US v. Augustine Perez - Opinion Reversed, Vacated, Remanded

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 23 - 7280 UNITED ST ATES OF AMER ICA, Plaintiff – App ellee, v. AUGUSTINE PE REZ; DEANNA CO LEMAN, Claimants – Appellan ts, and $25,325.00 I N U.S. CURRENCY, Defend ant. Appeal from the United States District Co urt for the Middle District of No rth Carolina, at Winston - Salem. Loretta C. Big gs, Senior District Judge. (1:21 - cv - 00584 - LCB - JLW) Argued: September 10, 2025 D ecided: February 23, 2 026 Before BENJAMIN and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and K EENAN, Senior Circuit Judge. Reversed, vacated, and reman ded with instructions by publ ished opinion. Judge Benjamin wrote the o pinion i n which Judge Berner and Judge Keenan joined. ARGUED: Ryan Men ter, GEORGETO WN UNIVERSI TY LAW CENTER, W ashington, D.C., for Appellants. Nathan Lee Strup, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, fo r Appellee. ON BRIEF: Erica Hashimoto,

2 Director, Madeline Brown, Student Counsel, Joshua Hyland, Stud ent Counsel, Appellate Litigation Cou nsel, GEORGETOWN UNI VERSITY LAW CE NTER, Washi ngton, D.C., for Appellants. Randall S. G alyon, Acting United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED ST ATES ATTO RNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

3 D E ANDREA GI ST BENJAMIN, C ircuit Judge: The Supreme Court has recognized that a warrantless search of a probationer’s home may be reas onable unde r the F ourth Ame ndment when it i s supporte d by rea sonable suspicion and authorized by a probation condition. Bu t th ese probationary searches may implicate the independent Fourth Amendment rights of third parties who are not subject to court supervision. This appeal presents that third - party issue. Federal probation officers conducted warrantless searches of two residences based on their sup ervision of Augustine Perez, a federal supervisee subject to warrantless search conditions. Officers first searched Perez’s reported residence and the n searched a separate home, owned by Perez and occupied by Deanna Coleman, based on the officers ’ belief that Perez resided there as well. A t Coleman’s home, the officers entered over her objection and initiated a probationary search that ultimately led to the seizure of $25,325 and other items later alleged to be connected to drug trafficking. The Gover nment br ought t his civi l forfeiture action against the seized currency, alleging that the currency was related to drug trafficking. Coleman an d Perez sought return of the currency and, as part of that effort, moved to suppress the evidence fo und during th e residential searches by arguing that the searches violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the mo tion to suppre ss and granted summary judgment for the Government. We reverse. As an initial matter, we conclude that a conditio n of supervised release that permits a warrantless searc h of a supervisee’s “prop erty” does not permit the

4 government to search real property owned by him and leased by a third - party resident. Additionally, we conclude that in order to rely on Perez’s sup ervised release conditions to search Coleman’s residence, the officers must have had probable cause to b elieve Perez also resid ed at Coleman’s home. We hold that the governmen t did not meet its burden to show probable cause and, therefore, find that the warrantless search of C oleman’s home was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the d istrict court erred in d enying Perez’s and Coleman’s motion to suppress, and the defendant currency was improperly seized and not subject to forfeiture. I. A. Perez was on federal supervised release and accordingly subject to certain supervised release conditio ns. His supervised release conditions required that he “permit a probation officer to visit h im .. . at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view by the probation officer.” J.A. 314. Further, Perez was required to “submit to warrantless search and seizures of person and property as directed by th e Probation Officer.” Id. The release conditions also req uired him to “notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by [his] criminal record or personal history or characteristics.” Id. Perez signed a document stating that h e understood and ha d bee n provide d with a c opy of his r elease conditions. While on supervised release, Perez lived in Reidsville, No rth Carolina, initially at a residence located at 140 Teal Drive and later at a residence located at 721 Lawndale D rive.

