favorable
terms” after he had declared his candidacy. at 734.

Similarly, the Court is satisfied that the Plaintiffs have met their

burden in showing that they have suffered injury in fact. On similar challenges
to the LC statute, every court addressing a candidate-plaintiff’s standing
concludes that he suffers a qualifying injury when he is confronted with an
uneven electoral playing field between incumbents and non-incumbents.

, 601 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2022) (relying on
to hold an injury in fact exists when one candidate can establish a
leadership committee under the LC Statute while the other candidate may not

and is subject to the traditional contribution limits); , 584 F.

Supp. 3d 1310, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2022) (relying on to hold the same as to
primary elections); , 634 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1351-52 (N.D. Ga.

2022), , , 110 F.4th

1239 (11th Cir. 2024) (relying on to hold the same as to general

                        7                                         

elections); , No. 25-cv-04426-VMC, at 10-14

(N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2025), ECF No. 22 (relying on and to

conclude the same).

The Defendants advocate for a narrower reading of , arguing that

an injury in fact only exists if a candidate exercised his own First Amendment
rights to a certain degree like the candidate in . ( Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n
to Pls.’ Mot. for Temp. Restraining Or., at 10-11). But the Court finds no reason
to depart from previous holdings in this District. The Court’s interpretation of
on this issue comports with the reasons enumerated in and

. Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient injury
in fact.

2. Traceability

“To satisfy the traceability requirement, a plaintiff must establish a
‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.’”
, 57 F.4th 916, 926 (11th Cir. 2023)
(quoting , 540 U.S. at 560). “Proximate causation is not a requirement of

Article III standing.” , 941 F.3d 1116, 1125 (11th

Cir. 2019) (quoting , 572

U.S. 118, 134 n. 6 (2014) (citation modified)). “A plaintiff therefore need not
show (or, as here, allege) that ‘the defendant’s actions are the very last step in
the chain of causation.’” at 1126 (quoting , 520 U.S. 154,

                        8                                         

168-69 (1997)). The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate
traceability because there are no actions taken by Defendant WBJLC that are
illegal or improper under the LC Statute. ( Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot.

for Temp. Restraining Or., at 11).

The Court is unpersuaded and instead finds Judge Cohen’s decision in
compelling. In , the plaintiff, a candidate for the Georgia
Republican gubernatorial primary election, brought a constitutional challenge
against the LC Statute and sought a preliminary injunction against a
leadership committee established by Governor Kemp, prohibiting the

committee from making future expenditures. , 584 F. Supp. 3d at

1315-17. When considering the traceability requirement of Article III standing,
Judge Cohen held that the plaintiff satisfied this element because the LC
Statute permitted Governor Kemp to take advantage of an “inequitable
scheme” and raise funds “not subject to the individual contribution limits
established by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(a), while [the plaintiff] remains subject to
those limits in the same primary election.” at 1320. Like , the facts

in this case show a primary challenger in a gubernatorial race hamstrung by
the “inequitable scheme” created by the LC Statute, where Defendant Jones
can raise money for his campaign without restriction through Defendant
WBJLC while Plaintiff Jackson is subject to the contribution limits imposed by
O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(a).

                        9                                         

Still, the Defendants urge the Court to look to Judge Calvert’s decision
in to support their position that the Plaintiffs’ injuries cannot be traceable
to the Defendants because WBJLC is the only party to the motion. ( Defs.’

Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Temp. Restraining Or., at 12-13). This approach
misconstrues Judge Calvert’s decision in . There, the Attorney General of
Georgia, in his personal capacity, brought suit as a candidate in the Republican
primary for governor against only Defendants Jones, WBJLC, and Burt Jones
for Georgia, Inc. challenging the LC Statute. , No. 25-cv-04426-VMC, at 7.
Judge Calvert held that the traceability requirement was not satisfied because

the complaint failed to include any government officials or any claim that the
LC Statute should be invalidated. at 15-16. Indeed, part of the reason
the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the traceability requirement is because the
defendants were doing exactly as Georgia law allowed them to do. at 14.
This is not the case here. The Plaintiffs have sued the three Defendants
in along with numerous state officials in charge of enforcing the LC
Statute. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ injury is traceable to actions of the parties in this

case, unlike in the facts underlying . It is irrelevant that WBJLC is the
only party to the motion because Article III standing is not evaluated on a
motion-by-motion basis but is instead evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis.
, 554 U.S. at 734; (Feb. 20, 2026 Hearing at 18:22-19:8). Thus, the
Plaintiffs have satisfied the second requirement of standing.

                       10                                         
  3.  Redressability                                              

“Finally, [the Court] address[es] redressability, the third and final
requirement of Article III standing. To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff

needs to show that ‘it must be likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that
the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” , 57

F.4th at 927 (quoting , 540 U.S. at 561 (citation modified)).

The Court again is persuaded by Judge Cohen’s decisions in and

on the issue of redressability. In both cases, Judge Cohen held that
enjoining the leadership committees from spending more money in favor of

Governor Kemp’s campaign would redress the plaintiffs’ injury and place the
parties on a level playing field where both candidates are subject to the
statutory maximum for contributions. , 584 F. Supp. 3d at 1320;

, 601 F. Supp. 3d at 1303-04. Entering a TRO against Defendant

WBJLC enjoining further expenditures in favor of Defendant Jones’s
gubernatorial campaign will have the same effect.

It is irrelevant to the issue before the Court whether other leadership

committees are capable of harming the Plaintiffs or if an injunction results in
more or less spending to the parties’ campaigns, as the Defendants contend.
( Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Temp. Restraining Or., at 12-13). The
continued spending of Defendant WBJLC in favor of Defendant Jones’s
campaign in excess of the proscribed limits imposed by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(a)

                       11                                         

is the harm remedied by the entry of an injunction. Ultimately, if the Plaintiffs
succeed in obtaining their declaratory and injunctive relief, the harm posed by
the LC Statute will cease and the electoral playing field will be leveled. Thus,

the Plaintiffs’ Complaint demonstrates that they have satisfied all three
elements necessary for Article III standing.

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

To establish a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits, a
plaintiff must “demonstrate a likelihood of success at trial as to both its
case and the affirmative defenses asserted by the defendant.”

                               , 519 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1134       

(S.D. Fla. 2021) (citation modified). The Defendants make several arguments
against the Plaintiffs’ motion on this factor. The Court addresses them as they
arise in its analysis.

1. State Actor

Turning to the substantive arguments, the Defendants argue that the
Plaintiffs cannot clearly establish a substantial likelihood of success on the

merits because Defendant WBJLC is not a state actor, which the Plaintiffs
must prove to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot.
for Temp. Restraining Or., at 13). Section 1983 imposes liability on “every
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State . . . causes to be subjected . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

                       12                                         

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. “To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, plaintiffs
must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed
.”

, 344 F.3d 1263, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (quoting
, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999) (citation

modified)). “Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely

private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” at 1277
(quoting , 526 U.S. at 50 (quotation marks
omitted)).

Under guidance from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit has set
forth three primary tests to determine whether a private party is involved in
state action for the purposes of Section 1983: “(1) the public function test;
(2) the state compulsion test; and (3) the nexus/joint action test.” (citation

omitted). “The nexus/joint action test applies where the state has so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private party that
it was a joint participant in the enterprise.” (citation modified). “[A court]
must determine on a case-by-case basis whether sufficient state action is
present from a non-state actor (defendant) to sustain a section 1983 claim.”

                       13                                         

(citation omitted). “To charge a private party with state action under this
standard, the governmental body and private party must be intertwined in a
symbiotic relationship. The Supreme Court has indicated that the symbiotic

relationship must involve the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.”
at 1278 (citation modified). “Only in rare circumstances can a private party
be viewed as a state actor for section 1983 purposes.”

, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation modified).

Judge Cohen’s holding in is instructive in determining whether

state action exists under the nexus/joint action test. There, Judge Cohen was

confronted with the issue of whether Governor Kemp’s leadership committee
was a state actor for the purposes of the plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim. After
reviewing the LC Statute, the court concluded that the operation of the
leadership committee satisfied the nexus/joint action test. , 601 F.

Supp. 3d at 1308-09. Specifically, Judge Cohen noted that the LC Statute
required a leadership committee to be chaired by the Governor in the case of
Governor Kemp, and, if he left his position, Governor Kemp would be required

to effectively dissolve the leadership committee. at 1308 (citing
O.C.G.A. §§ 21-5-34.2(a), (c)). Because Governor Kemp’s leadership committee
required him to chair the committee, Judge Cohen concluded that Governor
Kemp had “so far insinuated himself into a position of interdependence with
the [leadership committee] that he [was] a joint participant in the enterprise.”

                       14                                         

(quoting , 241 F.3d at 1348 (citation modified)).

Similarly, Defendant WBJLC contains all the hallmarks of satisfying
the nexus/joint action test. At this stage in the Republican primary election,

the only candidate in the election permitted to form a leadership committee is
Defendant Jones, as Lieutenant Governor of the State of Georgia. Without
Defendant Jones chairing Defendant WBJLC, the leadership committee would
be required to dissolve and transfer its assets to another leadership committee.
O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34.2(c). Alternatively, the LC Statute requires Defendant
Jones to name another eligible person as the new chairperson for Defendant

WBJLC. But the only other individual who could chair Defendant

WBJLC at this stage of the election is Governor Kemp, because there will not
be official nominees for any party until the conclusion of the primary elections
on May 9, 2026.

Still, the Defendants argue that the nexus/joint action test cannot be
satisfied, comparing Defendant WBJLC to a series of cases where the Supreme
Court and the Eleventh Circuit have ruled that the test had been satisfied.

( Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Temp. Restraining Or, at 14-15). Yet,
leadership committees like Defendant WBJLC have no analogue. Georgia’s LC
Statute stands alone in the structure and operation of its “leadership
committees.” It is difficult to argue that leadership committees, which may
only be chaired by the leaders of the executive branch, are not intertwined in

                       15                                         

a symbiotic relationship with the State of Georgia. , 344 F.3d at 1278. Defendant WBJLC lends its entire existence to the
participation of the Lieutenant Governor of the State of Georgia. Meanwhile,

Defendant Jones gains the benefit of being able to use the entity to circumvent
the contribution rules applicable to every other primary candidate by receiving
unlimited contribution funds, as well as coordinating Defendant WBJLC’s
expenditures. Thus, the Court concludes that Defendant WBJLC is a state
actor for the purposes of the Plaintiffs’ claims under Section 1983.

2. Substantive Arguments

Under the Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege two Section 1983 counts
against the Defendants. ( Compl. ¶¶ 57-72). The first count requests
declaratory and injunctive relief under the First Amendment, as applied to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment. ( ¶¶ 57-65). The second count

asserts an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. (

¶¶ 66-72). The Court need not address the second count because the Court
concludes that the Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of success on the

merits of their First Amendment claim.

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . .

abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The First Amendment
applies to Georgia through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. , 370 F.3d 1252, 1268 (11th

                       16                                         

Cir. 2004) (citing , 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931)). “The First
Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered
during a campaign for political office.” , 584 F. Supp. 3d at 1322 (quoting

                                  , [480 U.S. 214](https://www.courtlistener.com/c/U.S./480/214/), 223 (1989)      

(citation modified)). “Spending for political ends and contributing to political
candidates both fall within the First Amendment’s protection of speech and
political association.” (quoting

, 533 U.S. 431, 440 (2001)). But the Supreme Court

routinely sustains “the facial constitutionality of limits on discrete and

aggregate individual contributions and on coordinated party expenditures.”
, 554 U.S. at 737.

