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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Upper Merion Area S.D. v. King of Prussia Associates ~ Appeal of: Upper Merion Area S.D.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 800 C.D. 2024

• Judges: Fizzano Cannon. Cohn Jubelirer

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.4K)

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Combined Opinion

                        by [Renee Cohn Jubelirer](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8207/renee-cohn-jubelirer/)

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Upper Merion Area School District :
:
v. :
:
King of Prussia Associates, :
Montgomery County Board of :
Assessment Appeals, Upper Merion :
Township, and Montgomery County :
:
Upper Merion Area School District :
:
v. :
:
Robert M. Segal and Stephen Frost, :
Trustees, n/k/a King of Prussia :
Associates, Montgomery County :
Board of Assessment Appeals, :
Upper Merion Township, and :
Montgomery County :
:
Appeal of: Upper Merion Area : No. 800 C.D. 2024
School District : Argued: February 3, 2026

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: March 17, 2026

Upper Merion Area School District (School District) appeals from an
order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (Trial Court) entered
on February 20, 2024 in four consolidated property tax assessment matters. The
School District argues that the Trial Court erred in concluding that the School
District violated constitutional tax uniformity principles in selecting properties in the
King of Prussia Mall (Mall) for property tax assessment appeals. Upon review, we
affirm the Trial Court’s order.

I. Background
In its opinion accompanying its February 20, 2024 order (Trial Court
Opinion), the Trial Court found that, in 2012, the School District filed assessment
appeals with the Montgomery County Board of Assessment Appeals (Board)
regarding several properties in the Mall. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 615a. King
of Prussia Associates (KOPA), the owner of the Mall, intervened in the assessment
appeals.1 Id. at 615a-16a.
In 2011, the School District enacted Policy 605.1 for the purpose of
providing guidance on the financial criteria the School District would use in
selecting properties for filing real property tax assessment appeals. R.R. at 618a.
Policy 605.1 provided:
605.1. DISTRICT-INITIATED REAL ESTATE TAX
ASSESSMENT APPEAL
1. Purpose
The Board of School Directors has the responsibility to
equalize the cost of providing a quality education among
all property taxpayers. The Board is limited in its ability
to do this by property assessment procedures and an
established appeal process operates under the jurisdiction
of Montgomery County Government.

1
The other real property taxing bodies, Upper Merion Township and Montgomery County,
also intervened, but neither entity filed a brief in this Court.

2
2. Guidelines
Where, in the interest of all of property taxpayers, an
appeal can reasonably be made the Board will do so under
the following conditions:
1. The Business Administrator shall annually review
recent real estate transactions and/or work with a third
party firm to identify properties that may be under
assessed.
2. Annually, but not later than the Board’s May Finance
Committee Meeting, the administration shall provide
to the Finance Committee a list of those properties
which have been identified as possible candidates for a
district-initiated real estate tax assessment appeal for
the current year. Only under unusual circumstances,
and with the approval of the Board, shall a property
with an assessment of $500,000 or less be considered
for a district-initiated assessment appeal.
3. Upon recommendation of the Finance Committee, a
resolution shall be put before the Board approving tax
assessment appeals on such properties as may be
appropriate. Notification will then be given to the
Montgomery County Assessment Office of the
district’s intent to appeal the property’s assessment.
The annual appeal deadline is September 1st.
R.R. at 201a.
Policy 605.1 was drafted by Steven Skrocki (Skrocki), then the School
District’s Business Administrator. R.R. at 617a. As of the date of the Trial Court’s
decision in this matter, the School District had filed 82 tax assessment appeals, all
of which related to commercial or industrial properties and none of which related to
single family residential properties despite the existence of such properties falling
within the financial guidelines of Policy 605.1. Id. at 618a-19a. In fact, the Trial
Court found as a fact that the School District acknowledged that Policy 605.1 “was
designed specifically to exclude single family residential properties from appeals.”

