USA v. Brandenburg - Bomb Threats Sentencing Enhancement

FOR PUBLICAT ION UNITE D STATES COURT OF APPE ALS FOR THE NI NTH CIR CUIT UNITED STATES OF AMER ICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. BRYAN MELV IN BRANDENBUR G, Defend ant - Appellant. No. 24-5966 D.C. No. 1:22- cr -00047- LEK -1 OPINION Appeal from the United States D istrict Court for the District of Hawa ii Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Ju dge , Presiding Argued and Submitted October 7, 2025 Honolulu, Hawaii Filed February 17, 2026 Before: M. M argaret McKeown, Michelle T. Friedland, and Jennifer Sung, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge McKeown 2 USA V . B RANDENDUR G SUMMARY * Criminal Law In a case in which a jury convicted Bryan Melvin Brandenburg of offenses arising from Brandenburg’s bomb threats direct ed t owards a Salt L ake City court house and other governmental and e ducational institutions, the panel affir med the district court’s impos ition of a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(4)(A) fo r substantial disruption of governmental functions. The panel held (1) a non -public- facing security re sponse to a threat may qualify as a substantial disruption of governmental functions under § 2A6.1(b)(4)(A); and (2) the district court, which correctly focused on the scope and time of the disruption caused by Brandenburg’s threat, did not abuse its discretion in applying § 2A6.1(b)(4)(A). The panel addressed Brandenburg’s appeal of his conviction and his other sentencing challenges in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. * This s ummary consti tutes no par t of the opi nion of the c ourt. It ha s been pre pared by c ourt staff for the convenie nce of t he reader . USA V . B RANDENDUR G 3 COUNSEL W. KeAupuni Akina (argued) and Darre n Ching, Assistant United States Attorneys; Kenneth M. Sorenson, Acting United State s Attorney; Offic e of the United States Attor ney, United State s Departme nt of Justice, Hono lulu, Haw aii; for Plaintiff - Appellee. Harlan Y. Kimura (argued), Harlan Y. Kimura AAL ALC, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Defendant-Appellant. OPINION McKEOWN , Cir cuit Judge: This ap peal arises from Bryan Brandenburg’s bomb threats directed t owards a S alt Lake City c ourthouse and a number of other government al and educational instituti ons. Following his conviction by a jury, the district cour t imposed sentencing enhancements for substantial disruption of governmental functions and obstruction of justice and determi ned that he did not qualify for a n adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. This opinion focuses on the enhancement related to “substantial disruption of . . . governmental . . . functions” under U.S. Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) 2A6.1(b)(4)(A). We addr ess Brandenburg’s appeal of his conviction and his other sentenci ng ch allenges in a s eparat e memo randum disposition filed concurrently with this opi nion , and we affirm. Brandenburg’s threats kickstar ted a series of security measures to secure the c ourthouse , including creation of a 4 USA V . B RANDENDUR G threat working group, enhanced screenings, surveillance - video reviews , and continuous patrols . However , he claims that the disr uption did n ot relate to governmental function s because security is not a governmental function, the disruption was not public facing, a nd the courthouse continued operations. This crabbed view of t he Guideline ignores the plain mea ning of “disruption” and miscomprehends the role of courthouse security, which is an integral function of courthouse operations. Indeed, secu rity functions performed behind the scen es , away fro m public view , are just as imp ortant as the prominent security apparatus the public sees upon entering a courthouse. As then -Judge Kennedy wrote when he was a member of this court, “[t]he serenity of the court of appeals is not so debili tatin g that w e fail to appreci ate the r eal dan gers po sed by threats of violence dire cted at other courthouses and governme nt facilities.” McMorris v. Alioto , 567 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1978). Recent thr eats to jud ges and courthouses h ave only amplified this sentiment. See , e.g. , Chief J ustice J ohn G. Roberts, Jr., Year End Report on the Federal Judiciary 5–7 ( Dec. 31, 2024 ) ; Mary Ell en Ba rber a & Joseph Baxter, Assessing Safety and Security Chall enges in State Courts , 104 Judicature , no. 3, 2020 – 21, at 56 . We hold that a non-public- facing securit y res ponse t o a th reat may qualif y as a “substantial disruption of . . . governmental . . . functions” under Sentencing Guideline 2A6.1(b)(4)(A). Background In 2022, Bryan