5 Perez reported his move from T eal Drive to Lawndale Drive to the probation office as required by his supervised release conditions. T he probation office made twelve unannou nced monthl y visit s to Perez’s new residence at Lawndale Dr iv e after he moved there. Perez maintained ownership of Teal Drive a fter he moved and leased the residenc e to his girlfrien d, Coleman. Coleman signed a one - year lease agreement with P erez and moved into Teal Drive with her tw elve - year - old daughte r. In addition to signing a formal lease, Coleman transferred the utilities to h er name. N early a year after Perez moved to Lawndale Drive, the probation office began receiving information from a c onfidential informant that Perez w as not living at his reported address, trafficking drugs, and traveling outside of North Carolina without permission. According to an affidavit submitted by a probation officer, a confidential informant and follow - up investigati on b y probation officers sug gested that Perez was actually residing at Teal Drive. Notably, ho wever, there are no additional details in the record describing the informant’s statement or th e results of investigative efforts. Based on this information, along with Perez’s supervised release conditions permitting warrantless searches of h is “property,” probation o fficers planned to search both Lawndale D r ive and Teal D r ive on the sa me day. Following standard practice, the probation officers contacted the local p olice department to help w ith the Lawndale Drive search and the county sheriff’s office to ass ist with the Teal Drive search.

6 B. P robation officers, wit h assistance from th e police department, carried out a search of Lawndale Drive. The re, officers located prescription bottles that listed Perez’s name and the Teal Drive address. Perez arrived at Lawndale Driv e during the search and was detained upon making contact with the officers. The officers questioned Perez about Teal Drive, but Perez denied any knowle dge of that address to the officers. A police dog t hat was at the scene alerted to Perez’s vehicle. The officers searched Perez’s vehicle based on the alert and found a trap compartment typically used to store and transport narcotics in the vehicle. The officers also seized seven cell phones from Perez’s per son during this i nteraction. Perez remained handcuff ed with two probation o fficers at Lawndale Drive. C. While Perez was detained a t Lawn dale Drive, probation officers, with help from the sheriff ’ s department, initiated a search at Teal D rive. Coleman was present when law enforcement arrived. The o fficers spoke with Coleman and told her that they were conducting a probationary search o f the residence. She told th e officers th at she was Perez’s girlfriend and asked the officers if th ey needed a warrant to search the house. T h e officers responded that they did not need a w arrant because they were conducting a probationary search of the hou se based on Perez’s supervised release conditions. T he officers continued their operation at Teal Driv e. The officers asked Coleman to wait outside while they searched the home. Coleman, who was dressed in a rob e, wen t to put on clothes. The o fficers then entered the house without Coleman’s permission.

7 When the officers asked Coleman how long she had been living at Teal Drive, Coleman replied that she had been living there for o ver one year. C oleman and her daughter were then taken outside to wait while the o fficers searched the home. Wh ile searching the kitchen, officers opened a lemonade container and found a white powdery substance. They also discovered larger quantities of a white powdery substance in a hidden compartment in the kitchen cabinet. The officers believed the white powder was likely a controlled su bstance, but lab results later revealed that it was no t. After the officers discovered the powder, the y asked Coleman for consent to conduct a full search of the residence. Co leman refused. Sheriff’s dep artment detectives then requested that the probation officers suspend their search w hile the sheriff’s department submitted a search warrant request for Teal Dr ive. The warrant application stated th at there was probable cause for a search of Teal Dr ive based on th e white powder found in Colem an’s kitchen; the presence of a trap compartment located in Perez’s vehicle; pres cription medication bottles from the Lawndale Dr ive search that had Perez’s name and the Teal Dr ive address on them; m ail from the Teal Dr ive house that had Perez’s name on it; and the alert on Perez’s van from th e police dog. Based on these allegations, the sheriff’s departmen t received a search warrant for Teal Dr ive. Once the search warrant w as approved, the sheriff’s department p erformed a more comprehensive search of Teal Dr ive. The sheriff’s deputies used a police dog to assist with the search of the residence. The police dog i ndicated a positive alert on approximately one gram of cocaine and two grams of heroin, which were located in Coleman’s bedroom.

