Lopez v. United States - Appeal of Sentence for Child Pornography Offenses

United Sta tes Court of Appeals f or the Fifth Circuit ________ ____ No. 25 - 40027 ________ ____ United States of America, Plainti ff — Appellee, versus David Lopez, Jr., Defendant — Appell ant. ________ ____ ___ _____ _______ ___ Appea l fr om the United State s District Co urt for the Sout her n Distr ict of Texa s USDC N o. 3:2 4 - CR -1-1 ________ ____ ___ _____ _______ ___ Before E lrod, C hie f Judge, a nd Smith and Wilson, Cir cuit Judges. Jennif er W alker Elr od, Ch ief Ju dge: In this appeal, D avid L opez, Jr., contests his 360 - mont h sentenc e, arguing that the district co urt shou ld not h ave applied two particular enhancem ents t o his bas e offens e l evel. The district court pro perly imposed a five - level incre ase fo r circumstances in which “the defendant d istributed ” child pornography “ in exchang e for any v aluabl e considera tion, b ut not for pecun iary gain.” But becaus e we agree w ith counsel fo r both partie s that the district c ourt in correctl y applied a five - level enhance ment for “a patte rn of activity involving the se xual abuse or e xploitati on of a m inor,” we VACATE and REMA ND for res entenci ng. United S tates Court of A ppeals Fifth Circuit FILED February 26, 2026 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/26/2026

No. 25 - 40027 2 I Lope z pleaded gu ilty to two counts o f transportatio n of ch ild pornogr aphy and t wo count s of possess ion of chi ld pornograp hy. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1), (a)(5)(B), (b)(1) – (2). The district co urt imp osed multi ple enhanc ement s, including, as relevan t h ere, a five - le vel enh ancement for “d istribut[ing ]” ch ild porn ography “in exchan ge for an y valuable consid eration, but not for p ecuniary gain,” U.S. Se nt’g Guidelin es Manual § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) (U.S. S ent’g Co mm’n 20 24), 1 a nd another f ive - l evel increas e for “en gag[ing] in a p attern of activity invo lving the s exual abuse or explo itation of a m inor,” id. § 2G 2.2(b)(5). Lop ez ob ject ed to the f ormer, but no t the latter. Once th e district court had add ed all the enhan cement s, Lop ez had an offens e lev el of fort y - two and a criminal - history categ ory of V. This r esulted in a Gui delines r ange of 360 mont hs t o life impris onment. Id. ch. 5, pt. A (Sen tencing Table). The distr ict court ado pted the presen tence inve stigation report as the court’s find ings and legal conc lusi ons. See United States v. Arviso - Ma ta, 442 F.3 d 382, 385 n.10 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he PSR ‘is consid ered reliab le and may be co nsidere d as evidence b y the district co urt when m aking sen tencing de termin ations.’” (quotin g United States v. Ramire z, 3 67 F.3 d 27 4, 277 (5th C ir. 20 04))). Having st ated that it “h a[d] con sidered the Guideline s and f[oun d] that a sen tence with in the G uidelines is consiste nt with an d takes into account all th e purp oses of” 18 U.S.C. § 35 53, the dis trict court se ntenced Lopez to 360 mont hs i n prison f or the two trans portat ion offenses a nd 240 mont hs f or the p oss ession off ens es. Th e cour t det ermined t hat Lopez ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 1 The d istrict c ourt a pplie d th e 2024 ed ition of the Sen tenc ing Gu idelines, a nd we do the same. Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/26/2026

