Nawal Ali v. BC Architects Engineers, PLC - Employment Discrimination Appeal

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH C IRCUIT No. 24-1963 NAWAL ALI, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. BC ARCHITECTS EN GINEERS, PLC, Defendant – Appell ee. Appeal from the Unit ed States District Co urt for the Easter n District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, Senior District Judge. (1:18- cv -01385-AJT- MSN) Argued: December 9, 2025 Decided: February 20, 2026 Before DIAZ, Chief Ju dge, and WYNN an d HARRIS, Circuit J udges. Reversed by published opinion. J udge Harris wrote t he opinion, in which Chief Judge Diaz and Judge Wynn joine d. Arinderjit Dhali, DHALI PLLC, Was hington, D.C., for Appellant. L ars Howard Liebeler, LARS LIEBELER PC, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

2 PAMELA HARRIS, C ircuit Judge: This appeal arises out of an employment disc rimination lawsui t filed by Nawal Al i against her former employer, BC Ar chitects Engineers, PL C. But it does not concern th e merits of Ali’s claims – at least not directly. Instead, after grant ing summary judgment to BC on Ali’s final claim, the district cou rt imposed sanctions against Ali’s counsel pursuan t to 28 U.S.C. § 192 7 and ordered him to pay roughly $5 7,000 in costs. In the distric t court’s view, by the end of discovery Ali’s co unsel k new or should have known that his client’s sole remaining claim was baseless. B ecaus e he failed to voluntarily dismiss the case at that point and instead opposed BC’s motio n for summary judgment, the d istrict court found he had unreasonably and vexatiously multiplie d the proceedings in a manner warranti ng sanctions. We conclude the district court abused its disc retion in imposing sanctions on Ali’s counsel and therefore r everse its judgment. I. We begin by outlining the factual an d procedural history of this long -running dispute, which has been the subject of fo ur district court opinions an d three prior appeals. Because the merits of Ali’s claims are indirec tly relevant to this appeal, we first review the motion to dismiss and summary jud gment proceedings in this case. We then summari ze the sanctions proceedin gs at issue on appea l.

3 A. Nawal Ali worked as a computer - as sisted design drafter at BC Archit ects Engineers, PLC (“BC”), from March 2015 until April 2016, whe n BC’s two o wners terminated her employment. Ali is a S yrian-American Musli m woman and wears a hijab. After her termination, Ali sued B C for unlaw ful race discriminatio n, hostile wor k environment, retaliatio n, breach of contract, and a violatio n of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. She clai med she was passed up for promotions and lat er demoted because o f her race and that another BC employee harass ed and discriminated against her because she was Arab. She also alleged that, shortly before she was fired, she reported this discrimination and harassment to BC’s two owners and subsequen tly faced retaliat ion, including her terminati on. The district court dismissed all of Ali’s cla ims. Ali v. BC Arc hitects Eng ’rs, P LC (“ Ali I ”), 2019 WL 11316659 (E.D. Va. M ay 1, 2019). On appeal, we affirmed the dismissal as to most of those cla ims. Ali v. BC Architec ts Eng’rs, PLC, 832 F. App’x 167 (4th Cir. 2020). But a claim for retali atory termination, we conclud ed, could go forward, and we reversed and remanded to the distric t court on that count. Id. at 173 – 74. In particular, we noted that Ali alleged “th at her work performan ce was satisfactory throughout her tenure, ” and that after she reported discriminati on and harassm ent to BC’s owners “she was twice denied reas onable requests to w ork from home to care fo r her sick son.” Id. at 173. These allegations t ogether, we explained, “plausi bly stated a retali atory- termination claim.” Id.