When confronted with such a statute that implicates First Amendment
interests, the Supreme Court has held that the statute cannot stand unless it
is “closely drawn” to serve a “sufficiently important interest,” such as
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. This standard is
considered to be less exacting than strict scrutiny, allowing “a measure of

deference to the judgment of the legislative body that enacted the law.” ;
, 838 F.3d 1057, 1063 (11th Cir.

2016). The burden of this showing is on the State, not the Plaintiff.

, 838 F.3d at 1063.

                       17                                         

Yet, the Defendants fail to make any such showing within their response
brief and omit any discussion on the merits of the Plaintiff’s First Amendment
claim. But even if the Defendants had attempted to carry their burden, the

Court is bound by . There, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the
court “ha[s] never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes different
contribution limits for candidates who are competing against each other.”
, 554 U.S. at 738. The Supreme Court further remarked that “imposing
different contribution and coordinated party expenditure limits on candidates
vying for the same seat is antithetical to the First Amendment.” at 743-44.

The three prior cases within this District addressing the constitutionality of
the LC Statute all apply to ultimately conclude that the statute likely
runs afoul of the First Amendment. , 584 F. Supp. 3d at 1321-27;

, 601 F. Supp. 3d at 1304-07; , 634 F. Supp. 3d at 1354-56.

The Court sees no reason to depart from Judge Cohen’s prior holdings.
The LC Statute creates the exact scheme the Supreme Court has explicitly
disavowed by imposing different contribution limits for candidates vying for

the Republican nomination for Governor of Georgia. Defendant Jones may take
advantage of leadership committees, while Plaintiff Jackson is subject to the
stricter campaign contribution limits imposed by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(a).
Furthermore, the Defendants can point to no underlying purpose behind the
LC Statute arising out of a need to combat corruption because the statute has

                       18                                         

no such purpose. Therefore, the Court concludes that the LC Statute is likely
unconstitutional.

3. Unclean Hands

In a last-ditch effort, the Defendants argue that the equitable doctrine
of unclean hands bars the Plaintiffs from the relief they seek in their
Complaint because Plaintiff Jackson allegedly spent millions of dollars in
support of his campaign prior to announcing his candidacy, in violation of state
campaign finance law. ( Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n. to Pls.’ Mot. for Temp.
Restraining Or., at 17). To demonstrate that a party is entitled to the defense

of unclean hands, a defendant must show that “(1) the plaintiff’s wrongdoing
is directly related to the claim, and (2) the defendant was personally injured
by the wrongdoing.” , 776 F.3d 797, 801 (11th

Cir. 2015). Assuming such allegations are true, Plaintiff Jackson’s conduct
would not entitle the Defendants to an unclean hands defense because his
alleged wrongdoing is not directly related to his First Amendment claim.
Therefore, the Defendants’ argument fails, and the Court concludes that the

Plaintiffs are substantially likely to prevail on the merits of their claims.
C. Irreparable Harm

“A showing of irreparable injury is ‘the sine qua non of injunctive relief.’
” , 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation modified).
“[E]ven if [the] Plaintiffs establish a likelihood of success of the merits, the

                       19                                         

absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone,
make [ ] injunctive relief improper.” “An injury is irreparable ‘if it cannot
be undone through monetary remedies.’ ” , 612 F.3d 1279, 1295 (11th Cir. 2010). “[T]he asserted irreparable injury ‘must be neither remote nor
speculative, but actual and imminent.’ ” , 234 F.3d at 1176-77 (citation
omitted).