No. 25 - 40027 3 shou ld serve all cou nts concu rrently “fo r a total cumulat ive sen tence of 360 mo nths” — the lo w en d of Lop ez’s Guideline s range. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. The distric t co urt also impose d a life term of supe rvised re lease, as well as r estitution and a special asse ssmen t. Lopez time ly appealed. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(A), (b)(A)(i). II We cons ider whether the district cou rt properly applied the distributio n and patte rn enhancemen ts. A Lope z maintains th at the five - level d istributio n en hancement does not apply t o him, but his argum ents fail. Lopez objected to thi s enhance ment in district cou rt, so we review th at c ourt’s applica tion of the Guideline s de novo and its factual fin dings f or clear e rror. United St ates v. Lawr ence, 9 20 F.3d 331, 334 (5th Cir. 2019); United Stat es v. B aco n, 64 6 F.3d 21 8, 220 (5t h Ci r. 2011). “A factu al finding is n ot clearly er roneous if it is plaus ible in ligh t of the rec ord as a whole.” Unit ed States v. Vill anuev a, 40 8 F.3d 193, 203 (5th Cir. 2 005) (citing United States v. Valen cia, 44 F.3d 269, 27 2 (5t h Ci r. 199 5)). Under the clear - error standard, “we may n ot set [a distr ict court’ s factual ] findin gs aside unle ss, after examinin g the entire record, we are ‘left with the defin ite and firm conviction th at a mista ke has been co mmitted.’” Alexan der v. S.C. State Con f. of the NA ACP, 602 U. S. 1, 18 (2024) (quot ing Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 3 09 (20 17)). The gov ernment must prove t hat enha nceme nts a pply by a prepo nder ance of t he e vi dence. Unite d State s v. Halv ers on, 897 F.3d 645, 652 (5th Cir. 2018). If the district court pro cedurally erred by apply ing the distr ibuti on enhancem ent, “reman d is requi red” unless “the gover nment Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/26/2026

No. 25 - 40027 4 can estab lish that the error was harmless.” Id. at 651 (citin g United States v. Delgado - Mar tinez, 564 F.3d 750, 752 – 53 (5th Ci r. 2009)). 1 The d istrict court imposed a five - leve l enhanceme nt that app lies “[i] f the de fendant distrib uted in exchan ge for any valuable consid eration, but not for pecu nia ry ga in.” U.S.S.G. § 2G 2.2(b)(3)(B). Per th e Gui del ines commenta ry, the phra se the defend ant dis tribut ed in exchan ge for any valua ble consider ation means t hat the de fendant “ agreed to an exchan ge with another person under which the defen dant knowin gly distribute d to that o ther pe rson for the specific p urpose of obtain ing some thing of valuab le consi deration from th at other person, s uch as oth er child p ornog raphic material, prefe rential access to child porno graphic material, or acce ss to a ch ild.” Id. § 2G2.2 c mt. n.1; see also id. (d efining d istribut ion). Thus, the enhanc ement applies if “(1) the defend ant agreed to an exchange with anoth er person, (2) the defendan t knowingly distribute d child pornograp hy to th at person (3) for the purpose of obtaining so meth ing of valuable consid eration, and (4) the valuable consideratio n came f rom that pe rson.” Halverson, 897 F.3 d at 652. That fourth requi rement does not mea n that the defendan t must “ actually receive ‘valu able consideration ’ in exchan ge for distribu ting child pornogr aphy under... § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B).” United Stat es v. Fuc ito, 12 9 F.4t h 289, 29 2 (5th Ci r. 202 5) (quoti ng U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b) (3)(B)); accor d id. at 295. Th e gov ern men t must show only “ that the distrib utor sen t the pornogr aphy wi th the intent that the receive r (and no t some third party) give valuable co nsider ation in return.” Id. at 295 n.4 (emphas is added) (citing Halverson, 897 F.3d a t 651). The district c ourt cor rectly co nclude d that L opez h ad an implic it agr eement to distr ibute child pornogra phy for the purp ose of obtai ning more Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/26/2026

