Kendra Russell v. International Automotive Components - Workers' Compensation Appeal Affirmed

Jump To

Top Caption Disposition Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

April 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Kendra Russell v. International Automotive Components

Kentucky Supreme Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-SC-0241
• Judges: Keller

• Disposition: OPINION OF THE COURT

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (55.3K)

• PDF

Disposition

OPINION OF THE COURT

Combined Opinion

by Michelle M. Keller

RENDERED: APRIL 23, 2026
TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky
2025-SC-0241-WC

KENDRA RUSSELL APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V. NO. 2025-CA-0238
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. WC-23-00900

INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE APPELLEES
COMPONENTS; HONORABLE
PHILLIPE RICH, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER

AFFIRMING

Appellant Kendra Russell (“Russell”) appeals the Court of Appeals’

decision affirming the Workers’ Compensation Board’s (“Board”) Opinion

vacating the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) award of the three-multiplier

and remanding for additional findings. For the reasons set out below, we

affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Russell, a 54-year-old female resident of Madisonville, Kentucky, filed a

claim for workers’ compensation benefits arising out of her employment with

International Automotive Components (“IAC”). Russell was employed by IAC

from June of 2002 until June 25, 2021, the date the plant closed. On
September 16, 2023, Russell filed a claim for injury, alleging a June 25, 2021,

cumulative trauma injury to multiple body parts — including her cervical

spine, lumbar spine, both hands, both knees, and both shoulders — resulting

from approximately twenty years of physically demanding and repetitive work

for IAC. IAC contested Russell’s claim, and her claim went before an ALJ. The

issues contested include whether the injury was caused by Russell’s

employment with IAC and whether Russell was entitled to permanent income

benefits per KRS 1 342.730.

On July 24, 2024, the ALJ rendered an Opinion, Award, and Order. That

opinion summarized the conflicting medical evidence presented in reports by

Dr. Larry Oteham, Dr. Mitchell Harris, and Dr. Gregory Snider. Dr. Oteham

and Russell were also deposed prior to the final hearing, and Russell testified

at the final hearing. Dr. Oteham, who had evaluated Russell at the request of

Russell’s attorney, diagnosed Russell with “lumbar, cervical, bilateral knee, and

bilateral shoulder degenerative disease, bilateral hand osteoarthritis and carpal

tunnel syndrome.” Dr. Oteham attributed 80% of Russell’s complaints to her

work at IAC. Dr. Harris and Dr. Snider had performed Independent Medical

Exams on Russell at IAC’s request. Dr. Harris found “no abnormal findings in

the cervical spine, mild lumbar pain with slightly decreased motion, a likely

right shoulder SLAP tear, mild bilateral patellofemoral knee arthritis, and

bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.” Dr. Harris attributed none of Russell’s

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

2
diagnoses to her work at IAC and assigned a 0% impairment, opining that her

condition was the result of common degenerative changes associated with her

age and body mass index. He concluded that he would not recommend

physical restrictions for Russell and that further medical treatment was

unnecessary. In his report, Dr. Snider noted that at the time Russell was laid

off in June of 2021, Russell was working full time without restrictions and was

not complaining about any limitations or work-related symptoms pertaining to

her back, knees, neck, hands, and shoulders. While Dr. Snider concluded that

Russell suffered from knee arthritis and may have shoulder tendinitis, he

found no signs that they were symptoms of work-induced cumulative trauma.

Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that “Russell’s neck and bilateral shoulder

conditions [are] partially attributable to her work with IAC.” However, the ALJ

concluded that “Russell’s low back condition is not traceable to a work-related

cumulative trauma,” and instead attributed these conditions to her age. As for

the permanent partial disability (“PPD”) income benefits under KRS 342.730

and KRS 342.732, the ALJ “relie[d] on Dr. Oteham to find Russell retains a

13.6% impairment for her work-related bilateral shoulder and cervical spine

condition.” After explaining how the ALJ calculated this figure, the ALJ briefly

noted that “[b]ased upon the testimony of Dr. Oteham, the ALJ finds Russell

lacks the physical capacity to return to her pre-injury work at IAC, and she is

3
entitled to the 3.2 multiplier contained in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 [sic].” 2 The ALJ

awarded $186.12 per week in PPD.

