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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Quinton Jermaine Wilson v. the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 01-24-00382-CR
• Nature of Suit: Murder

• Disposition: Affirm TC judgment

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirm TC judgment

Lead Opinion

Opinion issued March 19, 2026.

In the

Court of Appeals
for the

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00382-CR
———————————
QUINTON JERMAINE WILSON, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 184th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1748455

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After a bench trial, the trial court convicted appellant Quinton Jermaine

Wilson of first-degree murder and sentenced appellant to 35 years’ imprisonment.

TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02. In his sole issue, appellant contends that he did not

expressly, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to trial by jury. We overrule
appellant’s sole issue because the record demonstrates that appellant waived his right

to trial by jury orally and in writing and that he did so knowingly and intelligently.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Background

On April 22, 2022, appellant was charged by indictment with the murder of

Giovanie Thompson. On May 16, 2024, the trial court held a hearing regarding

appellant’s waiver of his right to trial by jury. Appellant was present with his

counsel. At the start of the hearing, the trial court stated, “I want the record to reflect

that Mr. Wilson has been set for trial to begin today; however, I understand that the

defendant has opted for a court trial and that the State has agreed to waive a jury; is

that right?” Counsel for the State and appellant’s counsel acknowledged that was

correct. Appellant’s counsel further added:

And I wanna put on the record that I’ve advised him of all his rights on
this, a right to a trial by jury, what a jury can do and what they cannot
do, and that he believes it is in his best interest to do a court trial,
therefore, ensuring that the Judge, if he is found guilty, would assess
punishment.

The trial court then engaged in the following colloquy with appellant:

THE COURT: So, Mr. Wilson does stand charged with the first-degree
felony offense of murder. And, Mr. Wilson, it’s your desire and wish
to have a court trial to me?

MR. WILSON: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Okay. And so — all right. And then, it’s your decision
and choice that — to come to me for punishment as well, right?

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MR. WILSON: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Okay. ‘Cause as a court trial, then I would decide the
punishment. All right. And I did explain to you before we went on the
record that the range of punishment is 5 years to 99 years or life,
correct?

MR. WILSON: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: All right. And the State had offered you 40 years, and
you declined that, correct?

MR. WILSON: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: And I believe your counter was 10 or 15 or something
like that.

[APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL]: We got to 15, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You got to 15. And you understand that I can give you
anywhere from 5 years to 99 years or life? Do you understand that?

MR. WILSON: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Okay. Of course, I haven’t heard anything, and these are
allegations, but I just wanna make sure that you understand that, and
that we’re clear, and that you do want a court trial; is that correct?

MR. WILSON: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: All right. So you do want a court trial?

MR. WILSON: Yes, ma’am.

Following this exchange, the State arraigned appellant. After the arraignment,

the trial court presented appellant with a written “Waiver of Trial by Jury in Offense

Less Than Capital,” and discussed it with him:

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THE COURT: Now, what I have in my hands for the record is a waiver
of a trial by jury in an offense less than capital murder, and what this
means is that you are agreeing to come to me, and the State’s agreeing
to allow you to come to me instead of having a jury trial, which is your
constitutional right. Do you understand that?

MR. WILSON: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Okay. And I just wanna make sure that you understand
that you’re giving up the right to a jury trial to come to me, and that’s
what you wanna do, correct?

MR. WILSON: Yes, ma’am.

The trial court then read the written waiver to appellant on the record. The

waiver stated, in part, that appellant

in person and in writing in open court, and with the consent and
approval of the Court and with the written and signed consent and
approval of the attorney representing the State, and prior to entering a
plea herein, and having been informed of the defendant’s right to a trial
by jury, waives the right to trial by jury, and chooses to have the issue
of guilt determined by the judge. . . . The above waiver of trial by jury
having been intentionally, knowingly and voluntarily made by the
defendant and approved by the attorney representing the State, prior to
entering of a plea herein, is approved by the Court and is ordered filed
in the papers of this cause.

The appellant, counsel for the State, appellant’s counsel, and the trial court all

signed the written waiver, and appellant acknowledged his signature on the record.

On May 21, 2024, the trial court found appellant guilty following a bench trial

and sentenced him to 35 years’ imprisonment. The following day, the trial court

certified appellant’s right of appeal, and appellant filed a notice of appeal. In the

notice of appeal, which is a pre-prepared form with blank spaces to be filled in or

4
marked, appellant’s trial counsel selected the box that read “The undersigned

attorney . . . MOVES to withdraw,” and appellant selected the box that read “The

defendant . . . REPRESENTS to the court that he is presently INDIGENT and ASKS

the court to immediately APPOINT appellate counsel to represent him.” The trial

court granted the motion to withdraw and found appellant indigent. On July 22,

2024, the trial court appointed appellate counsel to represent appellant.1

Waiver of Jury Trial

Criminal defendants have an absolute constitutional right to a trial by jury.

Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); U.S. CONST. amend.

VI. To waive this right, a criminal defendant must do so expressly, knowingly, and

intelligently on the record. Guillett v. State, 677 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. Crim. App.

1984). Article 1.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure also requires a written

waiver of the defendant’s right to a jury trial “in open court.” TEX. CRIM. PROC.

CODE art. 1.13(a).

Prior to the May 16, 2024 hearing, appellant’s counsel explained to appellant

his right to a trial by jury. On the record, after the trial court admonished appellant

and confirmed his waiver, appellant orally waived his right to a trial by jury.

1
After appellant filed his brief, the State submitted a request to supplement the
reporter’s record. On April 17 and April 25, 2025, respectively, supplemental
clerk’s and reporter’s records were filed. Those supplemental records included
appellant’s written and oral waivers of his right to trial by jury.

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Following the arraignment, the trial court again confirmed that appellant desired to

waive his right to a trial by jury, read the written waiver aloud to appellant, and had

appellant orally acknowledge his signature on the written waiver. The record

demonstrates that appellant expressly, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right

to a trial by jury. See Ragan v. State, 608 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020,

pet. ref’d) (holding that appellant waived jury trial where he signed written waiver

and orally waived jury trial following on-the-record admonishment by his counsel,

even though trial court did not engage in colloquy with defendant); Martinez v. State,

449 S.W.3d 193, 199-200 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (holding

that foreign-language appellant waived jury trial where court-appointed interpreter

read written waiver to him, appellant signed waiver, and trial court engaged in

colloquy with appellant who orally affirmed waiver through interpreter).

We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Amparo “Amy” Guerra
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Dokupil.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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