3
Id. at 619a. The School District hired Keystone Realty Advisors (Keystone) to help
select properties for tax assessment appeals. Id. Skrocki understood that Keystone
would focus on commercial and industrial properties; Keystone did not evaluate any
single family residential properties and did not recommend any such properties to
the School District for tax assessment appeals. Id. at 620a.
Keystone recommended several properties for tax assessment appeals,
five of which were parcels in the Mall that were owned by KOPA. R.R. at 621a.
Skrocki had previously identified those properties independently in 2011 by
examining property sales information and interim tax assessments regarding
commercial and industrial properties. Id. at 161a-65a, 195a-99a, 173a-74a & 621a.
Skrocki did not examine information regarding single family residential properties.
Id. at 621a.
In 2012, the School District filed tax assessment appeals that included
four Mall parcels. R.R. at 615a-16a & 621a. The assessment appeals resulted in no
changes to the assessments. Id. at 616a. The School District appealed to the Trial
Court, which consolidated the appeals. Id
The Trial Court determined that the School District’s selections of
properties for tax assessment appeals under Policy 605.1 and the School District’s
implementation of that policy violated the tax uniformity provision of article VIII,
section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll taxes shall be
uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority
levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” PA. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1 (Uniformity Clause); see also R.R. at 623a-27a. Following the Trial
Court’s denial of the School District’s assessment appeals regarding the Mall
properties, the School District timely appealed to this Court.

4
II. Issues
On appeal,2 the School District presents three questions for review,
which we consolidate into two issues and summarize as follows.3

2
This Court has previously explained:

Our review of tax assessment appeals is limited to determining
whether errors of law were committed, an abuse of discretion
occurred, or constitutional rights were violated. Green v. Schuylkill
[Cnty.] Bd. of Assessment Appeals, . . . 772 A.2d 419 ([Pa.] 2001);
Jackson v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of Cumberland [Cnty.], 950
A.2d 1081 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). While the weight of the evidence is
before the appellate court for review, the trial court’s findings are
entitled to great weight and will be reversed only for clear error. Id.

Parkview Ct. Assocs. v. Del. Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 959 A.2d 515, 519 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2008). “Clear error” occurs only where a trial court’s findings after a bench trial are “clearly,
plainly, palpably, or manifestly wrong or erroneous.” 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 958 (2025).
This Court has observed that “a judge should not label a prior order to be ‘clearly erroneous’
merely because he disagrees with that order, but rather, it must be virtually undisputable that the
prior judge erred.” Bates v. Del. Cnty. Prison Emps. Indep. Union, 150 A.3d 121, 130 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting Zane v. Friends Hosp., 836 A.2d 25, 34 (Pa. 2003) (Nigro, J., concurring)
(additional quotation marks omitted)). Although Bates related to the coordinate jurisdiction rule,
we apply its definition of clear error here as well.
3
In full, the School District’s Questions Presented and suggested dispositions were:

A. Whether the Trial Court Erred In Declaring that How the
Mall was Identified was Immaterial and Thereby Wholly Ignored
The Uncontroverted Evidence That The Appeal Of The Mall
Properties Was A Result Of The [School District’s] Business
Manager Identifying The Transfer of an Interest in the Mall
Properties Based On Business Journals Prior To Enactment Of
Policy 605. 1, And Despite Its Exclusion From Involvement or
Compensation To The [School District’s] Real Estate Consultant.

Answer: Yes

B. Whether The Policy and Methodology Utilized By [The
School District] in Selecting Properties for Tax Assessment Appeals
was Not Arbitrary and Did Not Violate The Uniformity Clause.

5
First, the School District maintains the Trial Court erred in finding that
how the School District initially identified the Mall as a possible assessment appeal
target was immaterial. The School District points to its evidence that its decision to
pursue the assessment appeals regarding the Mall properties originally arose from
articles in business journals concerning the pending sale of half interests in those
properties, which the School District’s Business Administrator first noted in May
2011, prior to the School District’s enactment of Policy 605.1 in July 2011. The
School District also relies on the exclusion of the Mall properties from Keystone’s
consulting contract with the School District, arguing that the exclusion was
negotiated in recognition that the School District had already identified the Mall
properties for possible assessment appeals before entering into the Keystone
contract. The School District contends that this exclusion constitutes further
evidence that the Mall properties were identified before the enactment of Policy
605.1, which occurred contemporaneously with the execution of the Keystone
contract in July 2011.
Second, the School District maintains that the Trial Court erred both
factually and legally in determining that the School District’s implementation of
Policy 605.1 violated the Uniformity Clause. Factually, the School District insists

Answer: Yes

C. Whether The Trial Court’s Finding that [School District]
Violated the Uniformity Clause is Based on a Flawed Understanding
of the[] Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Decision in the Valley Forge
Tower case and its Progeny; and the Considerations that Go into
Evaluating Whether a School District Has Exercised the Broad
Powers it Has to File Assessment Appeals so Long as Property
Classification Is Not Utilized as a Criteri[on] in Doing So.

