Woolfson v Woolfson & Ors - High Court Chancery Division Case

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  Woolfson   v Woolfson & Ors [2026] EWHC 613 (Ch) (20 March 2026)

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[2026] EWHC 613 (Ch) | | |
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| | | Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 613 (Ch) |
| | | Case No: PT-2025-000633 |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
PROPERTY, TRUSTS and PROBATE LIST

| | | Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL |
| | | 20/03/2026 |
B e f o r e :

MASTER MCQUAIL

Between:
| | KAREN WOOLFSON | Claimant |
| | - and - | |
| | (1) ADRIAN WOOLFSON
(2) DAVID SAMUEL WOOLFSON
(3) GERALD WOOLFSON
(4) LYNNE WOOLFSON
(5) JOHN RAYMOND GAVIN
(6) JOSEPH MICHAEL CHARLAFF
(7) ALEXANDER FLOREY WOOLFSON
(8) BENJAMIN BROOK | Defendants |

**The Claimant in person
Mr Jordan Holland (instructed by Kingsley Napley LLP) for the First Defendant
Ms Emilia Carslaw (instructed by Winckworth Sherwood LLP) for the Third, Fourth and Seventh Defendants
Ms Helen Galley (instructed by Brook Martin & Co) for the Eighth Defendant
The Second and Fifth Defendants in person
The Sixth Defendant remotely in person

Hearing date: 26 January 2026**

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT ____________________

Crown Copyright ©

3. This judgment was handed down remotely at 02:00 pm on 20 March 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
5. .............................
7. :
8. The claimant, Karen Woolfson (Ms Woolfson), issued these proceedings on 22 June 2025; she has acted in person since shortly before issue. The Claim Form is verified by a CPR compliant statement of truth. It was accompanied by Particulars of Claim dated 10 June 2025; Ms Woolfson has not verified the Particulars of Claim by a statement of truth. I will refer to the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim together as the Claim Documents. Ms Woolfson's claims appear to concern the testamentary dispositions of her mother, Sheila Banks (Ms Banks), who died on 19 January 2024 as well as assets owned or formerly owned by her parents and/or maternal grandparents in which Ms Woolfson asserts an interest.
11. The proximate cause of the proceedings was a summons issued in the Leeds District Probate Registry by Ms Woolfson's brother, Adrian Woolfson (Adrian), seeking the removal of the caveat Ms Woolfson had entered in Ms Banks's estate and seeking an order that unless Ms Woolfson issue and serve proceedings concerning the validity of the Will of Ms Banks dated 11 June 2018 (the Second June 2018 Will) within a limited period then Ms Woolfson's caveat in the estate of Ms Banks be discontinued. Ms Woolfson issued her proceedings before the summons was determined.
14. The claimant joined to the claim as defendants:
16. (i) Adrian;
17. (ii) her brother, David Woolfson (David);
18. (iii) her father, Gerald Woolfson (Gerald);
19. (iv) her step-mother, Lynne Woolfson (Lynne);
20. (v) Ms Banks's former partner and friend, John Gavin (Mr Gavin);
21. (vi) Ms Banks's brother, Joseph Charlaff (Mr Charlaff);
22. (vii) Ms Woolfson's half-brother, Alexander Woolfson (Alexander); and
23. (viii) Ms Banks's downstairs neighbour and witness to her apparent last will of 11 June 2008 (the Second June 2018 Will), Benjamin Brook (Mr Brook).
24. I will use the given names of members of the Woolfson family in this judgment for clarity.
26. The brief details of claim endorsed on Ms Woolfson's Claim Form read as follows:
28. "KAREN WOOLFSON, Claimant: Sheila's only daughter, main Beneficiary. disputed 11 June 2018 Last Will leaves fraction only (true entitlement is one third or more of whole estate.incl.residuary= millions). Beneficiary: 8 December 2006 Will (via Certainty), split equally btwn Sheila's three children. Beneficiary/Executor: 1978 Will that links to earlier Wills of Sheila/her parents 1967,1985, 1954. DAVID WOOLFSON: Eldest son. Beneficiary:alleged 11 June 2018 Will and 8 Dec 2006 & 1978 Wills. Executor: 1978 Will and disputed 4th Nov 2016 Will. ADRIAN WOOLFSON, youngest. Executor/Beneficiary: alleged 11 June 2018, 4th Nov 201fi, 8 Dec 2006 Wills (need originals). Beneficiary:1978 Will. Adrian rarely visited Sheila in person last 15-20 yrs. JOSEPH CHARLAFF, beneficiary alleged 11 June 2018 & 4th Nov 2016 Wills/rarely saw Sheila last 10yrs. JOHN GAVIN (Sheila, fling1980s),Executor 8 Dec 2006 Will. GERALD WOOLFSON, Sheila's ex-husband. Required but failed to transfer Karen's inheritance in Sheila's estate: one third or more share of Parliament Hill.Redington Rd.Parsifal Inv on adulthood. Gerald had left Sheila.Years later.he & partner LYNNE, not beneficiaries, seized control of estate improperly. Others drawn in. GROUNDS: Lack of Knowledge and Approval, Lack of Testamentary Capacity, Undue lnfluence, Lack of Legal Compliance, Breach of Trust, Estoppel, Restitution, Fraud and or Forgery. CHALLENGE:11th June 2018 & 4th Nov 2016 both invalid & any others suddenly said by Defendants to exist. Need 8 Dec 2006 Will to check validity. If not valid, then use 1978 Will and earlier.
30. The relief sought in the prayer to the Particulars of Claim dated 10 June 2025, is in the following terms:
32. "1. Declaration the 11 June 2018 and 4 November 2016 Wills are invalid, and any new wills and codicils the Defendants suddenly claim are invalid.
33. 2. Full Disclosure of the 8 December 2006 Will and the earlier family wills and documents listed above.
34. 3. Declaration that Sheila's (the Deceased) three children: Karen, David and Adrian are the three main beneficiaries of the entire Estate, as well as the residuary, and everything else that comes down through Sheila, from Sheila's father Ephraim. That Karen is entitled to receive one third or more, as always intended since a child. For Defendants to account for and rectify, everything they have taken and or control, so Karen receives her full entitlement.
35. 4. Full Disclosure and response to a) the four Larke v Nugus requests: i) Jaffe Porter Crossick ii) Osbornes iii) IM Sheffield iv) Attwells. b) Requests in the 5th November 2024 warning refused. That followed 27th August Sealed Appearance, 14th June 2024 warning and prior letters.
36. 5. Provide signed Authorisation for Claimant to access mother's full medical records.
37. 6. Full Disclosure of Estate Accounts
38. 7. Declaration that earlier intergenerational Wills known about for decades must be taken into account (see listed in this document). In the alternative, intestate entitlement. That should include all properties above, those bought and or sold, and other assets in this estate, inter alia.
39. 8. Specific return of:
40. ii) Second Floor Flat at 56 Parliament Hill and turret above it + Freehold of building.
41. iii) One third of 2024 value of 56 Redington Rd and other properties bought with the proceeds.
42. iv) Box of her Mum's and Gran's jewellery due to Karen, investments, shares, policies, oil paintings, art, rare first edition illustrated books, inter alia, worldwide holdings.
43. 9. Legal costs: Order that non-beneficiaries desist from using funds from the estate for legal costs, under cover of Adrian, and that estate pays the claimant's legal costs. Unfair for Adrian and David to charge legal costs to the estate, and not ensure their sister Karen's legal fees are paid.
44. 10. Further or other relief, including for 45 years of deprivation."
46. There is a further section of the Particulars of Claim which reads:
48. "The Claimant was told since childhood that she would receive one third or more of the entire estate. The Claimant is a main beneficiary, the only daughter of the Deceased, and grand-daughter of late maternal Grandfather and Grandmother. Entitled to and told very clearly and unambiguously she will receive one whole storey and the turret room above it of four-to-five storey 56 Parliament Hill NW3, and Freehold of whole building. Entitled also to one third or more of detached 56 Redington Road, Hampstead NW3, plus what family on the other side has made by investing the proceeds of 56 Redington Road in other properties, such as those listed above. Entitled under earlier Wills and within the intergenerational structure. Daughter also entitled under intestacy. Sealed Appearance was issued 27th August 2024 (accompanied by sixth page, a cover letter)."
50. David initially filed an acknowledgment of service stating that he intended to contest the claim, he later filed a second acknowledgment stating that he did not intend to contest, annexed to it was what appears to be a copy of a will of Ms Banks dated 22 July 1991. Mr Gavin acknowledged service indicating no intention to defend. Mr Charlaff acknowledged service indicating that he intended to defend and attached a brief response to the claim including a statement that he lived abroad and would not be able to afford legal representation in England.
