BLM Wild Horse Management Plans Revision Ordered by D.C. Circuit

United States Court of A ppeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUM BIA CIRCUIT Argued October 1, 2025 Decided Febr uary 20, 2026 No. 24-5155 F RIENDS OF A NIMALS, A PPELLANT v. U NITED S TATES B UR EAU OF L AND M ANAGE MENT, AN AGENCY OF THE U NITED S TA TES AN D S TATE OF U TAH, A PPELLEES Appeal f rom the United States D istrict Court for the D istrict of Columbia (No. 1:18- cv -02029) Jennifer Best argu ed the cau se for ap pellant. With her on the bri efs was St ephen Hernick. Ezekiel A. Peters on, Attorney, U.S. Department of Just ice, argued the cause for appellee U.S. Bureau of Land Management. With him on the brief were Adam R.F. Gustafson, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Robert Lundman, Attorney. Rebecca Jaff e, Attorney, entered an appearan ce. Steve Gear y, Assistant Solicitor Genera l, Office of the

2 Attorney General for the State of Utah, argued the cause for appellee S tate of U tah. With him on the brief were Dere k Brown, Attorney General, and Stanford Purse r, Solicitor General. Before: K ATSAS and C HILDS, Circuit Judges, and E DWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge. Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge E DWARDS. E DWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: The Wild Free -Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (the “Act ”), authorizes and directs the Bureau o f Land Man agement (“BLM”) “ to protec t and manage wild free - roaming horses and burros as components of the public lands.” Id. § 133 3(a). Pursuant to this rol e, BLM is responsible for culling the w ild horse population on public lands to promote the ir l ong- term sustainability. In assuming this responsibility, BLM is obliged to a dhere to certain statutory requir ement s that were ena cted to ensure the protection of wild horses. T he dispute in t his case is focused on “ten - year plans ” tha t were issued by BLM to manage wild horse populations on public lands. These p lans authorize BLM to gather and remove wild horses from four different geographi c area s during the course of a ten - y ear perio d. In August 2018, Appellant, Friends of Animals, filed a lawsuit in the Distric t Court against BLM under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA ”) initiating a challeng e to the t en -y e ar p lans. In pursuing this action, Appellant cl aimed that t he con tested plans should be struck down because they impermissibly “allow BLM t o conduct an indefinite number of subsequent removals of wild horses despite (1) not identifying a spe cific overpopulation or excess horses that need to be removed, (2) not making excess

3 determinations based on current information, and (3) not consulting with independent parties.” Appellant’s Br. 2. According to Appellant, “[n] othing in the [Act]. . . au thorizes BLM to iss ue long - term, open -e nded [plans] t o continually roundup and remove an undisclosed number of wild horses at unknown times over the course of ten years. ” Id. at 23. BLM responded that nothing in the Act prohibits it from authorizing multiple gathers over a p eriod of years in a single plan. The Distr ict Court foun d merit in some of the claims advanced by Appellant. In particular, the court held unlawful and vac ated each of th e cont ested ten - year pl ans to th e extent that each authorized ad dit ional g athers aft er the plan has achieved the stated population goal for a specified geographic area. See Friends of Animals v. BLM, 728 F. Sup p. 3d 45, 80- 81 (D.D.C. 2024). No party contests this j udgment. The District Court also held that the t en - year p lans a re unlawful t o the extent they aut horize fut ure gat hers th at disreg ard the A ct’s “ duty to act promptly and to ensu re that gather decisions are inform ed by current information and consultation. ” Id. at 81. No party contests this judgment. The District Court th en remand ed the case to B LM to “r evise” each of the contes ted plans “ to clarify which future gathe rs will req uire further process before they can pro ceed. ” Id. at 79 (citation omitte d); see also Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 406. Therefore, the par ties’ principal disagreements were left unresolved by the District Court pending remand. Appellant now app eals, s eeking to invoke this court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, that section limits our jurisdic tion to “ final decisions of the distric t courts of the Un ited States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis adde d), and controlling case law instructs us that “ a district cour t ’ s remand order is not normally ‘ fi nal ’ for purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, ” N.C. Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. G utierr ez, 550

