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March 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State ex rel. Hicks v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections

Ohio Supreme Court

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 993
• Docket Number: 2026-0231

• Judges: Hawkins, J.

• Opinion

• Authorities (18)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (12.1K)

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Syllabus

Elections—Mandamus—Writ sought to compel board of elections to hold hearing under R.C. 3513.05—Relator failed to establish a clear legal right to a mandatory hearing or board's corresponding clear legal duty to hold such a hearing because his request did not constitute a valid protest under R.C. 3513.05—A hearing on relator's request would be in vain as it would not result in candidate's removal from primary-election ballot—Writ denied.

Combined Opinion

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Hicks v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-993.]

NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-993
THE STATE EX REL . HICKS v. CLERMONT COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS
ET AL.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as State ex rel. Hicks v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip
Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-993.]
Elections—Mandamus—Writ sought to compel board of elections to hold hearing
under R.C. 3513.05—Relator failed to establish a clear legal right to a
mandatory hearing or board’s corresponding clear legal duty to hold such
a hearing because his request did not constitute a valid protest under R.C.
3513.05—A hearing on relator’s request would be in vain as it would not
result in candidate’s removal from primary-election ballot—Writ denied.
(No. 2026-0231—Submitted March 11, 2026—Decided March 24, 2026.)
IN MANDAMUS.

---

HAWKINS, J., authored the opinion of the court, which DEWINE, DETERS,
and SHANAHAN, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, C.J., concurred in judgment only, with an
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

opinion joined by FISCHER, J. BRUNNER, J., concurred in part and dissented in part,
with an opinion.

HAWKINS, J.
{¶ 1} Relator, Christopher R. Hicks, timely submitted to the Clermont
County Board of Elections a written request objecting to the nominating petition of
Claire Corcoran, who seeks to run in the upcoming primary election as a
Republican candidate for the office of Clermont County Commissioner. Hicks’s
request alleged that one of the part-petitions filed in support of Corcoran’s
declaration of candidacy contained elector signatures that were not properly
witnessed by the circulator of that part-petition.
{¶ 2} Upon receiving Hicks’s request, the board declined to schedule or
conduct a protest hearing. Instead, at a “special meeting,” the board concluded that
Hicks’s submission failed to meet the requirements of R.C. 3501.39 and 3513.05
and therefore did not constitute a “valid protest”; thus, the board reasoned, no
hearing was required. This conclusion rested primarily on the board’s
determination that even if it ultimately invalidated all the elector signatures on the
single part-petition to which Hicks objected, Corcoran would still have had more
than the 50 valid signatures required by law and would therefore remain on the
primary-election ballot.
{¶ 3} Soon after receiving notice of the board’s determination, Hicks filed
this action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling respondents—the board; its
director, Stephanie Haight; its deputy director, Chris Dennison; its chair, Raymond
W. Lembke; and its individual members, Gregg Conrad, Larry Heller, and Tim
Rudd (collectively, “the board”)—to schedule and conduct a protest hearing as
provided in R.C. 3513.05. The board answered, and the parties submitted briefs
and evidence in accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08. In its merit brief, the board
seeks sanctions against Hicks under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A). After its time for filing

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evidence had expired, the board filed a motion for leave to file amended evidence,
which Hicks did not oppose.
{¶ 4} The arguments and evidence in this case establish that Hicks’s request
for a hearing under R.C. 3513.05 was based on allegations that ultimately have no
bearing on Corcoran’s candidacy. In these circumstances, we conclude that (1)
Hicks failed to establish a clear legal right to a mandatory hearing in accordance
with R.C. 3513.05 or the board’s corresponding clear legal duty to hold that hearing
because Hicks’s request did not constitute a protest against Corcocan’s candidacy
and (2) a hearing on Hicks’s request would be in vain as it would not result in
Corcoran’s removal from the primary-election ballot. On these grounds, we deny
Hicks’s request for a writ of mandamus. We also deny the board’s request for
sanctions against Hicks and grant the board’s motion for leave to file amended
evidence.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Hicks’s request and the board’s response
{¶ 5} Claire Corcoran seeks to run in the May 5, 2026 primary election as a
Republican candidate for the office of Clermont County Commissioner. Hicks
contends that on October 15, 2025, he observed a part-petition in support of
Corcoran’s declaration of candidacy being signed without the circulator present to
witness the affixing of signatures. At that time, Hicks signed and took a photograph
of the part-petition.
{¶ 6} The part-petition in question was circulated by Corcoran’s husband,
T. Jeffrey Corcoran, who had signed the circulator statement. That statement
requires the circulator to “declare under penalty of election falsification” that,
among other things, the circulator “witnessed the affixing of every signature,” that
all signers are “to the best of [the circulator’s] knowledge and belief qualified to
sign,” and that every signature is “to the best of [the circulator’s] knowledge and