Answer: Yes

Sch. Dist. Br. at 4-5 (italics added).

6
the Trial Court erred in its weighing of the evidence and its resultant finding that the
School District purposely excluded all residential properties from consideration for
tax assessment appeals. Legally, the School District asserts that the Trial Court
misunderstood the import of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Valley
Forge Towers v. Upper Merion Area School District, 163 A.3d 962 (Pa. 2017), and
misapplied that decision’s reasoning in concluding that Policy 605.1 violated the
Uniformity Clause.

III. Discussion
A. The School District’s Identification of the Mall Properties
The School District maintains that it identified the Mall properties for
potential assessment appeals through Skrocki, who spotted business journal articles
concerning the pending sale of a half interest in the Mall and the expected sale price.
The School District points to evidence that Skrocki first noted the journal articles in
May 2011, prior to the School District’s enactment of Policy 605.1 in July 2011,
even though the appeals were not actually filed until 2012. Implicit in the School
District’s argument is a suggestion that if the Mall properties were identified for
assessment appeals prior to enactment of Policy 605.1, they could not have been
selected and appealed pursuant to Policy 605.1. Consequently, any alleged
constitutional infirmity of Policy 605.1 would not affect the School District’s
assessment appeals concerning the Mall properties.
There appears to be no dispute that the School District had already
identified the Mall properties for possible assessment appeals before the enactment
of Policy 605.1. See R.R. at 161a-65a, 195a-99a & 173a-74a. A pretrial order of
the Trial Court specifically observed that the School District’s decision to initiate

7
the assessment appeals arose from the journal articles spotted by Skrocki. Id. at
109a-10a. Moreover, the School District’s consulting agreement with Keystone
recognized that the School District had already identified the Mall properties and
that Keystone would not be compensated regarding any assessment appeals the
School District might pursue regarding those properties. Id. at 110a, 1014a-15a,
1021a-22a, 2533a & 2530a-40a.
Ultimately, however, the Trial Court opined that the source of the
District’s information leading to its assessment appeals regarding the Mall properties
was immaterial. In its first assertion of error, the School District contends the Trial
Court erred in that determination. We disagree.
Skrocki testified that Policy 605.1 was under consideration in the same
time period during which he identified the Mall properties as possible assessment
appeal candidates. R.R. at 1024a-25a. He acknowledged that the School District
would have considered the $500,000 threshold of Policy 605.1 if the policy had been
in place. Id. Skrocki explained that he knew from the journal articles that the Mall
property valuation at issue was between $1,000,000 and $2,000,000 and, thus, that
the assessed values of the Mall property interests being sold would exceed the
$500,000 threshold in Policy 605.1. Id. at 1025a & 1077a.
Significantly, although the School District enacted Policy 605.1 in July
2011, the School District did not file assessment appeals relating to the Mall
properties until 2012. R.R. at 110a. Skrocki testified that the School District was
not prepared to pursue assessment appeals concerning the Mall properties in 2011
because the School District was still gathering necessary information and the
property sale of the Mall properties had not yet closed. Id. at 1025a-34a & 1077a-
81a. Further, notwithstanding Skrocki’s initial identification of the Mall properties

8
for appeal consideration in 2011, the School District’s current Business
Administrator testified that every assessment appeal undertaken by the School
District since the enactment of Policy 605.1 on July 5, 2011 has been initiated
pursuant to Policy 605.1 Id. at 1148a. Skrocki similarly acknowledged that the
presentation of assessment appeal properties to the School District for 2012 appeals,
including the Mall properties, was done in accordance with Policy 605.1. Id. at
1040a-43a.
In short, regardless of how the School District first identified and
selected the Mall properties for potential assessment appeals, it did not file those
appeals until 2012, the year after the enactment of Policy 605.1. The District’s own
witnesses acknowledged that all assessment appeals initiated after the enactment of
Policy 605.1, including the assessment appeals regarding the Mall properties, were
pursued in accordance with Policy 605.1. Thus, the Trial Court did not err in opining
that the School District’s initial source of information identifying the Mall properties
was immaterial to the applicability of Policy 605.1.

