Quiroz v. Hernandez and City of Dayton - Fifth Circuit Court Opinion

United Sta tes Court of Ap peals for the Fifth Circuit ________ ____ _ No. 25 - 4003 2 ________ ____ _ Madelyn Marina Quiroz; Marina Naomi Hernande z Quiroz, Plaint iffs — Appella nts, versus Eduardo Hern and ez; City of Dayt on; The o Mela nc on, City o f Day ton, Ci ty Mana ger; Dickens on City Man ager; Rob ert Vine, D ayton C ity Pol ice Chie f; John D. Colem an, Dayt on City Police Capt ain; Ter ri H ug hes, C rimin al Invest igation D ivisio n Lieut enant, Day ton Cit y; Car oli ne W a dzeck; Kristen Seibert; City of Dayton Fir e Dep art ment; Murp hy Green; Jen nif er Bergman Harkness, Lib erty Cou nty D istri ct Atto rney; Matthew Poston, Liberty County Att orney; Matthew Saldana; City of Libert y, Texas; Kat elyn G rimes; A llegi ance Mo bi le Health Med ical Servi ce; Stev e S mith; Jamey Way ne Bice, als o know n as J aime B ice, also known as Jam es Bi ce, al so known as Jamey Bice; Stephanie Lee Blum Bice; Morgan Skye White; Union Pacif ic Rai lroa d Com pany, Defendant s —Appellees. ________ ____ ___ _____ _______ ___ ____ Appeal fr om the United State s District Co urt Eastern District o f Texas USDC N o. 1:23 - CV - 273 ________ ____ ___ _____ _______ ___ ____ ON PET ITIO N FO R REH EARI NG United S tates Court of A ppeals Fifth Circuit FILED December 31, 202 5 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

Befor e Southwick, Higginso n, and Douglas, Circuit Jud ges. Per Curiam: T he peti tion for r ehea ring i s DENIED. We withdraw the p ri or opinion, repo rted a t 163 F.4th 222 (5t h Cir. 2025), and substitu te the followi ng. This case arises o ut of a seriou s car accide nt invo lving the reckles s driving o f two tee nagers. Ap pellant M adelyn Marin a Quiro z and her mother Marina Nao mi Hern andez Q uiroz c hallenge the dis trict court’ s dismissal o f all of th eir c laims again st twenty - thre e named defendant s. 1 T he dis trict cou rt adopte d the Magistrate Judge ’s report and recom mendatio n and dismisse d A ppellants ’ claims again st all defen dants w ith prejudice, with the e xception of Eduar do Hernand ez, whose claims were d ismissed without p rejudice. The district cou rt descr ibed the S ec ond C or rect ed A men ded C omplaint (the “Operative Complaint”) as “riddle d with p leading deficie ncies, diffi cult to decipher t hrougho ut, and reple te with vague, concluso ry allegation s.” 2 Neverth eless, the d istrict co urt was able to di scern multiple claims relatin g to the alleged ne gligence of first re sponders and private parties, as well as discrimin ation cla ims arising un der 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983 again st vari ous city officials related to their handling of th e post - accident investigat ion. Made lyn 1 Defend ant Niss an N orth Americ a was volunta rily d ismiss ed by the pa rties a nd was n ot named in this a ppeal. 2 It is im porta nt to n ote tha t Ma delyn and he r mother are no t proce eding p ro s e — they p rocur ed co unsel pr ior to th e filin g of the O perati ve C ompla int. Cou nsel entered an appearance repres enting the Appellants on Novem ber 9, 2023. The Second Amended Comp laint was filed on Novem ber 20, 2023, and the “Second (Corre cted) Amend ed Comp laint,” a t iss ue here, was f iled on No vembe r 21, 2023. Due to the “c orrec tion” made by Appella nts, though it is titled as a “S econd” Comp laint, the Operativ e Compla int is func tionally their thir d. The c han ges made in the Operativ e Com plaint were not lim ited to scrivener’s errors — Appellants instead made chan ges to the bod y of th e Operative Comp laint, inc lud ing the des cription s of p arties and the c laims agains t them. Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 3 and he r mother now appe al the ruling of the di strict court, ar guing that th ey shou ld be give n a chance to replead for a fou rth ti me to address these deficie ncies. Additionally, they ar gue that t he district c ourt er red in its dismis sal of all defenda nts. H avi ng found no e rror or a buse of di scret ion, w e AFFIRM. I On J anuary 23, 2020, appe llant Made lyn Quiro z, then just 16 years old, w as a backse at passenge r in a car drive n by appe llee Morgan Wh ite. Morgan was drivin g at a dange rous spee d — ar ound 86 to 96 mi les per hour — on a ro adway with a poste d speed limit o f 30 m iles pe r hour. She was racing appellee Eduardo Hernandez, who was drivin g a separate vehicle. Morgan even tually lost co ntrol of her vehic le, launch in g it airborn e approximate ly 10 to 15 fe et over a ditch and lan ding on railroad tracks owne d by appellee U nion Pacific R ailroad Com pany. Madely n suffered serio us in juries f rom the c rash, includin g a broke n back, a se rious sp inal cord inj ury, broken ribs, an d internal bleed ing. Du e to the se injur ies, Mad elyn is no w a paraplegic, co nfine d to a whee lchair and p aralyzed from the ches t down. Mad elyn and her mother sued various city o fficials responsible for the immed iate care given to Madely n after the accid ent an d the resu lting crash investiga tion. The y also brough t claims against Eduar do, Morgan, and members o f Morgan’s family for their involv ement i n the cra sh. II Given t he high numb er of def endant s invol ved in this appeal, our court w ill analy ze the distin ct (al though ove rlapping) claims br ought against each o f the twen ty - thr ee defe nda nts. For the sa ke of brev it y, w e have group ed certain defendan ts to addre ss all claims against th em. We review the dis trict court’ s dism issals for failure to state a claim de novo. See Cody v. Allst ate Fir e & Cas. I ns., 19 F.4th 7 12, 714 (5t h Ci r. 20 21). Li ke wi se, we Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 4 review the district co urt’s dismissa l for lack o f sub ject m atter ju risdictio n de novo. G hedi v. Mayor kas, 16 F. 4th 45 6, 463 (5t h Cir. 2021). A A ppellants first br ing ge neral § 1983 discrimination and negligen ce claims again st appell ees A llegiance Mobile Health, a pri vate medical transp ort compa