8 The sheriff’s department discovered a total of $25,325 in cash behind a vanity mirror and behind a bathroom door in P erez and Coleman’s bedroom at Teal Dr ive. The currency was packaged in rubber bands, and the portion found behind the vanity mirror was banded in $1,000 increments. In the training and experience of the o fficers conducting the search, it is com mon practice for drug traffickers to band their proceeds in that manner. While searching Teal Dr ive, the officers also located an old p assport for Perez, several prescriptio n medication bottles bearin g Perez’s, and mail addressed to Perez. The officers seized various other items fro m the residence, including two handguns; numerous rounds of ammunition and magazines; a sentry safe, the key to which was found on Perez’s key ring; Crown Royal bags and gloves inside the sentry safe; fou r plastic baggies containing white powder; 195 30 - milligram oxycodone hyd rochloride pills; digital scales; a paper ledger recording names and large amounts of currency, much like drug ledgers; one blue and black bag containing a white money bag; two bills addressed to Perez at Teal Dr ive; and one m oney counter. D. The Gover nment, as plaintiff, filed this civil forfeiture comp laint against the defendant $25,325. The G overnm ent sought forfeiture of the defendant cu rrency on the grounds that the currency was related to drug trafficking. Shortly after the complaint w as filed, a magistrate judge issued a warrant to arrest th e c urrency, finding probable cause to believe the defendant currency was sub ject to forfeiture for being related to drug trafficking.

9 Both Perez and Coleman filed clai ms for portions o f the defendant currency. Perez claimed ownership of $10,445 of the $25,325, an d Coleman claimed ownership of the remaining $14,880. After filing their claims, Perez and Coleman, as claimants, jointly moved to dismiss the complaint and suppress the evidence. They argued that the court sho uld suppress the evidence seized from their homes because the searches were u nconstitutional under th e Fourth Amendment. 1 T he district court den ied their motion, and the case proceeded to discovery and dispositive motions. T he district court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment and ordered the defendant cu rrency to be seized. Relying primarily on the evidence seized from the claimants’ homes, the district court found that the currency was proceed s of, or traceable to, drug trafficking. C laimants now appeal the den ial of their motion to suppress and th e grant of the Government’s motion for summary judgment. Because th is appeal turns on the constitutionality of the search at Teal Drive, we only address the d enial of the motion to suppress as to that resi dence. 2 1 The Fourth Amendment’s protectio n against unreasonable searches and seizures applies in civil forfeiture p roceedings. See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693, 696 (1 965); United States v. Taylor, 13 F.3d 786, 788 (4th Cir. 1994). The exclusionary rule that prevents the government from using evidence against a defendant obtained in v iolation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment righ ts also bars the government from relying on evidence derived from an illegal search to sustain a forfeiture. One 1958 Ply mouth Se dan, 380 U.S. at 698. 2 We assume without deciding that the search of Lawndale Drive was constitutio nal under the Fourth Amendment.

10 II. “ We review the factual findings underly ing a motion to suppress for clear error and the district court’s legal determinations [rega rding t he Fourth Amendment ] de novo. ” United States v. Hashime, 734 F.3d 2 78, 282 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 2 26, 233 (4t h Cir. 20 12)). III. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he righ t of the peop le to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against u nreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. C ONST. amend. IV. Although the Fourth Amendment enumerates persons, houses, papers, and effects, “the home is first among equals,” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (20 13), and warrantless entry into and search of a home is the “chief evil against which the. . . Fourth Ame ndment [was ] directed, ” Payton v. New Yor k, 445 U.S. 573, 585 – 86 (1980) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. fo r the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). When it comes to the home, the reason ableness of a search is typically demonstrated w hen law enforcement conducts the search pursuan t to a particularized warrant supported by proba ble caus e. Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 301 (202 1). Indeed, a search conducted without a warrant is “p resumptively unreasonable.” Payton, 4 45 U.S. at 586; accord Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“With few excep tions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be

11 answered no.”). H owever, “t he warrant requirement is subject to certain ex ceptions. ” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). One exception to the warrant requirement relates to people o n probati on or par ole. The Supreme Court has said that a warrantless search of a probationer’s home, supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and authorized by a probation condition, is reasonable under the Fourth Amendmen t. See, e.g., Griffin v. W isconsin, 483 U.S. 8 68, 880 (1987); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (20 01). In Griffin, the Supreme Court found the warrantless search of a state probationer’ s residence constitutional “because it was conducted pursuant to a valid [state ] reg ulation governing probationers.” 4 83 U.S. at 880. Wisconsin law subjected all state probationers to conditions set out by state regulation. Id. at 870. The regulations “permit[ted] any probation officer to search a probationer’s home withou t a warrant as long as his supervisor approves and as long as there are ‘ reasonable grounds ’ to believe the presence of contraband.” Id. at 870 – 71 (quoting Wis. Admin. Code H SS §§ 328.21(4), 328. 16(1) (1981)). The regu lations also “ma[de] it a violation of the terms o f probation to refuse to consent to a home search.” Id. at 871. Based on these regulations, officers searched the probationer’s apartment and found that the probationer was illegally in possession of a handgun. Id. at 871 – 72. The Court upheld th e search under the “special needs” ex ception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 873 – 80. To the Court, su pervision of probationers “ is a ‘ sp ecial need ’ of the [s] tate permitting a d egree of impingement upon p rivacy that would no t be constitutional if applied to the public at large.” Id. at 875. Th e Court reasoned that, u nlike

