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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

3939 Williams v. Weaver

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24CA2140

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (20)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (45.9K)

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Combined Opinion

24CA2140 3939 Williams v Weaver 03-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2140
City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV33398
Honorable Andrew J. Luxen, Judge

3939 Williams Building Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jonathan Weaver,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Fox and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 26, 2026

CYLG, P.C., Christoper A. Young, Denver, Colorado: CYLG, P.C., R. Anthony
Young, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Westerfield & Martin, LLC, Zachary S. Westerfield, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Jonathan Weaver, appeals the trial court’s entry of

summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, 3939 Williams Building

Corporation, for breach of contract. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In April 2022, 3939 Williams and Weaver entered into a rental

agreement. Weaver agreed to pay monthly installments to lease

7,535 square feet of commercial storage space in a large warehouse.

The following year, 3939 Williams sued Weaver for breaching the

contract by failing to pay rent. Weaver counterclaimed for breach of

contract and gross negligence. He claimed that 3939 Williams

breached the rental agreement through its gross negligence when it

allowed “the roof . . . to remain in disrepair[,] causing rain to fall on

[his] possessions,” and failed to respond to “continuous break ins”

at the building. He also claimed that 3939 Williams breached the

contract by failing to keep the premises in “broom-clean condition,”

as required by the rental agreement. Finally, Weaver pleaded a tort

claim, alleging that 3939 Williams’s gross negligence caused him

damages. While Weaver admitted to “the withholding of rent,” he

argued that this action was justified by 3939 Williams’s gross

negligence and its own earlier breach of contract.

1
¶3 3939 Williams then moved for summary judgment. It argued

that Weaver failed to pay rent for four months. It also argued that

the rental agreement contained a “clear and unambiguous”

exculpatory clause. Through this exculpatory clause, it argued,

Weaver had agreed to “not hold nor attempt to hold . . . [3939

Williams] . . . liable for . . . any claims for: (i) any injury or damage

to persons or property.” It also asserted that Weaver had waived

his right to seek damages for any injuries he suffered under the

clause.

¶4 In response, Weaver claimed that he was fraudulently induced

into signing the contract because he was not told about the

building’s susceptibility to floods and break-ins. He also argued

that his counterclaim for breach of contract should not be

dismissed. Weaver noted that the exculpatory clause contains an

exception exposing 3939 Williams to liability “to the extent [an]

injury or damage is caused by the gross negligence or willful

misconduct of [3939 Williams].” Weaver attached two unsworn

2
exhibits that included “affidavit” in their titles to his response,1 one

signed by himself and another signed by Stephen Hayne, a

nonparty familiar with the warehouse. The exhibits included

photos, text messages, and an email.

¶5 Weaver later moved to amend his counterclaims and add a

punitive damages claim. He also moved for leave to file a surreply

opposing 3939 Williams’s motion for summary judgment. The

surreply included updated copies of the Weaver exhibit and the

Hayne exhibit. The court denied all these motions.

¶6 The trial court ultimately granted 3939 Williams’s motion for

summary judgment. First, it refused to consider Weaver’s unsworn

exhibits because they weren’t sworn affidavits and they didn’t

comply with section 13-27-106, C.R.S. 2025. Then, having set

aside the exhibits, the trial court concluded that 3939 Williams had

proved its claim for breach of contract. The court found that there

was no evidence in the record that 3939 Williams’s conduct “with

1 Though the exhibits included “affidavit” in their titles, they were

not sworn or certified, see Cody Park Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Harder,
251 P.3d 1, 4 (Colo. App. 2009), and they did not meet the
requirements for unsworn declarations under section 13-27-106,
C.R.S. 2025.

3
respect to its performance or lack thereof . . . under the [rental

agreement] was willful and wanton.” Accordingly, the court rejected

Weaver’s breach of contract counterclaim. The court also

concluded that Weaver’s gross negligence counterclaim was barred

by the economic loss rule. Finally, the court held that Weaver

waived his fraudulent inducement and breach of duty of good faith

and fair dealing affirmative defenses. The court thus entered

summary judgment in 3939 Williams’s favor, awarding it

$27,416.85 in damages for breach of contract.

