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Feb. 9, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Logan Beck v. State of Colorado and Acme Revival, Inc.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-01184

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (11.4K)

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Trial Court Document

FTOhRe THHoEn oDrIaSbTleR IMCiTc hOaFe lC EO. LROoRmAeDroO

In re:

Case No. 25-11438 MER

Logan Beck

Chapter 7

Debtor.

State of Colorado Adversary No. 25-01184 MER

 Plaintiff,                                                          

v.

Logan Beck and Acme Revival, Inc.

 Defendants.                                                         

      ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART                     
   MOTION TO DISMISS AND STRIKING AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES               

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Defendant 

Beck’s Counterclaim and Strike Certain Affirmative Defenses (“Motion”) filed by the
State of Colorado (the “State”), Debtor/Defendant Logan Beck’s (“Beck”) response
thereto, and the State’s reply.1

BACKGROUND

The State initiated the instant adversary proceeding against Beck and his
company, Acme Inc. (“Acme”), on June 20, 2025. The State filed an amended
complaint on September 5, 2025.2 Per the amended complaint, the State asserts that
Beck violated certain provisions of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”).

The State further asserts any debts Beck owes in connection with such violations are
nondischargeable pursuant to §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), (a)(6), and (a)(7).3 Beck filed an
answer to the amended complaint on September 15, 2025.4 In his answer, Beck
asserts a counterclaim for declaratory relief against the State. In particular, Beck
contends that no “fraud, fiduciary capacity, willful or malicious injury, or other grounds
under § 523(a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), or (a)(7) exist that would except any debt from

1 ECF Nos. 45, 46, & 47.

2 ECF No. 38.

3 Any use of the term “Section” or “§” hereafter means Title 11 of the United States Code.

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other things, that the complaint is deficient because the State failed to identify specific
parties harmed by his alleged violations of the CCPA and that he was denied due
process.

The State filed the instant Motion on October 6, 2025. Per the Motion, the State
asserts that Beck’s counterclaim should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
because factual allegations do not support it, nor does it serve any useful purpose since
it simply seeks a determination of the State’s nondischargeability claims in Beck’s
favor.6 The State also contends that several of Beck’s affirmative defenses should be
stricken pursuant to Rule 12(f). In response to the Motion, Beck argues that the
counterclaim is necessary to prevent the State from “extracting” discovery in this
proceeding and then voluntarily dismissing the proceeding to pursue a case in state
court. Beck also contends that the State misuses Rule 12(f) and that the rule does not
empower the Court to strike affirmative defenses that may constrain penalties or
injunctions once the facts are developed. Alternatively, Beck argues he should, at a
minimum, be granted leave to amend his counterclaim and affirmative defenses, and
that the Court should enter an order finding any voluntary dismissal is without prejudice,
and the State may not reuse discovery obtained in the instant proceeding.
ANALYSIS

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal Is Warranted

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as
true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and views them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.7 A complaint or counterclaim will be dismissed unless it
“contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”8 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”9 “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.”10 “A motion to dismiss is properly granted when a complaint or
counterclaim provides no more than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

5 Id. at 33, ¶ 3.

6 Any use of the term “Rule” hereafter means the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

7 In re Matt Garton & Assoc., Adv. Pro. No. 21-1215-TBM, 2022 WL 711518, at *3 (Bankr. D. Colo. Feb.
14, 2022) (citing Burnett v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013)).
Any use of the term “Rule” hereafter means the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

8 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Hear-Wear Technologies, LLC v. Oticon, Inc., 551 F.Supp.2d 1272, 1276 (N.D. Okla. 2008).

9 Id. 10 Id. Here, Beck provides no factual allegations to support his counterclaim. Instead,
Beck merely alleges the State cannot prove the necessary elements of its

nondischargeability claims. This alone is insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.

Further, whether the State can prove the necessary elements for each of its claims is a
question to be determined either on summary judgment or at trial. If the State cannot
prove all necessary elements, then any debts Beck owes for his alleged violations of the
CCPA will be discharged, regardless of whether he brings his counterclaim.