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belief the signature of the person whose signature it purports to be,” R.C. 3513.07
(prescribing the form of a declaration of candidacy and petition).
{¶ 7} On February 20, 2026, Hicks emailed and faxed a document styled
“Protest of the Part Petitions of Claire Corcoran” to Haight and Dennison. Haight
acknowledged receipt of Hicks’s request in an email she sent Hicks on the same
day.
{¶ 8} On the first page of his request, Hicks cited R.C. 3501.38, 3501.39,
and 3513.05, indicated that he is a member of the Republican Party, and stated that
“[t]his is a written protest to the part petitions of Claire Corcoran as filed on
February 3, 2026, seeking the office of Commissioner, January 1, 2027, term.” The
request also stated, in relevant part:

I personally witnessed a part petition page being circulated
and signed, on October 15, 2025, with no witness to any of the
signatures being affixed. I took pictures at the time to document the
lack of any witness. Here is one: [photograph of part-petition]
Others who witnessed the events can testify to the lack of
any witnesses to the signatures. I signed that petition page to make
it self-authenticating.
That page was submitted with T. Jeffrey Corcoran having
signed the circulator statement, under penalty of election
falsification: [screenshot of circulator statement]
There may be issues beyond that page.

{¶ 9} Haight avers in an affidavit that upon receipt of the request, she
forwarded it to the other members of the board “to determine whether the Purported
Protest met the requirements of R.C. 3513.05 and 3501.39 such that a hearing
would be required.” The board called a special meeting to review Hicks’s request

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and determine whether a protest hearing was required. The board emailed Hicks,
notifying him when the special meeting would be held and attaching the agenda for
the special meeting.
{¶ 10} At the February 24 special meeting, which Hicks did not attend, the
board discussed Hicks’s protest and Corcoran’s request. During that discussion,
the board reviewed Corcoran’s petition as a whole and determined that, including
those affixed to the part-petition to which Hicks had objected, Corcoran had
gathered 86 otherwise valid signatures. The board determined that without the
objected-to part-petition, which contained 17 signatures, Corcoran’s petition
contained 69 valid signatures—19 more than the 50 required by law.1 See R.C.
3513.05 (“the petition shall be signed by not less than fifty qualified electors”).
{¶ 11} The board concluded that, even if it accepted as true Hicks’s
allegations regarding the single part-petition referenced and consequently struck
the affected signatures, the protest would have no effect on the validity of
Corcoran’s petition as a whole or her candidacy. The board also determined that
Hicks’s request did not specifically allege the invalidity of Corcoran’s petition as a
whole or her candidacy. Though one member queried whether the proper action
was to “deny the protest,” the board ultimately determined that Hicks’s request was
not a “proper” or “valid” protest. As a result, the board decided that because
Hicks’s request was “not a protest under [R.C.] 3513.05 at all,” the board was not
required to “deny” the request or hold a hearing. The board did, however,
contemplate that “some investigation” might be warranted.
{¶ 12} Haight emailed Hicks on February 26 to advise him of the outcome
of the special meeting, stating that Hicks’s submission “did not meet the
requirements of R.C. 3513.05 and 3501.39,” because it did not identify which

1. At the special meeting, the board determined that the objected-to part-petition contained 18 signatures, when in fact it contained only 17; thus, absent those on the objected-to part-petition, Corcoran’s petition contained 69 valid signatures rather than 68.