¶7 Weaver now appeals.

II. Analysis

¶8 Weaver contends that the trial court erred by granting

summary judgment to 3939 Williams on its contract claim and

Weaver’s contract counterclaim because there were genuine issues

of material fact concerning whether 3939 Williams (1) breached the

rental agreement by failing to keep the premises in “broom-clean”

condition; (2) breached the rental agreement first; and (3) breached

the agreement by failing to respond to the flooding and theft issues,

amounting to gross negligence. Weaver also contends that the

court should have addressed two of his affirmative defenses

4
because (4) Weaver was fraudulently induced into signing the rental

agreement; and (5) 3939 Williams breached the implied duty of good

faith and fair dealing in the rental agreement. Finally, Weaver

contends that (6) the economic loss rule does not bar his tort

counterclaim for gross negligence. We address each contention in

turn.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶9 Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law.” C.R.C.P. 56(c). “The moving party has the initial

burden to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact.”

AviComm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 955 P.2d 1023, 1029

(Colo. 1998). When the moving party meets its initial burden, the

burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must “establish

that there is a triable issue of fact.” Id. While the nonmoving party

is “entitled to all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the

undisputed facts,” id., the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of the [moving] party’s pleadings, but[,]

5
. . . by affidavits or [as] otherwise provided in this Rule, must set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,”

C.R.C.P. 56(e).

¶ 10 “We review de novo an order granting summary judgment.”

McDonald v. Zions First Nat’l Bank, N.A., 2015 COA 29, ¶ 44.

B. Breach of Contract Claims

¶ 11 Weaver contends that the trial court erred by resolving 3939

Williams’s breach of contract claim and his breach of contract

counterclaim against him. He argues that the evidence attached to

the summary judgment briefing showed several genuine issues of

material fact, which precluded summary judgment. Specifically, he

asserts that there were genuine issues about whether 3939

Williams kept the premises in “broom-clean” condition, breached

the agreement first so that he was excused from paying rent, and

committed gross negligence.

¶ 12 While Weaver argues extensively over the contents of the

materials he presented with the summary judgment briefing, the

trial court disregarded all those materials as not complying with the

procedural rules when it made its ruling. Specifically, the trial

court concluded that the exhibits were deficient because they

6
weren’t sworn affidavits and they didn’t comply with section

13-27-106. Reviewing the court’s summary judgment ruling de

novo, see McDonald, ¶ 44, we first address whether the court

properly excluded these materials.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 13 A motion for summary judgment can be supported by

“pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, . . . admissions

on file, [and] affidavits.” C.R.C.P. 56(c). “[S]upporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such

facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters

stated therein.” C.R.C.P. 56(e). Copies of all papers must also be

“[s]worn or certified.” Id.

¶ 14 Affidavits may be made under oath “before any officer

authorized by law.” C.R.C.P. 108; see also Otani v. Dist. Ct., 662

P.2d 1088, 1090 (Colo. 1983) (“An affidavit is a signed, written

statement, made under oath before an authorized officer, in which

the affiant vouches that what is said is true.”). An unsworn

declaration that complies with section 13-27-106 can substitute for

an affidavit. People v. Ramcharan, 2024 COA 110, ¶ 31. Among

7
other requirements, an unsworn declaration must include the

following statement: “I declare under penalty of perjury under the

law of Colorado that the foregoing is true and correct.”

§ 13-27-106. “A court must disregard documents referred to in a

motion for summary judgment that are not sworn or certified.”

Cody Park Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 251 P.3d at 4.

1. The Court Did Not Err By Excluding the Unsworn Materials

¶ 15 Weaver attached the Weaver exhibit and the Hayne exhibit to

his summary judgment response. The Weaver exhibit included

Weaver’s statements, copies of text messages, and an email. In the

exhibit, Weaver claimed that there were multiple instances of

flooding and break-ins, 3939 Williams knew about these issues

before it entered into the lease with Weaver, it did nothing to

address these issues, and it breached the contract first by failing to

keep the premises in “broom-clean” condition.