Brandenburg participated remotely in divorce proceedings at the Third Judicial District Courthouse in downtown Salt Lake City, Utah. Aft er a bench trial, Brandenburg’s email inquiries to c ourt staff USA V . B RANDENDUR G 5 regarding a timeline for issuance of a decision grew increasingly indecorous . Eve ntually, his insults degen erated into threats. On May 3 and 4, Brandenburg — once a prominent S alt Lak e businessman — emailed c ourt st aff threats to “bom b” or “level ” a variety of local t argets , including “the city,” “the s acred tem ple,” “the State Capita l [sic],” “the mayor’s of fice,” an d “the 3rd District Courthouse.” H e also threat ened t o bomb Iv y Leagu e schools, Rockefeller Center, and “the Federal Cou rthouse in San Dieg o to teach them a lesso n .” In response, the Third Judicial District Courth ouse ’s security team initiated exte nsive security me asures , including creation o f a n in terdepartm ental threat working group; coordination with the sherif f’s dep artmen t to conduct background research on Brandenburg a nd ensure appropriate responses by the state capitol and mayor’s office; enhan ced s creeni ng s of all entran ts , inclu ding staff, to the courthouse; review of surv eil lance t apes fr om t he day of the threat and prior days ; and continuous patrols of the courthouse’s interior, exterior, and surr ounding buil dings and areas . Be cause the e mail ed thre ats us ed th e first -person plural “we,” c ourthouse security assumed that more than one person w as involved in the threat. All offic ers not actively protecting a jury, staff member, or courtroom w ere assigned to patrol within and around the courthouse. The r esult was that approximately fifteen deputies, about half of t he officers on duty at the courthouse, were removed from their normal duties and dedicated to constant searches fo r suspicious devices and persons. Th e high - aler t status lasted fro m May 4 until May 6. As the co urthouse’s securit y directo r recall ed, “for [the courthouse’s] security staff, it wasn’t business as usual . . . there was [sic] no breaks, there was no nothing.” 6 USA V . B RANDENDUR G The imp act of Brandenbu rg’s threats radiated beyond the Third Judicial District Courthouse. On May 6, he em ailed four local journalists accusing medical - devi ces compan y Hall Lab s and t he University of Utah ’s C enter for Med ical Innovation of having pl aced “ illegal medical de vices in [him] without [his] knowledge or permission .” Th e email concluded: “We ’ re bombing both campuses today for crimes against humanity.” At le ast three of the four journal ists deemed th e threat s suff iciently serious to warrant contacting local police departments. Authorities mobiliz ed in response. A Provo P olice Department offi cer deployed to Hall Lab s , performed an exterior sweep, and offered to search the premises wit h bomb - sniffing canines. At the University of Utah, authorities evacu ated th e Heal th Sciences Lib rary, the adjoining Coll ege of Nursing, an d sections of the nearby hospital before conducting a visual and canin e search o f the enti re library building. All but one of the U niversity’s patrol officers were diverted to assist , and a S ituati on Triag e and Assess ment Team was assem bled with campus, local, and federal authorities. The bomb threat coincid ed with commencem ent ceremo nies and t he fu neral of Senator Orrin Hatch, which drew various high - profile politicians and religious leaders to campus. Brandenburg was indic ted for one count of transmitting a threat in inte rstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) and six counts of making threats or false statements about explosives in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e). Counts 1 through 6 of the indictment arise from the threats sen t to the Third Judicial District Courthouse staff, while Count 7 arises f rom the ema il sent to jour nalists thre atening Ha ll Labs and the University o f Utah. A jury found Brande nburg guilty of all seven counts. USA V . B RANDENDUR G 7 At sentencing, the government argued for an enhanc ement for Counts 1 through 6 under Sente ncing Guideline 2A6.1(b)(4)(A) , which courts must apply wh en an offense resulted in “substantial disruption of public, governmental, or business functions or services . ” Pushing back, Brandenburg argued that a lthough “secur ity may have been disrupted . . . security is not necessarily [a ] governmental function[].” Or, “i n other words, the court was still opera ting . . . as intended” and “therefore the sentenc[ing] enhancement should not apply.” The distric t court disag reed and applied the enhanc ement , re asoning that the cou rt securit y staff ’s devotion of “time and energy” to addressing the threat resulted in sufficient “int erfere [nce]” with governmental functions. The district court sentence d Brandenb u rg to concurrent sentences of sixty months for transmitting a threat in interstate commerce and seventy months for eac h of the six counts for making threats or false statements about explosives. Brandenburg appealed both his conviction and sentence. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Analysis I. Defining “D isruptio n of Gov ernmenta l Functi on s” Guideline 2A6.1(b) (4) provides for a four - level enhanc ement: [i]f the o ffense r esul ted i n (A) substantial disruption of public, governmental, or business functions or services; or (B) a substantial expenditure of funds to clean up, 8 USA V . B RANDENDUR G decontaminate, or otherwise respond to the offense[. ] The commentary to Guideline 2A6.1 doe s not define what constitutes a “substantial disruption of public, governmental, or business functions or ser vices,” and caselaw regarding the G uideli ne’s par ameters i s s cant : W e have add res sed the meaning of “substantial disruption” under Guideline 2A6.1 in only one previous cas e. See United States v. Mohamed , 459 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2006) . However, we can also draw on virtually identica l language in recently deleted Guideline 5K2.7’s upward departure for “a significant disruption of a governmental function.” In Mohamed , we held that a substantial disruption occurred after the defendant telephoned in a threat to b omb several shopping malls near a federal building in Los Angeles. 459 F.3d at 98 1, 988. In response, “[ l]aw enforcem ent agenci es . . . devoted substantial resource s to investigating and preventing the purported a ttack ,” with at least s even di fferent age ncies contributing suppo rt. Id. at 982. Additionally, “the hoax disrupted business in the targeted areas, ” with sales at affected establishments decreasi ng by up to e ighty - five p ercent . Id . Such effects on law enfo rcemen t and bu sin esses provided “ampl e evidence ” to support Guideline 2A6.1(b)(4)(A)’s application. Id. at 988. Mohamed , however, does not directly address what constitutes “substantial disruption of governmental functions.” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(4)(A) (c itation modified). We first consider de nov o the meaning of “disruption o f governmental functions .” United States v. Patterson , 119 F.4th 609, 611 (9th Cir. 2024) (“We review de novo the district co urt’s legal in terpreta tion of the [Sentenc ing] Guidelines.” (citation omitted) ). In order t o “d etermi ne[e] USA V . B RANDENDUR G 9 the ‘plain meaning’ of a word, we may consult di ctionary definitions, which we trust to ca pture the common contemporary understandings of the word.” United States v. Flores , 729 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2013). “Disruption” derives from “‘disrupt,’ which means ‘to cause d isorder or turmoil in.’” United States v. Dudley , 463 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting R andom House Unabridged Dictionar y 569 (2d ed. 1993)). A disruption is characterized by “a break o r interruption in the normal course or continuation of some activity, process, etc.” Disrupti on , Merriam - Webster. com Dictiona ry , https://www.me rriam - webster.com/dictionary/disruption https://perma.cc/2Q3G - FNDB. Our precedent examini ng recently del eted Gu ideli ne 5K2.7’s upward departure for “a significant disrupt ion of a governmental function” echoes dictionaries’ emphasis on confusion caused by the interr uption of normal activities. 1 Although Guideline 5K2.7’s “significant disruption” is not the same as Guideline 2A6.1(b)(4)(A)’s “subst antial disruption,” we view the terms as nearly synonym ous in th is context. Compare Substantial , Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“ C onsiderable in extent, amount, or value”), with Significant , Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“ O f speci al i mportan ce; momentous, as distinguished from insignifica nt”). In United Stat es v. Singleton , we stated that 1 Guideli ne 5K2.7 was dele ted alongs ide the rest o f the Sentenci ng Guideli ne’s Chapt er Five, whic h containe d departu res and policy statements regarding specific personal characteristics . The Chapter was removed “to be tter ali gn the requi rements placed on the [sent encing] court an d acknowl edge the gr owing s hift awa y from the use of de partures provided f or withi n the Gui deline s Manual i n the wake of United States v. Booker , 543 U .S. 220 (2005), a nd subse quent deci sions.” U.S. Sent ’g Guidelines Manual app. B , pt. 3, a t 133 (U.S . Sent’g Comm’n 202 5). 