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particular signatures Hicks was “questioning,” it did not “actual[ly] claim that Mrs.
Corcoran should not be placed on the ballot,” and—even assuming the entire part-
petition in question were declared invalid—Corcoran would still have enough valid
signatures to appear on the ballot. Thus, his request “did not invoke a mandatory
hearing.”
B. This mandamus action
{¶ 13} On February 27, Hicks brought this action seeking a writ of
mandamus compelling the board to schedule and conduct a hearing on his request
in accordance with R.C. 3513.05. On the same day, he filed a first amended
complaint and a second amended complaint, seeking the same relief.
{¶ 14} The board timely answered on the same day, denying that Hicks’s
submission constituted a “written protest” under R.C. 3513.05 and 3501.39 and
consequently determining that it was not obligated to schedule or conduct a hearing.
Both parties filed briefs and submitted evidence. In its merit brief, the board seeks
sanctions against Hicks under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A). The board separately filed a
motion for leave to file amended evidence, which Hicks did not oppose.
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 15} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Hicks must establish by clear
and convincing evidence that (1) he has a clear legal right to the requested relief,
(2) the board has a clear legal duty to provide that relief, and (3) he does not have
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Strbich v.
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2024-Ohio-4933, ¶ 11. Because the May 5,
2026 primary election is now less than two months away, Hicks lacks an adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law and therefore meets the third element.
See, e.g., State ex rel. West v. LaRose, 2020-Ohio-4380, ¶ 15 (relator lacked an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law when the election at issue was
less than 60 days away).

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{¶ 16} To determine whether Hicks has established a clear legal right and
the board’s corresponding clear legal duty, we must consider whether the board
“engaged in fraud, corruption, or abuse of discretion or acted in clear disregard of
applicable law,” State ex rel. Tjaden v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2024-Ohio-
3396, ¶ 23. A writ of mandamus is an “extraordinary remedy” that is granted
“carefully and cautiously,” State ex rel. Fostoria Daily Rev. Co. v. Fostoria Hosp.
Assn., 32 Ohio St.3d 327, 329 (1987), and only in “the sound discretion of the
court” asked to issue it, State ex rel. Allied Wheel Prods. v. Indus. Comm., 161 Ohio
St. 555, 560 (1954).
A. The board is not required to hold a protest hearing under R.C. 3501.39
and 3513.05 because the challenge could not affect Corcoran’s candidacy
{¶ 17} Hicks asserts that he is entitled to a hearing on his request under R.C.
3501.39(A) and 3513.05. R.C. 3501.39(A)(1) provides that a board of elections
“shall accept” any petition described in R.C. 3501.38—i.e., any “declarations of
candidacy, nominating petitions, or other petitions presented to . . . a board of
elections . . . for the purpose of becoming a candidate for any nomination,” R.C.
3501.38—unless a “written protest against the petition or candidacy, naming
specific objections, is filed, a hearing is held, and a determination is made . . . that
the petition is invalid, in accordance with any section of the Revised Code
providing a protest procedure.”
{¶ 18} Here, the applicable “protest procedure” that R.C. 3501.39(A)(1)
refers to is laid out in the 13th paragraph of R.C. 3513.05, which governs “[p]rotests
against the candidacy of any person filing a declaration of candidacy for party
nomination or for election to an office or position.” See also State ex rel. Harbarger
v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 1996-Ohio-254, ¶ 6 (“R.C. 3513.05, relating to
declarations of candidacy and petitions in primary elections, provides the
applicable protest procedure here since [the protestor] protested [candidates’]
petitions based on R.C. 3501.38(E). . . .”).

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{¶ 19} R.C. 3513.05 provides that such protests must be filed (1) in writing,
(2) by a qualified elector who is eligible to vote in the primary election at issue and
is of the same political party as the person whose candidacy is protested, (3) no
later than 4:00 p.m. on the 74th day before the primary election at issue, and
(4) with the election officials with whom the declaration of candidacy and petition
was filed. Additionally, R.C. 3513.05 requires that when a valid protest is filed, a
board of elections must “promptly fix the time for hearing it” and “forthwith” mail
notice to the person whose candidacy is protested and to the protestor. See also
State ex rel. Yeager v. Richland Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2013-Ohio-3862, ¶ 29. At
that hearing, the board of elections must “hear the protest and determine the validity
or invalidity of the declaration of candidacy and petition.” R.C. 3513.05.
{¶ 20} There are two grounds for a determination of invalidity: first, if the
election officials “find that such candidate is not an elector of the state, district,
county, or political subdivision in which the candidate seeks a party nomination or
election to an office or position,” and second, if the election officials find that the
candidate “has not fully complied with” R.C. Ch. 3513. R.C. 3513.05.
{¶ 21} Under this statutory scheme, the board did not exceed its authority
by refusing to accept Hicks’s submission as a protest mandating a hearing. The
text of the relevant statutes show that a board is not obligated to hold a hearing on
any request labeling itself a R.C. 3513.05 protest. Rather, the prerequisites to a
protest stated in R.C. 3513.05 and the specificity requirement in R.C. 3501.38
indicate that a board must evaluate, as a threshold determination, whether a request
purporting to be a protest under R.C. 3513.05 meets the applicable statutory
standards to mandate a hearing.
{¶ 22} Relevant to this case, the only protest authorized by R.C. 3513.05 is
a “[p]rotest[] against the candidacy of any person filing a declaration of candidacy
for party nomination or for election to an office or position.” (Emphasis added.)
R.C. 3501.39 and 3513.05 do not require, let alone clearly require, a board of

