Cante Mijangos v. Bondi - Immigration Asylum Petition Review

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 25 - 1267 ROSA LIDIA CANTE MIJANGOS, P etitioner, v. PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General, Respondent. PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS Before Barron, Chief Judge, Kayatta and Rikelman, Circuit Judges. Lidia M. Sanchez, for petitioner. Marie V. Robinson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, with whom Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, w ere on brief, for respondent. February 18, 2026

RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Rosa Lidia Cante Mijangos, a citizen of Guatemala, suffered sexual and physical abuse at the hands of her former intimate partner for years. Fearing for her safety, she fled to the United States in 2014 and eventually applied for asylum and withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1), 1231(b)(3). The Immigration Judge (IJ) rejected her claims after concluding that Cante Mij angos had failed to show the required connection or " nexus " between the harm she experienced and her asserted prote cted status as a " Guatemalan wom an who was unable to effectively leave a domesti c relationship." Instead, the IJ found that her ex- partner abused her because of his generally vi olent nature. T he Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, and Cante Mijangos petitioned our C ourt for review. Although we do not minimize the harm that Cante Mijangos experienced, we must deny the petition because she has failed to develop any challenge to the legal and factual base s for the BIA ' s ruling. I. BACKGROUND A. Relevant Facts 1 Cante Mijangos began a relationship with her former partner, Walter, in 2007. Three years later, in 2010, Walter began 1 "We draw the facts from the administrative record, including [Cante Mijangos's] testimony before the IJ." Khalil v. Garland, 97 F.4th 54, 59 n.1 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Caz v. Garland, 84 F.4th 22, 25 n.2 (1st Cir. 2023)).

abusing her emotionally, physically, and sexually. When he was away, Walter prevented Cante Mijangos from leaving the ir home by chaining and padlocking the front door and placing bars on the windows. He also removed her phone so that she could not communicate with anyone and le ft her with insu fficient food. Further, Walter r epeatedly sexuall y abused Cante Mi jangos, and she eventually became pregnant as a result of that abuse. His abuse continued during her pregnancy, including a beating when she was seven months pregnant that le ft her unconscious for most of the night and resulted in a ten - day hospital stay. Dur ing a follow-up medical visit, Cante Mijangos informed a doctor about the abuse, but he said that he could not help her. Towards the end of Cante Mijangos's pregnancy, Walter moved her to a different residence where she was constantly monitored. When she was ready to give birth, Wa lter brought her to a new hospital because he had discovered that she had alerted a doctor at the previous hospital about his abusive conduct. After Cante Mijangos gave birth, she remained at the residence where she was closely watched, and Walter often left her without enough food for herself and her daughter. Walter also continued to physically abus e her. In one episode, after Cante Mijangos asked if she could visit her parents, Walter attacked her with a knife, scarring her leg. In another violent episode, Walter swung a machete at her head. She blocked the machete with her hand, leaving her with

more permanent scar s. Walter also abused their dau ghter, including by burning the child's feet with a cigarette to "shut her up." Cante Mijangos testified before the IJ that she did not seek help from the police because Walter threatened to harm her if she did. Cante Mijangos e ventually escape d from Walter with the help of a neighbor, fleeing with her daughter to her parents' house and then to her brother's home. Although Walter t racked Cante Mijangos to her parents ' house, her mother told him that she did not know where Cante Mijangos had moved. Fearing that Walter would soon find her and harm her, Cante Mijangos decided to leave Guatemala. She entered the United States in March 2014. Her daughter remain s in Guatemala with Cant e Mijangos's parents. In 2017, Walter tried to remove his daughter fro m her maternal grandparents' house by force. Although Cante Mijangos' s brother prevented him from abducting the child, Walter assaulted and injured the brother with a machete. P olice officers responded to the family's report of th e attack, but they did not conduct a search for Walter and never arrested him. Cante Mijangos' s parents and brother have not seen Walter since this 2017 attack, and Cante Mijango s confirmed to the IJ that sh e has no information about Walter ' s whereabouts. B. Procedural History After the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Can te Mijangos, she applied for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the C onvention Against Torture. 2 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 (b)(1), 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16. During her hearing before the IJ, s he asserted that she qualified for asylum and withholding of removal based on her membership in the particular social group (PSG) of " Guatemalan women unable to leave a domestic relationship. " She confirmed that she was relying on "just that one group." The IJ ultimately denied all relief. Although noting that Cante Mijang os had " suffered unspeakable abuse in Guatemala, " the IJ found parts of her testimony to be of " questionable credibility. " Putting credibility aside, the I J also determined that Cante Mijangos had failed to show the required nexus between the harm she experienced in Guatemala and any protected ground under the immigration statutes. The IJ found that, even assuming the PSG asserted by Cante Mijangos was legally cognizable, there was no " nexus " betwe en Walter's abus e and her PSG. According to the IJ, although the record demonstrated that Walter was a " violent, dangerous [,] and abusive man, " the re was no indication that he abused Cante Mijangos to " punish [her] for holding a 2 Cante Mijangos has waived any challenge to the agency's rejection of her claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture by failing to present any developed argument on th at clai m.