12 the public at large, a probationer’s liberty interest is restricted by conditions imposed as part of an ongoing criminal senten ce. See i d. at 87 4 (“Pro bation is simply one point (o r, more accurately, one set of points) on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum - security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service.”). And the Court furth er noted that pro bationary conditions “are meant to assure that the probation serves as a perio d of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.” Id. at 875. In Knights, the Supreme Court found constitutional the warrantless search of a state probationer’s home because it was “supp orted by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation.” 53 4 U.S. at 122. The probationer was sub ject to a condition requiring him to “[s]ubmit his .. . person, pro perty, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law en forcement officer.” Id. at 114 (internal quotation marks omitted & ellipsis in orig inal). Based on this condition, an officer, with reasonable suspicion that the prob ationer was involved in criminal activity, searched the probationer ’ s home, finding evidence leading to the probationer’s indictment. Id. at 11 4– 16. This time the Cou rt upheld the search under the totality of the circumstances, balancing the degree of p rivacy intrusion caused by the search with the government’s interest in conducting the search. Id. at 118 – 21. The Court found that the defendant’s “status as a probationer subject to a s earch condition informs bo th sides of that balance.” Id. at 1 19. For the intrusion, th e defendant’s status as a probationer and the probation

13 condition subjecting his person, residen ce, and effects to search at an y time “ significantly diminished [his ] reasonable expectation of privacy. ” Id. at 120. And on the government’s side, the Court noted the government’s interest in monitoring probationers closely because they are statistically more likely to commit a crime than ordinary citizens. Id. at 1 20 – 21. T he Court also noted for the governmental interest that probationers have a stronger incentive than ordinary criminals to h ide crimes and destroy evidence becau se they face supervision and possible revocation of probation without fu ll trial protections. Id. at 120. Based on this balancing, th e Cou rt ultimately held that “the balance of these consideratio ns requires no more than reasonable su spicion to conduct a search o f this probationer’s house.” Id. at 121. The Supreme Court has also considered the scope of Fourth A mendment protections for court - supervised individuals outside the residential search context. See Sa mson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). In Samson, the Court found constitutional a suspicionless search of a state parolee’s person because the parolee agreed in writing to be “ subject to search or s eizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause. ” 547 U.S. at 8 46 (quoting Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3067(a)). The Court again reasoned that parole is on the “continuum” of state - impose d punishments such that parolees h ave fewer expectations of privacy. I d. at 850 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kni ghts, 534 U.S. at 119). The Court also reiterated the substantial state interests in “ supervising paro lees because ‘ parolees. . . are more likely to commit future crim inal offenses.’ ” Id. a t 853 (alteration in original) (quoting Penn. Bd. of Prob. & P arole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1 998)). To the Court,

14 the “[s]tate’s interests in reducing recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizenship among prob ationers and parolees warrant privacy intrusion s t hat would not oth erwis e be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment. ” Id. (citing G riffin, 483 U.S. at 879; Knights, 534 U.S. at 121). With this bac kground for probationary searches in mind, w e find the search of Teal Drive unconstitutional for two reasons, each rooted in the protection of Co le man’s Fourth Amendment rights as a third - party occup ant. Firs t, we conclude that the officers were no t permitted to search Teal Drive merely based on Perez’ ownership of that property because Coleman resided there as a tenant. And second, we conclude that the officers were requ ired to have probable cause to believe that Perez also resided at Teal Drive before initiating a probationary search of Coleman’s home, and th ey did not meet that standard here. A. The Gover nment first argues that the officers were justif ied in searching Teal Drive because Perez owned Teal Drive and h is release conditions require d him to submit to warrantless searches of his “ pro perty. ” To the Government, it’s simple: P erez’s property can be subje ct to warrantless searches, and Teal Drive is Perez’s property. To evaluate the Government’s position, we look to the analogous consent exception to the warrant requirement. The Fourth Amendment generally allow s warrantless entry and search of a h ome when poli ce obtain t he vol untary cons ent of an occupa nt of the home. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 1 81 (1990). This exception also applies in shared living arrangements, even when an absent co - occup ant does not consent to th e search. United