4 F.3d 16, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2 008) (citations omitte d). In thi s case, t he District Court ordered BLM to reconsider Appellant’s claims on remand. BLM must “a dopt reasonable limita tions regarding when (and with what information in h and) it may conduct follow - on gathers before achieving [the targe t population] for each of the four [ten - year plans].” J.A. 406; see also Friends of Animals, 728 F. Supp. 3d at 81. The District Court’s order remanding the case to the agency was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Therefore, on the record before us, we are required to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction. I. B ACKGROUND A. Wild Free -Roaming Horses and Burros Act Congres s enact ed th e Wil d Free - Ro amin g Hors es and Burros Act in 1971 to prese rve and protect wild free -roaming horses and burros. Congress believed that doing so would “ enhance and enrich the dreams and enjoyment of future generati ons of Am erican s.” H.R. R EP. N O. 92- 681, at 7 (1971) (Conf. Rep.). To that end, the 1971 enact ment o nly permitte d BLM to destroy horses or burros “because of overpopulation” if it determine d that “such act ion [was ] the onl y pract ical w ay to remo ve excess animal s from the ar ea. ” Pub. L. No. 92 -195 § 3(c), 85 Stat. 649, 650 (1971). Congress soon realized that the 1971 law m ay have overreach ed i n pursuing its goal of protecting wild horses and burros. The legislative history underlying the 1978 amendments to the Act note s that wild horses and burros had “exceed[ed] the carrying capacity of the range” and “pose[d] a threat to their own habitat” as well as o ther wildlife and rangeland values. H.R. R EP. N O. 95- 1122, at 2 (1978).

5 Although Congress re mained committe d to “ protecting wild free - roaming horses an d burros from capture, branding, h arassmen t, or deat h,” it also recognized the necess ity of “ facilitating the removal and disposal of exce ss wild free - roaming horses and burros.” Id. Congress enacted the 1978 amendments to serve both goals. The amend ed Act directs BLM, as del egate for the Secretary of the Int erior, to “protect and man ag e wild fr ee - roaming horses and burros . . . in a manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands.” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a); see also id. § 1332 (a). To ca rry out these responsibilities, the Act tasks BLM with “maintain [ing] a current i nventory of wild free - roaming horses and burros ” in order to: [1] mak e determinations as to whether and whe re an overpopulation exists and whether action should be taken to remove excess anim als; [2] determin e ap prop riate m anagem ent lev els of wild free - roaming horses and burros on these a reas of the public lands; and [3] d eterm in e whether app ropriate m anagem ent levels should be achieved by the r emoval or destruction of excess a nimals, or other options (such as sterilization, or natural controls on population levels). Id. § 1333(b)(1). “In making such determinations[,]” BLM must consult with state a nd federal wildlife agencies, independent individuals recommended by the National Academy o f Scien ces, and “such other individuals” with “scientific expertise and spec ial knowledge of wild horse and burro protection, wildlife management and animal husbandry as related to ran geland m anagem ent. ” Id.

6 BLM has some di scretion in determining whether an overpopulation of horses exists and whe ther removal is necessa ry. Howev er, on ce it h as made an ex cess an d neces sary - to - remove deter mination based on the statutorily required informatio n, it must act “immediate ly” to remov e excess wild horses. The Act states: Where the S ecreta ry dete rmines on the b asis of (i) the current inventory of lands within his jurisdiction; (ii) information contained in any [statutorily required] land use planning . . .; (iii) information conta ined in court ordered environmental impact statements . . .; and (iv) such additional information as beco mes availab le to him from t ime to time, including t hat information developed in the rese arch study mandated by this section, or in the absen ce of the information contained in (i – iv) above on the basis of all in formation currently available to him, that an overpopulation exists on a given area of the public lands and that action is n ecessa ry to rem ove exc ess animal s, he shal l imm ediately rem ove ex cess ani mals from the range so as to achieve appropriate managemen t level s. Id. § 1333(b)(2). BLM must take a ction in the “order and priority” specified by the Act, “until a ll excess animals ha ve been remov ed.” Id. BLM carries o ut its functions under the Act in “l ocali zed ‘ herd man agement areas ’ (‘ HMAs ’).” Fund for Animals, Inc. v. BLM, 460 F.3d 13, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citatio ns omitted). For exam ple, BLM determines and sets appropriate managemen t level s (“AMLs”) for each herd man agement area. The AML is the number of wil d horses that achiev es “a thriving natural ecolog ical b alanc e” and is usually expressed as a r ange.