ny, and on e of its parame dic s Steve Smith (the “Allegiance Defenda nts”). A ppellants cl aim that th e Allegiance Defendants discrimin ated again st Mad elyn and de prived he r of “life liberty an d property in the pursu it of ha ppiness a nd also [] d enied [her] e qual prot ection of the law.” This claim s tems from an alleged argumen t betwee n Smit h and the City of Dayton Fire C hief, Mur phy G reen, regardi ng whet her or not to medivac M adelyn from the scene o f the accident. A ppellants argue that this disagree ment led to a si gnificant delay in Madelyn receivin g treatment fo r her injuri es. A ppellants furth er claim that Smith “withheld me dical treatm ent and aba ndoned [Mad elyn]. . . le[aving] a cri tical patien t in the care o f a much lower l evel [EM T].” The d istrict co urt ch aracterize d A ppellants’ cla ims against the Allegian ce Def endants as vague and conclusor y. Ne verthele ss, the district court dis cerned s everal pos sible claims again st them: “a vagu e claim for discrimin ation, n egligen ce, and violation s of due pr ocess, equ al prote ction, a nd the Fourt h Amen dment 3 pursuan t to § 1983”. W e analy ze each cla im below. 1 3 Becaus e Appe llants made n o claim relatin g to the un lawf ul sea rch or s eizur e of Madely n’s pr operty o r person, ou r court will c onstr ue their Fourth Amendm ent claim as a genera l § 1983 claim for disc rimin ation. A c laim of false arres t implic ates guara ntees of the Fourth and F ourteenth Amendments and, therefore, is a ctionable under § 19 83. See Sorenson v. Ferr ie 134 F.3d 325, 328 (5th C ir.1998). Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 5 Appellan ts argue th at the district co urt err ed in co ncluding that the y failed to prope rly show that the Alle giance Defe ndants were state actors f or the pu rposes of the ir § 198 3 claims, and that any such claims wo uld be tim e - barred. Add itionally, A ppellan ts claim tha t the district co urt er red in conclud ing that th ey failed to properly asser t claims again st the Allegian ce Defenda nts. Hav ing fou nd no error, we affirm. i. Section 1983 require s state involve men t before a cause of action can be as serted th ereun der. For d v. H arris Cnty. Med. S oc., 535 F.2d 321, 3 23 (5 th Cir. 1 976). “ Like the state - actio n requirement o f the Fourtee nth Amendme nt, the und er - color - of - state - la w element of § 1 983 ex clu des fr om its reach ‘ merely p rivate con duct, no matter how discriminator y or wrong ful.’ ” Amer ican Mfrs. Mut. I ns. Co. v. Sulliv an, 5 26 U. S. 40, 50 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 10 02 (1 982)). Allegian ce is a private emerg enc y trans port compa ny. Smith, an employee of A llegiance, is a private c itizen. He is not em ployed b y the state o f Texas, or by the federa l governm ent. Appellants ar gue that A llegiance, as a co ntractor f or the City of Dayton, acted un der color of law in und ertaking a functi on intended by t he city. App ellant s ha ve not cite d to a case whe r e our cou rt has fo und a private compan y contracting with a municipa lity for a ny functi on simila r to an ambulan ce service to be a state ac tor for t he purp oses of a § 1983 cl aim and we have not fo und on e. 4 Further, as explained, infra, Appellants’ § 1983 claim again st the Alle giance De fendants fails on other grounds. 4 In other contex ts, the Supre me Court h as h eld that c ontra ctors for the gove rnment are not state ac tors f or tax purposes. See United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (19 82). See also United States v. Boyd, 378 U. S. 39, 4 7 (1964) (“[w] e cannot conclud e that [the c ontrac tors], both cos t - plus c ontractor s for p rofit, ha ve been so inc orporated into the gover nmen t struc ture as to be come instrum entaliti es of the [Sta te]. ”) Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 6 To adeq uately p lead a discrimin ation claim unde r § 1983, a plain tiff must alle ge (1) th at th ey we re treated diff erently from a sim ilarly situated individu al of a diffe rent race, and (2) th at the differen tial treatme nt was motivate d by discr imin atory inte nt. Se e Fenn ell v. Mario n Inde p. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3 d 39 8, 41 2 (5t h Ci r. 201 5) (ci ti ng Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3 d 414, 424 (5th Cir. 2004)). Appellants vague ly allude to Morgan Wh ite receivin g different tr eatme nt but fail to alle ge any facts to su pport a claim th at that th e treatment was re lated to Ma delyn’s ra ce. T heref ore, App ella nts f a i l to adequately allege any discr iminat ory int ent on be half of any of the Allegian ce Def endants. Under these facts, we hold that th e district court prope rly conclud ed that the Allegian ce Defen dants were not state actors and that the re was no evide nce of discr iminator y inten t for the purposes of § 1983. N evert hel ess, due to A ppellants ’ inar tful plead ing, and out of f airness to Madelyn, we consid er the ir timelin ess argume nts below. 5 ii. “Sectio n 1983 does no t prescribe a statute of lim itations. Instead, the statute o f limita tions for a s uit bro ught under § 19 83 is determ ined by the gene ral statute o f limitation s govern ing personal inju ries in th e forum state. ” Heilman v. City of Beau mont, 638 F. Ap p’x 363, 366 (5t h Cir. 201 6) (q uoting Piotr owski v. City of Hous., 23 7 F.3d 567, 57 6 (5t h Cir. 200 1)) (citation Furth er, th e Cour t has held that to be liable un der § 1983, a priva te entity m us t be perfor ming “p owers tr adition ally exc lusiv ely res erved to the State.” Manhattan Cmty. Access Cor p. v. Hall eck, 587 U.S. 802, 809 (cita tion mod ified). “I t is not eno ugh tha t the federa l, s tate, or loc al gove rnmen t exerc ised th e function in the p ast, or still d oes.” Id. 5 Appella nts a lso asser t various tolling prov isions, witho ut ju risprud ential su pport, through out their Opera tive C omplaint. Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 7 modified). In Texas, that statute of limitat ions period is two ye ars. 6 Tex. Civ. Prac. & R em. Cod e § 16.003. “J ust as we borrow the forum state’s statute o f limitat ions for § 19 83 purposes, we borrow also the state’s tolling principle s.” Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3 d 407, 415 (5t h Cir. 2008). In Tex as, equ itable tollin g is ap plied “sparin gly” — plaintif fs mu st be able to prove certain cir cumstance s to allow for to lling to be applied. Hand v. St evens Trans p., Inc. Emp. B enefit P lan, 8 3 S.W. 3d 286, 293 (Tex. Ap p. 2002). Litigants canno t use the doctrine to “ avoid the con sequences o f their own neglige nce.” Id. Two exce ptions reco gnized under Texas law operate to delay o r toll the limitat ions pe riod — the discovery ru le and the doctrine of fraudule nt concealment. See Clouse v. S. Methodist Univ., No. 24 - 1 046 1, 20 25 WL 2427 75 5, at *2 (5t h C ir. 20 25) (unpubli shed) (citing Valdez v. Holl enbeck, 465 S. W.3d 217, 229 (Tex. 20 15)). Madelyn a nd her moth er filed th eir original comp laint on July 17, 2023, one d ay befor e the t wo - year statute o f limitatio ns period expir ed. A p pellants did not nam e the Allegian ce Def endants in their original complain t. The Allegiance D efendan ts were not named as par ties until A ppellants filed the ir first amen ded complaint on October 12, 2 0 23. In respon se to the magistr ate ju dge’s conclus ion that th eir claims against the Allegian ce Def endants we r e time - barred, A ppellants argue d that the ir claim against th e Allegianc e Defendants should re late bac k to the original complain t. Appellan ts made n o specific argum ent fo r fraudulent conce alment or th e discovery rule. Nevertheless, the district cou rt charitably consid ered whe th er eithe r doctrin e applies. We review its concl usions, beginn ing first with the d iscovery rule. 6 Additiona lly, in Texa s, the sta tute of lim itations period f or a negligen ce claim is also two yea rs. Tex. C iv. Prac. & Re m. Code § 16.003(a); Ledf ord v. Keen, 9 F.4t h 335, 3 38 (5th C ir. 2021). Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 8 “To beg in, t he dis cov ery rul e is a na rrow ex cept ion r eserved for excep tional case s and its appli cations sho uld be f ew an d narrow ly drawn.” Clouse, 2025 WL 24 27755, at *4 (quoti ng Berry v. Be rry, 64 6 S.W.3 d 51 6, 524 (Tex. 20 22) (citation m odified). The r ule i s limite d to c ircumsta nces in which a plaintiff’ s inju ry is “inh erently undisco verable; that is unlikely to be discove red w ithin the prescribed lim itations per iod de spite th e exercise o f reason able diligence.” Id. (quot ing Marc us & Milli chap Real E st. Inv. Serv s. of Nev., Inc. v. Triex Tex. Holdings, LLC, 65 9 S.W.3d 45 6, 461 (Tex. 20 23) (citation modifi ed). The inquiry is “ not case - specific: the question is whethe r t he type of inju ry alleged is the kind th at could o rdinarily be discove red th rough the e xercise of reas onable dilige nce.” Id. at *4. Here, it is axio matic th at Madelyn’ s inju ries wer e disco verable — the y were t he very b asi s of the suit o riginally filed in October o f 2023. Further, A ppellants failed to b ring for th any notions that her injur ies were undisco verable in the O perative Complaint o r in the instant ap peal. Accord ingly, th e district co urt correctly concluded th at the discover y rule does not a pply her e. Under the doctrin e of fraud ulent co ncealment, “when a defendant has fraud ulently conc ealed th e facts form ing th e basis of the plaintiff’s claim, [a statute of] limitatio ns does not begin to run until the [plain tiff], using reason able diligence, discovere d or s hould ha ve dis covered t he i njury.” Regenc y Field Ser vs., LLC v. Swift Energ y Oper ating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807, 817 (Tex. 2021). A ppellants raise var iou s vague a nd conclu sory allegations in the Ope rative Com plaint, accusing diffe rent ap pe llees o f dele ting bod y camera footage, withholding medical re cords, failing to in vestigate certain le ads, and altering an d removing physical e vidence found with in the car in volved in th e acciden t. Altho ugh they make the se claims gene rally in th eir complain t, Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 9 A ppellants fail to br ing fo rth specific allega tions of f raudulent co ncealment as it relate s to the ir untimely filin g against th e Allegiance De f endants. We there f ore agre e with the d istrict court in concluding th at the doctrine of fraudule nt concealment do e s not apply. 2 On appe al, A ppellants argue th at an argument between Smith and appelle e Murphy Green le d to a ninety - minute delay in Made lyn receivin g medical tr eatme nt. For the purposes of th is opinion, we will constru e this as a gene ral claim f or neglige nce against th e Alle giance De fendants. Havin g dete rmined th at neither the do ctrine of fraudu lent con c ealmen t nor t he discove ry rule saves A ppellants ’ § 1983 claims from b eing barr ed by Texas’ s statute o f limitat ions, we tu rn to th e doctrine s of misnomer and miside ntific ation. 7 In respo nse to the Allegi ance Defe ndant s’ moti on to dis miss, A ppellants cite to the do ctrines of misn o mer and m isidentification in support of the ir argument that their u ntimely claim s shou ld relate back to their original complaint. T he district co urt disagr eed, findi ng the doct rines of misno mer and misid entificatio n inapp licable. On appeal, A ppe llants make the same ar gument. T he crux of the A llegiance Defend ants’ o pposition rests on the ar gument th at A ppellants fail to raise an y facts that wou ld relate th eir othe rwise untime ly claims back to the original co mplaint u nder the doctrines of misn o mer an d misiden tification. Federa l Rule of Civil Proce dure 15(c)(1)(A) provid es that an amen dment relate s back to th e date o f the original p leading w hen a new party 7 On app eal, it is u nclear whether App ellants mean to c laim mis nomer a nd misid entific ation a s to their negligenc e cla im alo ng with their § 19 83 cla im. Ou t of an abunda nce of c au tion, we will con sider the argu ment in d efens e of bo th cla ims being untim ely. Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 10 was time ly served, th e amendmen t does not violate an y applicable s tatutes of limitatio ns, and the par ty sough t to be added: (i) receive d such n otice o f the act ion that it will n ot be prejud iced in defending on the merits; and (ii) kne w or sho uld have know n that th e action wo uld have been brough t against it, but for a mistake co ncernin g the prope r party’s identity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i)–(ii). 8 In othe r words, u nder Rule 15(c), t he party to be brough t in by amend ment must have received notice o f the action such th at it wo uld no t be prejud iced in de fending o n the merits, an d it must have known or s hould ha ve known tha t the a ction would ha ve been br ought against it but for a mistake co ncerning the p arty’s p roper identity. “Furt herm ore R ule 15 (c) is meant to allow an am endme nt chan ging the name of a party to r elate back to the o riginal com plaint only if t he ch ange is the re s ult of an err or, such as a misnomer or misiden tification. ” Ultraflo Corp. v. Pe lican Tank Par ts, Inc., 92 6 F. S upp. 2d 93 5, 9 47 (S.D. T ex. 201 3) (quoting Miller v. Man cuso, 388 Fed. Appx. 38 9, 391 (5th Cir.2010) (citation modified). “A mis nomer occ urs whe n a par ty misna mes its elf or anot her party, bu t the correct partie s are invo lved.” In re Great er Houston Orth op a edic Specialists, Inc., 295 S.W.3d 323, 325 (Tex. 200 9). Furt her, R ule 15 (c) only applies to substituting or changing a de fendant rather than adding a new one. See Tap p v. Shaw Envt l., Inc., 401 F. App ’x 93 0, 93 2 (5th Ci r. 201 0) (per curiam). In revie wing Texas statu tes of l imitations, our co urt has h eld tha t Fe d. R. C iv. P 15(c) and Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.0 68 8 Similar to Te xas la w, Fed. R. C iv. P. 15(c) als o req uires that the a ction conc erning th e newly ad ded pa rties aris e out of th e same tra nsaction or occu rrence, and not be ba rred by any applica ble sta tute of lim itations. Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 11 contro l, such th at “a claim will be deem ed to relate back if relat ion back is perm itted unde r state law, even if it is not pe rmitted under federal law.” Schirl e v. Sok udo U SA, L.L.C., 48 4 F. App’x 893, 901 (5th Cir. 2012). Texas law states that: If a file d plead ing rela tes to a cause of action, cro ss action, counte rclaim, or defense that is not subject to a p lea of limitatio n when th e pleading is file d, a subsequent ame ndment or sup plement to th e pleading that chan ges the facts or gro unds of liabi lity or de fense is n ot subje ct to a plea o f limitation unle ss the amendm ent or s upp lement i s whol ly based on a new, distinct, o r diffe rent tra nsaction or o ccurren c e. Te x. Ci v. Pra c. & Rem. Co de § 16.068. Misiden tification “arises when two separate le gal entities ex ist and a plai ntiff mistakenly sues an entity with a n ame similar to that of th e correct entity. ” Houst on Ortho p a edic, 29 5 S.W.3d at 325. Mi snomer oc curs w hen a part y misnames itsel f or another party, bu t the correct partie s are invo lved. Id. “But we have made clear th at tolling is ge nerally not avai lable in cases o f misid entificat ion, which involve suing th e wro ng defendant with a name similar to the one again st which su it was i ntended.” Levinso n Alcoser Assocs., L.P. v. El Pistolon II, Lt d., 670 S.W.3 d 622, 628 (Tex. 20 23) (ci ti ng Hous ton Ort hop a edic at 325). A ppellants claim on appe al that they inten ded to name the Alle giance Defend ants, but in stead named the City o f Dayton, belie ving that the City of Dayton was re sponsible for Mad elyn’s triag e immediately follow ing the acciden t. This ass ertion does no t invoke t he d octri ne of misn omer or miside ntificatio n: th e Allegian ce Def endants are a p rivate en tity, wholly independ ent fro m the C ity of D ayton, a nd thei r names a re in no wa y si milar. A ppellants addition ally cite to Bailey v. U niv ersit y of Tex as He alth Science C enter at San Antonio, wherein plaintiffs were able to successf ully relate b ack their m edical neglige nce claims to add a n egligen t doctor’s Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 12 emplo yer. 261 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App. 2008) 3 32 S.W.3d 395 (Tex. 20 11). In that case, th ough the two defendan ts did not have similar names, the inten ded party w as the orig inal defe ndant’s gove rnmental emp loyer and had full kno wledge of the lawsuit at the time it was o riginally fi led. Id. at 15 2–5 3. The s ame is not true in Madelyn’s case. She and he r mother file d s uit against the City of Day ton mistakenly believing that the city was re sponsible for he r emergency m edical care. At the tim e of th e original fili ng, the Allegian ce De fendants had no know ledge that the y were an intended party of the law suit. A ddition ally, th e Alle giance De fendants and th e City o f Dayto n do not e njoy the empl oyer - employee relation s hip pres ent i n Bai ley. On th e facts before us, we cannot s ay that the Alle giance Defend ants k new or sh ould have kn own that a law suit filed again st the City of Dayto n was meant to include them based on their involvemen t in an accide nt. T her efo re, we conclud e that th e district co urt did not er r in de termin ing that the doctrines of misn o mer an d misiden tification do not apply to th e untimely claims m ade against th e Allegiance Defend ants. 3 Any neg lig ence or § 1983 c laims aga inst Steve Smith, th e paramedic employ ed by Alle giance, are likewise time - ba rred. See id. Smit h was not name d as a party in th e original co mplaint. Smith, like h is employer, was n ot name d until A ppellants filed the ir first amended complaint o n Octobe r 12, 2023, outside of the s tatute of lim itations for a ny negligence or § 1983 claim. As a private individual wh o was workin g for a private ambulance com pany, absent an y additional facts, we must agree w ith the district co urt that Sm ith was prop erly dis missed along with his employe r. We t herefore c onclu de tha t all of A pp ellants’ c laims again st the Allegiance De fendants are barr ed. Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 13 B The Op erative Co m plaint nam es the City of Dayton, the former mayor of Dayto n Ca roli ne Wadz eck, the form er cit y manage r Theo Melancon, form er “D eputy C ity Manager/ Chi ef [of] Police” Robert Vin e, forme r police captain J ohn D. Colem an, former c riminal in vestigat ion division lieute nant Terri Hughe s, police serg eant Kr isten Se ibert, the Day ton Volun te er Fir e Departm ent, an d its form er chief M urphy Green as defendant s, (herein after “Dayto n Defendan ts ”). The claim s brough t against the Dayt on Defe ndant s are simil ar to those br ought against the Alle giance Defend ants. Sp ecifically, Ap pellants c ontend t hat the Dayt on Defenda nts “den i ed Madelyn [] life, liberty, and prop erty in th e pursuit o f happiness an d [] also denied [he r] equal pro tection of the law. Additio nally, A ppellants claim that the Day ton Defendan ts “allow [ed] a fau lty inves tigation to continue, depri ving [Ma delyn] of Crime Vict im Compensat ion b enefit s for over tw o and a half ye ars.” We will an alyze th e claims ag ainst each o f the Dayton Def enda nts bel ow. 1 We be gin first with former mayor Carol ine Wadzeck, the City of Dayton Fire D epartment, an d its chief Murp hy Gre en. T he Oper ati ve Complai nt appears to allege equal prote ction and due process claims again st these d efendan ts pursuant to § 19 83. Like the § 1983 claim s agains t the Allegian ce Defe ndants, the claims against these defendants are tim e - barred. Under Texas law, th e statute of limitatio ns for § 1983 claims is two y ears. See Schir le, supra; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 1 6.003 (a). A ppellants failed to name the City of D ayton Fir e Departme nt, Wadzeck, and Gre en in their o riginal complain t. The se def enda nts were fir st na med in t he first amen ded complain t filed mo r e than tw o years after the s tatute of limitation s expir ed. Appellan ts claim that they shoul d have b een afford ed the Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 14 oppo rtunity to re pl ead to addr ess their f ailure to tim ely na m e the above - menti oned d efen dant s, or alternati vely that the ir dismissals should hav e bee n witho ut prejudice. Because t he A ppellants raise this argum ent as to every named defendan t, this op inion will ad dress, infra, the district court’s dismissal w ith prejud ice as to a ll defendan ts. Having d isce rned no other defens e raised against the dismissal of these defenda nts by t he A ppellants, we aff irm the distr ict cou rt’s dism issal as to Wad zeck, the City of Dayt on Fire D epartmen t, and Green as time - barred. 2 In additio n to suin g ma ny of the Cit y of Dayt on’s f irst r espond ers and firefighters, A ppellan ts appear to have attem pted to bring a Monell liability claim aga inst the City of D ayton its elf. Th ese claims are again vague and difficult - to - deciph er. The O perative Co mplaint s tates that the City of Dayton and its offici als “ worked to obstr uct ju stice in viol ation of Mad elyn’s First A mendmen t rights, ” and point to variou s pieces of e vidence that they claim we re pur pose fully lost in the post - accid ent investigat ion. T he dis trict court dis cerne d these addition al claims to be ano th er § 19 83 claim as well as a claim fo r Monell liability against th e City of Dayto n. Section 1983 “makes liab le eve ry per son who, un der co lor of state law, violates fe deral constit utional rights.” L ittell v. Hous ton In dep. Sch. Dis t., 894 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Ci r. 201 8) (citation mod ified). To assert a Monell liability claim und er § 19 83 against the City of Dayton, an ap pellant must a llege three eleme nts: (1) a policy maker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a violat ion of a constitu tional r ight by a policymake r whose “mov ing forc e” is t he policy or custom. Alvarez v. City of Brownsvi lle, 904 F. 3d 382, 389 (5th Ci r. 2018); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 6 58, 69 4 (1978). There ar e three ways to e stablish a “p olicy” un der Mo nell: Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 15 First, a p laintiff can show w ritten policy statem ents, ordinanc es, or r egula tions.[] Sec ond, a plai ntiff ca n show a wide spread practice that is so comm on and well - settle d as to constitu te custom that fairly re presen ts municipal po licy. [] Third, ev en a sing le decisio n may co nstitute municip al policy.. . w h en the official or e ntity po ssessing fin al policym aking author ity for an action pe rforms the spe cific act that fo rms the basis of th e § 19 83 claim. Webb v. Town of Saint Jos eph, 925 F.3d 209, 215 (5th C ir. 2019) (c it ation modified). The district co urt determine d that t he A ppellants’ Mone ll claim fails on its face. We agree. A ppellants fail to bring forth any facts s howin g an y ordin ance or writte n policy state ments, fail to sho w any wides pread discrimin atory p ractice in the City of Dayton, and, finally, f ail to poin t to any specific ac t forming th e basis of a § 1983 claim. A pp ellants again string togeth er vague and conclusory allegations that fail to give rise to any violatio ns of M adelyn’ s constitu tional rig hts by the City of D ayton. A ppellants do not atte mpt to su p port their c laims against th e City o f Dayton, instead only ar guing that they s hould have bee n given a chance to reple ad, that req u est seem ingly being their last line o f d efen s e of all failin g argum ents. 3 As to the r emaini ng Da yton D efendant s, form er ci ty emplo yees Vi ne, Colem an, and H ughes, e ach name d in their of ficial capacity, the district court disc erned these claims to be redundant echoe s of the claim s against th e City of Dayto n itself. Again, we agr ee. Becaus e the City o f Dayton is a named