characteristic " that he sought " to overcome. " In support of that finding, t he IJ pointed out that Walter did not abuse Cante M ijangos in the first years of their relationship and that he was also violent towards his own daughter and Cante Mij angos' s brother. Thus, the IJ determined that Walter was an "uncontrolled abuser" and was not motivated to harm Cante Mijangos because of her asserted PSG. Although the no - nexus finding was dispositive of Cante Mijangos's asylum and with h olding of removal claims, the IJ rejected th o se claims on other grounds as well. For example, the IJ concluded that Cante Mijangos had failed to establish that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect her from Walter. The BIA affirmed the IJ's dec ision in March 2025. A ssuming that Cante Mijangos h ad testified credibly, the BIA nevertheless upheld the IJ' s finding that Walter had not be en motivated to persecute Cante Mijangos because of he r asserted PSG. The BIA expressl y conclud ed that there was no clear error in the IJ's determination th at Walter's actions w ere "due to his uncontrolled abusive nature, " not on account of any protected ground, and thus Cante Mijangos could not satisfy the nexus requirement. It also discerned no clear error in the IJ's other findings, including that Cante Mijangos had failed to demonstrate

that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect her from Walter. Cante Mijangos timely filed a petition for review. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Although our review is focused on the final decision of the BIA, "'to the extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted the IJ's reasoning, we review those portions of the IJ's decision' as well. " Ferreira v. Garland, 97 F.4th 36, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Chavez v. Garland, 51 F.4th 424, 429 (1st Cir. 2022)). "We uphold factual findings under the substantial evidence standard unless the record compels a contrary conclusion. " Id. at 46. We review legal conclusions de novo. See Alve s v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 297, 298 (1st Cir. 2025). W hen discussing the decisions of the BIA and the IJ " as a unit," we refer to them as " the agency. " Khalil v. Garland, 97 F.4th 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2024). III. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard An applicant for asylum must qualify as a " refugee " under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). The INA define s a refugee as someone who is "unable or unwil ling to return [to] or to avail herself of the protection of her own country 'because of p ersecution or a well - founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a part icular social group, or political

opinion. '" De Pena- Paniagua v. Barr, 957 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). Additionally, when an individual is se eking asylum based on past or future harm by a private actor, they must also show that the government was unable or unwilling to protect them from that harm. See Medina -Su guilanda v. Garland, 121 F.4th 316, 322 (1st Cir. 2024). To establish that persecution is "on account of " a protected ground -- the so - called nexus requirement -- an individual must show that the protected ground is "at least one central reason for [the] persecuti[on]. " See Espinoza - Ochoa v. Garland, 89 F.4th 222, 230 (1st Cir. 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). " The 'one central reason ' test does 'not require an . . . applicant to demonstrate that [she was ] singled out only due to [her] protected trait. " Khalil, 97 F.4th at 62 (quoting Barnica - Lopez v. Garland, 59 F.4th 520, 5 31 (1st Cir. 2023)). " Instead, the test ' contemplates the possibility that multiple motivations can exist. '" Id. (quoting Aldana - Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 18- 19 (1st Cir. 2014)). To prevail on a mixed-motive theory, the applicant must show that the ir protected trait " was not incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for [the] harm." Id. at 63 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Espinoza - Ochoa, 89 F.4th at 235).