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elections to hold a hearing on the validity of a declaration of candidacy and petition
when the allegations in the request submitted to the board, on their face, could never
amount to legal grounds for rejecting the candidacy.
{¶ 23} That is the situation the board faced here. In an attempt to raise the
question of compliance with R.C. 3501.38(E)(1) and R.C. 3501.38(F), which
pertain to the statement and knowledge of the circulator, Hicks alleged that one
part-petition had been signed by electors without the circulator’s having witnessed
all signatures. But the part-petition at issue concerned only 17 signatures.
Corcoran’s remaining part-petitions contained a total of 69 valid signatures, and
she needed only 50 signatures to qualify for the primary-election ballot. See R.C.
3513.05 (“the petition shall be signed by not less than fifty qualified electors”).
While Hicks vaguely suggests that “[t]here may be issues beyond that page,” he
does not argue—much less submit evidence showing—that holding a hearing could
have resulted in Corcoran’s removal from the ballot.
{¶ 24} Because the allegations in Hicks’s request for a hearing could never
amount to legal grounds for rejecting Corcoran’s candidacy, the board correctly
concluded that Hicks had not filed a protest under R.C. 3513.05 to mandate a
hearing. Hicks has not, therefore, met the high bar of establishing a clear legal right
and the board’s corresponding clear legal duty to hold a mandatory hearing in
accordance with R.C. 3513.05.
B. Granting the requested writ of mandamus would compel a vain act
{¶ 25} The futility of Hicks’s submission also demands that we deny the
requested writ because “‘mandamus will not issue to compel a vain act,’” State ex
rel. Oberlin Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Talarico, 2005-Ohio-5061, ¶ 17,
quoting State ex rel. Moore v. Malone, 2002-Ohio-4821, ¶ 38.
{¶ 26} We have previously applied this precept to deny extraordinary relief
in an election-related original action. Oberlin Citizens at ¶ 17. In Oberlin Citizens,
a city auditor refused to transmit or certify the relators’ initiative and referendum

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petitions regarding a city ordinance to the county board of elections based on the
auditor’s determination that the subject ordinance was administrative rather than
legal and therefore not subject to referendum. Relators requested a writ of
mandamus compelling the auditor to submit the petitions to the board of elections.
We denied the requested writ, determining that the ordinance at issue was
administrative and therefore was not “properly the subject of either referendum or
initiative seeking its repeal.” Id. at ¶ 31. Thus, because the board of elections
“would ultimately have been required to withhold the initiative and referendum
from the ballot,” granting the requested writ would have compelled only a vain act.
Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶ 27} This case presents similar circumstances. As explained in the
previous section, the sole purpose of the hearing that Hicks seeks is to determine
the validity or invalidity of Corcoran’s declaration of candidacy and petition—i.e.,
to determine whether Corcoran will appear on the May 5 primary-election ballot.
See R.C. 3513.05 (addressing “[p]rotests against the candidacy of any person filing
a declaration of candidacy”). And the evidence submitted in this case establishes
that the board, faced with one allegedly invalid part-petition, would have had no
choice but to determine that Corcoran’s candidacy was valid because she had
retained enough valid signatures on her petition to remain on the primary-election
ballot regardless of Hicks’s allegations.
{¶ 28} Based on the arguments and evidence submitted in this case, we
conclude that granting the requested writ of mandamus would compel only a vain
act, and we therefore decline to do so. See Oberlin Citizens at ¶ 7 (“we need not
grant the requested writ of mandamus if the board of elections would ultimately
have been required to withhold the initiative and referendum from the ballot”).
C. The board’s request for sanctions against Hicks
{¶ 29} In its merit brief, the board requests sanctions against Hicks under
S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A), arguing that he filed the instant action “in an effort to harass

