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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Tayseer Yousef

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-1426
• Panel: Danny Julian Boggs, John Baylor Nalbandian

• Judges: Danny J. Boggs; John B. Nalbandian; Andre B. Mathis

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (13.7K)

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Combined Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0083p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
│
Plaintiff-Appellee, │

   No. 25-1426

│
v. │
│
TAYSEER YOUSEF, │
Defendant-Appellant. │
┘

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 1:23-cr-00086-1—Hala Y. Jarbou, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: March 17, 2026

Before: BOGGS, NALBANDIAN, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

---

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Frank Stanley, FRANK STANLEY, P.C., Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellant.
Alexia A. Jansen, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for
Appellee.

---

OPINION

---

MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Tayseer Yousef was a professional “fence” in a scheme to
resell stolen cell phones obtained from armed robberies of retail stores. A jury convicted Yousef
of two counts of interstate transportation of stolen goods and one count of conspiracy to transport
stolen goods interstate. The district court sentenced him to 109 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Yousef challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.
No. 25-1426 United States v. Yousef Page 2

I.

Tayseer Yousef owned a cell-phone store outside Chicago, Illinois. From at least 2020 to
2021, he regularly purchased stolen cell phones from robbery crews based in Grand Rapids,
Michigan, to sell domestically and overseas at a substantial profit. Operating mostly in west
Michigan, the robbers would enter AT&T, T-Mobile, and other retail stores during business
hours, displaying weapons and threatening store employees. Some employees suffered injuries,
with one store clerk reporting “a broken jaw and a broken nose.” R. 92, PageID 644. On at least
one occasion, a robber stole an employee’s personal cell phone.

Although Yousef was not present at any of the robberies, he encouraged the robberies
and sometimes even helped direct them. When inventory ran low, Yousef texted his
coconspirators urging them “to get [him] more stuff.” R. 110, PageID 1216. On many
occasions, he provided specific instructions to thieves on what devices to steal and which retail
chains to target. Yousef also provided guidance on how to evade law enforcement; for example,
he advised the robbers to avoid older phone models because they are easier for authorities to
track.

After a robbery, the thieves would typically message Yousef through a middleman,
describe what they had to sell, and arrange for a meeting. Yousef would then drive from
Chicago to Michigan to purchase the phones, either directly from the robbers or through an
intermediary. Yousef and the robbers would often complete the entire transaction on the same
day as the robbery.

Yousef sold many of the stolen phones in his store. To prepare the phones for resale, he
had to circumvent various security precautions designed to prevent the use of stolen phones. For
example, when a phone is stolen, a carrier will “blacklist” the phone, so that it cannot be
activated or used on a cellular network in the United States, Canada, or Great Britain. R. 94,
PageID 1012. But Yousef claimed he was able to “clean” a stolen phone by removing its
identifying information. R. 110, PageID 1210.
No. 25-1426 United States v. Yousef Page 3

Yousef would also sell phones in overseas markets like Dubai and Hong Kong. In those
markets, blacklisting had no effect. And so the phones could be worth two or three times more
when sold to international buyers.

In 2020, law enforcement began investigating a string of cell-phone-store robberies in
and around Grand Rapids. Investigators learned that multiple robbery crews sold stolen
electronic devices to the same individual, later identified as Yousef. After obtaining a search
warrant for Yousef’s Apple iCloud accounts, investigators discovered photos, messages, and
other evidence tying him to a conspiracy, involving multiple robbery crews, to obtain and resell
stolen cell phones and other electronic devices. In all, the government linked Yousef to 42
robberies between 2018 and 2021, involving stolen merchandise with a combined value of
$1,045,441.93.

A grand jury indicted Yousef on three counts: one count of conspiracy to transport stolen
goods interstate, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2314; and two counts of interstate transportation of stolen
goods, id. § 2314. Yousef was charged in connection with two robberies: a November 15, 2020
robbery of an AT&T store and a January 20, 2021 robbery of a T-Mobile store.

Yousef exercised his right to a jury trial. At trial, the government presented cellular
location data and license-plate toll records revealing that Yousef traveled to Michigan shortly
after at least nine robberies, including the two subject robberies. The government also
introduced text messages connecting Yousef to dozens of other robberies. These messages
included price lists, handoff logistics, and other instructions to the robbers. And the evidence left
little doubt that Yousef knew all about the robberies—including how dangerous they were. In
one message, Yousef shared a link to a news article about “a string of violent robberies at several
cell phone stores” in west Michigan.1 He informed another individual of a cell-phone-store
robbery set to occur the following morning. The jury convicted Yousef on all three counts.