7 B UREAU OF L AND M GMT., U.S. D EP ’ T OF TH E I NTERIOR, BLM H ANDBOOK H-4700-1, W ILD H ORSES AND B URROS M ANAGEMENT H ANDB OOK 17 (2010), J.A. 856. BLM then monitors population lev els in each HMA or “Complex,” a group of HMAs managed collectively, to determ ine whet her AML is being achi eved. As mentioned, if based on current inventory and other applicable information, BLM makes a determin ation that an overpopulation exists and removal is necessa ry, the ag ency m ust act promptly t o remove ex cess animals. Prior to taki ng acti on, BLM m ust create a gather plan that includes a site - specific environmental analysis compliant with the National Environmental Policy Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); BLM, W ILD H ORSES AND B URROS M ANAGEMENT H ANDBOOK at 47-48, J.A. 85 7-58. A gather p lan often includes alternative proposed actions. BLM then issues a decision record t hat do cu ments t he exces s and n ecessa ry - to - remove determinations, adopts a proposed ac tion fro m the gather pl an, and provides a rati onale fo r the sele cted act ion. BLM typically implements gathers pursuant to a final deci sion record. B. Ten - Year Plans “ Historically, after making an exce ss determination and explaining why removal is necessary, BLM wo uld issue a g ather p lan t hat authorized a single ga ther and removal operation.” Br. for Fed. Appellee 8 (cleaned u p). In other words, each deci sion reco rd gave BLM one attempt to bring the wild horse population to AML, and, if that attempt fai led, BLM would have to restart the entire regulatory process. BLM explains that, over time, this approach proved untenable. As wild horse populations continued to grow, it became

8 “impract icabl e” for BLM to achi eve AML in a singl e gather. Id. T he resou rce an d logi stical challeng es were to o great. BLM decided to follow a “longer- term ap proach ” when aiming to achiev e AML. Id. BLM thus adopted gather plans that authorize it to conduct as many removal operations as necessa ry to achi eve and maintai n AML ov er a ten - year time horizon in each HMA or Complex. At issue on appeal are four decision r ecords approving ten - year gather plans for th e following geographies: the Eagle Complex, the Onaqui Mountain HMA, the Muddy Creek HMA, and the Pine Nut Mountains HMA. We r efer to the four decisi on records at issu e as th e “ten - year plans.” Each of the ten - year plans contai n s an exc ess and neces sary - to -remove determination and a pproves a gather plan that auth orizes BL M to gather and remove horses over the course of ten years to achieve and then maintain the population withi n the region’s approved AM L range. The AML ranges for all four areas were approved prior to their inclusion in the ten - year plans and ar e not at issue in the present proceeding. 1. Eagle Complex The Eagle Complex consists of three HMAs: th e Eag le, Mount Elinore, and Chokecherry HMA s. In A ugust 2018, BLM issued the decis ion record for the Eagle Complex. BL M estimated that 2,220 wild horses were then - present in the region an d determi ned th at remo val was nec essar y to achieve the approved AML range of 145- 265 wild horses. The de cision record ap prov es a gat her plan th at autho rizes the r elevant fiel d offices to gather and remove approximately 90% of the existing horses an d to return as n eeded over t en years to achieve and maint ain the AM L range.