53. Adrian filed a Defence and Counterclaim dated 9 September 2025 seeking:
55. (i) to propound the Second June 2018 Will, alternatively earlier wills made by Ms Banks; and
56. (ii) a declaration that Ms Banks held the entirety of the beneficial interest in three bank accounts and the ground, first and second floor flats at 56 Parliament Hill at the time of her death;
57. he is represented by Kingsley Napley LLP and Mr Jordan Holland.
59. Gerald, Lynne and Alexander filed a Defence dated 29 August 2025; they are represented by Winckworth Sherwood LLP and Ms Emilia Carslaw. They have not acknowledged service as they deny that they have been properly served with the proceedings.
62. Mr Brook filed a Defence dated 16 September 2025; he is represented by Brook Martin & Co and Ms Helen Galley.
65. Ms Woolfson filed and served around 200 pages of documents in response to the acknowledgments of service and Defences of the defendants at various dates between mid-August and late September 2025 (the Response Documents). None of those documents is verified by a statement of truth in the form required by the CPR.
68. Adrian's witness statement of testamentary evidence dated 12 August 2025 describes testamentary documents known to him (the Known Testamentary Documents) and exhibits those of which an original or copy exists. A summary schedule of the executed wills and codicils is annexed to his Defence and Counterclaim. The earliest of the Known Testamentary Documents is a will dated 8 December 2006 drafted and witnessed by a solicitor. There follow nine wills drafted and witnessed by solicitors and three codicils drafted and witnessed by solicitors and two handmade codicils (the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents) of which the last is the Second June 2018 Will.
71. On 29 September 2025 Ms Woolfson issued an application (Ms Woolfson's Application) seeking:
73. (i) "strike out all disputed wills that the defendants have produced";
74. (ii) "order 8 December 2006 will only permitted ? original must be provided for validity checking";
75. (iii) "order disclosure of all earlier intergenerational wills requested by claimant":
76. (iv) "strike out all defences/counterclaims"; and
77. (v) "order ADR".
78. Ms Woolfson's Application was accompanied by various supporting documents apparently prepared by Ms Woolfson, but, apart from the Form N244 itself, no document verified by a CPR compliant statement of truth. In mid-October Ms Woolfson CE-filed a number of documents which were said to be supplemental to Ms Woolfson's application. These documents appeared in the correspondence section of the bundle as enclosures to a letter from Ms Woolfson to Adrian's solicitors.
80. On 8 October 2025 Adrian issued an application (Adrian's Application) seeking:
82. (i) strike out of the claim form particulars of claim and supporting documents pursuant to CPR 3.4(2);
83. (ii) summary judgment on his claim; and
84. (iii) summary judgment on his counterclaim.
86. On 13 November 2025 Gerald, Lynne and Alexander issued an application (Gerald, Lynne and Alexander's Application) seeking (subject to the outcome of Adrian's application):
88. (i) strike out pursuant to CPR 3.4 of the claimant's statements of case so far as they seek relief against Gerald, Lynne and Alexander; and/or
89. (ii) removal of Gerald, Lynne and Alexander as parties to the proceedings.
91. On 28 October 2025 Mr Brook issued an application (Mr Brook's Application) seeking strike out or summary dismissal of the claim against him pursuant to CPR 3.4(2).
94. The witness evidence in the hearing bundle in support of the defendants' three applications is as follows:
96. (i) Adrian's second witness statement dated 7 October 2025;
97. (ii) a witness statement of Katherine Emma Pymont of Kingsley Napley dated 8 October 2025;
98. (iii) an affidavit of due execution of the Second June 2028 Will of Mr Brook dated 2 October 2025;
99. (iv) an affidavit of due execution of the First June 2018 Will of Sophie Evans of Irwin Mitchell dated 9 October 2025;
100. (v) a witness statement of Philip Anthony Collins of Winckworth Sherwood dated 13 November 2025;
101. (vi) a witness statement of Alexander dated 13 November 2025;
102. (vii) an affidavit of due execution of Jhoanna Libres of the First and Second June 2018 Wills dated 14 January 2026; and
103. (viii) a witness statement of Jhoanna Libres dated 14 January 2026.
105. Ms Woolfson has made a large number of informal applications and requests to the Court via CEfile during the currency of these proceedings. On 16 December 2025 the parties were sent my email direction confirming that Ms Woolfson's Application, Adrian's Application, Gerald, Lynne and Alexander's Application and Mr Brook's Application were all listed to be heard on 26 January 2026. On 19 December the parties were sent my further direction which made clear that Kingsley Napley was to be responsible for preparing the hearing bundle and that that firm was to provide a hard copy for the use of Ms Woolfson and if there were any difficulty sending it to Ms Woolfson's PO Box address (the only address she has given for service) either Ms Woolfson must give a functional address for service of the bundle or she must collect the bundle from Kingsley Napley. In that direction I also made clear that a further application issued by Ms Woolfson on 2 December 2025 would only be listed, if at all, after the four applications listed to be heard on 26 January had been disposed of.
108. Over the weekend immediately before the hearing Ms Woolfson filed (but did not serve on the other parties) a series of pdf bundles. The only material not in the hearing bundles and to which Ms Woolfson made reference to at the hearing (and which was supplied to the other parties) was a 36 page bundle comprising copy extracts of family wills and trusts and related documents dating from the 1950s to 1980s together with Ms Woolfson's commentary.
111. At the outset of the hearing on 26 January 2026 Ms Woolfson made an application to adjourn the hearing, in part because she said she had not had access to the hearing bundles. For the reasons I gave in a short judgment I refused that application, not least because Ms Woolfson had been sent the bundles electronically and had been offered the opportunity to collect the bundles from Kingsley Napley in good time before the hearing. Ms Woolfson had also been afforded an opportunity in November 2025 to see copies of Ms Banks's medical records which in due course comprised Bundle D of the hearing bundle, but chose not to do so. Almost all of the rest of the content of the hearing bundles was material that had been sent to Ms Woolfson during the currency of the proceedings or which she had sent to other parties.
114. Family History
115. Ms Banks was born in South Africa in 1932. Ms Banks and Gerald married in 1954 in Cape Town, but by about 1960 had moved permanently to London. There are three children of the marriage: Ms Woolfson, David and Adrian. Gerald and Ms Banks separated in 1976 and divorced in 1981 and reached a full and final agreement to separate their financial affairs. In the same year Gerald married Lynne with whom he had had a child, Alexander, in 1978.
118. Before they separated, Gerald and Ms Banks' matrimonial home was in Redington Road NW3. Gerald and Ms Banks held other properties including a house at 56 Parliament Hill NW3 through Parsifal Investments Limited. As part of the separation of their financial affairs Gerald retained the Redington Road property while the Parliament Hill property was transferred to Ms Banks by the liquidator of Parsifal Investments Limited, which was subsequently dissolved. At some stage the Parliament Hill property had been divided into four leasehold flats. Ms Banks owned the freehold and the upper three flats and lived in the ground floor flat until her death. A long lease of the basement flat was owned by Mr Brook's parents and is now owned by Mr Brook and his partner.
121. Ms Woolfson's brother, Mr Charlaff, now lives in Israel. At some stage Ms Banks was in a relationship with Mr Gavin; they remained friends at the time of her death.
124. The content of the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents as well as other material contained within the Known Testamentary Documents indicates that Ms Banks was estranged from Ms Woolfson from around 2009 as Ms Woolfson received no benefit under any of them save for a legacy of ?100,000 in the First and Second June 2018 Wills. David received no benefit save a legacy of ?100,000 in the June 2018 Wills in any testamentary documents later than the codicil dated 31 October 2013.
127. The evidence of Adrian and Alexander details hostile behaviour by Ms Woolfson towards, in particular Adrian, Gerald and Lynne over a prolonged period.
130. The Claims in Summary
131. By her claim Ms Woolfson appears to challenge any will or will and codicil combination later than the December 2006 Will. So far as concerns the December 2006 Will Ms Woolfson's position appears to be that she requires to be satisfied that it is genuine.
134. To achieve any benefit from the probate element of her claim Ms Woolfson must fatally undermine all the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents, so that Adrian and Mr Gavin as the appointed executors would be entitled to take a grant of probate of the December 2006 Will and Ms Woolfson would be entitled to a one-third share of Ms Banks's residuary estate. David would only benefit from Ms Banks's estate if wills and codicils going back to October 2013 are fatally undermined.