4 On remand, the case proceeded to di scovery. As sometimes happens, the evidence uncovered did not corroborate all of the co mplaint’s allegations – including the two we had highlighted in our earlier opinion. Fo r instance, the evidence called into question Ali’s job performance, indicatin g that she had fa iled to meet work deadlines o n multiple oc casions and owed 30 work ho urs to BC, whi ch she did not mak e up despite promises to do so. As for Ali’s two requests to work from hom e, BC had granted one and, while denying the other, still permitted Al i to take leave so sh e could care for her son. But discovery also revealed new inform ation about the case that was arguably less favorable to BC. First, in interrog atory responses and depositio ns, BC’s owners put forward their reasons f or terminating Ali’s e mployment. A nd as the district court would later acknowledge, there were certain “vari ations” in these accou nts. See Ali v. BC Architects Eng’rs, P LC (“ Ali II ”), 2021 WL 2816016, at *9 (E.D. Va. May 28, 2021). Second, deposition t estimony revealed that Ali had not been placed on the per formance improvement plan (“PI P”) contemplated by B C’s progressive discipl ine policy before her termination. According to BC’s owne rs, that was because the y were unaware of the company’s progressive discipline poli cy, though it was laid out in the employee handbook. At the close of discove ry, BC moved for sum mary judgment, and Al i opposed the motion. Analyzin g Ali’s claim un der the f amiliar McDonne ll Douglas framework, the district court found that Ali had establishe d a prima facie case of retaliation. Id. at *7 –8. But, the district court c oncluded, Ali failed to meet her burden at the “pretext” stage of the analysis because there was no record evi dence from which a jury c ould infer that B C’s proffered reasons for her termination were pretexts fo r retalia tion. Id. at *8 –9.

5 Specifically, the distric t court rejected Ali’s argument that BC’s shifting explanat ions for her termination were evidence of pret ext, reasoning t hat Ali had iden tified only “rel atively minor discrepancies” a nd that all of BC’s e xplanations fell “within th e general category of lack of productivity an d insubordinatio n.” Id. The district court d id not address Ali’s argument that a jury also could infer pre text from BC’s depar ture from its progressive discipline policy in con nection with her termin ation. Having found that Ali failed to rebut BC’s le gitimate, non - retaliator y reasons for her termination, the district court granted su mmary judgment to BC. Id. at *9. We affirmed the district court’s order in an unpubl ished per curiam decision. Ali v. BC Architects Eng’rs, PLC, 202 2 WL 17985701 (4th C ir. Dec. 29, 2022). B. After the district court granted summary judg ment, BC moved for sanctions against Ali’s counsel pursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which authorizes courts to require “[a ]ny attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unr easonably and vexat iously” to “satisfy personally the excess cost s, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such condu ct.” In support of this motion, BC arg ued that Ali’s claims w ere frivolous and that her counsel had file d and prosecuted the ca se without a reasonable basis for doing so. 1 1 BC also mov ed for an award of attorneys’ fees and c osts against Ali herself, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The dis trict court denied this portion of the motion, see Ali v. BC Architects Eng’rs, PLC (“ Ali III ”), 2023 WL 31914 35, at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2023), and it is not at is sue on appeal.

6 The district court granted BC’s mo tion in part, finding that sanctions against Ali’ s counsel were warranted under § 1927 f or the period beginning when Ali opposed summary judgment and including the final dispositi on of the summary judgment appeal and the motion for sanctions. Ali v. BC Architects En g’rs, PLC (“ Ali III ”), 2023 WL 3191435, at *7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2023). “B y the end of discovery,” the district court found, “ [Ali] ’s counsel knew, or should have known, that th e core allegations the Fourth Circuit found sufficient to plausib ly state a retaliati on claim were non-existe nt.” Id. at *6. And without support for those allegations, the distr ict court reasoned, Ali ’s retaliation claim was “entirely groundless.” Id. But Ali’s couns el nonetheless opposed summary judgment, which in the district court’s view “prolong ed and multiplie d the[] proceedings wi th unwarranted filings an d argument,” and then “continued to multiply the[] proceeding [s] ” by appealing the summary judgment decision. Id. at *7. The district cou rt reserved decision on the amount of sanctions to be imposed and ordere d the parties to submit supplemental briefing on that question. See id. 2 After briefing, the district court o rdered Ali’s counsel to pay $57,015.82 in attorneys’ fees and costs to BC. Ali v. BC Architects Eng’rs, PLC (“ Ali IV ”), 2024 WL 2 Ali immediately appea led the order gra nting sanctions. We dismisse d the appeal for lack of jurisd iction, finding that the order was not final because it d id not fix the amount of sanctions to be paid. Ali v. BC Architects Eng’rs, PLC, 2023 WL 7279894 (4th Cir. Sep. 19, 2023). BC again s ought sanctions aga inst Ali’s cou nsel under § 1927, this time for filing a frivolous appea l. We denied that m otion. Id. at *1.