No. 25 - 40027 5 child pornography and that he in deed d istributed it. Se e U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1; Halvers on, 89 7 F.3d at 652. As th at court found, Lopez participated in onlin e “chatro oms” that “requir ed him to subm it child po rnography images to receive additional ch ild porno graphy images” — indee d, t hese “chatro oms” we re created f or the express purpose of “s endin g and receivin g” such m aterials. A spe cial agent testified that “som e of thes e source s required frequent submission to avoid bein g a ‘lurker,’ someone who views but does not contribu te.” This ap parent p olicy against “ lurkers” shows that these chatroo ms require participan ts to pos t child por nographic material to take part in the chatroom at all, su ch th at Lopez could have been kicked ou t of the chatroom if he had n ot submitted child porno graph y. To begin, w e cannot say that the d istrict cou rt clearly erre d in finding that Lopez ha d f ormed an implicit agreemen t to exch ange child pornograp hy. “Wheth er an agre ement exis ts is a f act q uestion reviewe d for clear erro r.” Fucito, 129 F.4th at 294. And the agreement may b e explicit or im plicit. Id. By joining a chatroo m that allo ws an in dividu al to view pornograp hy onl y if he contribu tes similar mate rials, the individua l implic itly agre es to dis tribute child p ornograph y in exc hange for more of the same. See id.; Halverson, 897 F. 3d at 652. This is so espe cially wh ere, as he re, the individual m ay participa te in the chatroo m only by submitting po rnograph ic material. The district cou rt’s find ing that Lop ez formed an im plicit agreem ent to exchan ge child po rnograp hy with oth ers w hen he ente red that chatro om is “p lausible in light of th e reco rd as a w hole,” so the district co urt did not clear ly er r. Villanuev a, 408 F.3d at 2 03 (citing Valencia, 44 F.3 d at 272). The evidenc e also s hows that L opez “kn owingly d istributed child pornogr aphy” in t hes e cha trooms wit h the g oal of receiving additional child pornogr aphy fro m thos e with who m he sha red it. Halverson, 897 F.3d at 652; see Fucito, 129 F.4th at 294 – 95. The factual basis to Lo pez’s g uilty ple a, which Lopez con firmed was tru e and co rrect, stated that Lo pez “adm itted to Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/26/2026

No. 25 - 40027 6 viewin g child po rnography i n [these] chat rooms. ” The fact th at Lopez was able to view c hild por nogra phy in th ese chat rooms, which condition acce ss on sh aring similar m aterials, shows tha t he gave child porn ogra phy to others with th e goal of procuring more such ma teria ls from them. The district co urt thus co rrectly co ncluded that the five - level d istribution enhance ment applies. H alverson, 8 97 F.3 d at 65 2. 2 Lope z insists that the enhancem ent does not a pply beca use, in hi s view, none o f the evidence demonstrate s that he had a quid pro quo a greeme nt with an other pe rson to distr ibute to that perso n with th e specif ic purpos e of getting some thing of valuable co nsider ation from that other pers on. See U.S.S.G. § 2G 2. 2 cmt. n.1. As our court has previo usly no ted, the d istributor must hav e sent t he por nograp hy “ with the inten t that the re ceiver (and not some third party) give valuable co nside ration in return.” Fucit o, 129 F. 4th a t 295 n. 4. Lope z maintains that the go vernment h as not show n a specif ic agreeme nt to exchan ge child po rnography with an other person to g et somethi ng “from t hat person, and not so me thi rd part y.” We dis agree: As we expl ai ned abov e, the district cou rt prope rly de termined th at Lopez implicit ly agree d to exch ange child porno graphy with other s in the chatro om and that h e distribu ted with that inten t. That con clusion ab ove accord s with th e Guide lines comm entary. 2 Again, per t he c om mentar y, a defendant distr ibuted in exchang e for any ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 2 “[T]h e Guid elines commenta ry is ‘au thoritati ve unless it violates th e Cons titution or a fede ral statu te, or is incons istent with, or a plainly e rroneou s read ing of, that gu ideline.’ ” Unite d States v. M artin, 119 F.4th 410, 414 (5th Cir. 2024) (q uoting Stinson v. Unit ed States, 508 U. S. 36, 38 (1993)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1 454 (2025); see also United Sta tes v. Varg as, 74 F.4th 673, 6 77 – 78, 680 – 83 (5th C ir. 2023) (en ba nc). No p ar ty Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/26/2026