137. By the Claim Documents Ms Woolfson seeks other relief which is, as to both its nature and basis, confused but seems to assert that certain, not clearly identified, property or assets should form part of Ms Banks's estate or should have been passed or should now pass to Ms Woolfson but do not do so because of:
139. (i) the manner in which Ms Banks and Gerald divorced and separated their financial affairs; or
140. (ii) some misapplication of trust or estate property.
142. So far as this other relief is concerned Ms Woolfson would only have locus to pursue it if she were to:
144. (i) obtain a grant of representation to Ms Banks's estate, which would necessarily require her either to establish that Ms Banks's true last will was one that appointed Ms Woolfson as executor or that Ms Banks died intestate; or
145. (ii) establish she was the beneficiary of a trust or an estate with a right to recover trust or estate property in the possession of one of the defendants or had a personal claim against one of the defendants as a trustee or personal representative.
147. The Second June 2018 Will was executed by Ms Banks in the presence of Mr Brook and Jhoanna Libres, who was employed as Ms Banks's carer, neither of whom has any interest in Ms Woolfson's estate on any basis. Each has sworn an affidavit of due execution. Mr Brook's affidavit exhibits a series of photos taken by him (which when viewed together are similar to a short video) recording the execution by Ms Banks and its witnessing by Jhoanna Libres.
150. The Second June 2018 Will is in identical terms to the will executed by Ms Banks on 6 June 2018 (the First June 2018 Will). The First June 2018 Will was drafted by Sophie Evans (formerly Smith) (Ms Evans) a private client solicitor at Irwin Mitchell LLP following instructions received from Ms Banks in a number of telephone calls, email exchanges and a meeting at Ms Banks's home. Ms Evans was one of the two attesting witnesses to the First June 2018 Will and has provided an affidavit of due execution. Jhoanna Libres was the other attesting witness and her affidavit of due execution covers this first occasion of execution in June 2018 also.
153. The terms of the June 2018 Wills may be summarised as follows:
155. (i) Adrian is appointed as executor and trustee;
156. (ii) there are pecuniary legacies:
157. > (a) totalling ?10,000 to charities;
158. > (b) of ?100,000 to each of Karen, David and Mr Charlaff;
159. > (c) of ?25,000 to each of David's son and Ms Woolfson's son;
160. > (d) of ?10,000 to Mr Gavin; and
161. (iii) the residuary estate is held for Adrian absolutely.
163. By his counterclaim, Adrian seeks to propound the Second June 2018 Will alternatively the First June 2018 or the November 2017 Will or the November 2016 Will or the September 2013 Will together with the October 2013 Codicil and October 2015 Codicil. All of these documents, bar the last, were professionally drafted by private client solicitors and appoint Adrian as sole executor and residuary beneficiary.
166. Law
167. Strike Out
168. CPR 3.4(2) provides that the court may strike out a statement of case (or part) if it appears to the court that:
170. (i) the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim (CPR 3.4(2)(a));
171. (ii) the statement of case is an abuse of the court's process or otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings (CPR 3.4(2)(b)); or
172. (iii) there has been a failure to comply with a Rule, Practice Direction or court order (CPR 3.4(2)(c)).
174. Paragraph 1.2 of PD 3A gives examples of cases where the court may conclude that particulars of claim should be struck out pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a). These include:
176. (i) those which set out no facts indicating what the claim is about;
177. (ii) those which are incoherent and make no sense; and
178. (ii) those which contain coherent facts but these facts, even if true, disclose no legally recognisable claim against the defendant.
180. For the purposes of CPR 3.4(2)(a) an applicant is usually bound to accept the accuracy of the facts pleaded unless they are contradictory, obviously wrong or "factually hopeless": see 3.4.2 of the White Book commentary.
183. If the court considers a statement of case is amenable to strike out it should consider whether to refrain from that draconian step and instead give an opportunity to amend: see Sim Kim v Youg [2011] EWHC 1781 (QB).
186. So far as concerns CPR 3.4(2)(b), there is no definition of "abuse of the court's process" in the CPR. In a different context in Attorney General v Barker [2001] 1 FLR 759 at [19] the term was defined as "a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process". That includes vexatious proceedings which would allow the court process to be used as a means of achieving injustice, see 3.4.4 of the White Book commentary.
189. Summary Judgment
190. CPR 24.3 provides that the court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of the claim or a particular issue if:
192. (i) it considers that the party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, defence or issue in question; and
193. (ii) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at trial.
195. The principles to be applied on applications for summary judgment are well established. They were set out by Lewison J in Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) at 15. I do not need to set those principles out here.
198. The test in determining a summary judgment application is not whether the respondent's pleaded case has a real prospect of succeeding, but whether they have no real prospect of succeeding on their claim. If a respondent produces evidence which leads the court to the conclusion that if the relevant statement of case were amended there would be a case with a real prospect of success a court may decline to grant summary judgment (and grant the respondent permission to amend): see Bhamani v Sattar [2021] EWCA Civ 243 at [62].
201. The burden is on an applicant to show that the criteria at CPR 24.3 are met. There is overlap between the court's powers under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and its powers to give summary judgment and in appropriate cases the court may treat an application for strike out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) as though it were an application for summary judgment: see 3.4.2 of the White Book commentary. In Lattimer v Karamanoli [2023] EWHC 1524 (Ch) at [39], a case which included a probate claim seeking to establish an intestacy, Master Clark considered that the practical upshot was that the court must determine whether the respondent to the strike out/summary judgment application has:
203. (i) a pleaded any case with a real prospect of success; or
204. (ii) adduced evidence disclosing such a case or a compelling reason why the case should go to trial.
206. Ms Woolfson's submissions
207. The first matter that Ms Woolfson addressed in her oral submissions was the June 2018 Wills. She said no will had ever been made in June 2018 and supported that by explaining that she had made enquiries which had not led to her locating any 2018 Will; her search with Certainty (The National Wills Register) had led her only to discovering the December 2006 Will. She said that her enquiries of Irwin Mitchell in Sheffield did not reveal that Ms Banks had been a client of that firm. So far as she had established the position the alleged Second June 2018 Will had been deposited with Osbornes solicitors (based near to Ms Banks's home) in 2019 and Adrian had picked it up from that firm after Ms Banks's death.
210. Ms Woolfson complained that Adrian and his lawyers had not sent her the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents in an orderly fashion all at once. One example of this, mentioned in the Claim Documents, was being sent the November 2016 Will on Christmas Eve 2024, it never having been mentioned to her before. Ms Woolfson goes on in the Claim Documents to allege that that will was fabricated in order to persuade Ms Woolfson to accept the validity of the Second June 2018 Will under which she received some benefit. The Claim Documents include the further allegation that in March 2025 "2015, 2013, 2012 and 2010" wills and codicils were "new" and used to intimidate or coerce her. There is a further allegation that a further copy will was produced which the defendants then altered by adding a page.
213. A further suggestion was made by Ms Woolfson that it should be inferred from the number of testamentary documents that Ms Banks had prepared that she had dementia. Ms Woolfson referred to Ms Banks's interaction with a mental health/dementia specialist in April 2018 in support of her assertion that Ms Banks had dementia. She referred also to an incident when Ms Banks had called the police to her home and then had forgotten why she had called them.
216. Ms Woolfson referred to Ms Banks's long-standing depressive episodes which she said dated back to at least the time of her own mother's death and suggested that she had lost cognitive ability long before 2018. She suggested that there was some connection between Ms Banks's loss of cognitive ability and a dispute with Mr Brook about alterations to the bay window at his flat which resulted in court or tribunal proceedings.
219. Ms Woolfson made submissions about undue influence which she said had been exercised mainly by Adrian, Gerald and Lynne and that Mr Brook being a witness to the Second June 20018 Will was evidence of that influence. The only specific matters Ms Woolfson referred to were the fact that Adrian had a Lasting Power of Attorney for Ms Banks and had somehow been involved in her will making, including in causing Ms Banks to instruct Irwin Mitchell.
222. So far as the "intergenerational" claims were concerned, Ms Woolfson's starting point was that her maternal grandfather, Ephraim Charlaff (Ephraim), who had emigrated as a youth from Eastern Europe to South Africa, had built up a successful and profitable printing/publishing enterprise such that he would have had considerable wealth at his death.