Notwithstanding this fact, Beck contends his counterclaim serves a non-

redundant purpose. That is, Beck asserts that without his counterclaim, the State could
voluntarily dismiss this proceeding and leave him with uncertainties regarding repeated
litigation, thus denying him the “fresh start” guaranteed by the Bankruptcy Code. Beck’s
argument is somewhat unclear, but from what the Court can gather, he is concerned
that if the State decides to dismiss this proceeding and initiate litigation against him in
state court, then he would be denied the opportunity to discharge any debts for his
alleged violations of the CCPA that the state court may find him liable for. While the
Court understands Beck’s concern, any claim the State may have against Beck for
violations of the CCPA arose before he filed for bankruptcy.12 As such, any debt that
Beck owes for his CCPA violations would likely be discharged in his underlying
bankruptcy case absent a finding that such debts are nondischargeable pursuant to
§ 523(a)(2), (a)(4), and/or (a)(6).13 Therefore, the Court finds Beck’s argument
meritless and his counterclaim must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

B. Affirmative Defenses

Next, the State asserts that several of Beck’s affirmative defenses should be 

stricken. Pursuant to Rule 12(f), a court may strike an insufficient defense from a
pleading either on its own or on motion made by another party. “A defense is
insufficient if it cannot succeed, as a matter of law, under any circumstances.”14

“Striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy; the federal courts generally view
motions to strike with disfavor and infrequently grant such requests.”15 A defense
should not be stricken unless the insufficiency of the defense is clearly apparent, and no

11 Head-Wear Technologies, LLC, 551 F.Supp.2d at 1276 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 127).

12 In re Parker, 264 B.R. 685, 696 (10th Cir. BAP 2001) (finding that a creditor’s claim against a debtor
arises at the time the debtor committed the conduct on which the claim is based rather than at the time
the creditor’s right to payment arises.).

13 In re Marshall, 302 B.R. 711, 714 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003) (“Thus, all prepetition debts are discharged
under § 727(b), subject only to the § 523 exceptions from discharge.”). The Court notes that debts that fall
within kind specified by § 523(a)(7) are automatically nondischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) & (c)

14 Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 648-49 (D. Kan. 2009).

15 In re McDaniel, 590 B.R. 537, 552 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018) (quoting Purzel Video GmbH v. Smoak, 11
F.Supp.3d 1020, 1029 (D. Colo. 2014)) (internal citations omitted).

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affirmative defense must also comply with the pleading standards outlined in Rule 8
(incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008).18 That is, an affirmative defense must include
a “short and plain” statement to give the opposing party fair notice of the defense and
the grounds upon which it rests.19 “Like the plaintiff, a defendant must also plead
sufficient facts to demonstrate a plausible affirmative defense, or one that has a
‘reasonably founded hope’ of success.”20 The decision to strike an affirmative defense
rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.21

1.  Affirmative Defenses Three and Twenty-Four                       

Beck’s affirmative defense numbers three and twenty-four are substantially 

similar. In general, both defenses assert the amended complaint is deficient because
the State failed to identify specific victims of Beck’s alleged violations of the CCPA or to
establish the standing of such victims.22 The State argues that these defenses should
be stricken because the CCPA does not require the attorney general to name specific
parties, nor does it require proof of actual injury or loss by individual consumers. Beck
contends these affirmative defenses do not challenge the State’s authority to enforce
the CCPA, but instead target the State’s § 523(a) claims, particularly its § 523(a)(2)(A)
claim, which requires the State to prove reliance and proximate cause.

The CCPA does not require the State to name specific aggrieved parties, nor 

does it require proof of reliance upon the Debtor’s misrepresentations by every
individual consumer for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A).23 Indeed, at least one division of
this Court has found that the State has standing to bring nondischargeability actions on

16 Id.; Hayne, 263 F.R.D. at 649.

17 In re McDaniel, 590 B.R. at 552 -53 (quoting Sierra Club v. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, 173 F.R.D. 275, 285 (D. Colo. 1997)).

18 Hayne, 263 F.R.D. at 649. Any use of the term “Rule” hereafter means the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

19 Id. 20 U.S. v. Quadrini, No. 2:07-CV-13227, 2007 WL 4303213, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2007).

21 Hayne, 263 F.R.D. at 649.

22 ECF No. 42 at 31-32.

23 In re MyLife.com Inc., 651 B.R. 30, 38 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2023) (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Gugliuzza
(In re Gugliuzza), 527 B.R. 370, 373 (C.D. Cal. 2015)) (finding that requiring proof that each individual
consumer relied upon the debtor’s misrepresentations would undermine the FTC Act’s purpose of
preventing widespread consumer fraud and would be entirely inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s
core principles.); see People v. Shifrin, 342 P.3d 506, 514 (Colo. App. 2014) (finding the CCPA does not
require the Attorney General to elicit testimony from every consumer who was harmed to prove a
violation.).

a matter of law and thus must be stricken.