IAC filed a petition for reconsideration, arguing that the record did not

support the ALJ’s award of the three-multiplier. KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 states, “If,

due to an injury, an employee does not retain the physical capacity to return to

the type of work that the employee performed at the time of injury, the benefit

for permanent partial disability shall be multiplied by three (3) times the

amount otherwise determined . . . .” IAC argued that the ALJ’s finding that

Russell is eligible under that statute was contradicted by Russell’s testimony

that when she was laid off by IAC, she was working without restrictions and

had no plans of quitting. IAC requested additional findings from the ALJ,

including a finding “reconciling how Plaintiff worked without restrictions until

she was laid off, at which point she had no plans of quitting, but is now

incapable of returning to that job.” IAC also requested the ALJ to clarify those

conditions found to be work-related. The ALJ’s order in response clarified that

“only Russell’s bilateral shoulder and cervical conditions are found to be

compensable” but overruled the remainder of the Defendant’s petition seeking

additional findings and explanation of the basis for the award.

IAC then appealed to the Board, raising two issues: (1) that the ALJ’s

determination that Russell’s neck and shoulder conditions were work-related

2 The Board explained in its Opinion that, “We note the three-multiplier is

contained in [KRS] 342.730(1)(c)1, not (1)(c)2 as stated by the ALJ; however, as we are
remanding this claim on other grounds, the ALJ may correct any clerical error on
remand.”

4
was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the ALJ abused his

discretion by awarding the three-multiplier because the record contained no

evidence that Russell was unable to perform her prior job at IAC or was now

under any work restrictions.

The Board issued an Opinion Affirming in Part, Vacating in Part, and

Remanding. The Board affirmed the ALJ on the issue of work-relatedness of

the neck and shoulder injuries but vacated the award of the three-multiplier

and remanded to the ALJ for further findings. The Board explained,

The ALJ is required to recite the specific evidence he relied
upon in finding the three-multiplier applicable. A general statement
of reliance upon a particular doctor is insufficient, as more detail is
required. In his report, Dr. Oteham opined Russell could “continue
to perform her work duties in the full-time setting she is currently
employed in.” Russell was working in a clerical data entry position
for a new employer at the time of Dr. Oteham’s examination. Dr.
Oteham did not mention any specific physical restrictions or
whether she could perform her pre-injury work.
The ALJ was charged with analyzing the actual tasks the
employee performed prior to the injury and then assessing the
limitations and restrictions on her physical activities resulting from
the work-related injury. Voith Industrial Services, Inc. v. Gray, 516
S.W.3d 817 (Ky. App. 2017). Miller v. Square D. Co., 254 S.W.3d
810, 813–14 (Ky. 2008) stands for the proposition that a worker who
can no longer perform all his required job tasks lacks the ability to
return to the “type of work performed at the time of injury.”
Additionally, in Ford Motor Co. v. Forman, 142 S.W.3d 141 (Ky.
2004), the Supreme Court held that the type of work performed at
time of injury refers to the actual jobs the individual performed.
Finally, the evidence is reviewed as of the time of the hearing to
determine whether a claimant could perform his pre-injury work.
See Apple Valley Sanitation Inc. v. Stambaugh, 645 S.W.3d 434, 438–
39 (Ky. 2022).
A worker’s testimony is competent evidence of his or her
physical condition and of their ability to perform various activities
both before and after being injured. Hush v. Abrams, 584 S.W.2d
48 (Ky. 1979). The ALJ may but is not compelled to rely upon the
claimant’s self-assessment of their ability to perform their prior