10 USA V . B RANDENDUR G law enforc ement m ust be stretched beyond “normal function[s]” and “responsibilities” for Guideline 5K2.7 to apply. 917 F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 1990). Similarly, in United States v. Dayea , we held that evidence that a government agency’s “functioning was impaired in [some] way” would be needed for a “disruption” to have occu rred . 32 F.3d 1377, 1381–82 (9th Cir. 1994). One example of a sufficient disruption under Guideline 5K2.7 was the “overwh elm[in g]” of th e Immigration a nd Naturaliza tion Service’s application processing appar atus by thousands of false immigr ation petitio ns. United States v. Velez , 113 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1997); accord United States v. Saani , 650 F.3d 761, 766 (D. C. Cir. 2011) (“Unlawful conduct necessitating an unusually burdensome or pr olonged investigation of a government office may suffice as a ‘significant disruption’ under § 5K2.7 regardless whether the investigation proves fruitful.”). A securit y resp onse alo ne may constitute a disruption of government functions. In Mohamed, we reason ed t hat “t h e costs of law enforcement ” that res ulted fro m the t hreat support ed Guideline 2A6.1(b)(4)’s application. 459 F.3d a t 988 (emphasis added). Elevated demands on security personnel can sow “disorder or turmoil” that “ prevent[ s ] normal continuance of” their functioning within broader governmental functions. Dudley , 463 F .3d at 1226 (quoting Disrupt , Random House Unabridge d Dictionary 569 (2d ed. 1993)); United States v. Anwar , 741 F.3d 1134, 1 137 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Disrupt , Webster’s T hird New International Dictionary 656 (1976)). The specific record r egarding the courthouse security team’s r espon ses to Brandenburg’s conduct illustrate s why that response qualifies as a “d isrupt ion.” Becaus e of Brandenburg’s threats, the Third Judicial District USA V . B RANDENDUR G 11 Courthouse’s security team’s responsibilities were stretch ed well beyond their “normal function” and “no rmal responsib ilities” of maintaining the day - to - day s afety of those inside the courthouse. Singleton , 917 F.2d at 414 . In response to Brandenburg’s threat , t he secu rity s taff shifted away from th eir norm al duties to continuously search throughout the courthouse and surrounding ar eas, conduct enhanced screenings of all visitors and sta ff , review taped surveillance footage, and coordinate with the sheriff’s department to understand the threat. Se e id. (emp hasizin g a change in scope of functions). Brandenburg’s threat s arose in a cl imate of s erious threats nationwide agains t courthouses and judges. In 2008 , the San Diego federal courthouse — one of the targets of Brandenburg ’s threat s — was bombed. See United States v. Love , No. 10 - cr -2418- M MM , 2013 WL 1660415, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2013) . In 2020, Distric t of New Jersey Judge Esther Salas’s son was murdered by a plaintif f who had appeared before h er, g rimly e choing the killing fifteen years earlier of Northern District of Illin ois Judge Joan Lefkow’s mother and husband by a disgruntled litigant . Esther Sal as, Federal Judges Are at Risk , N.Y. Times, Dec . 9, 2020, at A25. Responses , be they public - facing or solely behind -the- scenes, t o thre ats can t rigger disruption s of governmental functions . Brandenburg ’s contrary argument that Guideline 2A6.1 differen tiat es between publi c - and private - facing government al functions is unpersuasive . The plain language of the G uidelin e cont ravenes Brandenburg’s view : T he disjunctive “or” distinguish e s among “public, governmental, or business functions or services.” U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(4)(A) (emphasis added). To read the Guideline as limited to “public” functions and se rvices would be to 12 USA V . B RANDENDUR G elimi nate the “o r.” Indeed, Brandenburg acknowledged tha t the “or” is disjunctive. We are hard - pressed to understand why an out -of-the- ordinary, non-routine security response at a courthouse could not qualify as disrupting governmental functions. A comparison can be drawn with Guideline 2J1.3(b)(2), which command s a three - level enhancemen t “[i ]f the p erjury, subornation of perjury, or witness bribery resul ted in subst antial interferen ce with the administration of justice .” (emphasi s add ed). Guide line 2J1.3(b)(2)’s language permits consideration of only a narrower cat egory o f justice - administra tion - related functions as co mpared to Guideline 2A6.1(b)(4)(A)’s broad ambit, which encomp asses all “public, governmental, or business functions or services. ” While both guidelines require courts to “assess[] the scope and time of the