225. The relevant documents in Ms Woolfson's bundle produced at the hearing and to which she made reference were:
227. (i) an antenuptial contract dated 17 December 1954 apparently made between Ms Banks and Gerald in South Africa;
228. (ii) part of a letter from Ms Banks to Ms Woolfson dated 31 May 1980 referring to Ms Banks's concerns about the financial dispute she was then engaged in with Gerald;
229. (iii) extracts from a 1965 South African trust deed by which Ephraim appears to have settled unidentified property upon incompletely evidenced trusts which may have benefitted Ms Banks and possibly her children;
230. (iv) Ephraim's last will dated 30 March 1967;
231. (v) "Acceptance of trust as executor" of Ephraim's estate by Ephraim's widow, Rachel, Ms Banks, Mr Charlaff and two others dated 6 September 1967 and Letters of Administration of Ephraim's estate granted to the same individuals on 28 August 1967 both being South African documents;
232. (vi) a schedule showing Ms Banks's address at Redington Road in 1967;
233. (vii) Rachel's South African will dated 3 April 1985 and an "amended estate duty addendum" concerning Rachel's estate showing a division of assets between Mr Charlaff, David, Adrian and Ms Woolfson.
235. In addition Ms Woolfson placed reliance in her submissions on a claimed payment of the sum of ?10,000 by Ephraim to Ms Banks in order, Ms Woolfson said, to fund the purchase of the Redington Road property. She said she was told by Ephraim, when she was aged 6, that that property would be held on trust for her after a lifetime interest for Ms Banks. In addition Ms Woolfson claimed that the Parliament Hill property's four flats were intended to pass to Ms Banks and one each to Adrian, David and Ms Woolfson. Ms Woolfson also claimed that she and David had been shareholders in Parsifal. Ms Woolfson's claim seemed to be that the financial settlement on her parents' divorce in 1981 could not be valid because of these prior arrangements and the South African pre-nuptial settlement.
238. In addition Ms Woolfson suggested that there was some irregularity in the employment of Ms Libres as Ms Banks's carer and that she wanted to investigate this point further. She also said that she wanted to identify the name of Ms Banks's consultant at the Royal Free Hospital and obtain from that person further evidence about Ms Banks.
241. Ms Woolfson also suggested that the June 2018 Wills should have borne the logo of Irwin Mitchell's predecessor firm Thomas Eggar, rather than that of Irwin Mitchell. Ms Woolfson also pointed out that Mr Brook mis-stated his postcode when completing his details after his signature to the Second June 2018 Will.
244. Mr Holland's Submissions on behalf of Adrian
245. Mr Holland submitted:
247. (i) the claims advanced by Ms Woolfson have no basis in either fact or law and could not be cured by a professionally drafted amended pleading;
248. (ii) the Claim and Response Documents are littered with serious accusations against the defendants and others (including legal professionals) which are contradicted by contemporaneous documentation. Ms Woolfson has no compunction in making statements which she cannot reasonably believe to be true;
249. (iii) the claim should be viewed in the context of an extensive campaign of harassment against Ms Woolfson's family and her extreme and volatile behaviour towards them over many years as both Adrian and Alexander explain in their evidence.
251. Strike Out or Reverse Summary Judgment on the Claim
252. Mr Holland said that while Ms Woolfson's intention may be to challenge the validity of all of the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents and possibly the December 2006 Will she has failed to give any particulars at all of her grounds save in relation to the Second June 2018 Will and the November 2016 Will and that is enough to make Ms Woolfson's probate claim amenable to strike out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) because Ms Woolfson by her pleaded case cannot achieve a greater interest in Ms Banks's estate than under the First June 2018 Will.
255. Mr Holland went on to submit that the grounds of challenge asserted by Ms Woolfson could not be advanced by any amended pleading to undermine the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents.
258. Want of Knowledge and Approval
259. There is a very strong presumption that if a will has been properly executed after being prepared by a solicitor and read over to the testatrix that she knew and approved of its contents: see Gill v Woodall at [2011] Ch 380 at [14]. As Deputy Master Lampert pointed out in Gohil v Gohil [2024] EWHC 213 (Ch) at [78] in the context of a strike out/summary judgment application in a probate case, that presumption is reinforced by policy considerations that support the fundamental principle of testamentary freedom and the evidential difficulties in the probate context because the testatrix cannot give evidence.
262. Mr Holland submitted that none of the matters described by Ms Woolfson in her Particulars of Claim as "Irregularities" in relation to the Second June 2018 Will or "Serious Irregularities" in relation to the November 2016 Will or elsewhere within the Claim Documents or Response Document could be sufficient to rebut that presumption even if there was a real prospect of proving those matters, which there is not. So far as concerns the Second June 2018 Will:
264. (i) the Second June 2018 Will is in identical terms to the First June 2018 Will which had been executed by Ms Banks only days earlier. The photos taken by Mr Brook show Ms Banks to be fully alert and engaged at the time that she executed the Second June 2018 Will;
265. (ii) the First June 2018 Will was drafted by Ms Evans after having taken instructions from Ms Banks by telephone on at least six occasions and in extensive and lucid email correspondence starting in mid-May 2018. The First June 2018 Will was executed by Ms Banks at her home with Ms Evans acting as one of the attesting witnesses. The documents on Irwin Mitchell's will file make plain that the First June 2018 Will was in accordance with the detailed instructions given by Ms Banks (and the only matter which the content of the file shows caused Ms Banks uncertainty was the size of Mr Charlaff's legacy and what should happen if he were to predecease Ms Banks);
266. (iii) the Second June 2018 Will accords with Ms Banks's pattern of will making demonstrated by the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents which made no provision for Ms Woolfson (other than the ?100,000 legacies included in the June 2018 Wills) and which had provided that Adrian would be sole residuary beneficiary since the execution of the October 2013 Codicil.
268. Ms Woolfson's express pleading of want of knowledge and approval in relation to the November 2016 Will and any possible inference that it could apply to the remaining 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents is also hopeless:
270. (i) the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents (save only the October 2015 Codicil, and the May and June 2015 Codicils, which did not concern provision or lack of it for Ms Woolfson) were professionally drafted by private client solicitors;
271. (ii) each of the November 2016 Will, the September 2013 Will, the October 2013 Codicil, the First and Second August 2012 Wills, the August 2010 Will and the December 2009 Will were also executed in the presence of the solicitors who had drafted them;
272. (iii) all 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents are consistent with a settled intention not to make any provision for Ms Woolfson and all of those from the time of the October 2013 Codicil are consistent with a settled intention for Adrian to be her only residuary beneficiary.
274. Lack of Testamentary Capacity
275. The test for testamentary capacity is set out in Banks v Goodfellow (1869-70) LR 5 QB 549. In order for Ms Banks to have testamentary capacity she must not have been suffering from a disorder of the mind which perverted her sense of right or prevented the exercise of her natural faculties (including any delusions which caused her to make provision she would not otherwise have made) and have been able to:
277. (i) understand the nature of her will and its effects;
278. (ii) understand the extent of her estate; and
279. (iii) understand the claims to which she ought to give effect
281. Ms Woolfson does not engage with the legal test for testamentary capacity in the Claim Documents or the Response Documents. The only averment that might support a case that Ms Banks lacked testamentary capacity, is one that Ms Banks had dementia and in the Response Document there is made for the first time an allegation that the dementia was the cause of delusional episodes.
284. Mr Holland explained:
286. (i) Adrian has obtained and provided Ms Banks's GP records and records from the Royal Free Hospital covering the period 2006 to December 2018. These records run to some 4324 pages. They contain no reference to Ms Banks suffering from dementia or any other condition or symptom which would have affected her testamentary capacity;
287. (ii) Adrian's solicitors have made very considerable efforts to provide Ms Woolfson with a copy of the medical records (including by emailing her a secure link to access them and affording her an opportunity to collect hard copies from their offices) but have been unable to send a hard copy to the P.O. Box address which she has provided for service given their size and nature.
289. Mr Holland explained that his instructing solicitors have undertaken a comprehensive review of the medical records and compiled a chronological schedule of relevant excerpts:
291. (i) the excerpts comprise references to Ms Banks' mental health or which appear to be capable of being said to affect her cognition or which refer to any of the defendants. Practically no such references would be capable of having any bearing on Ms Banks' testamentary capacity (as they primarily concern Ms Banks's depressive episodes, which are not a type capable of affecting her ability to fulfil the requirements of Banks v Goodfellow). The medical records show that Ms Banks suffered depressive episodes throughout her life, including at the time she made the December 2006 Will;
292. (ii) also included are entries for dates when Ms Banks made each of the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents as well as known dates on which she met with solicitors to give instructions in relation to her testamentary affairs. There is no pattern between her episodic depression and the making of her wills and codicils. Some were made during recorded episodes of depression and others were not;
293. (iii) there is nothing in the medical records to support a case that Ms Banks was suffering from dementia at the time she made any of the Post-2006 Testamentary Documents (let alone dementia of sufficient severity to rob her of testamentary capacity).