9 BLM has complet ed seve ral gath er oper ation s in the Eagle Complex HMAs pursuant to t he decisi on reco rd. Although more th an 2,500 wild horses have been removed from th e Complex, the March 2025 popula tion estimate was 2,400 wild horses. 2. Mud dy Creek HMA BLM issued the decisi on record for the Muddy Creek HMA in July 2018. At th at time, BL M estimated that 224 wild horses w ere pr esent in the region and determ ined that rem oval of exces s horses was nec essary to bring the popul ation within the approved AML range of 75-125 wild horses. The decision record approves a gat her plan that autho rizes an i nit ial gath er and subsequent maintenance gathers to be conducted in the Muddy Creek HMA for ten years from the date of the initial gather to achieve and maintain the low end of the AML range. BLM conducted a gather and removal operation pursuant to t he deci sion reco rd in September 2018, bringing the region’s wild horse population n ear the low end of the AML rang e. BLM repr esent ed that i t “ will not conduct any further gather and removals in the Muddy Creek HMA under the [d] ecision [r ecord] ch alleng ed here. ” Br. for Fed. Appellee 20. 3. Onaqui Mo untain HMA When BLM issued the decision record for the Onaqui Mountain HMA in December 2018, the estima ted wild horse population was approximately 510 animals. BLM det ermined that rem oval of ex cess w ild horses was necess ary to bring the population within the approved AML r ange o f 121-210 wild horses. T he decision record adopts a gather pl an to initia lly remove 465 wild horses and then auth orizes BLM to “ return periodically over a period of ten years to maintain AML.” J.A.

10 587. The adopted gather plan also authorizes BLM to return to the HMA to remove excess horses above the low end of the AML ran ge if the initial gath er fails to do so. BLM began an initial gather in Sept ember 2019 and conducted a subs equent gather in Jul y 2021. As of March 2025, the population was stil l estim ated to ex ceed AML at approximately 315 wild horses. 4. Pine Nut M ountains HMA BLM issued the decision record for the Pine Nut Mountains HMA in November 2017. At t he time, the estimated wild horse population was about 700 animals, which BLM determined was in excess of the a pproved AML range of 118 - 179 wild horses. The decision record adopts a gather plan to, over the course of ten years, “ achieve and main tain a population size within the established AML.” J.A. 689. The initial g ather co ndu cted pursuant to the decisio n record began in February 2019 and was completed in July 2019. BLM estimate s that 383 wild ho rses were gat hered and removed, but th e population st ill excee d ed AML at 317 wild horses as of March 2025. C. Procedural History The Distr ict Court’s decision at issu e on appeal is far from “the fir st chapter in this long - running dispute, which has already generated two lengthy opinions, and four ver sions of Plaintiff’ s complaint. ” F riends of Animals, 728 F. S upp. 3d at 59 (citations o mitted). We summar ize the aspects of the saga that are relevant to the pending appeal.

11 Appellant’s operative complaint against BLM challenged the lawfulness of th e four decision records described above, i.e., t he ten - year pl ans. The State of Utah moved to intervene, and the District Court granted that motion. All partie s moved for summary judgment. Appellant argued th at the ten - y ear p lans exc eed B LM’s authority under the Act and should be held unlawful and set aside pursuant to the APA. In Appellant’s view, the Act does not permit BLM to issue “long - t erm, open - ended roundup decisi ons” be cause t he Act req uires B LM t o make s epar ate excess and necess ary - to - remove determinations for each gather operation, to make each of those determinations based on “ current information and consultation with independent parties ” and, after making such determinations, to “ immediat ely ” rem ove excess animals but only u ntil AML has been ach ieved. Plaint iff’s Cros s - Motion for Summary Judgment at 7 -8, Friends of Animals v. BLM, No. 1:18- cv - 02029 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2022) (citation omitted). The District Court declined to hold the ten - year plans “ faciall y unlawf ul mere ly becaus e they aut hori ze mult iple gathers over a period of years. ” Friends of Animals, 728 F. Supp. 3d at 79. At the same time, the court fou nd some merit to a number of Appellant’s argu ment s and agreed th at aspe cts of the challenged plans require reconsideration. First, the District Court hel d that after BLM has achi eved AML in a p articul ar HMA or Complex, t he Act does not permit BLM to continue conducting gathers to “ maintain ” the population without issuing a new gather plan and de cision record. T he court explain ed that aft er BL M has made an ex cess and nec essary - to - remove determination, the Act “ authorizes [BLM] t o remove ex cess an imal [s ] only to the extent needed ‘ to achiev e appropri ate man agement l evels ’ and only ‘ until all