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not only the Board and its staff and counsel, but also the candidate and her spouse.”
The board cites a video that Hicks posted on YouTube before he submitted the
request for a protest hearing. In the video, Hicks posits that “[i]f this page is tossed,
I believe she still has enough signatures, but if there’s any uh problems emerge on
any other page, which I’ll study through, then she would be tossed from the ballot.”
The board also points to “ad hominem attacks and personal invective” contained in
Hicks’s mandamus complaint and merit brief.
{¶ 30} Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A), we may sanction the person who signed
or submitted a filing—including by awarding reasonable attorney fees and litigation
expenses to the opposing party—if we determine that the filing “is frivolous or is
prosecuted for delay, harassment, or any other improper purpose.” A filing is
frivolous if “it is not reasonably grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or a
good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”
Id.
{¶ 31} Though we decline to grant the writ Hicks requests, it cannot be said
that his argument—that the board exceeded its authority in failing to schedule and
hold a protest hearing—was “not reasonably grounded in fact or warranted by
existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law,” id. Nor does the YouTube video cited by the board establish that
Hicks filed this action for harassment. Although Hicks noted in the video that
invalidation of the part-petition he had challenged likely would not result in
Corcoran’s removal from the ballot, he also stated that he planned to review the
remaining part-petitions for any other “problems” that may have resulted in
Corcoran’s falling below the requisite number of signatures—though he ultimately
failed to submit any evidence of, or argument regarding, other such “problems” to
this court. Finally, while we condemn the type of personal attacks that Hicks
included in his merit and reply briefs, the board does not identify any case in which
we have invoked S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A) to sanction a litigant solely for impugning

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the character of an opposing party or its counsel, nor do we believe on the facts here
that such a sanction would be justified.
{¶ 32} We therefore deny the board’s request for sanctions.
D. The board’s motion for leave to file amended evidence
{¶ 33} On March 6, one day after its deadline to file evidence under
S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08(A)(2), the board filed a motion for leave to file amended
evidence. The board’s proposed amendments—namely, the correction of an
internet link, the amendment of an affidavit to assert that it was made on personal
knowledge, and the correction of a reference to a misnumbered exhibit—are minor
and technical. Hicks did not file a response in opposition to the board’s motion.
{¶ 34} S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13(B)(3) allows a party to file a motion for leave to
file a revised document when the time for submitting the original document has
expired. The board properly requested leave to revise its previously filed evidence
under this provision. Because Hicks did not file a response in opposition and
because he will not suffer any prejudice, particularly given the technical and
nonsubstantive nature of the proposed amendments, we grant the board’s motion.
See State ex rel. Boddy v. Xenia Community City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2026-
Ohio-164, ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. Maxwell v. Brice, 2021-Ohio-4333, ¶ 24.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 35} For the foregoing reasons, we deny Hicks’s request for a writ of
mandamus, deny the board’s request for sanctions, and grant the board’s motion for
leave to file amended evidence.
Writ denied.

---

KENNEDY, C.J., joined by FISCHER, J., concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 36} I agree with the court’s judgment denying the Clermont County
Board of Elections’ request for sanctions against relator, Christopher R. Hicks, and
granting the board’s motion for leave to file amended evidence. I also agree with

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the court’s denial of Hicks’s request for a writ of mandamus compelling
respondents—the Clermont County Board of Elections; its director, Stephanie
Haight; its deputy director, Chris Dennison; its chair, Raymond W. Lembke; and
its individual members, Gregg Conrad, Larry Heller, and Tim Rudd (collectively,
“the board”)—to conduct a hearing on his protest.
{¶ 37} However, my reasoning differs from that of the majority.
Establishing a clear legal right to the remedy requested is the first step in
determining whether to award a writ of mandamus. If, as the majority suggests,
Hicks’s request for a hearing was invalid, then Hicks has no clear legal right to, and
the board has no clear legal duty to hold, a hearing. See majority opinion, ¶ 4.
Under the majority’s conclusion, there is no need to go further and reach the
question whether granting mandamus relief would compel only a vain act.
{¶ 38} But, in my view, the board, as a creature of statute, lacked discretion
to disregard its statutory duty to hold a hearing on Hicks’s protest based on its
conclusion that a protest hearing under R.C. 3513.05 would not result in the
removal of the objected-to candidate from the ballot. Because Hicks submitted a
valid protest, the board was required to hold a hearing on it. Under these
circumstances, a writ of mandamus would typically issue.
{¶ 39} Nonetheless, it is well established that a writ of mandamus will not
issue to compel a vain act. State ex rel. Grendell v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs.,
2022-Ohio-2833, ¶ 9; State ex rel. Rodriguez v. Indus. Comm., 1993-Ohio-89, ¶ 14.
And although the board was required to hold a hearing on Hicks’s protest, the result
of that hearing is foreordained—the board has already determined that the candidate
would have enough signatures to stay on the ballot even if Hicks proved the
allegations in his protest. Consequently, issuing the writ of mandamus Hicks
requests would compel a vain act. I therefore concur in the court’s judgment
denying the requested writ of mandamus.