7 4492061, at *4 (E.D. V a. Sep. 11, 2024). 3 Ali timely appealed. II. The district court awarded sanctions aga inst Ali’s counsel pur suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which provides that: Any attorney or other person a dmitted to con duct cases in any court of t he United States or an y Territory thereof who so multipl ies the proceed ings in any case unreasonably and vexatiousl y may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess cos ts, expenses, and attorneys ’ fees reasonably incurred because of suc h conduct. On appeal, Ali’s counsel argues that his co nduct in this case was no t sanctionable under this statute and, in the alternative, that the district cour t erred in calc ulating the a mount of sanctions imposed. We have jurisdic tion to consider this appeal because the di strict court has now entered its final order i mposing sanctions. Se e Ali IV, 20 24 WL 4492061, at *4. And we review for abuse of discretion the district court’s awar d of sanctio ns under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Six v. Generations Fed. Cre dit Union, 891 F.3d 50 8, 518 – 19 (4th Cir. 201 8). In general, we give deference to a district court’s assessment of whet her a plaintiff’s claim was “frivolous, unreaso nable, or groundless.” Abdelhalim v. Lewis, 9 0 F.4th 265, 272 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation and internal quotat ion marks omitted). But we ha ve also explained that 3 BC sought almost $70, 000 in sanctions. Ali IV, 2024 WL 4492061, at *2. Because we conclude that no sanctions should have be en imposed and revers e on that basis, there is no need to detail ho w the district court calc ulated its award of $57, 015.82.

8 “[a] district court abuses its discretion when its reasoning is flawed by erroneous factual or legal premises.” Id. (citation and internal q uotation marks omitte d). After reviewing the record, we concl ude that the district co urt abused its discretio n when it found that Ali’s opposition t o BC’s su mmary judgment mo tion was “baseles s,” se e Ali III, 2023 WL 3191 435, at *7, and reverse the award of sanctio ns on that ground. 4 A. Ali’s counsel begins by arguing that past decisions of this cour t categorically foreclose the imposit ion of § 1927 sanctions f or the kind of conduct the district co urt relied on here. We do not read our precede nt quite so broadly, and we disagr ee with Ali’s counsel on this point. Counsel first argues that the sanctions award un der § 1927 was erroneous as a matter of law because he did nothing to “multi ply the proceedings” in this case. As support, he points to our decisi on in DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499 (4th C ir. 1999), where we emphasized that “[t]he unambiguous text of § 1927 aims only at attorneys who multipl y proceedings” and held “as a matter of law tha t the filing of a single complaint cannot be held to have multiplied the proceedi ngs unreasonably and vexatio usly.” Id. a t 511 –12. Because he filed only a complai nt and two a mended complaints an d initiated no other proceedings, Ali’ s counsel claims, De Bauche forecloses the award of § 192 7 sanctions against him. 4 The district court also awarded sanctions ba sed on Ali’s appeal of its summary judgment order. Although we leave for ano ther day whether the district court had the authority to do so, it follows from our analy sis that Ali’s appeal was not “groundless” ei ther.

9 But this case is distinguishable fro m DeBauche and thus not co ntrolled by its outcome. In DeBauch e, the district court gra nted a motion to dismi ss the complaint and then awarded sanctions based on that filing al one. See id. at 504. As we explained, merely commencing a case by filing a complaint cannot multiply the pro ceedings within the meaning of § 1927 (al though filing a frivolo us complaint might be sanctionable under another authority). See id. at 511–12. Here, by contrast, Al i’s counsel did more tha n just commence the case by filing a complaint. He also opp osed BC’s motion for s ummary judgment at th e close of discovery, which the district cour t expressly identified a s the sanctionable conduct that “prolon ged and multiplied the [] pr oceedings.” Ali III, 2023 WL 3191 435, at *7. As we previousl y explained in an unpublished opinion, “refusing to voluntarily di smiss [a] case once its lack of merit bec[omes] evident” is “no t analogous to t he filing of a single faulty complaint tha t gave rise to our decision in DeBauche,” and can, under the right circu mstances, “protract[] the litigation” in a way that merits sa nctions under § 1927. Salvin v. Am. Nat ’l Ins. Co., 281 F. App’x 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). We fin d that reasoning per suasive and adopt it here. DeBauche does not con trol this case. We appreciate, as Ali’s counsel argues, t hat simply respondi ng to a motion filed by the opposing party may not sound l ike the kind of “multiplicatio n of proceedings” that should be sanctioned under § 1927. An d indeed, we expect that most § 1927 sanctions will be reserved for con duct that more affirmative ly multiplies the proceedings at is sue. See, e.g., Six, 891 F.3d at 511 (explaining that the sanctioned attorn eys “challenged the authenticity of a loan agreement for tw o years before revealing that they p ossessed an