Not every violation of constitutional rights constitutes irreparable harm.
at 1177. Nonetheless, violations of the First Amendment often satisfy this
standard. In , 427 U.S. 347 (1976), the Supreme Court explicitly

held that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” at 373. Applying this
standard, the Eleventh Circuit has held that violations of the First
Amendment constitute irreparable harm to the Plaintiffs where there is an
“imminent likelihood that pure speech will be chilled or prevented altogether.”
, 234 F.3d at 1178. This is because “chilled free speech . . . , because of
its intangible nature, could not be compensated for by monetary damages; in

other words, plaintiffs could not be made whole.” , 612 F.3d at 1295 (citation modified).

Because the Court has found that the Plaintiffs are substantially likely
to succeed on their First Amendment claim, the Plaintiffs have demonstrated
irreparable harm. The continued expenditures of Defendant WBJLC in favor

                       20                                         

of Defendant Jones’s campaign are only permitted under the LC Statute and
would be barred by the campaign finance rules of O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(a). This
includes the contracts entered into after the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint

with the Court. The operations of Defendant WBJLC, permitted by the LC

Statute, have violated and continue to violate the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment
right of free speech. Therefore, there is a very real and imminent likelihood
that the Plaintiffs’ speech will be chilled under the LC Statute. , 234
F.3d at 1178.

Yet, the Defendants argue that Plaintiff Jackson and Plaintiff Jackson

for Governor, Inc. cannot establish that any speech was chilled because
Plaintiff Jackson has allegedly stated that he need not rely on campaign
contributions to prevail in his candidacy. ( Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot.
for Temp. Restraining Or., at 8). Additionally, the Defendants highlight that
Plaintiff Jackson has spent his own personal funds through Plaintiff Jackson
for Governor, Inc. and has already spent or plans to spend $29.08 million on
television advertising. ( at 8-9; Feb. 20, 2026 Hearing at 30:06-30:10).

At the February 20, 2026 hearing, the Defendants further emphasized the size
of this spending in comparison to prior Republican primaries, showing that the
total spend on television advertisements in the 2022 Republican gubernatorial
primary was $35.6 million.3 ( Feb. 20, 2026 Hearing at 30:11-30:13).

3 To further illustrate their point, the Defendants presented a
21

While the facts understandably do not paint a favorable impression of
the Plaintiffs’ claim that their speech was chilled by the LC Statute, the Court
still finds injury to Plaintiff Jackson. First, as the Plaintiffs highlighted both

at the February 20, 2026 hearing and in their reply brief, the Defendants take
Plaintiff Jackson’s quote about contributions out of context. These comments
were in relation to money coming from the Georgia political establishment and
were not in the context of contributions in general.4 ( Reply Br. in Supp. of
Pls.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Temp. Restraining Or., at 2 [Doc. 39]; Feb. 20
Hearing at 8:20-9:21). This added context is further supported by the fact that

Plaintiff Jackson for Governor, Inc. continues to seek contributions from
supporters. ( Reply Br. in Supp. of Pls.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Temp.
Restraining Or., at 2 (citing Zolnierowicz Supp. Decl. ¶ 9)). As such, the
variable contribution limits between the campaigns have the effect of
continuously and imminently chilling speech.

demonstrative PowerPoint to supplement their oral argument at the February
20, 2026 hearing. The demonstrative showed that Defendant WBJLC spent

around $9.3 million in 2026, compared to the $29.08 million spent by the
Plaintiffs’ campaign. In a pie chart, the Defendants showed that the Plaintiffs
are responsible for around 76% of expenditures related to ad buys in 2026,
while Defendant WBJLC has spent 24%.

4 The Court is unable to access the article containing the disputed quote
and context by Plaintiff Jackson. However, the Defendants do not appear to
dispute the added context provided by the Plaintiffs. Thus, the Court will
consider the Plaintiffs’ added context despite not being able to access the article
itself.

