Young v. Toberman - Default Judgment Vacated

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April 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Matthew Young, V. Harold And Brenda Toberman

Court of Appeals of Washington

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 87607-4

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

MATTHEW YOUNG,
No. 87607-4-I
Appellant,
DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HAROLD TOBERMAN and BRENDA
TOBERMAN, and their marital
community,

Respondents.

DÍAZ, J. — Matthew Young claims a superior court judge abused its

discretion when it denied his motion for revision of a commissioner’s decision to

vacate a default judgment entered against Harold and Brenda Toberman (together,

the Tobermans). We disagree and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Young does not assign error to the following facts from the judge’s order.

Young purchased real property from the Tobermans in November 2022. In

March 2024, Young’s attorney wrote a letter to the Tobermans claiming they failed

to disclose known defects. They responded in writing, denying the allegations.

Young served a summons and complaint on the Tobermans in June 2024.
No. 87607-4-I/2

They then retained counsel, Robert Zoffel. In July 2024, Zoffel wrote a letter

informing Young’s attorney of his representation and of Tobermans’ response to

the claims. But he sent the letter to an incorrect address.

Young subsequently filed the complaint and moved for an order of default

and default judgment without notice to the Tobermans. A commissioner eventually

granted the motion in early September 2024, entering judgment in the amount of

approximately $47,000. The Tobermans learned of the default judgment

approximately two weeks later.

The following month, the Tobermans moved to vacate the judgment. A

commissioner granted that motion but awarded Young attorney fees for the cost

of defending it.

Young then moved a superior court judge to revise the order vacating the

judgment. The superior court denied his motion. He timely appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

Young claims the judge abused his discretion in denying his motion for

revision.

When a court denies a motion to revise a commissioner’s decision, we

review the superior court’s decision, not the commissioner’s. In re Marriage of

Williams, 156 Wn. App. 22, 27, 232 P.3d 573 (2010). We review rulings vacating

default judgments for an abuse of discretion. Showalter v. Wild Oats, 124 Wn.

App. 506, 510, 101 P.3d 867 (2004). A manifestly unreasonable or untenable

decision is an abuse of discretion. Id. But there is no abuse of discretion if a court

applies the correct legal standard, with substantial evidence for its findings. State

2
No. 87607-4-I/3

v. Martinez-Loyola, 35 Wn. App. 2d 521, 523, 576 P.3d 590 (2025), review granted

in part, 5 Wn.3d 1034, 583 P.3d 24 (2026). Evidence is substantial if it is “sufficient

to persuade a rational fair-minded person the premise is true.” Id. at 531.

We review decisions regarding default judgments according to the unique

facts and circumstances of a particular case. Showalter, 124 Wn. App. at 510.

However, we are generally less likely to reverse a decision which vacated a default

judgment. Id. at 511. That is because Washington law favors resolving disputes

on their merits. Id. at 510; see also Morin v. Burris, 160 Wn.2d 745, 754, 161 P.3d

956 (2007) (noting that “for more than a century, it has been the policy of this court

to set aside default judgments liberally.”)

A court may set aside a default judgment pursuant to a four-part test from

White v. Holm. Morin v. Burris, 160 Wn.2d 745, 755, 161 P.3d 956, 961 (2007)

(citing 73 Wn.2d 348, 352, 438 P.2d 581 (1968)). The moving party must show:

(1) That there is substantial evidence extant to support, at least prima
facie, a defense to the claim asserted by the opposing party; (2) that
the moving party's failure to timely appear in the action, and answer
the opponent's claim, was occasioned by mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect; (3) that the moving party acted with due
diligence after notice of entry of the default judgment; and (4) that no
substantial hardship will result to the opposing party.

Id.

Young’s challenge focuses on the second and fourth parts of the White test.

We hold that the judge had substantial evidence for the decision it reached.

As to the second factor, the court concluded the Tobermans’ failure to

respond was attributable to their counsel’s mistake. That is, Zoffel had accidentally

sent his letter responding to Young’s counsel “to a wrong address.” It also pointed

3
No. 87607-4-I/4

to evidence their failure was not deliberate. The Tobermans had otherwise notified

Young they contested his claims. And in retaining an attorney, they intended to

defend the action. Together, these unchallenged findings constitute substantial

evidence for the judge’s conclusion, which is consistent with the law. See Ha v.

Signal Elec., Inc., 182 Wn. App. 436, 452, 332 P.3d 991 (2014) (finding mistake

where, inter alia, an attorney failed to forward a complaint to the correct recipient);

Showalter, 124 Wn. App. at 515 (excusing a defendant's failure to timely answer

in holding “the circumstances surrounding the misunderstanding between Wild

Oats’ staff are more akin to a mistake than inexcusable neglect.”)

For reasons unknown, Young claims the court found excusable neglect,

when it made no such finding. The authority Young otherwise relies on is

unavailing. He cites to a case in which we held that the failure to respond to a

properly served summons and complaint was not excusable neglect when caused

by nothing more than “a breakdown of internal office procedure.” (Citing TMT Bear

Creek Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. PETCO Animal Supplies, Inc., 140 Wn. App. 191, 212,

165 P.3d 1271 (2007)). He does not explain how a scrivener’s error by one

attorney—misaddressing a letter—is not a mistake, regardless of whether it was

neglectful. Nor does he explain how that action on behalf of an individual, rather

than a company, represents a similar fundamental breakdown of internal office

procedure, particularly when the recipient (Young) was already aware his

opponent substantively contested the allegations. Even if viewed as a neglect

case, this case is closer to Ha and Showalter than TMT.

Also, his reliance on Morin is selective. When read in full, the case does

4
No. 87607-4-I/5

not support his point. It is true that our Supreme Court held “[p]arties must take

some action acknowledging that the dispute is in court before they are entitled to

a notice of default judgment hearing,” but it also held “they may still be entitled to

have default judgment set aside upon other well-established grounds.” Morin,160

Wn.2d at 757. Those grounds are present here.

Turning to the fourth factor, the judge found Young would not suffer

substantial hardship if the judgement was set aside. Young avers that he had

“prepared” to initiate a collection action on the debt and had incurred litigation costs

in obtaining the default judgment. But he does not cite to a single authority for the

proposition that making plans to collect on a preliminary order, which is known to

be appealable, is a hardship. DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122,

126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962) (“Where no authorities are cited in support of a

proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume

that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.”) Moreover, the commissioner

awarded Young fees for some of the resources he expended in relation to the initial

judgment. Thus, Young fails to establish that the judge abused their discretion as

to hardship.

Young also raises claims regarding the first and third parts of the White test,

which require proof of a prima facie defense and due diligence, though he couches

the error as one of improper burden shifting. Again, we disagree. The court did

not fail to consider these factors, as he first contends. And there is nothing in the

court’s reasoning—either expressed or implied—to substantiate his conclusory

5
No. 87607-4-I/6

assertion that it erred as a matter of law by shifting the burden of proof. It

addressed both, without erring.

As to the first factor, the court referenced specific facts in the Tobermans’

refutation of Young’s claims. Namely, the Tobermans asserted the roof did not

leak while they owned the house and they never had issues with the electrical

panel. Also, an inspector who Young hired before closing had not raised any of

the issues from his suit after examining the property. There is substantial evidence

in the record for these findings.

As to the third factor, the fact that the Tobermans “moved to vacate the

judgment approximately one month after learning of [it],” as the court found,

constitutes substantial evidence they acted with due diligence. Young adduces no

legal or persuasive support for his remaining arguments to the contrary. 1

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

1 In response to Young’s motion to strike, we note that our holding in no way relies

on any assertions of fact not contained within the record.

6