"A similar test applies to wit hholding of removal." Espinoza - Ochoa, 89 F.4th at 230. To obtain this form of relief, an applicant "must establish a cle ar probability th at, if returned to [their ] homeland, [they ] will be persecuted on account of a statutorily protected ground. " Id. (quoting Sanchez - Vasquez v. Garland, 994 F.3d 40, 46 (1st Cir. 2021)); s ee 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Thus, like the asylum statute, the withholding of removal statute requires a showing of nexus betw een any past or future harm and a protected ground. See Espinoza - Ochoa, 89 F.4th at 230. But the " clear probability " standard for withholding of removal is even harder to meet than the " well - founded fear " standard required for asylum. See id. B. Analysis Our analysis begins and ends with waiver. The BIA's decision focuses on the nexus requirement. Specifically, the BIA concluded that the IJ did not clearly err in finding that Cante Mijangos had failed to establish any nexus between the persecution she experienced in Guatemala and her asserted PSG. Thus, the BIA affirmed the IJ ' s determination that "the abuse [Cante Mijangos] suffered" was " motivated by her former partner's violent and abusive nature " rather than "any desire to overcome a characteristic of " her asserted PSG. Yet, in her petition, Cante Mijangos fails to grapple with this critic al ruling by the BIA. Alt hough she asserts that

"the record compels the conclusion that she suffered past persecution. . . on account of being a Guatemal an woman," and refers to her testimony regarding the abuse she experienced "at the hands of her ex- partner, " she fails to advance any record - based argument connecting Walter's abuse to her asserted PSG. Nor does she lodge a legal challenge to the IJ's application of our mixed - motive precedent. To be sure, Cante Mijangos contends in her petition that the agency erred when it did " not explain why the harm and abuse " she experienced "was not sufficiently related to her status as a Guatemalan woman that was subjected to gender and sexual violence due to her membership in this particular group." But the remainder of her petition does not develop this c ontentio n wi th any legal or factual support whatsoever. Our precedent makes cl ear that " issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. " United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2 d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding an issue waived when not fully raised in the opening brief). Instead of addres sing the basis fo r the agency's ru ling, Cante Mijangos focuses her petition on a separate issue: the legal cognizability of her asserted PSG. T he only substantial argument Cante Mijangos makes in her petition is that the group " Guatemalan women " is immutable, particular, and socially distinct, citing to evidence o f gender-based violen ce in Guatemala. But whether

" Guatemalan women " is a legally valid PSG is not at issue in this case. 3 And, r egardless of the asserted PSG, Cante Mijangos's failure to make any developed argument as to why the agency's nexus determination was in correct is necessarily fata l to her claims. " Without a sufficient showing as to nexus, the harm [Cante Mijangos] suffered or fears suffering isn't a ground for asylum. " Pazine v. Garland, 115 F.4th 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2024); see Alves, 128 F.4th at 299. As such, her " asylum claim. . . fail [s] right out of the gate." Pazine, 115 F.4th at 58. Her failure to challenge the agency ' s nexus ruling also dooms her withholding of removal claim. See Gonzalez -A revalo v. Garland, 112 F.4th 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2024) (holding an applic ant who cannot meet the asylum standard will necessarily fail under the higher standard for withholding of removal). Alth ough the agency rejected Cante Mijangos's claims on other grounds as well, we need go no further in our review. See Alves, 128 F.4th at 299. IV. CONCLUSION For all these reasons, we deny the petition for review. 3 Be fore the agency, Cante Mijangos offered the PSG of " Guatemalan women [who are] unable to leave a domestic relationship. " In her petition to us, however, Cante Mijangos asserts the PSG of " Guatemalan women." Because we deny her petition on other grounds, we do not address the implications of the different framing of her asserted PSG before our Court.