party, an d because “offic ial - capacity suits gen erally re present only anothe r way of pleading an action against an e ntity of which an officer is an ag ent[,] ” we hold th at the dis trict court prope rly dismissed A ppellants’ claim s against the abo ve - named Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 16 defend ants as duplicat ive. Hafer v. Melo, 5 02 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (citing Kentuck y v. Gr aham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1 985) (holding th at suits against s tate officials in their official capacities sho uld be treated as suits again st the State) (citation modifie d). The Operative Complaint is rif e with duplicative claims and it is apparent th at A ppellants simply r estated the same claims against multiple defen dants with th e ho pe that at least o ne wou ld succeed. We theref ore conclude that th e claims again st the re maining Dayton De f endants were p roperly dismissed as d uplicative. In sum, the d istrict court d id not err in dismissin g A ppellan ts’ claims against Vin e, Coleman, and Hugh es. The se claims against th e city ’s o fficials were p roperly dism issed for failing to state a claim, and for bein g duplicative of pre viously brought claim s. C We nex t turn to ap pellee th e City of Liber ty, its f ire de partmen t, an d appelle e Katelyn Grimes (collective ly, the “Liberty Def endants”). In the Ope rative Com plaint, A p pellants nam e the City of Lib erty, T exas alo ng with City of L iberty p aramedic Kately n Grimes. Although the City of Liberty is named in th e capt ion of the Operat ive C omplai nt, nowher e in the b ody of t he complain t do the appe l lants list any causes of action against th e city itself. The same can be said of A p pellants’ brief and their r eply. In analy zing the allega tions against th e Ci ty of Liberty, the dis trict court co nstrue d the “extrem ely spar se and conclu sory” claims as vio lations of Made lyn’s due process and equal p rotection rights an d found a discrimin ation claim unde r § 1983. As a thresho ld matter, the district co urt conclud ed that b ecause A ppellants failed to bring f orth an y claims again st the City of L iberty in the Operative Com plaint, t hey abandoned all claims against it. W e agree. On appeal, A p pellants likewise make no claims as to th e City of Liberty. In f act, they make no me ntion of t he ci ty anywher e in their briefs. Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 17 As such, all claims against the City of Liberty wer e waived by A ppe llants when they first fa iled to name any cause of action against the city, and secon d failed to raise any issu es on appeal as to this de fendant. See Rat clif f v. T exas, 699 F. A pp’x 410, 41 1 (5th Ci r. 2017) (unp ublis hed) (citing Brinkm ann v. Dallas Cty. D eputy Sh er iff Abner, 81 3 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Ci r. 1 987). Turnin g to paramedic Kate lyn Grim es an d the C ity of Libe rty Fire Departme nt, the Operative Co mplaint a lleg es that Grime s and the Liberty Fire De pa rtment discriminated again st Madelyn an d “denied [her] of life, liberty, and pro perty in the pursuit of happ iness and [] also denie d Madelyn [] equ al prote ction of the law.” It fur ther alleges th at Madelyn’s f ather, Flavio Q uiroz was d enied access to his injured daugh ter by Grimes at the scene of the accid ent, and that Madelyn ’s medical histo ry was n ot obtained b y Grimes, or by ot her em ergency me dica l personn el on th e scen e. The d istrict court c onclud ed that an y poss ible discrimin ation claim fails be cause A ppellan ts “state n o facts at all showing that [Gr imes or the Liberty Fire Department ] discriminate d against Madelyn a nd fail to alle ge any spe cific action for discrim ination.” We agree. Mere ly stating that discrimin ation h as taken place witho ut alleging suppo rting facts does no t state a claim f or relief th at is plausib le on its face. Ash croft v. I qbal, 55 6 U.S., 66267 8 (200 9). 9 A ppellants ’ failur e to state a claim, com bined with their inability to name any cause of action aga inst the Liber ty Defen dants, an d the h igh likeliho od that an y claim is barred by the applicable statutes of lim itation s, 9 Additiona lly, had th e distr ict court been a ble to dis cern a plaus ible § 1983 claim, any such cl aim likely would be barred by app licab le s tatute s o f lim itations. A ppe llants failed to nam e Kate lyn Grim es or the Lib erty Fire Depa rtment in their orig inal c ompla int — th ey were not named as defendant s un til over two years after the s tatute of limita tions ha d run. As discus sed supr a, th e statute of lim itations for § 19 83 cla ims in Texas is two y ears. See Schirle 484 F. App’x at 901 – 02; Tex. C iv. Prac. & Re m. Code Ann. § 1 6.003(a). Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 18 leads our court to conclu de that the d istrict court c orrectly dismissed the claims against th em. D In additio n to the A ppellants naming th e C ity of Liberty, Texas, they also na me city employe es Jennif er Harkn ess, Matthe w Poston, and M atthew Saldana. Harknes s is the Liberty County District Atto rney, and Po ston an d Saldana are Liberty Coun ty assistant distr ict atto rney s (the “Liberty Cou nty Defenda nts”). A ppellants claim that the Liber ty County De fendants discrimin ated aga inst M adelyn, deny ing her equal pro tection of th e law. Specific ally, A ppellants claim th at Harkne ss and the assis tant distric t attor ne ys assigned to the criminal case again st Morgan Wh ite did not prope rly prosecute Wh ite, “fail[ing] the public and [the ] victim.” A ppellants claim th at Po ston simply fe lt that it wo uld “be too hard to try th is case” le ading to h is refusal to revie w new evid ence. A ppellan ts argu e that the Libert y County D efenda nts ’ fail ure to adeq uately prosecute White was the re sult of discrim inati on aga inst Madelyn due to her race and depriv ed her of Crime Victim Compen sation ben efits and due pro cess of law. The d istrict court, “for the s ake of th oroughn