12 excess animal s have b een rem oved so as to res tor e ’ the range.” Id. at 78 (quoting 16 U.S. C. § 1333(b)(2)). Th e cou rt added that because BLM’s authoriz ation to continue a gather ends when it achieves AML, any subsequent gather to “ maintain” the population is, effectively, premised on a new determination that an overpopulation or excess of animals exists. Thus, B LM must undertake the full statutory process to make t he requ isit e determin ations. Accordingly, the District Court vacated each of the t en - year plans to the extent it autho rizes BLM to conduct additional gathers in the region after AM L has be en achi eved. Second, while the District Court found the prec ise “line. .. more difficult to draw based on the existing record,” it h eld that t he ten - year pl ans “ are also unlawful to the extent that they authorize future gathers that are not conducted as promptly as reasonably possible or that authorize future gathers even where, by the time those gathers occur, [BLM] k nows (or has reason to know) that they are based on information or consultatio ns that are materially out -of- dat e.” Id. at 79. The cou rt expl ained that the Act “ places a premium on ‘ current ’ information ” and “ requ ires [BLM] to act based on the best infor mation that is curr ently ava ilable to it. ” Id. a t 72. And while “[t]hat requirement does not preclude staged gather plans,” it also does not permit BLM to “disregard significant informatio n that comes to its attention eve n befor e it has achieved AM L. ” Id. A ccordingly, the court also agreed with Appellant that “ a point may come when, based on all information then - av ailab le,” BLM may h ave to consider whether completing a staged gather is unnecessary and thus unauthorized und er an existing pl an. Id. at 73. Similarly, the court re cognized that gi ven the A ct’s “ clear” d irective that BLM consider and take “seriously” expert input, “ there may be limits on [BLM’s] authority to use a multi - year gath er plan as a means of circumventing the consultation requirement. ” Id. at

13 73- 74 (cita tion omitted). Last, the court was not persuaded that the Act requires BLM to “immed iately” ach ieve A ML after making an excess an d necess ary - to - remove determinatio n. Id. at 77. However, the D istrict Court heeded this court’s observation that the Act requires “prompt action” and “thus directs that excess horses should be removed expeditiously.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, Inc. v. Watt, 694 F.2d 1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Applying t hat directive, the court found that the Act does not permi t BLM “to take an entire d ecade to a ct.” Id. In short, the cou rt found that the ten - year plans had gone too far. The court explained that BLM “ may not grant itself carte blanche to conduct gathers many years from now, without regard to the statutory requirements. ” Id. at 79. However, r ecognizing that BLM “is bett er situat ed t han t he c ourt to draw those lines in the first instance,” id. (cleaned u p) (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978)), the c ourt remanded to BLM t o “adopt reasonable limitations regarding when (and with what information in hand) it may conduct follow - on gathers before achieving AML, ” id. at 81. In clarifying the scope of its holding, the District Court observed that “ each o f the [t en - year ] plans ap pears t o leave [BLM] unlimited dis cre tion to conduct gathers intended to achieve AML at any time over the next decade. ” Id. at 80. W hile the court recognized that BLM “is entitled to so me leewa y,” it also held that BLM may not grant itself blan ket authoriz ation “ to continue initial gath ers f or many years to come, notwithstanding the duty to act pro mptly and to ensure that gather decisions are informed by current information and consultation.” Id. at 80 -81. All part ies fil ed noti ces of appeal. BLM and Utah subsequently moved to voluntarily dismiss their appeals, and