10 identical copy”). But our court has previo usly recognized that in some excep tional circumstances, a plaint iff’s claim may be rev ealed as so patently frivolous th at failure to voluntarily dismiss the claim, couple d with continued litigation i n support of it, c ould be sanctionable under § 1 927. See, e.g., Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm P’shi p, 850 F.2d 207, 211 n.1 (4th Cir. 1988); Blu e v. U.S. Dep’t of the A rmy, 914 F.2d 525, 544 –45 (4th Cir. 199 0); Salvin, 281 F. App’ x at 226; Sweetla nd v. Bank of A m. Corp., 241 F. App’x 92, 97 (4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). We therefore disa gree with Ali’s co unsel that our precedents foreclose § 1927 sa nctions in this case as a matter of law. For related reasons, we also reject counsel’s ar gument that the district court erred as a matter of law by cons idering the merits of his client’s claim i n awarding sanctions. It is true that § 1927 “focuses on the conduct of the litigation and not on its merits,” DeBauc he, 191 F.3d at 511, a nd the “weaknesses o f [a pla intiff]’s case” are not by themselves g rounds for sanctions under § 1 927, EEOC v. Great St eaks, Inc., 667 F.3d 51 0, 522 (4th Cir. 2012). But at the same time, as described above, our precedents leave open the possibility that § 1927 sanctions ma y be awarded w hen cou nsel con tinues to litiga te a frivolous clai m “long after it would have been r easonable and responsi ble to have dis missed” it, Blue, 914 F.2d at 545 (citation and internal qu otation marks o mitted) – which necessarily r equires the court to consider whether a claim i n fact qualifies as frivolous, wi th no “arguable basis either in law or in fact, ” Neitzke v. William s, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Here, the district court did not fault Ali’s coun sel for any ordinary weakness in Ali’s claims. Instead, it determined only that Ali’s counsel “knew, or sho uld have known” by

11 the end of discover y that Ali’s retaliation cla im was “entirely groun dless,” or “baseless.” Ali III, 2023 WL 3191 435, at *6–7. That is the limited inquiry our precedent allows. B. We agree with Ali’s co unsel, however, that the district court abused it s discretion in applying this standard and finding that the claims advanced in opposition to sum mary judgment were so “base less” and “unsub stantiated” that § 1927 sanctions were appropriat e. See id. at *7. On that g round, we reverse the d istrict court’s judgment. We take as our starting point the earlier distr ict court decision granting summary judgment to BC on Ali’s retaliation claim. The district court found, first, that A li had sufficiently made out a prima facie case of retaliation, base d largely on the temporal proximity between her protected activit y – alleged complaints of race discrimination – and her termination approximately two wee ks later. Ali II, 2021 WL 2816016, at * 7–8 (applying the McD onnell Douglas frame work). It turned then to whether Ali had met her burden of presenting evidence t hat BC’s purported non - retaliatory reasons for her termination were pretextual. Id. at *8. Afte r considering certain discrepancies i n BC’s explanations for the te rmination, the d istrict court concl uded that the y were too “minor” t o serve as proof of pretex t, and thus held that Ali had faile d to rebu t BC’s legitimate a nd non - retaliatory reasons f or her termination. Id. at * 8–9. On its face, this is in all respects a very ordina ry decision, of the sort we regularly review. The district c ourt did, to be sure, rul e against Ali, finding her claim to be without merit – a judgment we affirmed on appeal. But as discussed above, that a claim proves to be non - meritorious cannot by itself be grou nds for sanctions, see Grea t Steaks, 667 F.3d at