ess” assumed th at Appellan ts inten ded to assert claim s under federal an d state law. T he cour t then conclude d that all L iberty County Defendants w ere en titled to E leventh Amendm ent immunity fro m a ny fede ral claims, and absolu te prosecutor ial immunit y from a ny claims made again st them in th eir individual capacit ies. We agr ee. 1 A ppellants ’ claim s agai nst the Li berty C ount y Defenda nts in their official capacit ies un question ably relate to de cisions made in their role s as prosecut ors for Li bert y County. They ar e therefor e entit led to immuni ty under t he Elev enth Am endment. See Qu inn v. Roach, 3 26 F. Ap p’x 280, 292 Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 19 (5th Cir. 2009) (granting Eleven th Amendmen t immunity to district attorne ys and assistant district a ttorneys s ued in the ir official cap acitie s for claims r elating to decis ions about w hether and w hen to bring charge s); see also Mor eno v. Don na In dep. Sc h. Dis t., 58 9 F. App’x 677, 680 (5th Ci r. 20 14) (findin g that the Eleve nth Amen dment shie lds district atto rney from official - capacity liability). We note, however, that claims b arred by sover eign immunit y sh ould be di smissed without pre judice, not with pr ejudi ce. United States v. $4, 480,46 6.16 in Fu nds Seize d from B ank o f Am. Acct. Ending i n 2653, 942 F.3d 655, 666 (5t h Ci r. 2019) (citing Warn ock v. P ecos C ty., T ex., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996)). Th eref ore, we affirm th e dismissal of th e Liberty County defendan ts with the mod ification that the ir dismissal be w ithout prejudice. 2 Ther e is one additional juris dictional is sue that we must a ddress sua sponte as to the Liberty Cou nty Defend ants, and that issue is one of stand ing. In a pre vious case befor e this circu it, we held th at a victim lacked stan ding to sue a pr osecu tor who failed to bring char ges again st her assailant. See Lefebure v. D ’ Aquill a, 15 F.4th 65 0 (5th Cir. 2 0 21). In that case, the prosecuto r alleged ly faile d to “prose cute or even investigate [the allege d perpetrator].” Id. at 655. The appellan t in Lefebure brough t forth spe cific allega tions and evide nce of wrongd oing by D’Aq uilla, the would - be pros ecutor in the criminal case against h er assailant. The pa nel in Le febure note d that the victim d eserve d to have her d ay in cou rt but that its h ands were tie d: “ Suprem e Court pre cedent makes cle ar that a citizen d oes n ot have s tandin g to challe nge th e polici es of the p rosecu ting autho rity unless sh e herself is prose cuted or threatened with pr osecution. ” Id. at 652. Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 20 In the case at bar, the g eneral allegat ions in the Ope rative Comp laint fail to po int our court to any co gnizable claims. 10 We therefo re conclude that A ppellants also lack standing to file s uit against th e Liberty County Defend ants. Be cause dismissals base d on lack of s tanding m ust be dismissed witho ut preju dice, we affirm the dismissal as modified, supra. 3 While th e Operative Com plaint mentio ns that the L iberty Co unty Defend ants were su ed only in the ir official capacities, on app eal, A ppe llants argue th at the se defend ant s are “ not e ntitled t o prosecuto rial immunity [for] claims bro ught agains t the m in their ind ividual capac ities un der both s tate and fe deral law.” It is the refore not alto geth er clear whe ther A ppellants inten ded to sue the Liberty Co unty Defendants in their official capacit ies, their in dividual capacit ies, or both. Becau se “courts may not s imply rely on the ch aracterizatio n of th e partie s in the complaint[, ]” we will con sider claims aga inst the Libe rty County Defend ants in the ir ind ividual c apacities as well. Lewis v. Clarke, 581, U.S. 155, 16 2 (201 4). As to th e Libe rty County Defendants be ing sue d in the ir individual capacitie s, “[t] he iden tity of th e real p arty in in terest d ictates w hat immun ities may be available. ” Id. at 163 (citing Kent ucky v. Gr aham, 473 U.S. 159 (19 85)). “An officer in an individual - capacity action. . . may be able to assert personal immunity defenses, su ch as, for example, absolute prose cutorial immunity in certain circ umstan ces.” Id. (citing Van de Kamp v. Goldst ein, 555 U.S. 33 5, 342 – 34 4 (200 9)). On appeal, A ppellan ts argue 10 Appella nts c laim tha t Madelyn wa s depriv ed of Crime Vic tims ’ Comp ensation by the Liberty Defend ants’ failure to prosec ute the case. However, acc ording to th e Te xas Offic e of Attorn ey Gen eral ’s we bsite on E ligib ility for Crime Victims ’ C omp ensation, a claimant nee d only show t ha t “there is enough evide nce to show the cri me occurre d. ” There is no req uirement that a judgment be rend ered in the victim’s favor. Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 20 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 21 that the Liberty County De fendants are be ing sued, not becau se of their roles as prose cutors, but rat her fo r their “admin is trative an d police - type acts.” A ppellants cite to the Supreme Court’s holding in Van de Kamp th at “absolu te immunity does not apply when a prosecu tor gives ad vice to po lice during a crimin al inve stigation[.]” Id. at 343. But th ere are no such allegatio ns here. Th e Op erative Co mplaint points to various de cision s the Libert y County Defe nda nts made in their ro les as advo cates f or th e st ate. Furth er, A ppellan ts fail to bring forth an y argume nts suppo rting their contenti on that the Libe rty Cou nty De fendants we r e acting in th eir administr ative ro le. Rather, A ppellan ts criticize dec isions made in handling of the prosecu tion of th e case, which were “in timately associate d with th e judicial p hase o f the cr iminal pro cess ” Id. (qu oti ng Im bler v. Pacht man, 424 U.S. 40 9, 42 8, 430 (1 976)). “District attorn eys and assistan t district attorne ys in Te xas are agents of the state wh en acting in the ir prosecuto rial capaci ties.” Quinn, 326 F. App’x a t 292. Ther efore, pros ecut ors a re ab solu tely immune, und er prose cutorial immunity, f rom liability with re spect to actions take n by them while represen ting the govern m ent in j udicial proce edings. Im bler 424 U.S. at 430 – 31. We there fore con clude that any claims brough t against these defend ants in their in dividual capacity are barr ed by prose cutorial imm un ity. E Appellan ts also bring negligen ce a nd ob struction of justice claims against U nion Pacific R ailroad, Jame s Wayne Bice, Stephanie Lee B lum Bice, Morgan White, a nd Edu ardo Her nand ez. Th ese appelle es did not respond to A ppellants ’ Ope rative Com plaint — som e respond ed to prev ious ver sions of the A ppellants’ complaints, an d some did no t respo nd at all. Due to the varying n ature of thes e appelle es’ circu mstances, our court will add ress the claims again st ea ch of the se app ell ees b elow. Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 21 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 22 1 At the district cou rt, Union Pacific Railro ad filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to d ismis s t he A ppellants’ first am ended complaint. 11 Th at mot ion was denie d as moot after A ppellants were permitte d to amend for a third time. Union Pacific Railro ad did not file an a nsw er or moti on to dismi ss i n respo nse to the Operative Complain t. On appeal, A p pellants ar gue only that their state law claims agains t Union Pacific should be dismisse d withou t prejud ice, so that they m ay have the opportun ity to replead. Ho wever, neith er we nor the district co urt disce rned an y state law cl aims made agains t Union P acific. That ge neral claim as to all defe ndants is discusse d, in fra. 2 Morgan White’s p arents, James B ice and S te phanie Lee Blum Bice, were n a med in the Ope rative Com plaint for interfe ring with a crim inal investigat ion, among other relate d claims. Like Un ion Pacific, the Bices responded to A ppellants’ first am ended complaint with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which was late r denied as m oot by the d istrict co urt followi ng A ppellants’ subsequent am e ndmen ts to their comp laint. Like all othe r claims mad e by A ppellants, th e claims against th e Bices are va gue and difficult t o understand. A ppellants alle ge that t he Bices “acted in concert ... to obstr uct justice in the investigation of the injured plain tiff and its causes. ” T he dis trict court fo u nd no disce rn i ble claims against th e Bice s i n the complain t, as amended, and dismissed all ch arges again st them with prejud ice. On appeal, A ppellants ’ sole argument is th at their claims against 11 In their fir st am ende d complain t, Appe llants alleged the s ame vagu e and conc lusory § 1983 c laims aga inst U nion Pa cific, mirr oring those th ey brou ght aga in st the Dayton Defend ants, Alleg i ance Defendant s, and Liberty Defendants. The dist rict court add itiona lly held that ap pellan ts failed to prope rly establis h Union Pacific was a state ac tor for pu rpos es of their § 1983 c laim. Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 22 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 23 the B ices should not have been dismissed with pre judice an d that they should have a righ t to reple ad to ad dress the de ficiencies highligh ted by th e district court. F Finally, A pp ellants br ing claims a gainst Ed uardo Her nandez an d Morgan White, t he two te en age drivers in the inciden t. O n appeal, A ppellants requ est that we dismiss the claims aga inst Hernan dez with out prejud ice. The district court has already done so. Turning t o Morgan W hi te, ast onishi ngly, A ppellants fail to bring fo rth any claims against he r i n the body o f the complaint, as ame nded, despite their later con tention that they had do n e so. On app eal, A ppe llants argue th at the neglige nce claims agai nst White we re not dismisse d by the district court. That is true, in fact, b ecause A ppell ants faile d to bri ng an y negl igen ce claim s against h er. C onsequ ently, there wa s no error in di smiss ing the c ompl ai nt as to Morga n Whit e. G On ap peal, in defense of the dis missal o f all claims ag ainst all defendants, A ppellants make one recur ring argume nt: they should be perm itted to r eplead or, alter natively, they as k our court to rema nd with the instructio n to dis miss all claims agains t all n amed d efendants with out prejud ice. In a motio n for reco nsideration that the distr ict court con strued as a Rule 5 9 (e) motion to alter ju dgment, A ppellan ts restated the ir claims as to all d efen dants, argu ing that any d eficien cies found by the district cour t could be corrected if A ppe llants we re given the opportun ity to replead. The district c ourt disagr eed. So do we. From th eir origin al complaint to th eir no w - operative and counsel ed second c orrect ed ame nded comp laint, the factual support fo r the claims Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 23 Date Filed: 02/12/2026

No. 25 - 40032 24 asserte d has bee n lacking. It is clear that a llowing A ppe llants to re p lead for the fo urth time wo uld be entirely futile. “A proposed amendment is futile if the am ended complaint fai ls to state a claim up on w hich re lief cou ld be granted.” Villarre al v. W ells Fargo Ban k, N.A., 81 4 F.3 d 7 63, 7 66 (5 th C ir. 2016). Having alre ady dete rmined that all o f A ppellants’ claims are rooted in futil ity, we affirm the district court’s dismis sal of a ll claims w ith pre judice, with th e exception of th ose Def endant s wh os e E leve nth Ame ndment immun ity require that dismissal be without p rejudice. We therefore also decline A ppellants’ requ est to in struct the district court to dismiss all claims against th e other defendan ts without prej udice. * * * For the foreg oing rea sons, we AFFIRM the distri ct court’s judgme nt, with th e excep tion of th e dismissal of the Liberty County Defenda nts, whose dismis sal we m odify to be without prej udice. Case: 25-40032 Document: 133-1 Page: 24 Date Filed: 02/12/2026