14 this court granted both motions. O nly Appellant’s appeal remains pending before this court. II. A NALYSIS On appeal, the parties continue to dispute BLM’s aut hority under the Wild and Free - Roam ing Ho rses Act to conduct multiple gathe r operations over a period of years pursuant to a single d ecision record. The parti es take larg ely t he same positions that they took before the District Court. Appellant continues to assert that the ten - year plans are unlawful because the Act req uires B LM to undertake the full statutory process for each gather and removal operation. Mean whil e, BLM maintains tha t the t en - year plans ar e lawful becau se the A ct authorizes it to “conduct [] multiple gathers and removals as necessa ry to achi eve AM L based on a singl e excess [and necessa ry - to -remove] determina tion. ” Br. fo r Fed. Appellee 30. In addre ssing t hese positions, the District Court rende red two principal l egal co nclu sions that are not in dispute on appeal. First, no party disputes the District Cour t’s holding th at the ten - year plans viola te the Act to the ex tent they authorize additional gather operations after th e plan has achieved AM L. The District Court’s or der for partial vacatu r is, t herefo re, not at iss ue on appeal. Second, no party disputes the District Court’s holding that the ten - year pl ans are “ also unl awful to the extent that they authorize future gathers that are not conducted as promptly as reasonably possible or that authorize future gathers even where, by the time those gathers occur, [BLM] k nows (or has reason to know) that they are based on information or

15 consultatio ns that are materia lly out -of- date.” Friends of Animals, 728 F. Supp. 3d at 79. Neither BLM nor Utah maintained its cross appea l, and, therefor e, neit her may “press arguments that would change or modify the [D] istrict [C] ourt’s judgment to [its ] benefit. ” Shatsky v. Pal. Liberation Org., 955 F.3d 1016, 102 8 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citing Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 276 (2015)). Appellant, for its part, generall y urges this court to adopt more decisive holding s in its favor. B ut Appe llant does not contest the District Court’s holding s that the ten - year plans are “unlawfu l” in certai n resp ects and m ust be revisi ted o n remand. Any disputes between the parties regarding the applica tion of the standards enunciated by the District Court are beyond the jurisdiction of this court to consider. They will be subject to resolution on remand, as necess ary. A. The District Court’s Remand O rder Is Not Final As noted above, Appellant s eek s t o invoke this court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 t o chall enge the ten - year plan s. T hat secti on limits our review to “f inal decis ions o f the district co urts of the U nited State s.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 188 (2011). Appellant as serts, and BLM does not dispute, that the Distr ict Court’s re mand order is final and, thus, appealable. However, “[b] ecaus e the question relates to our jur isdiction to hear the case, we are obligated to conduct an independent inquiry, notwithstanding the part ies’ ag reem ent.” Lacson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 726 F.3d 170, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Be tter Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 -95 (1998)). Having done so, we disagr ee with both Appellant and B LM. The remand order at issue is not final, and we do not have jurisdiction to review it.

