Knieling v. Fook - Maritime Injury Appeal

U.S. C OUR T OF A PPEALS FOR THE T HIRD C IRCUIT No. 24 -2613 T AMMY K NIELING, Appellant v. D ON F UNG F OOK; W ILLIAM P OSTON ________________________ _____ Appeal from the District Court, D. V.I. Magistrate Judge Ruth Miller, No. 3:22- cv -00036 Before: H ARDIMAN, B IBAS, and P ORTER, Cir cuit Judges Argued: Dec. 9, 2025; Filed: Feb. 11, 2026 ___________________________ __ O PINION OF THE C OUR T B IBAS, Cir cuit Judge. Sailing is dangerous, so shipowners have long been responsible for t heir injured sailors’ medical bills and living expenses. The duty to pay co ntinues unti l ship- owners can show that injured sailors have reached maximum medical improveme nt. While working as a first mate and chef, T ammy Knieling broke her finger. She recovered all her past me di c al e xp ens es a n d t h en so m e, b ut al s o wan t s mo ne y for f ut ure treatments. Because it is un clear what future treatments she

2 may get to help her finger, she cannot recover more now, but may come back later. So we will AFFIRM the District Court’ s judgment. I. S A IL OR K N I EL IN G R E C O VE RS F O R H ER B R O K EN F I N G E R Tammy Knieling worked as a chef and deck hand for short- term boat charters. Captain Don Fung Fook hired her to work on William Poston’s 51 -foot power catamaran, the M.B. Some- where Hot. The voyage started uneventfully. But then, injury struck. As the boat weathered rough seas, Fook ordered Kniel- ing to let out the dinghy line. Knieling grabbed the line with her left hand. But before she could unwrap it from the cleat, her fingers got trapped between the taut line and the metal post. Though she tugged on the line with her right hand to free her left, the pressure was too great. So she screamed, “stop the boat, stop the boat. I’m h urt.” App. 704. Fook cut the engines. A medical student aboard the boat grabbed a firs t-aid kit and wrapped Knieli ng’s left middle fin- ger. With the help of Fook and gues ts, she was able to keep up with her duties and did not miss any days’ work. Back on shore, she was diagnosed with a broken and dislocated finger. While getting treated ashore, she continued to work. Eventually, her fracture healed and her grip strength recovered. But her left middle finger has 20% less range of motion, and she will never get it all back. Dr. F le tch er, a pl as tic a nd ha nd su rg eon, rec om men ded ex erc is es and an injection to help with range of motion,

3 possibly followed by surgery as a last resort. He could not say whether she had reached maxi mum medical improvement. Knieling sued Fook and Poston. The parties consented to a bench trial before a magistrate judge, who issued a split deci- sion. She dismissed the claims against Fook. Yet she held Poston liable under the Jones Act for negligence and awarded Knieling past medical expenses plus interest, as well as past and future pain and suffering. She al so found Poston liable for medical expenses (cure) under admiralty law, but Knieling had recovered these under the Jones Act. She did not awar d Kniel- ing any living expenses (maintenance) under admiralty law, punitive damages, or attorney’s fees. We review the District Court’s factual findings for cl ear error, its legal conclusions de novo, a nd its ultimate attorney’s -fee award for abuse of discre- tion. Deisler v. McCormack Aggregates, Co., 54 F. 3d 1074, 1079, 1087 (3d Cir. 19 95). II. K N IE L I N G G ET S N O M O R E M AI NT E N A N C E & C U RE N OW Since the Middle Ages, shipowners have been obligated to care for their injured sailors. 1 Robert Force & Martin J. Norris, The Law of Seamen § 26:6, at 1099 (5th ed. 2025). So while sailors are ashore recovering from injury or illness, shipowners m us t c ov er t he ir m ed i ca l (c ur e) a nd l iv in g (m ai nt en a nc e) e xp en s es. O’Connell v. Interocean Mgmt. Corp., 90 F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 1996). Owners are strictly liable for them so long as the sailor (1) was working as a seaman, (2) was injured or grew ill while serving the vessel, and (3) lost wages or incurred expenses f rom treating the injury or illness. 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 6:28 (7th ed. 2025).

4 Once the sailor shows a right to maintenance and cure, the owner must keep paying her those expenses “until the seaman has reached the point of maximum cure, that is until the seaman is cured or his condition is diagnosed as permanent and incur- able.” O’Connell, 90 F.3d at 84 (internal quotation marks omit- ted). As for maintenance, Knieling had no need for it. Knieling did not take time ashore to recover from her injury. She con- tinued to serve as chef and mate, never missing a paycheck. Knieling protests that she went back t o work because she needed the money. True, returning to work because of coercion or “fi nancial neces sity” does not bar maintenance. Yates v. Dann, 223 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1955). But as the District Court found, “there is no indication that she ever gave any hin t of wanting to take time off to heal.” App. 33. “Rather, plaintiff made it clear that she wanted to keep going, and that she did not want to miss any of the scheduled charters.” Id. Because she never ha d to take ti me off, she incurred no living expenses and lost no wages as a result of her injury, and thus had no right to maintenance. And as for cure, though Knieling has recovered for her past medical expenses, she also seeks payment for future ones. Sail- ors have a right to cure for medical expenses that “may be needful in the immediate future” and are “of a kind and for a period which can be definitely ascertained.” Calmar S.S. Co rp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 531 – 32 (1938). The District Court denied future cure because Knieling’s request was too speculative. We agree. Though Dr. Fletcher