No. 25 - 40027 7 valuable co nsider ation if he “agreed to an exchange with anot her person under which the defe ndant know ingly dis tributed to tha t other p erson for the specific purpose of obtaini ng somethi ng of valu able consi derati on from th at othe r person.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1 (empha sis added). To the extent that Lope z argues that an individual’s agre ement with a group will n ot qualify fo r the e nhancement, w e disagree. The Guidelin es comme ntary does not prohibi t the enha ncem ent from applyi ng whe re the d efendant has a gr eed to exchan ge with anoth er group of peop le as oppose d to another ind ividual. See id. When in terpretin g Guidelin es commen tary, “we ap ply ord inary rules of statuto ry cons truction.” Uni ted Sta tes v. A ustin, 479 F.3d 363, 367 – 68 (5th Cir. 2 007) (citing United St ates v. Car bajal, 290 F.3d 277, 283 (5t h Ci r. 2002)). And absent “a con trary indic ation, ... the singular in clude s the plural (an d vice ver sa).” A ntonin Scalia & B ryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Inte rpretation o f Legal Texts 1 29 (2012) (em phasis omitte d). Thus, unde r the Guidelin es commen tary, the five - leve l distribution enh anceme nt can apply w her e a defendant agree s (explicitly o r implicitly) to exchange with a group o f individu als and distrib ute to th at group with the intent to receive from that group. See U.S.S.G. § 2G 2. 2 cmt. n.1. Put differently, a “perso n - to - people” agre ement, as dist inct fro m a “pe rson - to - person” one, suffices. Nor do es our conclusion that the enhan cement applie s to Lope z’s chatr oom excha nges r un af oul of the Gu idelines ’ ame ndment hist ory. See, e.g., Scalia & Garner, su pra, at 256, 432, 440 (favo ring statuto ry histor y, “[t]he enacted line age of a s tatute, inclu ding prio r laws, ame ndments, ________ ____ ___ _____ _ to this case a rgues that th e commen tary to the G uidelines at issue he re suff er s f rom an y of these flaws. Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/26/2026

No. 25 - 40027 8 codificat ions, an d repeals, ” b ut not leg islative h istory, “the proceeding s leading to the e nactme nt of a statu te, includin g legislative he arings, committe e repo rts, and floo r debates”). In 20 16, th e S ent encing Commissi on revis ed § 2G2.2(b)(3) (B) to cre ate the cu rrent five - level distributio n enhance ment, inte nding th us to “addr ess[] cir cuit con flicts” regardin g the men tal state that th e enh ancement req uires, es pecially “when the off ense inv olv es a peer - to - p eer fil e - sha ring pr ogram or n et work.” U.S.S.G. app. C ame nd. 80 1. For exampl e, before t he amend ment, the Fourt h Circ uit had held t hat the enh ancement ap plied if the de fendant “(1) ‘ knowingly made child pornogr aphy in hi s possessi on ava ilabl e to others by some m eans’ ” (2) “for the sp ecific purp ose of obtainin g some thing of valuab le con sideration, such as more pornogr aphy.” Id. (quoti ng Un ited S tates v. Mc Manus, 734 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2013), superseded by regulat ion, U.S.S.G. § 2G 2.2(b)(3)(B)). We, though, ha d ap plied t he enhanc ement “ when t he defe ndant k nowing ly use [d] fil e - sharing so ftware.” Id. (citin g Unite d State s v. Groce, 78 4 F. 3d 2 91, 294 (5t h Ci r. 2015), super seded by regulation, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B)). In the 2 016 amen dment, the Commissio n clarifie d that th is five - le vel in crease applies in the circu mstan ces that th e Guide lines cur rently d escribe. Id.; see id. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B); id. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1. But the amendment d id not ind icate that de fendants w ho use the kind of chatro oms in which Lopez participated are exempt from th is d istribution enhancem ent. See i d. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B); id. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1. Lope z urges that the amen dment “cle arly rej ected ” our pre vious ho lding that the enhancem ent woul d appl y “when a def endant knowingl y use[d] fil e - shari ng soft ware. ” Id. app. C amend. 801; see Groce, 784 F.3d at 29 4. T he amend ment desc rib ed a peer - to - peer f ile - sh aring ne twork as “ a so ftware applicatio n that e nables co mputer users to share file s easily o ver the [i] nter net.” U.S.S.G. app. C amend. 801. T hes e net works “d o n ot requ ir e Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/26/2026