B. Policy 605.1 and the Uniformity Clause
1. Weight of the Evidence
The School District posits that the Trial Court erred in its weighing of
the evidence and its resultant factual finding that the School District purposely, and
unconstitutionally, excluded all residential properties from consideration for tax
assessment appeals. As noted above, this Court may reverse the Trial Court’s
findings of fact only for clear error. See Green v. Schuylkill [Cnty.] Bd. of
Assessment Appeals, 772 A.2d 419 (Pa. 2001); Jackson v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals
of Cumberland Cnty., 950 A.2d 1081 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). We discern no clear error

9
here. To the contrary, the record includes copious evidence in support of the Trial
Court’s findings concerning the School District’s deliberate exclusion of residential
properties from consideration for tax assessment appeals.
The School District presented testimony indicating that the $500,000
threshold valuation figure in Policy 605.1 was based on return on investment,
weighing the likely tax receipts of a successful assessment appeal against the cost of
litigation. R.R. at 154a. However, Skrocki also acknowledged that the School
District had not pursued a tax assessment appeal against any residential property
during his employment there. Id. at 789a & 1052a. Skrocki stated further that he
“frequently” reached out to the county’s commercial and industrial property assessor
to check on interim assessments but did not even know who the residential assessor
was. Id. at 960a-65a. He conceded that Keystone did not mention any work to him
regarding residential properties and that he knew Keystone’s focus was on
commercial and industrial properties. Id. at 799a and 807a-09a. The January 2011
minutes of a joint meeting of the School District, Bridgeport Borough, and Upper
Merion Township reflected that Skrocki answered a question about tax assessment
appeals by stating that the new methodology under Policy 605.1 would look
aggressively at commercial and industrial properties; Skrocki made no mention of
residential properties and did not state that all types of properties would be reviewed.
Id. at 810a-13a & 2968a. Skrocki admitted that the February 16, 2011 meeting
minutes of the Finance Committee indicated that tax assessment appeals to date had
all related to commercial properties and that he repeatedly told the Board, the
Finance Committee, and the public that Keystone was focusing on commercial
properties for assessment appeals. Id. at 813a-16a, 818a & 2686a. Skrocki testified
that he repeatedly told the Board, the Finance Committee, and the public that the

10
intent of Policy 605.1 was to go after commercial and industrial properties that were
underassessed and not to go after residential properties. Id. at 903a-05a, 929a, 937a-
38a & 940a-42a; see also id. at 2653a, 2721a, 2920a-21a & 2848a. Indeed, Skrocki
stated that the School District enacted Policy 605.1 as “an assessment policy to
preclude appeals against most residential property owners.” Id. at 951a-52a; see also
id. at 2635a. Notably, Skrocki stated that one Board member voted against Policy
605.1 because of concerns that it focused on commercial and industrial properties
and excluded single family residential properties. Id. at 909a & 911a.
As noted above, a court will not find clear error merely because it
disagrees with the order being reviewed; “it must be virtually undisputable that the
prior judge erred.” Bates, 150 A.3d at 130 (quoting Zane, 836 A.2d at 34). In light
of the ample record support for the Trial Court’s decision here, we cannot say that
the Trial Court clearly erred.
In addition, we observe that on May 13, 2021, the Trial Court issued a
separate, preliminary opinion and order in response to KOPA’s motion for sanctions
based on the School District’s alleged failure to preserve evidence. R.R. at 107a-
22a. The Trial Court granted KOPA’s motion in part. Accordingly, the Trial Court
found that the School District failed to comply with its preservation duty despite a
timely and thorough litigation hold letter issued by KOPA and that KOPA was
prejudiced by the School District’s failure to comply with the hold letter. Id. at 120a.
The unpreserved documents included emails pertaining to the formation of Policy
605.1, packets of materials issued to school board members of the School District
prior to board meetings during the relevant time period, public blog posts relating to
tax assessment appeals, and a “watch list” of properties for potential future tax
assessment appeals. Id. at 118a-19a. In consequence, the Trial Court authorized the

11
trial judge to draw an adverse inference that the specified documents not preserved
by the School District would have been favorable to KOPA on the issue of the School
District’s alleged violation of the Uniformity Clause. Id. at 121a-22a (first citing
Schroeder v. Dep’t of Transp., 710 A.2d 23, 27 (Pa. 1998); then citing Schmid v.
Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d. Cir. 1994); and then citing King v.
Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 139 A.3d 336, 346-47 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)).
The School District has not asserted on appeal before this Court that the
Trial Court erred in issuing the May 13, 2021 order, and the Trial Court’s opinion
on the School District’s tax appeal did not state whether any adverse inferences were
being drawn. Nevertheless, the School District’s observed failure to preserve
relevant evidence in the face of a hold letter further supports the absence of clear
error in the Trial Court’s findings and weighing of the evidence.