295. Mr Holland identified the following particular points:
297. (i) between March 2007 and October 2018 a large number of medical professionals completed forms which required them to record whether Ms Banks had a diagnosis of dementia or should be referred for assessment. No such diagnosis or need for assessment is recorded in the medical history;
298. (ii) the medical records as a whole and the schedule demonstrate Ms Banks's high level of ability to engage with medical professionals and show insight into her own health issues. She also exhibited a tendency to become overly concerned with her symptoms and offer her own diagnosis. For example in April 2018 her GP recorded: "she thinks she has dementia, but I am not convinced as she operates at a high level. She is getting forgetful, but part of that is the confusion of trying to co-ordinate the different medical appointments.";
299. (iii) in the same month a mental health/dementia specialist who assessed Ms Banks as part of a complex care assessment indicated that Ms Banks should not be referred to the memory service as that "may just add another thing for [Ms Banks] to fixate on and have wrong with her;
300. (iv) given what is recorded in April 2018 and Ms Banks's level of engagement with medical professionals it is inconceivable that if she had dementia or dementia-like symptoms in the period in which she made the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents, there would not have been a documented diagnosis of such. The dementia and mental health specialist who saw Ms Banks in April 2018 has recently confirmed in a letter to Adrian that she recalls Ms Banks and that she showed no signs of cognitive decline in April 2018.
302. Mr Holland made three further points regarding testamentary capacity:
304. (i) the majority of the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents were drafted by private client solicitors and most of those were also executed in the presence of the draftsperson. The "golden but tactless rule" discussed in Kenward v Adams [1975] CLY 359 was not followed in relation to any of the Post-2006 Testamentary Documents. It should be inferred that this was because none of those solicitors had any concerns about Ms Banks's testamentary capacity;
305. (ii) insight into Ms Banks's cognitive abilities at the time she made the June 2018 Wills is provided by Irwin Mitchell's file in relation to the First June 2018 Will. The documents show a level of engagement with relevant legal concepts (including the claims to which she ought to give effect) that would be unusual in many testators of any age;
306. (iii) Ms Woolfson makes repeated references in her Claim Documents and Response Documents to the fact that Ms Banks's death certificate records vascular dementia as one of the causes of her death. Adrian, who is an experienced medical doctor, says in his witness statement that to his knowledge, Ms Banks never received a formal diagnosis of dementia. Inclusion as a cause of death on a death certificate is not determinative of whether the deceased person received any such formal diagnosis before death. Ms Banks died over 5 and a half years after the execution of the Second June 2018 Will. The reference to dementia on her death certificate could not even begin to displace the positive evidence of testamentary capacity at the time she made the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents. To the extent that Ms Banks displayed symptoms of dementia prior to her death, the court can be confident from the medical records that these post-dated all the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents and are therefore not indicative of Ms Banks suffering from dementia at the time she executed any of those wills and codicils.
308. Undue Influence
309. The approach to undue influence in the testamentary context was summarised by Lewison J in Re Edwards [2007] EWHC 1119 (Ch) at [47]:
311. (i) unlike in relation to lifetime transactions, undue influence is never presumed in relation to wills and other testamentary dispositions. Whether undue influence occurred is therefore a question of fact;
312. (ii) the burden of proving undue influence rests on the person alleging it. Although the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities a party bears a high burden to discharge in respect of probate undue influence;
313. (iii) in the probate context, undue influence means influence exercised by coercion, such that the testator's will was overborne or the will was brought about by fraud. Coercion is pressure that overpowers the will without convincing the judgment. It is distinguished from persuasion which is legitimate;
314. (iv) the physical and mental strength of the testator are relevant factors in determining how much pressure is necessary to overbear the will. The will of a weak, ill person may be more easily overborne than that of a hale and hearty one. In some circumstances a "drip-feed" approach may overbear the will;
315. (v) there is a separate ground of fraudulent calumny which involves the poisoning of the testator's mind by making dishonest aspersions against a person who would otherwise have been a beneficiary;
316. (vi) the question is not whether a testamentary disposition is fair but whether a testator has acted as a free agent.
318. Mr Holland described the allegations that Ms Woolfson makes against Adrian and the other defendants as "wild". He says that they are serious, contradicted by numerous contemporaneous documents and should never have been made and the court should treat them as lacking any credibility. Even were they made out they would not be sufficient for the court to find that any of the Post-2006 Testamentary Documents are vitiated on the grounds of undue influence (or fraudulent calumny):
320. (i) Ms Woolfson does not even begin to set out the means by which Adrian or anyone else exercised coercion over Ms Banks in relation to one or more of the Post-2006 Testamentary Documents, each of which show a consistent desire to exclude Ms Woolfson over a 12 year period;
321. (ii) in relation to the June 2018 Wills, it is evident from Irwin Mitchell's file that, although Adrian initially introduced Ms Banks to Irwin Mitchell and Ms Evans kept him informed of the steps being taken in relation to Ms Banks's will, no third party was involved in the giving of instructions (communicated by emails evidently sent by Ms Banks herself given the idiosyncrasies and by telephone conversations and confirmed in person at the execution of the First June 2018 Will);
322. (iii) in relation to the remaining Post-2006 Testamentary Documents, these were all (apart from three codicils) drafted by private client solicitors. Adrian was not involved in the instruction and drafting process of any of these documents and Ms Woolfson has not particularised any such involvement.
324. "Lack of Legal Compliance"
325. The Claim Documents do not make clear what Ms Woolfson's complaint of "lack of legal compliance" means. Mr Holland posited the assumption, in light of the Response Documents, that this complaint is intended as an allegation that the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents were not duly executed.
328. Mr Holland submitted that given that all of the 14 Post-2016 Testamentary Documents contain an attestation clause addressing the requirements of due execution set out at s.9 Wills Act 1837 in standard form there is a strong presumption of due execution: see Sherrington v Sherrington [2006] EWCA Civ 1784 (citing Wright v Rogers (1869) LR 1 PD 678) at [40]. The strength of the presumption applies with more or less force depending on the circumstances of the case.
331. Mr Holland submitted that even were the attesting witnesses unavailable, the presumption of due execution in relation to the June 2018 Wills would be very strong indeed and would require the most cogent of evidence to rebut given the presence of the attestation clause and, in the case of the First June 2018 Will, that one of the attesting witnesses was an experienced private client solicitor who had drafted the will. He submitted on the evidence available the court should be satisfied that each of the June 2018 Wills was duly executed:
333. (i) Mr Brook (who has no financial interest) has provided an affidavit of due execution and exhibits a series of photos showing that Ms Banks signed the Second June 2018 Will in Mr Brook's presence and the presence of the other witness and that the other witness signed it in the presence of Ms Banks and Mr Brook and Mr Brook's affidavit confirms that he then duly witnessed the document;
334. (ii) Ms Evans, who is an experienced private client solicitor, has provided an affidavit of due execution in respect of the First June 2018 Will;
335. (iii) the presumption of due execution is strong in respect of the remaining 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents by reason of the attestation clauses and strengthened by the fact that all other than the July 2013 Codicil, the 2015 Codicils and the November 2017 Will were executed in the presence of the private client solicitors who drafted them.
337. Mr Holland submitted that there is nothing in the Claim Documents or Response Documents or any other document that could begin to rebut the presumption of due execution in respect of any of the Post-2006 Testamentary Documents let alone impugn the independent affidavit evidence and the series of live photos showing due execution in respect of the June 2018 Wills. That none of the Post-2006 Testamentary Documents was executed in accordance with s.9 Wills Act 1837 is as improbable as Ms Woolfson's scandalous allegations of fraud and dishonesty against not only all eight defendants but against a wide range of legal professionals.
340. Fraud or Forgery
341. Mr Holland points out that Ms Woolfson's Claim Documents and Response Documents are replete with references to fraud, lying and forgery. He says that the allegations appear to have been made with a complete absence of insight into the seriousness of what is being said in respect of a range of legal professionals, including Adrian's solicitors. To accept the allegations would involve concluding that a long lasting and wide-ranging conspiracy of fraud had been perpetrated against Ms Woolfson by all of the defendants and numerous legal and other professionals instructed by them and by Ms Banks. There is no prospect of her being able to prove these obviously untrue allegations.
344. Mr Holland took a proportionate approach and did not attempt to identify each document which contradicts the wide-ranging allegations of fraud and forgery made by Ms Woolfson. He relied on these particular points:
346. (i) the overwhelming majority of the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents were drafted by solicitors. There are a number of solicitors files available which provide contemporaneous records of Ms Banks's instructions and execution of the Post-2006 Testamentary Documents;
347. (ii) Ms Evans acted as one of the attesting witnesses to the First June 2018 Will and has provided an affidavit of due execution in relation to it. The large majority of the remainder of the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents were witnessed by legal professionals;
348. (iii) Mr Brook has provided an affidavit of due execution and exhibited a series of photos showing the execution of the Second 2018 Will.