15 States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1 974) (“ [T]he cons ent of one wh o possess es commo n authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.”). A physically present co - occupant’s stated refusal to poli ce entry, however, renders a warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to hi m. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006). These rules rest on “wid ely shared social expectations.” Id. at 111. For example, a solitary coinhabitant can consent to the search of a shared premises based on the “commonly held understanding [s] about the authority that co - inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other’s interests.” Id. (discussing M atlock, 415 U.S. at 164). Similarly, a police officer canno t enter a home over the objectio ns of a present cotenant because “the co - tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no recognized autho rity in law or social practice to prevail ov er a present and objecting co - tenant.” Id. at 114. That rationale also applies to land lords. A landlord cannot g ive police consent to conduct a warrantless search of a tenant’s home. C hapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616 – 17 (1961); see also Ran dolph, 547 U.S. at 112 (explaining th at a landlord “calls up no customary understanding of authority to admit guests without the consent of th e current occupant”). In Chapman, th e Court found unconstitutional a warrantless search b ased on a landlord’s consent, explain ing that the premises were occupied by a ten ant and that the landlord had no right to admit po lice in the tenant’s stead. Chapman, 365 U.S. at 617.

16 Although the warrantless search of Teal Drive was not conducted by con sent, we find that the landlord limitation to the consent ex ception applies with equal fo rce here. 3 To hold otherwise would allow probation conditions to override settled Fourth Amendment limits and permit warrantless searches of third parties’ homes based solely on the landlord’s legal status. Therefore, just as a landlord’s p roperty interest does no t confer authority to consent to the search of a tenant’s residen ce, a probationer’s ownership interest does not permit officers to rely on probation conditions to search a tenant - occupied residen ce. Accordingly, Perez’s ownership of Teal Drive did not authorize prob ation officers to enter and search the home without a w arrant. Because Coleman was the lawful resident of Teal Drive, the warrantless sear ch cannot be justified based on P erez’s ownership alone. 3 In cases involving individuals who cohab it with a parolee or probationer, courts have considered whether the rule from Randolph, that a present coresident’s stated refusal to police entry renders a warrantless search unreasonable as to the objecting co resid ent, applies. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Santa Clara, 876 F.3 d 987, 993 – 94 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Harden, 104 F.4th 830, 83 6– 38 (11th Cir. 2024). Those courts foun d that Randolph does not apply to probationary searches because non - probationer coresidents who voluntarily live with someone on p robation have a lowered reasonable expectation of privacy and assume th e risk of lowered Fourth A mendment protections. See Smith, 876 F.3d at 993; Harden, 10 4 F.4th at 836 – 37. But this reasoning does not apply to the landlord - tenant context. Tenants do not have a lowered expectation of privacy nor assume the risk of lowered Fou rth Amendment protections simply by renting from a pro perty owner who is on probation. A ten ant would not expect their landlord ’s probation officer to visit their rental property like a coresid ent would expect their coresident’s p robation officer to visit their shared property. Therefore, a tenant’s expectation o f privacy is not diminished by a landlord’s probation ary status.

17 B. 1. The government alternatively argues that the officers could search Coleman’s house, pursuant to Perez’s supervised release conditions, because the officers reason ably believed that Perez also resided in Coleman’s home. The government contend s that the dis trict court properly applied a reasonable suspicion standard to that inquiry but we disagree and conclude that probable cause is required in order to protect the rights of third parties. S earches conducted pursuant to supervised release conditions som etimes implicate third - party rights. See, e.g., United States v. Thabit, 56 F.4th 1145, 1151 (8th Cir. 2023). T hat can also be said for entry into and searches of a third party ’s residence in order to execute an arrest warrant. United States v. Brinkley, 980 F.3d 377, 38 4–86 (4th Cir. 2020). The question for those cases is whether the search is reason able considering the third party’s rights and reaso nable expectations of priv acy. See, e.g., id. at 38 4 (noting “ [the third party’s ] interest in being free from an unreasonable search” (q uoting Steagald v. United States, 4551 U.S. 204, 216 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted & b rackets in original)). Considering those third - party rights, this court in Brinkley held that police must have probable cause to believe the suspect named in the arrest warrant resides in the home before entering it to execute the warrant. Id. at 386. The cour t was tasked with determining the level of proof necessary to satisfy a two - prong standard requiring officers to have “reason to believe” both that th e location is the suspect’s residen ce and that the suspect will be