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Background
{¶ 40} In this case, Claire Corcoran seeks to run in the upcoming primary
election as a Republican candidate for the office of Clermont County
Commissioner. Hicks submitted to the board a written protest objecting to her
nominating petition because, he says, one of the part-petitions filed in support of
Corcoran’s declaration of candidacy contained elector signatures that had not been
properly witnessed by the circulator of that part-petition.
{¶ 41} The board, however, chose not to hold a protest hearing. Instead, at
a “special meeting,” the board concluded that Hicks’s submission did not constitute
a “valid protest” and no hearing was required. This conclusion rested primarily on
the board’s determination that even if it ultimately invalidated all the elector
signatures on the part-petition Hicks objected to, Corcoran would still have had
more than the 50 valid signatures required by law and would therefore remain on
the primary-election ballot.
{¶ 42} Hicks filed this action requesting a writ of mandamus compelling the
board to schedule and hold a protest hearing in accordance with R.C. 3513.05.
The Standard for a Writ of Mandamus
{¶ 43} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Hicks must establish by clear
and convincing evidence that (1) he has a clear legal right to the requested relief,
(2) the board has a clear legal duty to provide that relief, and (3) he does not have
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Strbich v.
Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2024-Ohio-4933, ¶ 11.
{¶ 44} I agree with the majority that Hicks lacks an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law. What I do not understand is why, upon determining
that Hicks did not establish his clear legal right to, or the board’s clear legal duty to
provide, the requested relief, the majority did not stop its analysis there. There is
no need to address whether the vain-act exception applies absent the

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determinations—which I would make—that Hicks was entitled to a hearing and
that the board failed to provide it.
The Statutes Required a Protest Hearing
{¶ 45} The board incorrectly determined that Hicks’s protest failed to meet
the requirements of R.C. 3501.39 and 3513.05. The 13th paragraph of R.C. 3513.05
governs “[p]rotests against the candidacy of any person filing a declaration of
candidacy for party nomination or for election to an office or position.” R.C.
3513.05 provides that such protests must be filed (1) in writing, (2) by a qualified
elector who is eligible to vote in the primary election at issue and is of the same
political party as the person whose candidacy is protested, (3) no later than 4:00
p.m. on the 74th day before the primary election at issue, and (4) with the election
officials with whom the declaration of candidacy and petition was filed. Hicks’s
protest satisfied all four of these requirements.
{¶ 46} R.C. 3513.05 requires that when a valid protest is filed, the board of
elections “shall promptly fix the time for hearing it” and “forthwith” mail notice to
the person whose candidacy is protested and to the protestor. At that hearing, the
board of elections must “hear the protest and determine the validity or invalidity of
the declaration of candidacy and petition.” Id.
{¶ 47} There are two grounds for a determination of invalidity: first, if the
election officials “find that such candidate is not an elector of the state, district,
county, or political subdivision in which the candidate seeks a party nomination or
election to an office or position,” and second, if the election officials find that the
candidate “has not fully complied with” R.C. Ch. 3513. R.C. 3513.05.
{¶ 48} Hicks alleged in his protest that one of Corcoran’s part-petitions
contained signatures of electors that had not been witnessed by the circulator—an
allegation that involves a failure to comply with (1) R.C. 3501.38(E)(1)’s
requirement that the circulator sign “a statement made under penalty of election
falsification that the circulator witnessed the affixing of every signature” and (2)