350. Breach of Trust, Intergenerational Wills, Estoppel, Restitution, Unjust Enrichment, Other Grounds
351. In both the Claim Documents and the Response Documents Ms Woolfson relies on "Breach of Trust", what she refers to as an "intergenerational will structure", estoppel, restitution, unjust enrichment and "other grounds". Mr Holland submitted that none of these have any prospect of success:
353. (i) in relation to "breach of trust", there is no particularisation at all and no trust is pleaded (let alone established). This aspect of Ms Woolfson's case is clearly in the category of cases identified at 1.2(1) of PD3A which do not set out any facts as to what they are about;
354. (ii) the references to "intergenerational wills" are difficult to understand without any clear definition of that which is being referred to. Ms Woolfson appears to be asserting the existence of some kind of overarching legal structure which restricts the testamentary freedom of Ms Banks and possibly other family members. The claim lacks particularity and has no legal basis and therefore does not disclose a recognisable claim against any of the defendants it is of the category of cases identified at 1.2(2) or 1.2(3) of PD3A;
355. (iii) Ms Woolfson makes no attempt to identify who is estopped, what they are estopped from doing nor how any estoppel arises. Her references to unjust enrichment are of the same type and are in the category of cases identified at 1.2(1) of PD3A which do not set out any facts as to what they are about;
356. (iv) Ms Woolfson's purported claims on "other grounds" are arguably worse than the examples of cases amenable to strike out given in 1.2 of PD3A;
357. (v) insofar as Ms Woolfson relied upon the documents she had recently obtained from South Africa, there must be a real question whether any claims, if appropriately pleaded, would not need to be brought in that jurisdiction.
359. No Other Compelling Reason
360. Mr Holland submitted that CPR 24.3(b) (but not CPR 3.4(2)(a)) requires the court to be satisfied that there is no other compelling reason why the Claim should be disposed of at a trial. He said there is no such reason and Ms Woolfson's conduct and history of harassment against her family provide compelling reasons why her claim should not proceed to trial.
363. Ms Woolfson's Application
364. Mr Holland submitted that Ms Woolfson's Application should be dismissed for these reasons:
366. > (i) the court has no power (whether under CPR 3.4 or otherwise) to strike out testamentary documents;
367. > (ii) it is Ms Woolfson's statements of case, not those of the Defendants which are amenable to strike out and this part of her application should be refused;
368. > (iii) even if the court did not strike out Ms Woolfson's statements of case as requested by Adrian, there is no basis for an order for disclosure of "the intergenerational wills", which are unparticularised, may not exist and have not been demonstrated to be in Adrian's control.
370. Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim
371. Mr Holland submitted:
373. (i) the evidence and documentation before the court establish the formal and substantive validity of the Second June 2018 Will. Neither Ms Woolfson nor David (who are the only people with a substantive interest in doing so) has a real prospect of defending Adrian's Counterclaim (and David has not sought to do so). The requirement at CPR 24.3(a) has therefore been met in relation to Adrian's counterclaim;
374. (ii) for the same reasons as in respect of the claim, there is no compelling reason why the counterclaim should be disposed of at trial. The requirement at CPR 2.3(b) has therefore also been met in relation to Adrian's counterclaim.
376. PD 57 5.1 requires Adrian to provide written evidence proving due execution of the Second June 2018 Will before the court will admit that will to probate in solemn form on an application for summary judgment. This requirement is met by the affidavits of due execution of Mr Brook and Ms Libres.
379. Ms Carslaw's Submissions on behalf of Gerald, Lynne and Alexander
380. Ms Carslaw pointed out that her clients are not beneficiaries of Ms Banks's estate but, subject to that, they support Adrian's application so far as it concerns the probate claim. So far as Ms Woolfson's claims made against "the Defendants" are directed at Gerald and Lynne they appear to relate to alleged misappropriation of assets to which Ms Woolfson alleges she is somehow entitled. If Adrian's Application is successful in striking out Ms Woolfson's Claim Documents and Response Documents in their entirety Gerald, Lynne and Alexander's Application should be otiose. If Adrian strikes out only part of the Statements of Case then their Application will be outstanding so as to deal with the elements of Ms Woolfson's case which concern them in particular.
383. Ms Carslaw submitted that an overarching indication of the defective nature of Ms Woolfson's Claim Documents and Response Documents is that they are so unreasonably vague and incoherent that it is impossible for Gerald, Lynne and Alexander to understand the claims that they must meet and to plead a response to the matters set out. She pointed out that a statement of case must include a concise statement of the facts on which a party relies (CPR r. 16.4) and referred to the judgment of Teare J in Towler v Wills [2010] EWHC 1209 (Comm) at [18]:
385. "The purpose of a pleading or statement of case is to inform the other party what the case is that is being brought against him. It is necessary that the other party understands the case which is being brought against him so that he may plead to it in response, disclose those of his documents which are relevant to that case and prepare witness statements which support his defence. If the case which is brought against him is vague or incoherent he will not, or may not, be able to do any of those things. Time and costs will, or may, be wasted if the defendant seeks to respond to a vague and incoherent case. It is also necessary for the Court to understand the case which is brought so that it may fairly and expeditiously decide the case and in a manner which saves unnecessary expense. For these reasons it is necessary that a party's pleaded case is a concise and clear statement of the facts on which he relies?"
387. Ms Carslaw submitted that the defects in Ms Woolfson's Statements of Case are especially serious where she is making allegations falling within CPR PD16A 8.2 including allegations of fraud, illegality, or breaches of trust. She said the deficiencies leave Ms Woolfson's Statements of Case liable to strike out under both (a) and (b) on the ground that they obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings.
390. Ms Carslaw referred to the Defence filed by her clients which points out that they cannot respond meaningfully to various allegations made against them, and it is not possible to identify precisely what case Ms Woolfson's Claim Documents disclose.
393. Ms Carslaw submitted that on a generous reading of the Claim Documents, Ms Woolfson's claims can be divided into two sorts:
395. (i) claims in relation to the validity of Ms Banks's testamentary documents; and
396. (ii) claims relating to recovery of and/or compensation for "misappropriation" of various assets.
397. Neither sort of claim appears to be directed against Alexander and no relief is sought against him and, on any basis, he ought never to have been made a party.
399. Ms Carslaw submitted that given the absence of any possible interest in the probate elements of Ms Woolfson's claim, to the extent that Adrian does not succeed in striking out or obtaining summary judgment in respect of probate of the Second June 2018 Will (or any earlier testamentary documents), that part of the claim brought against Gerald, Lynne and Alexander should be struck out.
402. Ms Carslaw's analysis was that the non-probate claims appear to relate to assets formerly jointly owned by Ms Banks and Gerald, or subsequently owned by Gerald and which do not form part of Ms Banks's estate, being, in particular:
404. (i) Parsifal Investments Ltd (the Company). This company was dissolved in 1981 pursuant to the Divorce Settlement between Gerald and Ms Banks;
405. (ii) the Parliament Hill property which was owned by the Company and transferred to Ms Banks by the liquidator in accordance with the Divorce Settlement;
406. (iii) the Redington Road property, which as part of the Divorce Settlement between Gerald and Ms Banks was transferred to Gerald. It was sold in 2000. The basis on which Ms Woolfson asserts a claim against Gerald and Lynne in respect of it is unclear.
408. Ms Woolfson's allegations include that Gerald and/or Lynne
410. (i) was "required but failed to transfer [Ms Woolfson's] inheritance in [Ms Banks's] estate: one third or more share of Parliament Hill, Redington Rd, Parsifal Inv on adulthood",
411. (ii) "improperly took control" of "estate assets" and/or "seized control of estate improperly"; this appears to include the "misappropriation" of the Company and of the Redington Road property;
413. Ms Carslaw submitted that Ms Woolfson's Statements of Case fail to set out any reasonable grounds on which any obligation to Ms Woolfson arose or what is referred to by "[Ms Woolfson's] inheritance", or on which Gerald and/or Lynne can be said to have "misappropriated" assets.
416. Ms Carslaw referred to Ms Woolfson's reliance on "breach of trust", "intergenerational wills" "estoppel, restitution, unjust enrichment" and "other grounds" as part of her claim and pointed out it is unclear if Ms Woolfson is bringing claims on behalf of Ms Banks's estate or on her own behalf but:
418. (i) to the extent it is on behalf of the estate she has no standing as she is not a personal representative: Roberts v Gill [2011] 1 AC 240.