18 present at the time of en try. Id. at 38 4– 86. Faced with the choice between interp reting “reason to believe” as requ iring mere reasonable suspicion o r the higher probable - cause standard, the court adop ted the latter. Id. at 386. In doing so, the cou rt emphasized the heightened Fourth Amendment protections afforded to the home and the significant privacy interests of third p arties. Id. at 385. As the court explained, w hen officers seek to enter a home based on their belief that a suspect resides there, the “reason to b elieve” standard is the only sa fegua rd protecting third parties from unreasonable sear ches of their home. Id. R equiring less than probable cause, the court warned, would “ render all private hom es. . . susceptible to search by din t of mere suspicion or uncorroborated info rmation” that the arrest warrant subject liv ed there. Id. at 38 6 (quoting United St ates v. Vasquez - Algar in, 821 F.3d 4 67, 480 (3r d Cir. 201 6)); id. at 385 – 86. The Fourth Circuit has not add ressed third - party rights for probationary search es, but the Eighth and Ninth Circuits hav e. Our sister c ircuits held that “[a] n office r must have probable cause to believe a dwelling is the residence of a parolee in order to in i tiate a warrantless search of a resid ence not known to b e the home of a parolee.” Thabit, 56 F.4th at 1151 (finding probationary searches uncons titutio nal because officers lacked probable cause that the probationer lived at a third p arty’s home); accord United States v. Grandberry, 730 F.3d 968, 973, 980 –82 (9th Cir. 2013) (find ing the same and rejecting the government’s argument that evidence sho wing the property was under the contro l of the parolee was sufficient). The Eighth Circuit in Thabit articulated three reasons fo r its holding. 56 F.4th at 1151 – 52. First, the court reasoned that “the potential for violations of the constitutional

19 rights of third parties necessitates a m ore rigorous standard than reason able suspicion. ” Id. at 1151 (citing Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1 072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled in par t by, United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189, 118 9 (9th Cir. 2012) (pe r curiam)). Second, the cou rt determined that applying this standard impose s only a m inimal b urden on law enforcement. Id. at 11 51 – 52. Law enforcement “ possess[es] substantial info rmation needed to locate [parolees], including the address listed on their conditional release forms and information relevant to their underlying arrest and detention.” Id. at 1 1 52. Third, the court no ted that release conditions requiring a parolee to submit to warrantless s earches of their residence “ nullifies any need for law enforcement to develop a reason to search. ” Id. (emphasi s omitted). L aw enforcement “ simply must posses s probable cause that the parolee actually resides at the search location. ” Id. The Ninth Circuit in Grandberry also reasoned that requiring officers to hav e probable cause to believe that a paro lee resides at a particular add ress before conducting a search there protects the interest s of third parties. 730 F.3d at 98 2. The court also noted that requiring probable cause in th is context “ implements the ‘ special protection ’ ‘ accorded to the home ’ under the Fourth Amendment. ” Id. (brackets & ellipsis omitted) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 552 n.13 (1982), overruled on other grounds by, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1 987)). We adopt the Eight h and Ninth Circuits’ reasoning, which balance s the potential for violations of the constitutional rig hts of third parties and th e government’s important interest in supervising parolees and probationers. We hold tha t a n officer must have probable cause to believ e a dwelling is the residence o f the court - supervised individual to