5 recommended some possible treatments, he also said he “would need to see [her] again to determine whether the treat- ments he previously recommended are still medically neces- sary.” App. 35. His testimony was “speculative as to whether additional treatment could be curat ive.” App. 33 n.14. What is more, Knieli ng gave no evide nce that she intende d to schedule further treatment. Future cure cannot be “based on a hypothet- ical future t reatment that may or may not be medically neces- sary and that the plain tiff may n ever receive.” App. 35 (citing Calmar S.S., 303 U.S. at 531 – 32). At the same time, the District Court’s ruling does not close the door on possible future cure. To end Knieling’s entitlement to cure, Poston had the burden to prove that she had reached maximum medical improvement. Smith v. Del. Bay Launch Serv., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 836, 848 (D. Del. 1997); Aadland v. Boat Santa Rita II, I nc., 42 F.4th 34, 53 (1st Cir. 2022). That i s ma i nl y a m ed ic a l qu es t io n. 1 Sc ho e nb au m § 6: 3 3. We re s ol ve doubts in favor of the seaman. Vaughan v. Atki nson, 369 U.S. 527, 532 (1962). As the District Co urt exp laine d, “there is no clear finding of MMI [m aximum medical improvement] — or the a bsence of MMI —on this record.” App. 32. Dr. Fletcher did not opine whether Knieling had recovered as much as she will. He did say that her finger will never be the same. But he suggested some therapies that could help. And surgery remained an op- tion. Given those doubts, Poston failed to carry his burden to show that her finger cannot im prove.

6 Resisting this conclusion, Poston relies on a single sentence in the District Court’s opinion: “The Court concludes from the bulk of the evidence that further treatment would be palliative as opposed to curative.” App. 32– 33. That sentence is, by its own terms, limited to the evidence in this record. And it is san d - wi c he d bet wee n tw o o th er s en te nce s th at hi ghl i gh t the a bs e nc e of proof: “There is no medical evidence or testimony indicating plaintiff reached MMI” and “Dr. Fletcher’s testimony is spec- ulative as to whether additional treatment could be curative.” App. 32, 33 n.14. So the lone sentence cannot bear the weight that Poston puts on it. Read as a whole, the District Court’s opinion is consistent with the burden of proof: Without enough evidence of maxi- mum medical improvement, Poston has not carried his burden. If Knieling “receives future treatment of a curative nature, she may … recover in a new proceeding the am ount exp e nded for such treatment and for maintenance while receiving it.” Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 519 (1 949) (cleaned up). III. K N IE LI N G D OE S N O T G ET P U NI TI V E D A MA GE S, A TT O R N EY ’ S F EES, OR C O ST S Knieling also see k s punitive da mages, attorney’s fees, and costs. She says that by refusing to pay her medical bills, Fook and Poston callously disregarded her rights. To recover these amounts, she must show that they acted in “bad faith, ” with “w ill fu l an d wa nto n d isr ega rd o f th e m ai nt ena nce a nd cu re ob lig at ion.” Deisler, 54 F.3d at 1087 (fi rst quotation); Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424 (2009) (second quotation).

7 Neither Fook nor Poston acted in bad faith. True, Poston delayed paying some medical bills, but that was because the parties had trouble determining the exact amount owed. And when she asked for more, he was willing to pay up. Knieling was partly res ponsible for the fact that Poston never paid those additional expenses because she never responded to Poston’s offer and did not claim for cure in her first complaint. Plus, Fook and Posto n had a good-faith basis to believe that she had reached maximum medical improvement based on her working aboard another boat. Gooden v. Sinclair Refin. Co., 378 F.2d 576, 579 (3d Cir. 1967). Though that defense failed at trial, it rested on a colorable legal basis. Poston’s delay was not callous or recalcitrant and did no t reflect wanton or intentional disre- gard for Knieling’s rights. Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 530 – 31; Del. River & Bay Au th. v. Kopacz, 584 F.3d 622, 635 (3d Cir. 2009). So the District Court properly denied punitive damages, attor- ney’s fees, and costs. * * * * * Knieling’s injury was serious, but not debilitating. Though she properly recovered medical expenses and other damages, she had no right to maintenance, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, or costs. If she needs future non -palliative medical care, sh e may br i ng a n ot h er s ui t f or f ut ur e c ur e. We wi ll t hus A F FI R M.

8 Counsel for Appellant T erry P. Roberts [Ar gu e d] F ISCHER R EDA VID Counsel for Appellees John P. W alsh [Ar gued] JP W ALSH L EGAL F IRM Matthew J. Duensing Joseph Sauerwein D UENSING & C ASNER