16 “ It is blac k letter law tha t a district court ’ s remand order is not normally ‘ final ’ for pur poses of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. ” N.C. Fisheries, 550 F.3d at 19 (citations o mitted). This rule generally forecloses a private party from obtaining immed iate appel late review o f an o rder t hat remands a case t o an agency for further proceedings. See id. at 19 -20; see also, e.g., Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, 231 F.3d 878, 8 80 (D.C. Cir. 2000). We h ave not d epar ted from this rule ev en wh ere, as here, the distric t court h as de clined to vacate the conte sted agen cy action. See, e.g., N.C. Fisheries, 550 F.3d a t 18, 20-21. In practi ce, we have reco gnized only limited exceptions to this rule. The se exceptions occur in instances where the remand order effectively te rminates the action, Limnia, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 857 F.3d 379, 385 - 86 (D.C. Cir. 2017), such as where th e order “ finally dispose [s]” of the petitioner’s claims, A m. Great Lak es Ports Ass ’ n v. Sc hult z, 962 F.3d 510, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted), or remands for “solely ‘ministerial’ proceedings,” Pueblo of Sandia, 231 F.3d at 88 1 (compiling cases). “Conversely, if an order does not terminate an action, but instead ‘ leaves the core dispute unresolved ’ fo r ‘ further proceedings, ’ it is not final for purpose s of § 1291. ” Limnia, 857 F.3d at 385 (cleane d up) (quoting Am. Haw. Cruises v. Skinner, 893 F.2d 1400, 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Here, it is pla in that the District Court did n ot fully resolve the part ies’ “ core dispute ” and that BLM must give further consideration to Appellant’s c laims on remand. The Distric t Court observed that “each of the [ten - year] pl ans appears to leave [BLM] unlimited direction to conduct gathers intended to achiev e AML at any time o ver the next decade. ” Friends of Animals, 728 F. Supp. 3d at 80. It added t hat each pl an authorizes future gathers “to be conducte d at unspecified times, based on unspecified infor mation and consultation.” Id. The court found that the Act does not authorize BLM to grant itself

17 such broad and unfettered discretion to con duct g athers. But it added that “based on the existing record,” it could not “draw those lines in the fir st insta nce.” Id. at 79. So, it remanded to BLM to consider the peripheries of its authority under the Act and to incorporate those limits into each of the ten -year plans. The question of the bounda ries of BLM’s authority under the Act and how those b oundaries map onto the four decision records at issue is the pa rties ’ “core di spute” in t his case. Th e District Court provided guidance and set some outer limits. BLM must add ress the pa rticulars on remand, including “ when (and with what information in hand) it may conduct follow -on gathers b efore achi evi ng AML for each of the four decision records. ” J.A. 406 (cle aned u p); see also Friends of Animals, 728 F. Supp. 3d at 81. And it must revise each of the decision records accordingly. BLM is mistaken if it views thi s exercis e as optional. Ther e fore, i t is cl ear that th ere is more for th e agency to do on remand. In a circum stan ce such as th is, we cann ot view t he rem and order as fi nal. See Limnia, 857 F.3d at 385; Pueblo of Sandia, 231 F.3d at 880-81; see also, e.g., Am. Haw. Cruises, 893 F.2d at 1402 (stating that a remand order instructing an agency “to engage in reasoned dec isionm aking surely [does] not end the litigation on the merits ” (citations omitted)). The fact t hat th e District Cour t described the orde r as fi nal, purported to relinquish jurisdiction to BLM, and terminated the action from its docket does not change our a nalysis. See Limnia, 857 F.3d at 386 (“[T]hat characterization cannot bind us.” (citation omit ted)). That is esp eci ally t rue where, as he re, t he reman d order is other wise “not fin al in char acter. ” Am. Haw. Cruises, 893 F.2d at 1403 (cleaned up). Deferring rev iew of a non - final order “ best s erves t he interests of judicial economy and ef ficiency. ” Pueblo of

18 Sandia, 231 F.3d at 880 (citation omitted). By declining to interject at this juncture, we refrain from engaging in the “piecem eal appel late di spos ition of what is, in practical consequence, but a single controversy. ” Eise n v. Carlisle & Jacqueli n, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974). We a void the prospect of duplicative appeals and, in the meantime, give BLM the opportunity to remediate and perhaps even re ach a solution that satisfies a ll parties without furt her judicia l intervention. See Pueblo of Sandia, 231 F.3d at 880. If Appellant r emain s agg rieved following remand, it will “ be able aga in to seek judicial review, including review in the court of appeals, raising not only new issues but all those on which it got no satisfa ction in its or iginal cha llenge. ” L akes Pilots Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Coast Guard, 359 F.3d 624, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitt ed); see genera lly id. (dismi ssing for lack of jurisdiction whe re it was lik ely that the petitioner ’s members would “still be aggrieved by the outcome” but would have a subsequent opportunity for revi ew). III. C ONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the case for l ack of jurisdiction. So ordered.