¶ 16 In the Hayne exhibit, Hayne stated that he was a plaintiff in

an unrelated case against 3939 Williams (along with another

defendant) and had incurred physical injuries while touring the

warehouse that included Weaver’s leased commercial storage space.

8
Hayne’s injury had occurred about a month before 3939 Williams

and Weaver entered into the rental agreement. Attached to the

Hayne exhibit were two photos taken the day of his injury. One of

the photos showed Hayne’s elevated, injured leg; the other showed a

puddle of water within the warehouse and “two metal grate-like

objects placed across the puddle as a makeshift bridge.”

¶ 17 There’s little question that the two exhibits didn’t constitute a

proper evidentiary basis to resist summary judgment. For one

thing, they weren’t affidavits sworn under oath in front of an

appropriate officer authorized by law. See C.R.C.P. 56(e), 108. And

they didn’t qualify as unsworn declarations because they omitted

the statutorily required language that the statements were made

“under penalty of perjury under the law of Colorado.” § 13-27-106.

Thus, the trial court did not err when it declined to consider these

documents in its decision because the exhibits were “insufficient to

raise disputed issues of material fact.” Credit Serv. Co. v. Dauwe,

134 P.3d 444, 446 (Colo. App. 2005); see Bjornsen v. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 2019 COA 59, ¶ 23.

¶ 18 Weaver’s argument that the court should have considered the

photos, text messages, and email attached to the exhibits fares no

9
better. Rule 56(e) requires “all papers or parts thereof” to be sworn

or certified, and a court need not consider unauthenticated exhibits

that do not comply with this rule. See Johnson v. Mountain Sav. &

Loan Ass’n, 426 P.2d 962, 963 (Colo. 1967). Further, though

Weaver argues that the text messages were independently

admissible because they contained the “admissions” of an

opponent, that’s not what the rule contemplates. In the context of

the summary judgment rule, a party may rely on the response to a

request for admission. See Cox v. Pearl Inv. Co., 450 P.2d 60, 71-72

(Colo. 1969). Therefore, the court did not err by not considering the

uncertified and unauthenticated photos, text messages, and email

after it concluded that the exhibits they were attached to were not

appropriate for consideration under Rule 56.

¶ 19 Finally, Weaver contends that the trial court erred when it

failed to consider the “corrected” exhibits that he submitted with his

motion to file a surreply. One of the corrected exhibits had been

notarized and the other included the required language under

section 13-27-106. He asserts that there were no substantive

changes to the exhibits other than the notarization and additional

language in compliance with section 13-27-106.

10
¶ 20 A trial court has discretion to permit a surreply. See Olson v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 174 P.3d 849, 860 (Colo. App. 2007).

In general, “[a] surreply allows the nonmoving party on a motion for

summary judgment to respond to new evidence and new legal

arguments raised for the first time in the moving party’s reply brief.”

Id. In denying the motion to amend, the trial court noted that 3939

Williams’s reply brief merely addressed issues that Weaver had

raised in his response. Weaver doesn’t contest this portion of the

order in his appellate briefing; instead, he argues only that 3939

Williams would not have been prejudiced had the court permitted

the surreply.2 Maybe so, but under the abuse of discretion

standard, we ask “not whether we would have reached a different

result but, rather, whether the trial court’s decision fell within a

range of reasonable options.” E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig,

140 P.3d 227, 230-31 (Colo. App. 2006). It did, and we cannot say

2 Weaver argues for the first time in his appellate reply brief that a

lack of prejudice is the sole argument required to establish an
abuse of discretion. However, that argument is not developed.
Therefore, we decline to consider it further. See City of Westminster
v. Centric-Jones Constructors, 100 P.3d 472, 480 (Colo. App. 2003)
(“We do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply
brief.”); see also Sanchez v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 COA
71, ¶ 41 (declining to address underdeveloped arguments).

11
on this record that the trial court’s ruling is manifestly

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair, or that it misapplies the law.