2. Affirmative Defenses Four and Twenty-Two

Affirmative defenses four and twenty-two are also similar.  Both defenses assert 

the State’s litigation of its § 523(a) claims without first liquidating the debts underlying
those claims is impermissible.25 Beck argues that while he doesn’t dispute that the
Court has authority to liquidate claims in § 523 actions, these affirmative defenses are
nonetheless necessary to “preserve abstention/comity and forum management
arguments,” and it cannot be argued that these defenses cannot succeed under any
circumstances.26 The Court disagrees. As Beck already acknowledged, the Court is
empowered to liquidate claims. Further, Beck provides no facts to support the defense
that this is necessary to preserve arguments regarding abstention. Neither party has
sought to have the Court abstain from hearing this matter, and the Court has already
advised the parties that it has no current plans to consider abstention. In the event the
Court is asked to consider abstaining from hearing these matters, Beck may address
this argument at that time, regardless of whether he lists it as an affirmative defense
here. Therefore, defenses four and twenty-two will be stricken.

3.  Affirmative Defense Twelve                                       

Affirmative defense twelve asserts that a significant portion of the consumer 

complaints underlying the State’s CCPA claims were only filed after Acme sued those
consumers. As such, Beck asserts those complaints are not reliable and are merely
retaliatory. Therefore, to the extent the State’s claims are based on such complaints,
they should be barred or discounted under the doctrines of selective enforcement,
abuse of process, and unclean hands. Beck also asserts the complaints fail to establish
the requisite intent or causation requirements for relief under the CCPA and § 523(a).

The State asserts this affirmative defense should be stricken because it is not a 

valid defense to the CCPA. Indeed, the attorney general’s broad discretion to enforce
the CCPA makes it unlikely that the defenses of selective enforcement, abuse of
process, or unclean hands would succeed. Beck disagrees. Instead, Beck argues that
because the State is seeking equitable relief in the form of an injunction, the Court
should consider equitable defenses. Alternatively, Beck asserts he should be permitted
to amend this defense to narrow the scope to the State’s request for an injunction alone
and not to the CCPA penalties.

While Beck is correct that CCPA actions are generally equitable in nature, this 

does not automatically give a defendant a right to assert equitable affirmative
defenses.27 This is especially true where certain equitable defenses, such as unclean

24 In re Trujillo, 135 B.R. 674, 676 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).

25 ECF No. 42 at 31-32.

26 ECF No. 46 at 9.

27Shifrin, 342 P.3d at 512 (“The majority of courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that similar
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or causation for purposes of its CCPA and § 523(a) claims, this defense may have
merit. Because the Court has not had the opportunity to review the complaints
underlying the State’s claims, nor have the parties had an opportunity to make
arguments about the complaints, the Court cannot say that this defense cannot succeed
as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court will not strike this defense.

4.  Affirmative Defense 13                                           

In his thirteenth affirmative defense, Beck argues the imposition of liability or 

penalties without the opportunity to be heard as to each allegedly harmed consumer
violates his due process rights. The State contends this defense should be stricken
because courts have typically rejected due process challenges to the CCPA. Beck’s
response to this argument is difficult to parse, but from what the Court can gather, Beck
is arguing that this defense is fact-specific and therefore should not be stricken at this
point in the proceeding.

As the Court previously stated, the CCPA does not require the State to name 

each individual Beck allegedly harmed. As such, it is unlikely Beck would succeed on
any argument that relies on the State naming every individual it is bringing the claim on
behalf of. As such, the Court will strike this defense.

5.  Affirmative Defense 14                                           

Beck’s fourteenth affirmative defense asserts that the State’s claims should be 

barred, in whole or in part, by estoppel, waiver, or laches, including the State’s refusal to
review the full context of Acme’s operations and relying on selectively presented
disputes. Like affirmative defense 12, the State argues there is no case law recognizing
these as valid defenses to the CCPA. Beck concedes that laches and waiver are
generally “disfavored against the sovereign,” and thus agrees to withdraw those
defenses.29 However, Beck contends the defense of equitable estoppel is still a valid
defense to the State’s claim for an injunction pursuant to § 105(a).

The Court cannot find any case law to support Beck’s claim that equitable 

estoppel is a valid defense to CCPA claims, nor did Beck cite to any case law in his
response. Further, Beck provides no facts to support this defense. Indeed, to prevail
on an equitable estoppel defense, the party asserting the defense must show
that:(1)The party to be estopped knew of the facts; (2) the party to be estopped

consumer protection actions are primarily equitable.”); State ex rel. Weiser v. Center for Excellence in
Higher Education, Inc., 529 P.3d 599, 610 (Colo. 2023).