5
work. Ira A. Watson Department Store v. Hamilton, [34 S.W.3d 48
(Ky. 2000)].
The Board is not directing a particular result. The ALJ must
simply and adequately detail the evidence relied upon in reaching
his decision. Kentland Elkhorn Coal Corporation v. Yates, 743
S.W.2d 47 (Ky. App. 1988). A party is entitled to know with some
specificity the reasons for the award, although certainly the ALJ is
not required to engage in a detailed discussion or set forth in minute
detail the reasons for reaching a particular result. Big Sandy
Community Action Program v. Chaffins, 502 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. App.
1973).
We affirm the finding Russell sustained injuries to her neck
and shoulders caused by work-related cumulative trauma; however,
we must vacate the award of PPD benefits enhanced by the three-
multiplier contained in KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 and remand for
additional findings consistent with this Opinion.

Russell appealed the Board’s Opinion Affirming in Part, Vacating in Part, and

Remanding to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Board’s determination to

vacate in part and remand was based upon a misunderstanding of the

evidence. The Court of Appeals perceived no such error and agreed with the

Board’s analysis. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Board. This

appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[A]ppellate courts may review the Board's decision to remand to the ALJ

for error, taking into consideration, however, the Board's wide discretion to do

so.” Tryon Trucking, Inc. v. Medlin, 586 S.W.3d 233, 238 (Ky. 2019). “[T]he

Board should have wide latitude and deference in whether to remand a

particular issue to the ALJ for additional findings and analysis . . . .” Id. “If

the ALJ has made all necessary findings to resolve the issue at hand and the

Board has erred in remanding for additional, unneeded findings that would be

6
of no additional value in resolving the issues in the case, if for no other reason

than judicial economy alone, that decision, just as any other, is subject to

review and reversal by the appellate courts.” Id. “[W]e assess the Board's

decision to remand based upon whether it has ‘overlooked or misconstrued

controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the

evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.’” Id. (quoting W. Baptist Hosp.

v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687–88 (Ky. 1992)).

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal to this Court, Russell argues that the Court of Appeals erred

in affirming the decisions of the Board. She likewise alleges that the Board

erred as a matter of law in vacating in part and remanding the ALJ’s decision

by substituting its judgment for that of the ALJ. Specifically, Russell claims

the Board erred in vacating the award of PPD benefits enhanced by the three-

multiplier and remanding to the ALJ for additional findings. Citing Whittaker

v. Rowland, 998 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1999), Russell argues that “[t]he Board, as an

appellate tribunal, may not usurp the ALJ’s role as fact-finder by

superimposing its own appraisals as to the weight and credibility to be afforded

the evidence or by noting reasonable inferences that otherwise could have been

drawn from the record.”

KRS 342.230(2) defines the duties of a Workers’ Compensation

administrative law judge as follows:

[A]dministrative law judges shall conduct hearings, and otherwise
supervise the presentation of evidence and perform any other duties
assigned to them by statute and shall render final decisions, orders,

7
or awards. Administrative law judges may, in receiving evidence,
make rulings affecting the competency, relevancy, and materiality of
the evidence about to be presented and upon motions presented
during the taking of evidence as will expedite the preparation of the
case.

“The ALJ, as the finder of fact, . . . has the sole authority to determine the

quality, character, and substance of the evidence.” Square D Co. v. Tipton, 862

S.W.2d 308, 309 (Ky. 1993). “Where . . . the . . . evidence is conflicting, the

question of which evidence to believe is the exclusive province of the ALJ.” Id.

“When one of two reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence, the

finders of fact may choose.” Jackson v. Gen. Refractories Co., 581 S.W.2d 10,

11 (Ky. 1979) (citing Blair Fork Coal Co. v. Blankenship, 416 S.W.2d 716, 718

(Ky. 1967)).