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R.C. 3501.38(F)’s provision that a petition paper is invalid “if a circulator
knowingly permits an unqualified person to sign . . . or permits a person to write a
name other than the person’s own.” This allegation raised the issue whether the
petition “complied with [R.C. Ch. 3513],” R.C. 3513.05. Hicks’s protest met the
requirements of R.C. 3501.39 and 3513.05.
{¶ 49} Upon receiving a written protest meeting the requirements of R.C.
3501.39 and 3513.05, R.C. 3513.05 requires that the board (1) “promptly fix the
time for hearing” the protest, (2) “mail notice of the filing of the protest and the
time fixed for [the] hearing” to the candidate and the protestor, and (3) at the time
so fixed, “hear the protest and determine the validity or invalidity of the declaration
of candidacy and petition,” R.C. 3513.05. Because this hearing is mandatory when
a written protest which meets the requirements of R.C 3501.39 and 3513.05 is
received by the board, Hicks has a clear legal right to it.
{¶ 50} But instead of scheduling and conducting a hearing on Hicks’s
protest, the board held a “special meeting” at which it reviewed his protest and
Corcoran’s petition and determined that Hicks’s protest could not result in the
invalidation of Corcoran’s petition for candidacy. The board contends that because
Corcoran had enough valid signatures even without those on the part-petition to
which Hicks objected, Hicks’s protest was not a “valid protest” necessitating a
hearing.
{¶ 51} A board of elections is “a creature of statute.” State ex rel. Lynch v.
Chesney, 113 Ohio App. 55, 58 (7th Dist. 1960). It has no discretion to disregard
a statutory mandate; as we have explained, a creature of statute “has no authority
to act beyond its statutory powers,” Discount Cellular, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm.,
2007-Ohio-53, ¶ 51. And a creature of statute “must comply with the clear
provisions of the [a]ct that define its powers and duties,” Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc. v.
Ohio Ins. Guar. Assn., 69 Ohio St.3d 521, 526 (1994).

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{¶ 52} Here, the board’s determination of the validity or invalidity of
Corcoran’s petition for candidacy was to happen at the required hearing, not before.
This statutory duty means the board has a clear legal duty to provide the relief Hicks
requests in this action.
{¶ 53} However, determining that Hicks had a clear legal right to, and that
the board had a clear legal duty to hold, a hearing does not end the analysis.
Mandamus Will Not Issue to Compel a Vain Act
{¶ 54} A writ of mandamus is “a high prerogative writ, and its issuance rests
in the sound discretion of the court.” Patton v. Springfield Bd. of Edn., 40 Ohio
St.3d 14, 15 (1988). “‘The court is not bound to allow the writ merely because [the]
applicant shows a clear legal right for which mandamus would be an appropriate
remedy, even though without mandamus [the] applicant for the writ would be
without remedy. The writ will not be issued on mere technical grounds, and it may
be granted or refused depending on whether or not it promotes substantial justice.’”
State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 161 (1967), quoting 55
C.J.S., Mandamus, § 9b, at 31-32 (1948). In exercising our discretion, we consider,
among other things, “‘whether the performance of the act by the respondent would
give the relator any effective relief, and whether such act would be . . . useless.’”
Id. at 162, quoting 35 Ohio Jur.2d, Mandamus, § 37, at 287 (1959).
{¶ 55} We have therefore recognized that “[m]andamus will not issue to
compel a vain act.” State ex rel. Burkons v. Beachwood, 2022-Ohio-748, ¶ 14. And
we have denied extraordinary relief in an expedited election action despite the
respondent’s failure to comply with a statutory duty when the result would be to
compel the respondent to engage in a vain act. State ex rel. Oberlin Citizens for
Responsible Dev. v. Talarico, 2005-Ohio-5061, ¶ 17.
{¶ 56} Hicks wants a hearing to challenge the validity of Corcoran’s
declaration of candidacy and petition. However, the record establishes that the
board could conclude only that Corcoran’s candidacy was valid because she had

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enough signatures on her petition to remain on the primary-election ballot
regardless of Hicks’s allegations.
{¶ 57} Hicks’s protest attacked one part-petition circulated by T. Jeffrey
Corcoran that Hicks says had been signed by electors without the circulator’s
witnessing all signatures. That part-petition contained 17 signatures. Even
assuming that Hicks is right that the entire part-petition should be invalidated,
Corcoran’s remaining part-petitions contained a total of 69 valid signatures and she
needed only 50 signatures to qualify for the primary-election ballot. See R.C.
3513.05 (“the petition shall be signed by not less than fifty qualified electors”).
{¶ 58} Consequently, granting the requested writ of mandamus would
compel only a vain act, and I would not order the Clermont County Board of
Elections to do that. Therefore, I concur in the court’s judgment denying a writ of
mandamus in this case.