1. Violation of the Uniformity Clause In asserting legal error, the School District contends that the Trial Court misunderstood the import of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Valley Forge Towers and misapplied the reasoning of that decision in concluding that Policy 605.1 violated the Uniformity Clause. We disagree. In Valley Forge Towers, our Supreme Court considered the precise issue presented here, i.e., “whether the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution permits a taxing authority to selectively appeal only the assessments of commercial properties . . . while choosing not to appeal the assessments of other types of property – most notably, single-family residential homes . . . .” 163 A.3d at 965. Notably, the School District was also the taxing body appealing the tax assessments at issue in Valley Forge Towers, Keystone was the consultant that

12
recommended the tax assessment appeals, and KOPA filed an amicus brief in that
case.
In Valley Forge Towers, the School District argued that uniformity
could be determined within sub-classifications such as commercial and residential;
the School District reasoned that if all properties within a sub-class were treated
uniformly regarding selection for tax assessment appeals, uniformity was preserved,
and a taxing entity was free to file appeals relating solely to a single sub-class of
property, such as commercial properties. 163 A.3d at 973. Our Supreme Court
rejected that argument, explaining that
it [is] an established feature of Pennsylvania uniformity
jurisprudence that “all real estate is a constitutionally
designated class entitled to uniform treatment and the ratio
of assessed value to market value adopted by the taxing
authority must be applied equally and uniformly to all real
estate within the taxing authority’s jurisdiction.”
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment,
Appeals & Review of Allegheny Cnty., . . . 652 A.2d 1306,
1314 ([Pa.] 1995) (citing McKnight Shopping Ctr., Inc. v.
Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Review of Allegheny
Cnty., . . . 209 A.2d 389 ([Pa.] 1965)); see also Clifton v.
Allegheny Cnty., 969 A.2d 1197, 1212 (Pa. 2009). While this may at first seem
incongruous, it is the inevitable result of the circumstance
that the Uniformity Clause views all property as a single
class and simultaneously incorporates federal Equal
Protection guarantees as a constitutional floor.
Id. at 973-74.
Notably, our Supreme Court acknowledged that in a taxpayer’s
assessment appeal, evidence relating to other similar properties in the same sub-class

13
may be considered in determining whether a property is over-assessed. Valley Forge
Towers, 163 A.3d at 974. Nonetheless, our Supreme Court concluded:
The observation that these types of proofs are relevant was
intended to maintain the longstanding protection of
taxpayers from high assessment ratios as compared with
those of comparable properties, and to promote harmony
with the equal protection principles, not as a means of
empowering the government to systematically engage in
disparate treatment of sub[-]classifications of property.
Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that “a taxing authority is not permitted
to implement a program of only appealing the assessments of one sub-classification
of properties, where that sub-classification is drawn according to property type —
that is, its use as commercial, apartment complex, single-family residential,
industrial, or the like.” Id. at 978.
The School District insists, however, that this case is not governed by
Valley Forge Towers, but rather, by this Court’s decision in Coatesville Area School
District v. Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals, 323 A.3d 61 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2024). The School District insists that its use of a monetary threshold of $500,000
was proper and that the tax assessment appeal selection policy approved by this
Court in Coatesville was similar in “relying on monetary thresholds without
reference to property types . . . .” Sch. Dist. Br. at 41-42 (citing Coatesville, 323
A.3d at 65-68). The School District also observes that “‘the mere fact that a given
assessment appeal has not resulted in a single appeal of a residential property does
not mean that the policy is being implemented in an unconstitutional manner.’” Sch.
Dist. Br. at 43-44 (quoting Coatesville, 323 A.3d at 82); see also Downingtown Area