28 In re Robertson, 570 B.R. 352, 363 (Bankr. D. Utah. 2017); In re Wigger, 595 B.R. 236, 259 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 2018) (finding the unclean hands doctrine requires the alleged misconduct on the part of the
plaintiff relate directly to the transaction about which the plaintiff has made a complaint.).

29 ECF No. 46 at 10.

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rely on the other party’s conduct for his injury.30

Essentially, equitable estoppel “prevents a party from taking a legal position
inconsistent with an earlier statement or action that places his adversary at a
disadvantage.”31 Here, Beck has not provided any facts to show he can meet the
elements required for an equitable estoppel defense. The Court also cannot see how
an estoppel defense would be applicable here because Beck does not assert the State
took an inconsistent legal position that put him at a disadvantage. As such, this
affirmative defense should be stricken.

Given the above, the Court finds that affirmative defenses 3, 4, 13, 14, 23, and
24 will be stricken, while affirmative defense 12 will not be stricken.

C. The Court Will Not Grant Leave to Amend

Alternatively, Beck requests the Court grant him leave to amend his counterclaim
and his affirmative defenses. In particular, Beck seeks to narrow his counterclaim to the
injunction/debt boundary for any relief sought and the § 524 consequences for any
attempt to collect pre-petition amounts via an injunction or otherwise. Beck also seeks
to narrow the scope of affirmative defenses 3, 12, 13, and 14 to the State’s request for
an injunction rather than its CCPA claims. The State contests Beck’s request, arguing
that the amendment would be futile. The Court agrees. The Court cannot see how
narrowing Beck’s counterclaim would resolve the fact that it is redundant. As the Court
already stated, the issues raised in Beck’s counterclaim are issues to be determined in
this adversary proceeding. The Court also does not believe narrowing Beck’s
affirmative defenses would resolve the issues the Court has with those defenses.

Therefore, the Court will not grant Beck leave to amend because doing so would be
futile.32

D. The Court Will Not Enter a Rule 41(a) Order

Beck also requests that the Court enter an order finding that any voluntary
dismissal of this proceeding by the State is with prejudice or, at a minimum, is
conditioned on the following: (1) that the State may not reuse discovery it obtains here
absent an order from the Court; (2) a cost-shifting provision for duplicative litigation;
(3) that the Court retain jurisdiction to decide already-joined § 523 issues; and (4) that
any re-filing must be in a forum with jurisdiction to adjudicate all § 523 issues together.
The State asserts that the Court should decline to enter any such order at this

30 Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 909 (10th Cir. 2002).

31 Id. (quoting Penny v. Giuffrida, 897 F.2d 1543, 1545 (10th Cir. 1990)).

32 Bradley v. Val-Mejias, 379 F.3d 892, 901 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Although Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) provides that
leave to amend shall be given freely, the district court may deny leave to amend where amendment would
be futile.”)

stage because doing so would be premature, given that the State has not moved for
dismissal and the Debtor has not provided any legal or factual justification for such an
order. The Court agrees. At this point in the proceeding, for the State to move for
dismissal without the Court's order, Beck would have to stipulate to dismissal.** Should
Beck not stipulate to dismissal, the State would be required to file a motion with the
Court requesting dismissal, to which Beck would have the opportunity to respond and
raise these arguments at that time.** Further, the Court already addressed some of
these concerns in its section regarding the dismissal of Beck’s counterclaim. In
particular, the Court has already held that any debts Beck may owe the State for his
alleged violations of the CCPA will be discharged in the underlying bankruptcy case,
absent a finding that they are nondischargeable under § 523(a), which the Court has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine.*> Therefore, the Court declines to enter an order
establishing any “guardrails” to dismissal at this time.
CONCLUSION
Given the above, THE COURT ORDERS the State’s Motion is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS Beck’s Counterclaim is DISMISSED.
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS the Motion is GRANTED as to Affirmative
Defenses 3, 4, 13, 14, 22, and 23, which are stricken.
THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS the Motion is DENIED as to Affirmative
Defense 12.
February 9, 2026 BY THE COURT:
=<
<
Michael E. Romero
United Stat ankruptcy Court

33 Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A).
34 Id. at (a)(2).
35 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (a); 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(I).