12 522, and it does nothing to disti nguish this case from co untless other employment discrimination actions i n which plaintiffs are ultimately uns uccessful. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEO C, 434 U.S. 412, 421 – 2 2 (1978) (warning tha t merely “because a plaintiff did not ult imately prevail” doe s not mean the “action must ha ve been unreaso nable or without foundation”); Abdelhalim, 90 F.4th at 272. What is missin g from this seemi ngly routine m erits decision is any indication that Ali’s claim was not only unavailing bu t also so obviously frivolou s that its continued pur suit could be deemed an “abuse of c ourt processes” under § 192 7. See DeBauche, 191 F.3d at 511 (citation a nd internal quotati on marks omitted). I ndeed, in its decision awarding sanc tions, the district court did n ot focus on its ultimate conclusion that Ali failed to produce evidence of pretext to rebut BC’s proffe red reasons for her termination. Instead, it assessed only two specifi c allegations in Ali’s complaint: that she performed her work to BC’s satisf action, and was denied two reasonable requests t o work from h ome shortl y after she engage d in protected activity. See Ali III, 2023 WL 3191 435, at *6. Those al legations, re call, were cited by th is court in reversing the district c ourt’s original dismis sal of Ali’s reta liation claim. I n the distric t court’s view, the ev idence uncovered in discovery pro ved these a llegations to be “factually false.” Id. And because these “core ” alleg ations had “preserved [Ali’s] retaliation clai m on appeal,” the dis trict court reasone d, once they were disproved, Ali’s retaliation claim became frivolous. Id. a t *6–7. We think the district court framed its § 19 27 inquiry too narrowly. W e can assume the district court was correct that these tw o specific allegations were disproved by

13 discovery evi dence. But by then, the case ha d moved on in other re spects, as well: BC had proffered legitimate and non - ret aliatory reason s for A li’s termination, and Ali had pointed to evidence from discovery to show t hat these rea sons were pretextual. 5 At that point, as the district court recognized in its merits decisio n, the determinative que stion became whether Ali, having made a prima facie showing of retaliation, had presen ted evidence from which a jury could in fer that BC’s proffered non-retaliatory reasons for he r termination were pretextual. Id. at *8 –9; see Roe v. Marshall U niv. Bd. of Governors, 145 F.4th 561, 569 (4th Cir. 2025) (explai ning the McDonnell Douglas framework for provin g a retaliation claim). So for purpose s of its san ction s inquiry, the distr ict court sho uld have asked whether Ali had an “arguable basis either in law or in fact,” see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, for her pretext argument. And our review of t he record s hows that Ali p ut forth at least two non-frivolous arguments to oppose s ummary judgment on t his basis. The first is that BC offered shi fting explanati ons for Ali’s ter mination. We have repeatedly explained that when a defen dant “offer[s] different justi fications at different times” for a challenged action, that fact “in an d of itself is evidence of pretext.” Hol lis v. 5 Ali was free to rely fo r her argument on new evidence obtai ned in discovery, as long as that evidence a dvanced a legal the ory of which her com plaint gave BC fair no tice. See, e.g., Faulco ner v. Centra Health, Inc., 808 F. App’x 148, 154 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[A] plaintiff does not have to allege in his complaint every fact on which he will rely at summary judgment,” as long as the evidence does not a dvance “an entirely d ifferent theory” that would be “tantamount to a c onstructive amendmen t of a complaint.”); Zampierollo- Rheinfeldt v. Ingersoll - Rand de P.R., Inc., 999 F. 3d 37, 54 – 55 (1st Cir. 2021) (same). The evidence from discovery relied on by Ali in oppo sing summar y judgment plainly related to her re taliatory terminatio n claim, which was rai sed in her complaint an d had already been the subject of exte nsive litigation. See, e.g., Ali I, 2019 WL 11 316659; Ali, 832 F. App’x 167. BC does not argue oth erwise.