22

Second, the Court finds no reason to penalize Plaintiff Jackson in the
exercise of his First Amendment right to contribute to his own campaign.
Indeed, previous decisions by the Supreme Court have emphasized “the

fundamental nature of the right to spend personal funds for campaign speech.”
, 554 U.S. at 738-39 (discussing , 424 U.S. 1, 52-54 (1976) and finding that the decision emphasized the fundamental right to
spend personal funds on a campaign). That is exactly the fundamental right
which Plaintiff Jackson exercises here while being injured by the unequal
electoral playing field created by the LC Statute. Furthermore, if the LC

Statute is later declared unconstitutional as to its application to Defendant
Jones’s campaign, it may reduce the necessity for Plaintiff Jackson to spend on
his own campaign because Defendant Jones would be subject to the same

requirements as to his campaign. Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs
have satisfied the irreparable harm factor.

D. Balance of Harms

The third factor requires a court to “weigh whether the defendant is

harmed more by the issuance of injunctive relief than the plaintiff is harmed
by not entering an injunction.” , 241 F. Supp.

3d 1208, 1231 (N.D. Ala. 2017); , 958 F.3d 1081, 1090-91 (11th Cir. 2020) (discussing the lower court’s application of the factor and
finding error in the balancing test where the lower court balanced harm to the

                       23                                         

plaintiff generally, instead of harm to the plaintiff without an injunction).

The harm to the Plaintiffs without TRO relief is clear. The Plaintiffs are
harmed by the unconstitutionality of the LC Statute and Defendant WBJLC’s

lawful operation under that statute. Such harm is irreparable, and the injury
would continue as Defendant WBJLC made broadcasting reservations with TV
stations worth $2.26 million shortly after the Plaintiffs’ filing of their
Complaint. The Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiffs would not be harmed
by Defendant WBJLC’s expenditures due to Plaintiff Jackson’s personal
expenditures, ( Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Temp. Restraining Or.,

at 18), fails for reasons already explained by the Court in its irreparable harm
analysis. , 584 F. Supp. 3d at 1328 (applying and

rejecting the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ harm was mitigated by
self-funding his own campaign); , 601 F. Supp. 3d at 1309 (rejecting

the defendants’ argument that funds raised by the plaintiffs’ campaign
mitigated their harm and placed the defendants at a disadvantage because the
leadership committee could still raise funds for the general election);

The Defendants argue that the harm to Defendant Jones’s campaign

upon entry of the TRO outweighs any harm to the Plaintiff. ( Defs.’ Br. in
Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Temp. Restraining Or., at 17-20). They liken the entry
of the TRO to a gag order and prior restraint, which allows the Plaintiffs to
allegedly dominate the airwaves while Defendant WBJLC’s lawful

                       24                                         

expenditures are quashed. ( at 17-18). This argument entirely

mischaracterizes the nature of the injunction. As Judge Cohen explained in
under similar circumstances, the requested injunction restores

Defendant Jones’s campaign to the status quo that would have existed prior to
the operation of the LC Statute. , 584 F. Supp. 3d at 1327.
Furthermore, there is no prohibition on Defendant WBJLC from spending

their contributions during the general election. , 601 F. Supp. 3d

at 1309.

In effect, Defendant Jones’s campaign can still receive contributions and

spend money on advertising without any restriction imposed by the Court as
long as Defendant WBJLC is not a participant in the campaign. This effectively
requires both Plaintiff Jackson and Defendant Jones to conduct their campaign
finances under the same restrictions imposed by O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(a). There
is no restriction on Defendant Jones spending his own money to fund his
campaign, just as Plaintiff Jackson has been doing for his own. Thus, the
balance of the harms favors the Plaintiffs.

E. Public Interest

The fourth factor requires a court to consider whether granting the TRO
will disserve the public interest. , 742 F.3d at

1329. “[T]he public, when the state is a party asserting harm, has no interest
in enforcing an unconstitutional law.” , 612 F.3d at 1297. “Similarly, a[n]

                       25                                         

[ ] injunction is not contrary to the public interest because it is in the public
interest to protect First Amendment rights.” , 94 F.4th 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2024).