419. (ii) to the extent it is on her own behalf the Claim Documents disclose no reasonable grounds for bringing any such claims for recovery against them.
421. Ms Carslaw referred to Ms Woolfson's reliance on "intergenerational wills" or "intergenerational documents" giving rise to an "intergenerational estate structure". To the extent Ms Woolfson is relying on these documents as founding a claim against Gerald or Lynne Ms Carslaw submitted the basis for doing so is opaque. Ms Woolfson has not, in the Claim Documents or Response Documents of case, adequately particularised the provisions of these documents or set out the basis on which the alleged "structure" gives her grounds to bring a claim. In any event, the alleged "intergenerational wills" could not amount to reasonable grounds for bringing a claim:
423. (i) a "pre-nuptial agreement" on the marriage of Ms Banks and Gerald in 1954 which "excludes Gerald on separation" and that "in the event of separation the parties would be treated as though they had never married, with Gerald receiving nothing" does not form the basis for any claim where the financial agreement in 1981 dealt comprehensively with financial matters between Gerald and Ms Banks and the letter of 31 May 1980 which predates that settlement is evidence only of negotiations prior to a concluded agreement;
424. (ii) Ms Woolfson appears to rely on a purported trust set up for her in 1960. There are no particulars given of this trust or on what basis it could found a claim against any of the defendants The only and incomplete document recently produced is a 1965 trust settled by Ephraim and there is no evidence that effect was not given to its terms or, in particular, that any of the defendants acted in breach of that trust;
425. (iii) a 1967 will of Ephraim has been the subject of various allegations against Gerald for a number of years. Ms Woolfson herself appears to accept that Gerald was not an executor or trustee of Ephraim's estate and the recently produced documents confirm this, and Ms Woolfson has not comprehensibly set out the grounds on which any claim against him or anyone else in this respect lies;
426. (iv) a 1978 Will of Ms Banks, or possibly an agreement between Ms Banks and Gerald and Lynne in 1978 or 1981 or 1982, pursuant to which Ms Banks is alleged to have agreed as a result of being "pressurised" by Gerald and Lynne to resign as director and secretary of the Company provided that Gerald and Lynne "honour the binding estate structure and transfer the Claimant her inheritance and to her brother David, as they had reached adulthood". No such Will or agreement has been produced nor have any terms been particularised leaving the grounds for a claim as incomprehensible. It is also difficult to see what rights a Will from 1978 could confer on Ms Woolfson where it has long been superseded;
427. (v) it is unclear on what basis any interest of Ms Banks or her children in the Redington Road property, whether deriving from a contribution of ?10,000 from Ephraim or otherwise could survive the 1981 financial agreement between Gerald and Ms Banks;
428. (v) If Ms Woolfson has any claim that she has not received assets or money to which she was entitled under Rachel Charlaff's will there is nothing to suppose it is a claim against any of the defendants to the present proceedings;
429. (vi) the appropriate jurisdiction for adjudication of at least some of these claims might well be South Africa.
431. There is some suggestion in Ms Woolfson's Response Documents that she is relying on promises made to her by Gerald. If Ms Woolfson is seeking recovery on the basis of an estoppel Ms Carslaw submitted she has failed to particularise any of the elements of an estoppel, in particular detriment, and against whom she is bringing any estoppel claim and there are no reasonable grounds for such a claim.
434. Ms Carslaw submitted, even if it is possible to ascertain what the Claim Documents disclose, they do not disclose any reasonable grounds for bringing a claim against Gerald, Lynne or Alexander.
437. Abuse of Process/Likely to Obstruct Just Disposal
438. Further or alternatively, Ms Carslaw submitted the Claim Documents and Response Documents should be struck out as an abuse of process under CPR r. 3.4(2)(b). They are unreasonably vague and incoherent as to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings. Gerald, Lynne and Alexander are simply unable to understand the claim which is brought against them and cannot meaningfully respond to it. Nor will the Court be able to decide the matter in a way which is in accordance with the overriding objective.
441. In addition Ms Carslaw submitted that insofar as it is possible to make out the facts on which Ms Woolfson relies in respect of her claims against Gerald and Lynne, these date as far back as 1981 and it is plain that any such claims would be barred by laches, given the prejudicial delay and the failure or inability to particularise these claims over 40 years later.
444. Further the Claim Documents and Response Documents make a number of serious, false and irrelevant allegations against all the Defendants, including Gerald, Lynne and Alexander and Alexander's witness statement details how in his view the claim fits into a campaign of harassing and abusive behaviour conducted by Ms Woolfson against his parents over at least the past five years.
447. So far as Mr Brook is concerned: he lived in the flat below Ms Banks and was a witness to the Second June 2018 Will. He has no interest in Ms Banks's estate. His Defence sets out why he is not a proper defendant. Gerald, Lynne and Alexander do not oppose Mr Brook's Application and make no submissions in respect of it.
450. Gerald, Lynne and Alexander's position in respect of each of the orders sought by Ms Woolfson's Application Notice is as follows:
452. (i) Gerald, Lynne and Alexander have no interest in the disputed Wills and in any event do not understand what jurisdiction the Court has to make these orders;
453. (ii) Ms Woolfson has not set out the basis on which she seeks disclosure of intergenerational wills from Gerald, Lynne and Alexander or why they would be in a position to provide it.
454. (iii) the request for strike out of the defendants' pleadings seems to be a retaliatory move;
455. (iv) ordering ADR would be wholly inappropriate in circumstances where Ms Woolfson' claims are liable to strike out and Gerald, Lynne and Alexander are unable to understand the claims brought against them.
457. Ms Galley's Submissions on behalf of Mr Brook
458. Mr Brook supports Adrian's application to strike out the entire claim on the basis set out in his application and supporting evidence but does not make separate submissions in relation to it.
461. Mr Brook's only connection to the issues arising in this claim is that he was an attesting witness to the Second June 2018 Will which was in identical form to the First June 2018 Will. He has produced an affidavit of due execution. Jhoanna Libres was an attesting witness to both of the June 2018 Wills and has now provided evidence dealing with the circumstances of the execution of the Second June 2018 Will which accords with what is said by Mr Brook and his photographic record. The First June 2018 Will was also witnessed by Ms Evans who has produced an affidavit of due execution.
464. Ms Galley submits that since Mr Brook is not a beneficiary of any of Ms Banks's wills and makes no claim to be entitled to any part of the estate he is not a proper defendant to Ms Woolfson's claim and no claim is in fact set out against him. If the claim were to proceed further Mr Brook might be a relevant witness of fact but he is not a proper party.
467. He has filed a Defence to which Ms Woolfson has responded. None of the Claim Documents or Response Documents disclose any cause of action against him. The claim does not relate to the ownership of the basement flat at the Parliament Hill property or to planning applications which he might or might not have made in relation to it and to which Ms Woolfson makes reference.
470. In relation to Mr Brook no cause of action is disclosed at all and he should not be party to the proceedings at all and not be put to the costs and expense of being a defendant to the Claim.
473. The Other Defendants
474. David and Mr Gavin attended the hearing and each made brief submissions indicating that they supported Adrian's position and hoped that an end might be brought to the claim. Mr Charlaff attended remotely from Israel but said nothing beyond what was said in the document accompanying his Acknowledgment of Service.
477. Discussion and Conclusions
478. In order to decide whether to strike out the Claim Documents and Response Documents pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) and/or grant summary judgment for Adrian on the claim I must determine whether Ms Woolfson has:
480. (i) a pleaded case with a real prospect of success; or
481. (ii) adduced evidence disclosing such a case or a compelling reason why the case should go to trial.
483. If I decide to strike out the Claim Documents and Response Documents I must then determine whether Ms Woolfson has
485. (i) a pleaded case with a real prospect of defeating Adrian's counterclaim; or
486. (ii) adduced evidence disclosing such a case or a compelling reason why the counterclaim should go to trial;
487. and if neither whether Adrian has adduced evidence of due execution as required by PD57.
489. If I do not strike out the Claim Documents and Response Documents pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) or grant summary judgment for Adrian I must determine whether the Claim Documents and Response Documents should be struck out under CPR 3.4(2)(b) as an abuse or for being likely to obstruct the just disposal of the claim.
492. If I do not strike out the Claim Documents in their entirety I must go on to consider whether I should strike them out insofar as they seek relief against Gerald, Lynne and Alexander or against Mr Brook or whether I should remove those individuals as parties to the claim because it is not desirable for them to be parties pursuant to CPR 19.2(3).