See Migoya v. Wheeler, 2024 COA 124, ¶ 23 (outlining the abuse of

discretion standard). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion when it denied Weaver’s motion to file a

surreply to the motion for summary judgment.

¶ 21 In sum, the court did not err by not considering the unsworn

and uncertified exhibits and attached materials that Weaver

submitted with his summary judgment response. We therefore

must reject all of Weaver’s contentions that are addressed to the

contents of those materials, including that the materials created

genuine issues of material fact regarding whether 3939 Williams

kept the premises in “broom-clean” condition, breached the

agreement first, or committed gross negligence.

C. Waived Affirmative Defenses

¶ 22 Weaver contends that 3939 Williams “made numerous

misrepresentations . . . and fraudulently induced . . . [him] to enter

into a contract.” Specifically, he claims that 3939 Williams failed to

inform him regarding “the deplorable state of disrepair of the

[p]remises prior to entering the [a]greement,” the building’s

12
susceptibility to flooding, the building’s previous break-ins, and the

building’s susceptibility to future break-ins.

¶ 23 Weaver also contends that 3939 Williams breached the implied

duty of good faith and fair dealing when it negotiated the rental

agreement. The breach of this duty, he argues, is a question of fact

that the jury must resolve. We disagree.

1. Additional Background

¶ 24 In Weaver’s answer, he included an affirmative defenses

section, in which he stated that

[3939 Williams] breached the terms of the
[rental agreement] through its failure to
disclose the issues with the roof at the
[p]remises[,] which would likely be considered
a hidden defect not fully visible at any
inspection unless the initial inspection were to
be conducted on a day that it was raining. It
is possible that this issue was fraudulently
concealed. [Weaver] reserves the right to bring
a claim for fraud, specifically fraudulent
concealment, should further information
become discoverable.

¶ 25 On the same day that summary judgment briefing closed,

Weaver moved to amend his answer and counterclaims to assert a

fraudulent concealment counterclaim. He claimed that 3939

Williams knew about the issues with water entering the warehouse

13
due to the roof being “in a total state of disrepair.” He also sought

to add a counterclaim for punitive damages. However, Weaver did

not seek to amend his affirmative defenses in the motion.

¶ 26 The trial court denied Weaver’s motion as untimely and noted

that the “request to amend to add a fraudulent

concealment/nondisclosure claim [was] futile as it could not

withstand a motion to dismiss.” Weaver does not challenge the

court’s ruling on his motion to amend.

¶ 27 Weaver did not include any statement in his original answer

(or his proposed amended answer) addressing a violation of the

implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. The first time he

addressed that theory was in his summary judgment response,

where he claimed that 3939 Williams violated its implied duty of

good faith and fair dealing by failing to disclose “flooding and theft

at the [p]remises prior to the agreement being entered into.”

¶ 28 In its summary judgment order, the trial court concluded that

Weaver waived the breach of good faith and fair dealing affirmative

defense by failing to include it in his answer. The trial court further

concluded that the duty could not be breached before a contract

was formed, and there was “no evidence supporting the contention

14
that a factual dispute exist[ed]” on this point. Accordingly, the

court rejected Weaver’s argument.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 29 Fraudulent inducement is an affirmative defense. Calvert v.

Mayberry, 2019 CO 23, ¶ 33 n.9. Likewise, a breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be treated as an

affirmative defense. Soicher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2015

COA 46, ¶¶ 10, 23, 26 (comparing noncooperation and a breach of

the duty of good faith and fair dealing as affirmative defenses).

¶ 30 A party must assert an affirmative defense in its responsive

pleading (or amended responsive pleading) or the defense is waived.

Dinosaur Park Invs., L.L.C. v. Tello, 192 P.3d 513, 517 (Colo. App.

2008). While C.R.C.P. 15(a) permits a party to amend a pleading to

which no response is permitted within twenty-one days after it is

filed, the party must obtain leave of court after that time.