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BRUNNER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 59} I agree with the opinion concurring in judgment only that relator,
Christopher R. Hicks, has established a clear legal right to a protest hearing and that
the respondent Clermont County Board of Elections had a clear legal duty to hold
one; I dissent, however, from the court’s judgment denying Hicks’s request for a
writ of mandamus. Neither a board of elections nor this court should adjudicate the
validity of an election protest unless a hearing is first held. Here, while the
Clermont County Board of Elections held a meeting about the fact that a protest
had been filed, that meeting was not a hearing on the protest, as it did not allow
Hicks the opportunity to present evidence and argument before the board.
{¶ 60} Boards of elections have no procedure allowing them to dismiss a
protest for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted before a hearing
is held. See, e.g., Civ.R. 12(B)(6) (rule of civil procedure allowing courts to grant
dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). Here, the

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majority opinion, in effect, permits a politically appointed board that holds quasi-
judicial authority, see R.C. 3501.06 (members of boards of elections are nominated
by local political parties and appointed by the secretary of state), to apply such a
procedure. It is an extreme position for this court to hold that a board of elections—
or in the case of a tie vote, the secretary of state, see R.C. 3501.11(X)—would have
the power to determine a protest’s validity without first holding a hearing. What is
tantamount to a disposition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) should remain in the hands of
the judiciary, not members of boards of elections appointed by the political class.
A protest calling for a candidate’s removal from the ballot should be the subject of
a hearing and should not be substantively decided without a hearing.
{¶ 61} It is not difficult to envision, especially at larger boards of elections,
a scenario whereby the county prosecuting attorney circulates a memorandum of
law to members of a board of elections recommending that, based on the
unlikelihood of its substantive success, a protest be rejected as invalid without first
being heard by the board. Discussion between board members occurring at a
meeting leading to a vote to reject the petition without a hearing creates the
potential for boards of elections to violate other laws of this State, especially R.C.
121.22, which requires boards of elections to hold open meetings. See, e.g., State
v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections, 1978 WL 214910, *5 (6th Dist. Nov. 2, 1978)
(holding that certification by board of elections of local option petition for
placement on ballot without open meeting violated R.C. 121.22). Such
circumstances cause me grave concern that today’s decision will encourage boards
of elections to preliminarily decide the substance of election protests before hearing
them and, in doing so, violate Ohio’s laws requiring all official business to occur at
an open meeting of the board in accordance with R.C. 121.22.
{¶ 62} Looking next to what judicial proceedings require, this court and all
other courts of this State are subject to Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio
Constitution, which provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an

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injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.” While
boards of elections initially determine the validity of petitions as part of their
ministerial duties, see R.C. 3501.38 and 3501.05, they become quasi-judicial
boards when determining whether to proceed on a protest request—which should
be heard regardless of how many eyebrows it may raise. See State ex rel.
Nelsonville v. Athens Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2025-Ohio-4363, ¶ 25, quoting State ex
rel. Moscow v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2022-Ohio-3138, ¶ 15 (“‘A board
of elections exercises quasi-judicial authority when it decides a protest after a
mandatory hearing that includes sworn testimony.’”).
{¶ 63} The majority opinion’s reliance on State ex rel. Oberlin Citizens for
Responsible Dev. v. Talarico, 2005-Ohio-5061, is inappropriate. That case
involved a determination that a protest hearing would be a vain act based on legal
issues as opposed to evidentiary facts. Many election protests are raised by
ordinary citizens who are unrepresented. Often, because of the timelines required
for filing a protest in order for the candidacy or issue to be placed on a printed
ballot, not all of the evidence is discovered before the actual protest hearing. It
would be easy for the vain-act exception—applied here in the majority opinion and
the concurring-in-judgment-only opinion—to be misinterpreted and result in
unwarranted filings of mandamus actions.
{¶ 64} Without this court requiring a protest hearing, a future protester
could misconstrue today’s decision and skip the protest proceeding altogether as
being a vain act, filing instead in mandamus and causing dismissal by this court for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See State ex rel. Lippitt v. Cuyahoga
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 56 Ohio St.2d 70, 72 (1978) (a protest is an administrative
remedy that must be exhausted before redress by this court).
{¶ 65} Today’s majority opinion heightens the risk of a publicly damaging
descent toward a future that denies both government transparency and access to

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remedies for redress of grievances for all Ohioans. Accordingly, I concur in the
majority opinion’s resolution of the pending motions, and I agree with the
concurring-in-judgment-only opinion that Hicks is entitled to a hearing. But I
dissent from the court’s judgment denying Hicks’s request for a writ of mandamus.
We should grant the writ and order the Clermont County Board of Elections to hold
a hearing on Hicks’s protest.

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Christopher R. Hicks, pro se.
Mark J. Tekulve, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian C.
Shrive and Joseph T. Mooney, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondents.

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