495. It is striking that Ms Banks made as many as the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents. I do not however accept as Ms Woolfson suggests that this is indicative of a lack of capacity. The medical evidence and the involvement of many private client solicitors over the period in question renders Ms Woolfson's suggestion fanciful. The explanation for the existence of the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents is that Ms Woolfson very much wanted to ensure she made and implemented the right decisions about her testamentary arrangements in circumstances where she was estranged from Ms Woolfson and had a difficult relationship with David. This is plain from the sequence of professionally drafted documents themselves and from the terms of Ms Evans' letter to Ms Banks of 1 June 2018 enclosing the draft of the First June 2018 Will.
498. Ms Woolfson's only substantive submission about Ms Banks lacking testamentary capacity was that dementia was mentioned on her death certificate in 2024. Apart from referring to Ms Banks's interaction with the mental health/dementia specialist Ms Woolfson did not identify any lifetime medical evidence which would support a case of lack of capacity. In light of the lack of any mention of dementia in Ms Banks's voluminous medical records in the relevant period and in particular in light of the observations recorded made by her GP and the mental health/dementia specialist in April 2018 there is no real prospect that Ms Woolfson would be able to establish that Ms Banks lacked testamentary capacity in June 2018 or at any earlier date. That a testatrix has a history of depressive illness does not without more lead to the conclusion that she did not have capacity at any particular date. The fact that Ms Banks was in dispute with Mr Brook about alterations to his home cannot be a matter from which a loss of cognitive ability might be inferred.
501. Ms Woolfson has pleaded no particulars and adduced no evidence that any person coerced Ms Banks into making the June 2018 Wills or any of the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents. For Ms Woolfson to succeed she would have to establish effective coercive behaviour by an identified person or persons over a period of more than ten years that went undetected by the series of solicitors instructed by Ms Banks. That Adrian held a Power of Attorney is not a particular of undue influence and nor is his limited involvement in putting Ms Banks in touch with Irwin Mitchell in 2018. That Mr Brook witnessed the Second June 2018 Will is not of itself any evidence of undue influence. The Claim Documents and Response Documents come nowhere near to advancing any such case that has even a remote prospect of success.
504. The June 2018 Wills benefit from the presumptions that they were
506. (i) known and approved by Ms Banks having been drafted by Ms Evans in accordance with the detailed instructions given by Ms Banks and recorded on Irwin Mitchell's file; and
507. (ii) that they were duly executed as they bear regular attestation clauses.
509. Quite apart from those presumptions, the evidence that both June 20018 Wills were known and approved by Ms Banks and regularly executed in accordance with section 9 of the Wills Act 1837 is comprehensive. Irwin Mitchell's file, the affidavits of due execution and the photographic record made by Mr Brook leave no room for any reasonable prospect of disputing those matters.
512. Ms Woolfson's suggestion that the June 2018 Wills should have shown the logo of Thomas Eggar makes no sense. By 2018 Ms Evans was employed by and the office in which she worked was an office of Irwin Mitchell as her emails show. Ms Woolfson's further complaint that Mr Brook recorded his postcode wrongly when witnessing the will as part of a cover up is a hopeless point. The same error was made in typing Mr Brook's affidavit of due execution presumably as a result of instructions from him, but corrected in manuscript when he signed the document. The explanation for the error appears in Ms Woolfson's own documentation: the postcode is that of Mr Brook's parents' home. How writing a wrong postcode after clearly stating his address at 56 Parliament Hill could camouflage what Ms Woolfson asserts is the fact that Mr Brook was an interested party is wholly unexplained, quite apart from his alleged interest being unexplained.
515. Ms Woolfson did not explain what her investigations into the employment of Ms Libres or with a consultant at the Royal Free Hospital might reveal to bolster her probate or other claims.
518. Ms Woolfson's complaint that she was not sent the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents all at once is simply a consequence of the process in which Adrian and his solicitors had to engage in order to discover them all; there is nothing sinister about it. The fact that Ms Woolfson's own searches did not unearth particular documents that have since been discovered does not by itself bring their validity into question. If Ms Woolfson's allegations of fraud, forgery or lying were true, it would have to be concluded that there was a widespread and long-lasting fraudulent conspiracy involving not only a number of the defendants but numerous legal professionals as well. That wills were invented or made up after Ms Banks's death for the purposes of persuading Ms Woolfson to accept the validity of June 2018 Wills is not only a highly fanciful, allegation but also, where most of the 14 Post-2006 Testamentary Documents were, as is apparent on their face, prepared by and witnessed by legal professionals an extremely serious one. The contention that the June 2018 Wills were in fact made at some later time is not supportable in light of the evidence of their execution given by those who witnessed them.
521. Ms Woolfson's claims based on breach of trust or intergenerational wills or structures, are hopeless. There is no proper articulation in the Claim Documents and Response Documents of any basis on which any such claims could succeed against any of the defendants. No trust is identified with certainty, no property (other than possibly the Redington Road property and the Parliament Hill property) is identified as being subject to the trust and no breach of trust is identified. That Ms Woolfson could ever have been a beneficiary of a trust of the Redington Road property or the Parliament Hill property is both inconsistent with the manner in which Ms Banks and Gerald settled their financial affairs in 1981 and highly improbable in the first place. It would be very unusual for a matrimonial home to be held for the benefit of the children of the marriage and an express declaration of trust, no evidence of which has been produced, would almost certainly have been needed to achieve that result. In the case of a property transferred from a property investment company to Ms Banks it is difficult to see how any trust interest for Ms Woolfson could arise. The documents recently obtained by Ms Woolfson from South Africa do not improve the prospects of success of Ms Woolfson's claims, if anything they indicate that at least some of her claims, if they could be properly articulated, would be matters for a South African Court.
524. The claims in estoppel, restitution or unjust enrichment are entirely unparticularised and also hopeless.
527. Ms Woolfson has no pleaded case with a real prospect of success so far as concerns her probate claims or her claims for other relief and she has adduced no material to demonstrate that she has any prospect of amending to plead such a case or that there is any compelling reason why the defendants should have to defend themselves against Ms Woolfson's claims at a trial.
530. I will therefore strike out the Claim Documents and Response Documents in their entirety pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) and grant summary judgment on the claim to the defendants.
533. For essentially the reasons I have already given it is plain that Ms Woolfson has no pleaded case with a real prospect of defeating Adrian's counterclaim and nor has she adduced evidence disclosing such a case or a compelling reason why the counterclaim should go to trial. Adrian has adduced evidence of due execution of both the June 2018 Wills as required by PD57. I will therefore grant summary judgment to Adrian on his counterclaim to propound the Second June 2018 Will.
536. I accept the submissions of counsel concerning the Claim Documents and the Response Documents. They are in many respects incoherent such that what is claimed cannot be understood. They include allegations or assertions about events ranging widely in scope and in time without any grounding in contemporaneous material which might substantiate them. Many are of serious matters including fraud and forgery and misappropriation of assets and they are made not just against the defendants but against lawyers without the particularisation that properly pleaded allegations require. The allegations cannot have been made with any proper regard being paid by Ms Woolfson to their truth or relevance. Ms Woolfson also cannot have made any proper assessment of whether she had legal grounds for making the claims that she has in these proceedings against the defendants she has joined as parties. I consider the Claim Documents and Response Documents to be abusive and likely to obstruct the just disposal of any such claim as Ms Woolfson might have and thus susceptible to strike out under CPR 3.4(2)(b) also.
539. It is also plain that Gerald, Lynne and Alexander and Mr Brook are on any footing not proper defendants to a probate claim concerning Ms Banks's estate. Alexander and Mr Brook are not proper defendants to any claim that is made in those proceedings even giving the broadest possible interpretation to what is intended to be alleged by the Claim Documents and Response Documents since no relief is claimed against them. If the Claim Documents were not to be struck out I would have removed them all as defendants to the probate element of the claim and Alexander and Mr Brook as defendants altogether.
542. Finally I must deal with Ms Woolfson's Application. The Court has no jurisdiction to strike out testamentary documents as the application asks. For the reasons already given I have concluded that the Second June 2018 Will should be admitted to probate, the effect is that all earlier wills and testamentary documents are irrelevant.
545. I do not propose to make any disclosure orders about intergenerational wills or any other matters. Ms Woolfson has not particularised what documents she seeks with any proper clarity and has not demonstrated any basis upon which any of the defendants would be holding such documents. She has herself been able to locate and obtain copies of some of the documents she may have intended to refer to in her Application and produced them at the hearing.
548. In circumstances where I will strike out Ms Woolfson's Claim Documents and Response Documents and grant summary judgment on Adrian's counterclaim, an application for strike out of the Defences and Counterclaims of the defendants serves no purpose. Similarly ordering ADR serves no purpose.

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