Still, the Defendants argue that the public interest weighs against
granting the TRO because it requires Defendant WBJLC to cancel any
advertising contracts it entered into after February 10, 2026 (the day the
Complaint was filed). ( Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Temp.
Restraining Or., at 21-22). The Defendants first take issue with a potential
TRO seeking mandatory injunctive relief because such relief would alter,

rather than maintain, the status quo. ( at 21). The Defendants then take
issue with the proposed TRO reversing Defendant WBJLC’s past actions as it
interferes with funds already spent or committed. ( at 21-22).

The Court disagrees. The mandatory injunctive relief imposed by the
TRO resets the parties to a position where both campaigns are subject to the
same rules and regulations for the Republican gubernatorial primary.
Defendant WBJLC’s contracts with television stations were only entered into

after the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint with the Court and were on notice
that they sought to restrict the operation of Defendant WBJLC due to the
unconstitutionality of the LC Statute. , 328 U.S. 246, 251 (1946) (“It has long been established that where a defendant with notice in an
injunction proceeding completes the acts sought to be enjoined the court may

                       26                                         

by mandatory injunction restore the status quo” (citing

, 276 U.S. 475, 479 (1928))). Although this

relief is being granted early in the litigation, it does not alter the status quo as

the Defendants contend.

The Defendants’ second argument similarly fails. The Defendants cite
to , 424 F.3d 1117, 1133 (11th Cir. 2005), for
the proposition that the Court may not order the reversal of Defendant
WBJLC’s past actions. ( Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Temp.
Restraining Or., at 21-22). This argument reflects a fundamental

misunderstanding in the decision’s holding. It is true that an injunction is
limited to prospective relief, , 424 F.3d at 1133 (citing , 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)), and that the Eleventh
Circuit stated that a “preliminary injunction is completely at odds with a
sanction for past conduct that may be addressed by adequate remedies at law,”

But the Eleventh Circuit’s use of the word “sanction” is indicative of

their actual holding. The facts underlying the appellate court’s decision
show that the court was reviewing an injunction that was entered against
certain parties by a lower court all the harm had already occurred.

(“Alabama and Florida make clear that all of the harm they claim has
occurred”). The Eleventh Circuit was explicit about what the lower

                       27                                         

court’s true error was, holding that “

is ‘the sine qua non of injunctive relief.’ ” (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). This is further reflected within the holding, as the appellate court

concludes that the plaintiffs’ past injuries are “irremediable—which renders
injunctive relief inappropriate.”

Here, it is true that the proposed TRO would require Defendant WBJLC
to reverse past conduct, namely the cancellation of advertising contracts with
television stations. But this action alone does not harm the Plaintiffs. It is the
use of Defendant WBJLC’s funds in favor of Defendant Jones’s campaign and

the exposure of the subsequent advertisement to the public that continues to
harm the Plaintiffs. An injunction cannot remedy past harm, but it can still be
imposed where “irreparable injury might result from delay or inaction.”
, 424 F.3d at 1133. Here, the Defendants have made no

showing that Defendant WBJLC has spent any amount of money under any of
the advertising contracts made. Furthermore, from the Court’s knowledge,
none of the advertisements have aired.

There is likely a reason for that. At the February 20, 2026 hearing, the
Plaintiffs highlighted that, generally, the media contracts entered into by
Defendant WBJLC require “no payment or financial commitment until 24

hours before the start of the reserved period.” (Feb. 20, 2026 Hearing
24:24-25:7). This means that Defendant WBJLC may cancel its contracts with

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television stations that it entered into after the filing of the Complaint without
any payment or penalty. ( ). The Defendants never provided any facts in
opposition to this statement within their briefing or during the hearing. Thus,

the requested relief under the TRO would not disserve the public interest
because the mandatory relief it imposes on Defendant WBJLC does not alter
the status quo and remedies imminent, not past harm.