20 initiate a warrantless search of a residence no t known to be the court - supervised individ ual ’s home. This hol ding not only aligns with our sister circuits, but it is a lso directly supported by our p recedent in Brinkley. If the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause to execute an arrest warrant at a th ird party’s hom e, then it should likewise require probable cause fo r executing a probationary search at a third p arty’s home. In fact, the government’s interest is likely higher and more urg ent in executing arrest warrants than in conducting probationary searches, where p robation officers have rou tine contact with their supervisees. Therefore, if probable cause is necessary when the government has a greater interest, it should also be required when that interest is less co mpelling. Requiring less than proba ble caus e would render “all private ho mes susceptible to search by dint of mere suspicion or uncorroborated information” that a probationer live s there. Brin kley, 980 F.3d at 386 (ellipses omitted) (quoting Vasquez - Algari n, 821 F.3d a t 480). 2. To meet this probable cause standard, an officer must have information sufficient for a person of reasonable prudence to believe that the person resides at the home at the time of the search. See Brinkley, 980 F.3d at 386. We consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing probable cause. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013). The “quantity and quality” of information known to officers bear s on whether they have probable cause, with less reliab le information requiring more co rroboration. See Alabam a v. White, 496 U.S. 32 5, 330 (199 0).

21 Here, the quantity and the quality of the o fficers’ information were insufficient to believe that Perez lived at Teal Drive. T he officers relied on only two weakly reliable sources, which did not have adequ ate corroboration to establish probable cause. First, the Gover nment poi nts to an affidavit by a probation officer in which he stated that, according to the con fidential informant, Perez was living at Teal Driv e. The probatio n officer also stated in his affidavit that “investigative efforts by probation officers, includ ing surveillance” demonstrated that Perez was living at Teal Drive. Bu t there is no additional evidence to support the informant’s tip n or any details regarding what the investigation efforts revealed. Notably, Coleman told the officers that she and her daughter had been living at Teal Drive for over a y ear and never stated that Perez also lived there. Moreover, p robation officers vis ited Perez at L awndale D rive once a month in the year prior to th e simultaneous searches, and P erez was present at each inspection. Indeed, Perez arrived at Lawndale Drive during th e search. And t wo p robation officers remained with Perez inside the La wndale Drive residence as the Teal Drive residence was searched. Given the officers’ familiarity with Perez’s residence at Lawnd ale Drive and their contemporaneous knowledge that he was detained there du ring the search of Teal Drive, the inform ant’s tip regarding Teal Drive is entitled little weigh t. Second, the Government notes that the officers found prescription pill b ottle s with Perez’s name and the Teal Drive address printed on it during the search of Lawndale Drive. But this evidence ignores the fact th at the officers decided to search Teal Drive before they ever en tered Lawndale Drive. B oth searches occu rred at, or close to, the same t ime. It is thus unlikely that the officers ev en knew about the prescription bottles before searching

22 Teal Drive. But even if they did, the Teal Drive address on the prescription bottle s w as not high - quality in formation entitled to significant weight, especially considering the o fficers knew that Perez used to live at Teal Drive. A poten tially outdated address on prescription bottle s, which may simply reflect Perez’s failure to update pharmacy records after his move, does little to support the belief that P erez resided at Teal Drive at the time of th e search. Without any corroborating information, the informant’s tip, the fact that some investigation was conducted, and the prescription pill bottle s were not sufficient for a person of reasonable p rudence to believe that Perez lived at Teal Drive at the time of the search. Because the officers d id not meet this prob able cause standard, the Teal Drive search w as u nconstitutional under t he Four th Amen dment. 4 A ny evide nce disc overe d there should be excluded from this civil forfeiture proceeding. IV. For the above reasons, we reverse the district cou rt’s order denying the c laimants’ motion t o suppre ss as to Teal Drive. And because the d efendant currency was seized during the search of Teal Drive, we vacate the district court’s ord er granting the Government ’s 4 If the officers had prob able cause to believe that Perez lived at Teal Drive, we would have continued and analyzed the search und er the Knights balancing test. Third - party privacy interests may still b e implicated even when police have prob able cause that the home they are searching is the home of the probationer. S ee, e.g., S mith, 87 6 F.3d at 994 (finding constitutional, under the Knights balancing test, a warrantless search of a probationer’s home despite a presen t non - probationer coresident but limitin g its conclusion to the facts before it wh ere the police had probab le cause that the probationer ju st participated in a violent felony a nd was still at large).

23 motion for summary judgme nt and remand with instructions to dismis s the gover nment’s complaint. REVERSED, VACA TED, AND RE MANDED WITH I NSTRUCTION S