No. 25 - 40027 9 a central s erver o r use of email”; they simply “allow [] two or mor e users t o esse ntially have access to each oth er’s com puters and to directly swap file s from their comput ers.” Id. “ Some p e er - to - peer program s automatically design ate a user’ s files as ‘pu blic’ (i.e., availab le for download by any other user of the pr ogra m), wherea s ot hers p ermi t a u ser to keep t heir own f iles private w hile still us ing the pee r - to - peer soft wa re to down load material.” Unite d State s v. Oli ver, 919 F.3 d 393, 39 8 (6t h Cir. 2019) (ci tin g U.S.S.G. app. C amen d. 80 1). But peer - to - peer sharing, standi ng alone, is not th e same th ing as the chatr ooms Lopez us ed in this case. Groce, which t he Guideline s amendme nt rejec ted, held th at any use of peer - to - peer file - sharing s oftware qualified fo r the dis tribution e nhancem ent — but that is not wh at is at issue here. Groce, 784 F.3 d at 295. The district court fo und th at Lopez’s cha trooms r equ ir e participants to share child pornography both to join the c hatro om a nd to receive similar mate rials in return. Those cha tr ooms require ac tive sh aring with th e kno wledg e and implicit agr eeme nt that the sh aring will r esult in an exchange of chi ld porn ography a nd thus actually satisfy § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B)’s text. Peer - to - p eer sha ri ng, though, i nvolv es only intent t o downloa d files; any “kno wing[] ag reement” a nd inte nt to ex change ne ed not be pr esent. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1; U.S.SG. app. C amend 801; Halverson, 8 97 F.3d at 652; Oliver, 919 F.3d at 398. This distin ction make s intuitive sense. Pure d ownl oads alone do not qualif y a defendant for t he enhance ment beca use t hey do not s how t hat he “know ingly distribu ted” to an other “with th e specific purpos e of ob taining somethi ng of va luab le consi derati on from t hat other p erson.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 c mt. n.1. T hat i s why our court’s pre - amendment ho lding that the enha ncem ent ap pli ed wher e a defen dan t had merely “knowi ngly use[d ] file - sharing softw are,” id. app. C a mend. 801; Gr oce, 7 84 F. 3d a t 294, was inconsi s tent with the “h igher le vel of culp ability ” that th e Guide lines assign Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/26/2026

No. 25 - 40027 10 “when the defe ndant had the specific pur pose o f distributin g child pornogr aphic mate rial to an other pe rson in exchan ge for valuable consideration,” U.S. S.G. app. C amend. 801. The 201 6 amendmen t did not catego rically p roscribe applying th e enh ancement to cir cumstance s that involve any sharin g of files. It merely clarifie d that the defendant must distribu te child p ornog raphy purs uant to an agr eement under which he agree s to exchange su ch mater ials with the counte rparty (or parties) to the agree ment, with the inten t to receive c hild pornogr aphy in r eturn. Id. § 2G2.2 c mt. n.1; Halverson, 897 F.3d a t 652. Lope z’s case fe atures th at mental s tate fo r th e reaso ns we have already discussed. 3 Our d ecision in Halverson is not to the co ntrary. There, t he def endan t pleade d guilty to possessing ch ild porn ography and appealed the application of the fiv e - level dis tribution en hancemen t. 897 F.3d at 64 9. An agent w ho had “acte d under cover” testifie d that “Hal verso n’s use o f peer - to - pe er networ k applicatio ns gave him prefe rential access to more child pornogr aphy.” Id. He furthe r atteste d that “ Halverson shared c omplete files wi th” the a gent but “had not sou ght anyt hing from hi m in excha nge for the f iles.” Id. We conclude d that the go vernment had “pre sented evide nce to establis h the [enhan cement’s] first three elements” but “faile d to prese nt any e vidence to show th at Halvers on distribu ted any child porno graphy to receive ‘someth ing of valuable conside ration f rom that [] person’ wit h whom he tra ded.” Id. at 652 (alteration in o riginal) (quoti ng U.S.S.G. § 2G 2.2 cmt. n.1); see also id. (holding that bo th erro rs were ultimate ly harm less). Lopez submits that her e, “ju st like in Hal verson,” no evidenc e shows that “Lo pez had a quid p ro quo agreem ent with an other person to distribute child pornograp hy fr om tha t other pers on.” But hi s cas e diffe rs from Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/26/2026