Although the ALJ is tasked with fact-finding, its findings are not review-

proof. KRS 342.285 grants the Board the authority to review the ALJ’s order or

award on appeal:

(1) An award or order of the administrative law judge as provided
in KRS 342.275, if petition for reconsideration is not filed as
provided for in KRS 342.281, shall be conclusive and binding as
to all questions of fact, but either party may in accordance with
administrative regulations promulgated by the commissioner appeal
to the Workers' Compensation Board for the review of the order or
award.
(2) No new or additional evidence may be introduced before the
board except as to the fraud or misconduct of some person engaged
in the administration of this chapter and affecting the order, ruling,
or award, but the board shall otherwise hear the appeal upon the
record as certified by the administrative law judge and shall dispose
of the appeal in summary manner. The board shall not substitute
its judgment for that of the administrative law judge as to the
weight of evidence on questions of fact, its review being limited
to determining whether or not:
(a) The administrative law judge acted without or in excess of
his powers;
8
(b) The order, decision, or award was procured by fraud;
(c) The order, decision, or award is not in conformity to the
provisions of this chapter;
(d) The order, decision, or award is clearly erroneous on
the basis of the reliable, probative, and material evidence
contained in the whole record; or
(e) The order, decision, or award is arbitrary or capricious
or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.

(emphasis added). The emphasized portions together indicate that when a

petition for reconsideration of the ALJ’s order or award is filed, the Board may

review that order or award to determine whether the material evidence in the

whole record renders it clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or clearly unwarranted. Because IAC filed a petition for

reconsideration, the Board was entitled to review the ALJ’s award of PPD

benefits enhanced by the three-multiplier for clear error, arbitrariness,

capriciousness, abuse of discretion, and to determine whether the award was

clearly unwarranted.

KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 requires that, before a claimant be awarded the

three-multiplier, he or she must be physically incapable of returning to the

type of work that the employee performed at the time of the injury. Here, the

ALJ found that, “[b]ased upon the testimony of Dr. Oteham, the ALJ finds

Russell lacks the physical capacity to return to her pre-injury work at IAC, and

she is entitled to the 3.2 multiplier contained in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2.” See fn.

1. As the Board pointed out in its Opinion Vacating in Part, the flaw with the

ALJ’s analysis is that

[i]n his report, Dr. Oteham opined Russell could “continue to
perform her work duties in the full-time setting she is currently
9
employed in.” Russell was working in a clerical data entry position
for a new employer at the time of Dr. Oteham’s examination. Dr.
Oteham did not mention any specific physical restrictions or
whether she could perform her pre-injury work.

Without more, it is difficult to follow the logical leap the ALJ made from Dr.

Oteham’s opinion that Russell is able to continue performing her current

clerical position to the ALJ’s conclusion that Russell cannot perform her prior

tasks at IAC. While it is true that the ALJ is the sole fact-finder in proceedings

in workers’ compensation claims, and the Board may not substitute its own

assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence in the record for that of

the ALJ’s, the ALJ must still have a reasonable basis for its factual

conclusions. As it stands, without greater support from the record, the ALJ’s

findings here suffer from a dearth of evidence and are therefore clearly

erroneous, and the award of the three-multiplier was an abuse of discretion.

Because of this, we cannot find that it was error for the Board to remand to the

ALJ with instructions to “simply and adequately detail the evidence relied upon

in reaching his decision.”

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming

the Workers’ Compensation Board’s Opinion vacating the administrative law

judge’s award of the three-multiplier and remanding for additional findings.

All sitting. Bisig, Conley, Goodwine, and Nickell, JJ., concur. Thompson,

J., concurs in result only. Lambert, C.J., dissents.

10
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, KENDRA RUSSELL:

McKinnley Morgan
Morgan, Collins, Yeast & Salyer

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE
COMPONENTS:

Donnie J. Niehaus
Walton Niehaus Law, PLLC

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:

Hon. Phillipe Rich

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD:

Michael Wayne Alvey, Chairman

11