disruption at issue,” Anwar , 741 F.3d at 1139, c ourts should consider a crime’s eff ects acro ss t he full breadth of governmental functions and ser vices under Guideline 2A6.1(b)(4)(A). We are not aware o f any support for Branden b u rg’s asserti on that “governmental functions” under Guideline 2A6.1(b)(4)(A) are limited to functions performed by public- facing or non - securit y - related government personnel. Court security staff, including those who do not perfor m public- facing tasks, can, and do, perform vital government functions and enable other government workers to perform their duties. For example, in this c ase, the effecti venes s of the Third J udicial Dist rict Courthouse security te am’s response permitted the court’s judges and other staff to continue their administra tion of justice despite Brandenburg’s credible threats. I t might have seem ed as though operations were business - as - usual to the p ublic, but , in fact , it was the extraordinary measures undertaken by USA V . B RANDENDUR G 13 securit y personnel that allowed courthouse operations to continue as normal ly as p ossible. Court proceedings, including Brandenburg’s contested divorce, are often explosive. Threats voiced by litigants and other aggrieved parties towar ds judges and the court system must be taken seriously. We agree with the district cou rt that members of security staff constitute essential parts of the organizational machinery that allow the government to function , and that demands beyond securit y sta ff’s normal scope of duties can , as a mat ter of la w, constitute a disruption of governmental functions under Guideline 2A6.1(b)(4)(A). II. Finding a Subs tantial D isruption T he question of whether the disruption wa s “substantial” requires us to evalu ate “ the district court ’ s application of the Guideline s to the facts , ” which we revi ew for abuse of discretion. United States v. Petrushkin , 142 F.4th 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2025) . Although this standard is deferential and “[ h]ow much disruption of governmental activity i s ‘substantial’ is a m atter of d egree ,” judges must still rely on “ evidence and not speculation” to e stablish Guideline 2A6.1’s applica bility. United States v. Bourquin , 966 F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2020) ( citation omitted ). We agre e with t he Ten th and Elev enth Circuit s tha t “substantial disruption of . . . functions or ser vices ” in Guideline 2A6.1(b)(4)(A) “suggests a significant interruption of normal activities when measured by scope and tim e.” Anwar , 741 F.3d at 1137 (citing Dudle y , 463 F.3d at 1226). The inquiry “focuses on the outcome o f the threat, not the defendant’s intent.” Id. Hen ce, a district court should consider “objectively quantifiable effects, such as the extent to which the false thre at interrupted or impeded normal a ctivity and the amount of time the interruption 14 USA V . B RANDENDUR G lasted .” Id. at 1139. Factors rel evant t o wh ether a “substantial disruption” occurred m ay i nclude how many law enforcement officers and agencies responded, how long the response lasted, what normal duties the responding officers were diverted from, how much money w as spent on the response, 2 and how other “public, gover nmental, or business functions or services” were affected. U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(4)(A); Mohamed , 459 F.3d a t 982, 988 ( mentioning facts relevant to each of t hese fact ors except diversion from normal duties) ; Anwar , 741 F.3d at 1139 – 41 (considering each of t hese fa ctors ex cept co st); D udley , 463 F.3d at 1226 (same). The district court’s inquiry correctly focuse d on the “scope and time” of the disruption caused by Brandenburg’s threat. Anwar , 741 F.3d at 1139. The courthouse security team’s sustained effor ts over three da ys disrupted its normal routine and shifted all av ailable o ffic ers from normal functions to nonstop patrols , time -consuming inspections of each visitor and staff m ember, exhaustive review of surveillance footage, vigilant co ordination with outside agencies, and oth er elevat ed secu rity protocols. 3 Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying Guideline 2A6.1(b) (4)(A) . AFFIRMED. 2 A court’s analys is of whet her a “s ubstantia l disrupti on” occ urred may overlap wi th it s analysi s under s ubsecti on (B) of G uideli ne 2A6.1( b)(4) of whether a “substant ial ex penditur e” of f unds occ urred in res ponse to a threat. 3 The dist rict co urt appli ed the enhance ment bas ed on the dis ruption to the court s ecurity staff’s routine rather tha n based o n any pote ntial e ffects on judges or in - court procee dings, a s the lat ter was not in the record.