F. Deficiencies Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Finally, the Defendants oppose the Plaintiffs’ proposed TRO based on
two structural deficiencies under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. First,

the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to join necessary parties
to obtain their requested mandatory injunctive relief under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 19 because the injunction “impairs and impedes” on their
interest. ( Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Temp. Restraining Or., at
15-16). Second, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs’ requested relief fails
for the want of specificity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. (
at 23-25). Neither is fatal to the Plaintiffs’ request for a TRO here.

  1.  Joinder of Necessary Parties                                

Under Rule 19, a party is indispensable from an action if “that [party]
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
disposing of the action in the person’s absence may . . . as a practical matter
impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

                       29                                         

19(a)(1)(B)(i). In determining whether a party is indispensable under Rule
19(a), “pragmatic concerns, especially the effect on the parties and the
litigation, control.” , 669 F.2d 667, 669 (11th Cir. 1982) (citation modified). The Defendants argue
that the television stations that Defendant WBJLC contracted with are
necessary parties under Rule 19 because the cancellation of those contracts
would “impair or impede” their contractual interests. ( Defs.’ Br. in Opp’n
to Pls.’ Mot. for Temp. Restraining Or., at 15-16). Taking all “pragmatic
concerns” into account, the Court holds that the television stations are not

indispensable parties because their interest in the litigation is .

While it is true that each television station has a contractual interest in
each reservation made by Defendant WBJLC, several factors counsel against
their inclusion as an indispensable party. First, the contractual interest alone
is bare. No money has been exchanged, and the parties have agreed that

Defendant WBJLC may cancel its reservation without penalty in most
circumstances. Second, the Plaintiffs’ requested TRO does not declare such

contracts void, but rather requires Defendant WBJLC to cancel them,
something Defendant WBJLC was already entitled to do. Third, there is no
evidence that the television stations cannot enter into other reservation
contracts to remedy any harm posed by the entry of the TRO. Denying a TRO
on this basis for a interest is not pragmatic and does not take into

                       30                                         

account the effect on the Plaintiffs or the litigation as a whole. Therefore, the
Court concludes that the television stations are not indispensable parties
under Rule 19.

  2.  Vagueness of Requested Relief                               

Under Rule 65, every order granting a restraining order must “describe
in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other
document—the act or acts restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(C).
From the text of this Rule alone, the Defendants’ Rule 65 argument fails. Rule
65(d) is a requirement imposed on a court entering a preliminary injunction or

TRO. , 143 F.3d 1407, 1411

(1998). It does not impose any such requirement on a plaintiff seeking a TRO
from the Court. If such a requirement exists, the Defendants fail to cite
supporting authority for it in their briefing to the Court. Thus, the Court is not
inclined to break new ground and deny a TRO on this basis.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons as well as those stated on the record at the

February 20, 2026 hearing on the motion, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order [Doc. 14] is GRANTED. Defendant WBJLC is hereby
ENJOINED from raising or spending any money in support of Defendant

Jones’s Georgia gubernatorial campaign until Defendant Jones becomes the
nominee of the Republican Party or further order of this Court, whichever

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comes first. Furthermore, the Defendants are ORDERED to either (1) cancel
any advertising contracts of any kind entered into by Defendant WBJLC that
support Defendant Jones’s campaign or (2) have those advertising contracts
assumed by Defendant Jones’s official candidate committee, Defendant Burt
Jones for Georgia, Inc., within 14 days of the date of this Order.
A hearing on the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 12]
is hereby set for March 13, 2026, at 10:00 A.M. in Courtroom 2108, United
States Courthouse, 75 Ted Turner Drive, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia. No live
witnesses will be permitted. The Defendants are directed to file their response
to the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 12] by March 2, 2026,
and any reply is due by March 11, 2026.
SO ORDERED, this 27th day of February, 2026.

                                   A tornes,   WO Fonte 
                                    THOMAS W. THRASH, JR. 
                                    United States District Judge 

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