No. 25 - 40027 11 Halverson. While Halvers on had “share d complete file s” with the age nt, he “had not sou ght anyt hing from [t he agent] i n exchang e for shari ng fil es.” Id. at 649. That he r eceived pr eferential ac cess to his des ired mate rials did no t qualify him for the en hancement b ecause th e evide nce d id not sh ow that he had intent to re ceive child porno graphy in e xchange fo r his distribu tion. Id. at 649, 6 52; see Fucit o, 1 29 F. 4th at 295 n. 4; sup ra pp. 7–10 (discussing why use of p eer - to - peer applicat ions, such as t he ones Halver son used, do not, standin g alone, m ake the enhancement applicable). Here, on t he other ha nd, Lop ez admit ted to v iewing por nogra phy in an onlin e forum that he could acce ss only by distributin g child po rnograph y and w here h e cou ld v iew a ny porn ography onl y by firs t shari ng the same. As the dis trict cour t corre ctly fou nd, by entering in to and p articipating in the chatr ooms at issue in this case, Lo pez made an i mplicit a greemen t with othe rs in the cha troom to g ive and excha nge chil d pornog raphy. 4 At argum ent, Lope z emphasize d the need for a “ spe cific ” agreem ent. But, as his counsel agreed, an implicit “pers on - to - peopl e” ag re ement satisfie s the Gu ideline s. It is unlikely that individ uals who particip ate in th ese abhorre nt onli ne excha nges wi ll sign an e xpress con tract authoriz ing their transaction s. Lope z maintains that “ gener alized posting an d downloading ” does not s uffic e. But more was happeni ng here. Lopez vi ewed chi ld pornogr aphy in c losed - access onlin e fora wh ose metapho rical doo rs opened o nly to those who sh ared those mate rials. He thus ent ered int o an imp licit Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/26/2026

No. 25 - 40027 12 agr eement to gi ve a nd recei ve c hild porn ogra phy. That satisf ies the Guidelin es commen tary. We hold th at the dis trict cour t properly applied the five - lev el distributio n enh ancement to Lopez. B We re ach a diffe rent resu lt with re gard to th e patte rn enhan cement, howev er. Lopez admits that h e did not o bject to th is enhan cement in dis trict court, so plain - error rev iew ap pli es. Puckett v. Uni ted State s, 556 U.S. 129, 134–3 5 (2009). Lopez mus t sho w a clear or obvious “error or defect — s ome sort of ‘[d]e viation f rom a legal rule ’ — that has not b een int ent ionall y relinquis hed or a bandone d.” Id. at 13 5 (alteratio n in or iginal) (quotin g Unite d State s v. Ol ano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 – 33 (1993)). The error must also have affe cted Lo pez’s “ substantial rights, which in the ordinar y case me ans he must demon strate that it ‘affecte d the outcome of the district court proceedi ngs.’ ” Id. (quoting O lano, 507 U. S. at 734). And if L opez can satisfy these r equi reme nts, we ha ve “discretion to remed y the error,” whic h we should exe rcise “ onl y if the error ‘seriously affe ct[s] the fairnes s, inte grity, or pub lic reputatio n of ju dicial proce edings.’ ” Id. (emphasis o mitted) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736). “The [g]overnmen t concedes th at it was plai n erro r” for the district court “to apply th e § 2G2.2(b)(5) pat tern e nh ancem ent ” for a “pattern of activity in volving th e sexual abu se or e xploitation of a minor,” and we ag re e. U.S.S.G. § 2G 2. 2(b)(5). Such a patte rn involves “ two or mo re separate instance s” of con duct that wou ld qualify as, among o ther things, certain enumer ated fed eral offens es or analogous state offen ses. Id. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1 Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/26/2026