1. Weaver Waived His Fraudulent Inducement and Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Affirmative Defenses

¶ 31 Reviewing the court’s summary judgment ruling de novo,

McDonald, ¶ 44, we perceive no error. Weaver didn’t assert a

fraudulent inducement affirmative defense in his answer. Instead,

15
he “reserved” the right to bring one in the future. But he hadn’t

done so before the court ruled on the motion for summary

judgment. Likewise, Weaver didn’t include any reference in his

answer to a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair

dealing.3 Because Weaver did not assert either affirmative defense

in his answer, they were waived. See Soicher, ¶ 21 (“An affirmative

defense must be specifically asserted in a party’s responsive

pleading or it is waived.”). Thus, the trial court did not err by

reaching the same conclusion.

D. Tort Counterclaim and the Economic Loss Rule

¶ 32 Weaver contends that the economic loss rule does not bar his

gross negligence tort counterclaim because the rental agreement

allows him to recover for damages caused by 3939 Williams’s gross

negligence. He argues, somewhat confusingly, that his claim is

“purely contractual,” and therefore the economic loss rule does not

3 Weaver acknowledges that the conduct he claims constituted the

breach occurred thirty-six days before the parties entered into the
rental agreement. As the trial court pointed out, it is only existing
contracts that contain the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing. See New Design Constr. Co. v. Hamon Contractors, Inc., 215
P.3d 1172, 1181 (Colo. App. 2008). Without a contract in place,
3939 Williams had no implied duty to breach.

16
apply. But he identifies no independent duty of care under tort law

that could support such a claim. Accordingly, we disagree with his

contention.

¶ 33 “[T]he economic loss rule is intended to maintain the boundary

between contract law and tort law.” Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr.,

Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Colo. 2000). Therefore, “a party suffering

only economic loss from the breach of an express or implied

contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach

absent an independent duty of care under tort law.” Id. at 1264. If

a duty of care is memorialized in an agreement, “then no duty exists

independent of the contract, and the economic loss rule will apply

to bar a tort claim.” Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. HIVE Constr., Inc., 2025

CO 17, ¶ 25. Willful and wanton tort claims are not excepted from

the economic loss rule. Id. at ¶ 26. We review de novo whether the

economic loss rule applies to a claim. Id. at ¶ 21.

¶ 34 Weaver’s second counterclaim is titled “Gross Negligence.” It

alleges facts similar to those described above: 3939 Williams was

grossly negligent because it was aware of the faulty roof and break-

ins and did not adequately address them. Weaver alleged that he

“suffered considerable damages as a result of [3939 Williams’s]

17
gross negligence.” Weaver identifies no duty of care that 3939

Williams owed to him other than those arising from the rental

agreement. To the contrary, he argues that his claim is “purely

contractual.” We agree with this last assertion. However, that

means that while Weaver could have properly maintained a breach

of contract claim, the economic loss rule bars his tort counterclaim

for gross negligence. See id. at ¶ 25.

E. Attorney Fees

¶ 35 3939 Williams asks for an award of its attorney fees and costs

incurred on appeal. It claims that Weaver’s appeal was frivolous as

filed for several reasons: Weaver claimed that he was entitled to

$2.8 million in damages, without providing any documentation as

to the expenses incurred; Weaver failed to cite any authority or

record support for his gross negligence counterclaim and fraudulent

concealment defense; and Weaver’s breach of the duty of good faith

and fair dealing claim was invalid.

¶ 36 An appeal “is frivolous as filed when there are no legitimately

appealable issues because the judgment below ‘was so plainly

correct and the legal authority contrary to the appellant’s position

18
so clear.’” Calvert, ¶ 45 (quoting Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148

P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App. 2006)).

¶ 37 While perhaps a close call, we can’t say that Weaver’s

appeal — as a whole — is frivolous as filed. Some of his arguments

are clearly contrary to binding authority. However, he also presents

some legitimate appealable issues. Considering the entire appeal,

we deny 3939 Williams’s request for appellate attorney fees.

¶ 38 3939 Williams is, however, entitled to its costs on appeal. See

C.A.R. 39(a)(2). It may seek those costs in the trial court as

provided by C.A.R. 39(c).

III. Disposition

¶ 39 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

19