14
Sch. Dist. v. Chester Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 303 A.3d 1104, 1117 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2023), appeal granted, 320 A.3d 661 (Pa. 2024).4
The obvious and fatal flaw in this argument is that here, unlike in
Coatesville, there were specific factual determinations that the School District and
its expert focused on commercial properties for assessment appeals and that Policy
605.1 was largely designed to carry out this purpose. In Coatesville, the common
pleas court had found as a fact that the school district’s use of a $10,000 monetary
threshold in its tax assessment appeal selection policy was not intended to
discriminate among different types of properties. 323 A.3d at 84; see also
Downingtown, 303 A.3d at 1117 (explaining that an acceptable tax assessment
appeal policy would “not systematically target commercial properties . . .”). By
contrast, as discussed above, the School District here expressly intended to avoid
targeting any residential properties. Thus, neither Coatesville nor Downingtown
offers any support for the School District’s position.
As discussed in the previous subsection, the Trial Court here did not
clearly err in finding as fact that the School District intentionally excluded single
family residential properties from consideration for tax assessment appeals and,
indeed, formulated Policy 605.1 with that intention. Accordingly, we agree with the
Trial Court’s conclusion that Policy 605.1 violated the Uniformity Clause, PA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1, in that the School District purposefully applied Policy 605.1
so as to appeal only tax assessments of commercial and industrial properties. The

4
The issues as to which appeal was granted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Downingtown Area School District v. Chester County Board of Assessment Appeals, 320 A.3d 661
(Pa. 2024), may be paraphrased as (1) whether a school district must appeal all potentially
underassessed properties in the school district in order to comply with uniformity requirements
and (2) whether there was a factual basis to conclude that the tax assessment appeal policy there
was implemented in an arbitrary fashion. See id. We note that neither issue appears facially
material to the issues here.

15
choice of the Mall properties was part of a plan or pattern of appealing only
commercial and industrial property assessments and, as such, violated uniformity.

IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Trial Court’s order is affirmed.

---

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

16
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Upper Merion Area School District :
:
v. :
:
King of Prussia Associates, :
Montgomery County Board of :
Assessment Appeals, Upper Merion :
Township, and Montgomery County :
:
Upper Merion Area School District :
:
v. :
:
Robert M. Segal and Stephen Frost, :
Trustees, n/k/a King of Prussia :
Associates, Montgomery County :
Board of Assessment Appeals, :
Upper Merion Township, and :
Montgomery County :
:
Appeal of: Upper Merion Area : No. 800 C.D. 2024
School District :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 17th day of March, 2026, the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Montgomery County dated February 20, 2024 is AFFIRMED.

---

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Upper Merion Area School District :
:
v. : No. 800 C.D. 2024
: Argued: February 3, 2026
King of Prussia Associates, :
Montgomery County Board of :
Assessment Appeals, Upper Merion :
Township, and Montgomery County :
:
Upper Merion Area School District :
:
v. :
:
Robert M. Segal and Stephen Frost, :
Trustees, n/k/a King of Prussia :
Associates, Montgomery County :
Board of Assessment Appeals, Upper :
Merion Township, and Montgomery :
County :
:
Appeal of: Upper Merion Area School :
District :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge

CONCURRING OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: March 17, 2026

I agree with the Majority that, based on the facts found, the Order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court) must be affirmed because the
Upper Merion Area School District’s (School District) application of its property tax
assessment appeal policy excluded single-family residential properties from
consideration in violation of the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. I write separately only to reconfirm that a
school district’s use of a “facially property-type-neutral monetary threshold[] do[es]
not per se run afoul of the Uniformity Clause.” Coatesville Area Sch. Dist. v. Chester
Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 323 A.3d 61, 78 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (en banc).
Such thresholds generally “represent school districts’ reliance on the commonsense
notion that ‘the two objectives’ of generating revenue on one hand, and ensuring
implementation of a taxing system that operates in a nondiscriminatory manner on
the other, ‘do not necessarily conflict.’” Id. (quoting Valley Forge Towers
Apartments N, LP v. Upper Merion Area Sch. Dist., 163 A.3d 962, 980 (Pa.
2017)). School districts have been given the authority to appeal tax assessments,
Section 8855 of the Consolidated County Assessment Law, 53 Pa.C.S. § 8855, and
“[f]or that to mean something, school districts must have a means of designing
facially neutral, quantitatively grounded policies to create predictability and fairness
in a taxing district.” Coatesville, 323 A.3d at 79. The violation of the Uniformity
Clause in this matter is not based on the use of a facially neutral monetary threshold,
but on the evidence that the School District applied its policy to intentionally exclude
single-family residential properties from consideration for assessment appeals,
making this case distinguishable from that in Coatesville.

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RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

Judge Tsai joins this Concurring Opinion.

RCJ - 2