No. 25 - 40027 13 (defining pattern of a ctiv ity involv ing t he sexual abuse o r exp loitation of a minor and sexual abuse or exp loitation). Lopez’s off enses of convi ction d o not count. Id. (excluding “poss ession, acce ssing with intent to view, re ceipt, or traf ficking in ” certain materials). And only one of his st ate off enses (sexual assaul t of a ch ild) qualifie s. Thus, Lop ez ha s not enga ged in t he requ ire d two in stances of condu ct that w ould cau se the p attern enhan cement to app ly. See id. The district c ourt clearly erre d in concludin g othe rwise. See Pu ckett, 556 U.S. a t 135. This er ror fulfills plain - erro r review’s other requirements. It affecte d Lope z’s substan tial rights. Id. Without t he pat tern enhanc ement, Lopez ’s offen se level wo uld have totaled th irty - seven, n ot fort y - two; with his criminal - history cat egory of V, this red uce d off ense l evel would hav e res ult ed in a Gui delines r ange of 324 to 405 months, not 360 months t o lif e. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. “When a defen dant is sentenc ed under an incorr ect Guidelin es rang e — whether o r not the def endant’s ultimate sente nce falls within the corre ct range — the e rror itself can, and mo st often w ill, be sufficie nt to sho w a reaso nable pr obability of a diffe rent o utcome abse nt the error.” Molina - Marti nez v. Un ited S tates, 578 U.S. 1 89, 1 98 (20 16). An d “[i]n th e ordi nary case, ... the failur e to cor rect a plain Guide lines e rror that affects a d efend ant’s substan tial rights w ill se riously affect the fairnes s, integrity, and pu blic reputatio n of j udicial pro ceedin gs.” Rosales- Mir eles v. Unite d State s, 585 U.S. 129, 145 (2018). Because the district cour t plainly erre d in applying the pattern enhancemen t on this r ecord, we vacate and remand f or resent enci ng within th e proper sentencing ran ge. The p arties disp ute whethe r the gove rnment should be able to present new evide nce t o supp ort the pa ttern enhanc ement on r emand. W e have previous ly sai d that “[t]he gov ernm ent genera lly ma y not presen t new Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/26/2026

No. 25 - 40027 14 evide nce on remand when reversal is required d ue to the failure to present evide nce orig inally.” United States v. Chem. & Metal Indus., Inc., 677 F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 2012) (c iting United States v. Arche r, 671 F.3d 1 49, 1 68 – 69 (2d Cir. 2011)). But exceptio ns exist to that rule. “‘[S]pe cial circumst ances’ may j ustify an e xception,” United St ates v. Villalob os, 879 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 2 018) (citin g Archer, 671 F.3d at 1 68 – 69), “inc luding ‘wh er e the gover nment ’s bu rden was un clea r’; (2) ‘wh ere the trial court pro hibited discussion of the issue’;” and “(3) ‘wher e the evidence was, for a good reason, unavailable,’” Uni ted Sta tes v. We st, 137 F.4th 39 5, 403 (5th C ir. 2025) (quot ing Villalob os, 879 F.3 d at 17 2); see id. (listing anothe r factor that applies in resti tution c ases). On rem and, the d istrict court sho uld co nsider these factors in determ ining w hether to allow the governm ent to pre sent ne w pattern - enhanc ement evi dence. * * * The d istrict cou rt pro perly ap plied th e five - leve l distribu tion enhancem ent. But because the district cou rt inco rrectly impos ed the pattern enha ncem ent, we VA CAT E Lopez ’s s ente nce a nd REMA ND for t he district court to se ntence L opez in a man ner consisten t wit h this opi ni on. We expres s no v iew ab out wh at senten ce the district court sh ould im pose on remand. Case: 25-40027 Document: 75-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/26/2026