14 Morgan State Univ., 153 F.4th 369, 383 (4th C ir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omi tted) (quoting EEOC v. Se ars Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 852 – 53 (4th Cir. 2001)). An d here, Ali presented evidence marshalled or disclosed during discovery to arg ue that BC’s reasons for her termination had not been entirely consistent. See, e.g., J.A. 36 2 (BC owner stating that the “primary reason” for termination was Ali’s “lack of producti vity”); J.A. 661 (Ali stating that she was told she was fired for creating “problems” in the co mpany and bringin g her “ mother’s problem s to the company”); Al i II, 2021 WL 281601 6, at *9 (comparing three reasons for term ination offered b y BC to Virgini a Employmen t Commission with nine reasons offered in BC ’s interrogatory answers). I ndeed, the district c ourt acknowledged that BC offered multip le “variations” on its proffered le gitimate reasons for Ali’s firing, and as noted above, it gave no indication that it v iewed Ali’s shifting explanations argument as frivolous. Ali II, 2021 WL 2816016, a t *9. To be sure, the distric t court ultimately con cluded these were “va riations” on a theme – that each expla nation fell within the sa me “general category o f lack of productivity and insubordination,” i d. – and we affir med that decision, Ali, 2022 WL 17985701. But the line between “mino r discrepancies” that do not give rise to an inference of pretex t, Ali II, 2021 WL 2816016, at *9, and mor e significant discre pancies that do can be a fine one. Compare, e.g., Sp atafore v. City of Clar ksburg, 2026 WL 4956 8, at * 4 (4th Ci r. Jan. 7, 2026) (finding that “minor inconsistenci es” in explanation s do not cre ate a triable issue of fact on pretext), with id. at *6 (Harris, J., dissenting) (fin ding that the same inconsistencies give rise to a jury question on pretext). That a l awyer ends up on t he wrong side of this

15 line does not make hi s position so evidently baseless that he shoul d be sanctioned for pursuing it. The same is true of Ali’s second argument: that BC’s failure to follow its ow n progressive discipline policy in terminati ng her was also evidence from which a jury could infer pretext. 6 BC’s employee handbook enum erated this poli cy, which include d the use of a PIP to attempt to resolve certain disciplina ry and work performance issues before they result ed in termination. BC did not di spute that the policy was not fo llowed. Instead, one of its owners explained that he was unaware of the policy in t he employee handbook, but that had he known about it, he w ould have placed Ali on a PI P before terminating her employment. The distr ict court described this explanation as “a little curious.” J.A. 861. Deviations from a company polic y can be “circumstantial evide nce from which pretext and discriminatory intent may be inferr ed.” Hollis, 153 F.4th at 383 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. M etro. Hous. Dev. Cor p., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (19 77); Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc., 41 F.4th 370, 383 (4th Cir. 2022)). Again, this argument did not carry the day for Ali at the summary judgment sta ge. But that does not make the argument frivolous. See Christia nsburg, 434 U.S. at 42 1 –22; Abdelhali m, 90 F.4th at 272. Because the district cour t did not address this argument expressly, we do n ot have the benefit of its reasoning. But it appears to us that the record provided Ali’s counsel with a plausible, non - 6 As noted a bove, the district court did not address this ar gument in its summar y judgment decision. See generally Ali II, 2021 WL 2816016. But Ali raised it in her brief in opposit ion to summary judgme nt and at the summary judgmen t motions hearing in fr ont of the district court.

16 frivolous basis for arguing that BC’s depart ure from its progressive discipline poli cy was evidence of pretext. For these rea sons, we conclude that Ali’s counsel had at least two non -frivolous grounds for opposi ng summary judgm ent. The distric t court ab used its discre tion when it imposed sanctions on Ali’s counsel base d on the “flawed. . . le gal premise[]” that the failure to substantiate two specific allegations in the complaint rende red his opposition to summary judgment s o frivolous, see Abdelhalim, 90 F.4th at 272 (cit ation omitted), that i t constituted an abuse of process under § 192 7. Because we resolve the case on these grounds, we need not and do not reach the parties’ argume nts about the amount of sanctions imposed. 7 III. For the foregoing re asons, the judgment o f the district court is reve rsed. 7 More than a month after oral argument in this appeal, BC again filed a motion in our court for add itional § 192 7 sanctions agai nst Ali’s counsel. See supra note 2. This time, BC pointed to letters filed with t his court by Ali’s counsel purs uant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), arguin g that the letters failed to com ply with Rule 28(j)’s requirements. We remind litigants that “the proper use of letters file d under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) is to alert the cour t to new authority that h as come to a party’s attention after briefing or oral argument. ” United States v. Heywa rd, 42 F.4th 460, 470 n.6 (4th Cir. 2022) (citations and internal quota tion marks omitted). But we frequently recei ve Rule 28(j) letters that at least arguably breach that standard, and we generally do not consider such run -of- the - mill filings sanction able under § 19 27. BC’s motion for sanctions is denied. BC also has filed a motion under Rule 60(a) of the Federa l Rules of Civ il Procedure, seeking leave to a llow the distri ct court to correct a pur ported error in its calculation of sanctions and increase the amount of its award. Given our reversal of the sancti ons imposed, we deny that motion as moot.

17 REVERSED