At sentencing, the district court applied numerous sentencing enhancements. Relevant
here are three enhancements based on the conduct of Yousef’s coconspirators: theft from the

1See Sam Knef, West Michigan police look for suspects involved in string of cell phone store robberies,
WWMT (Nov. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/3MLU-Z5YR.
No. 25-1426 United States v. Yousef Page 4

person of another, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(3); possession of a dangerous weapon, id.
§ 2B1.1(b)(16)(B); and physical restraint of a victim, id. § 3A1.3. Also at issue is an
enhancement for using sophisticated means, under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). After applying
these and other enhancements, Yousef’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range was 97 to 121
months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Yousef to 109 months’ imprisonment. He
timely appealed.

II.

Yousef challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. A district court
imposes a procedurally unreasonable sentence by “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)
the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We review the
procedural reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence for an abuse of discretion. Id.

On appeal, Yousef argues that the district court improperly calculated his Guidelines
range when it applied: (1) three sentencing enhancements based on the conduct of his
coconspirators, and (2) an enhancement for using sophisticated means. We address each
argument in turn.

A.

We consider first whether the district court properly applied the sentencing enhancements
for theft from the person of another, possession of a dangerous weapon, and physical restraint of
a victim. Yousef did not personally commit the acts underlying these enhancements; his
coconspirators did. Still, the district court found the coconspirators’ actions attributable to
Yousef as “relevant conduct.” In cases involving “jointly undertaken criminal activity,” relevant
conduct encompasses:

all acts and omissions of others that were—
(i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity,
(ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and
No. 25-1426 United States v. Yousef Page 5

(iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal
activity;
that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction,
in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to
avoid detection or responsibility for that offense[.]

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). We review de novo whether acts or omissions constitute relevant
conduct under this guideline. United States v. Donadeo, 910 F.3d 886, 893 (6th Cir. 2018). And
we review the district court’s underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Smith,
79 F.4th 790, 794 (6th Cir. 2023). The government bears the burden of proof to show that an
enhancement qualifies as relevant conduct. United States v. Amerson, 886 F.3d 568, 573 (6th
Cir. 2018).

Start with what is not in dispute. Yousef does not contest the district court’s factual
findings that his coconspirators “displayed firearms, detained victims, and, in at least one
instance, stole a victim’s personal cell phone.” D. 10 at p.20. And he does not argue that his
coconspirators’ actions were unforeseeable; nor does he suggest that their actions were not in
furtherance of criminal activity. Thus, the only question is whether the robberies—and the
conduct that occurred during their commission—were “within the scope of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)(i).

The scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity “is not necessarily the same as the
scope of the entire conspiracy.” Donadeo, 910 F.3d at 894–95 (quotation omitted). Instead, it is
“the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant’s agreement.” Id. at
895 (quotation omitted). That agreement may be explicit, or it may be an “implicit agreement
fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others.” Id. (quotation omitted). The
district court must make “particularized findings” about “the scope of the defendant’s
agreement” before holding him accountable. United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 400 (6th
Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted).

We consider six factors when “determining the scope of the criminal activity that a
defendant agreed to jointly undertake. Donadeo, 910 F.3d at 895. Those factors are: “(1) the
existence of a single scheme; (2) similarities in modus operandi; (3) coordination of activities
among schemers; (4) pooling of resources or profits; (5) knowledge of the scope of the scheme;
No. 25-1426 United States v. Yousef Page 6

and (6) length and degree of the defendant’s participation in the scheme.” Id. (quotation
omitted). The district court need not find that all six factors support its determination that the
defendant engaged in jointly undertaken criminal activity. We have upheld a district court’s
conclusion that others’ actions were attributable to the defendant when only four factors weighed
against the defendant. See United States v. Moody, 787 F. App’x 857, 869–70 (6th Cir. 2019).

Five of the six Donadeo factors weigh against Yousef. So the district court did not err in
its application of the theft, dangerous-weapon, and physical-restraint enhancements.

Existence of a single scheme. Yousef’s conduct and the robberies were part of a single
scheme—that is, to resell stolen cell phones obtained from robberies. We must be precise when
defining the boundaries of this scheme, and it is not enough to say that Yousef’s shared objective
with the robbers was merely to profit off stolen phones no matter where they came from. The
fact that the phones were obtained during armed robberies—robberies Yousef knew about,
encouraged, and in some cases helped plan—was central to the success of the entire enterprise.
We see no indication that he used alternative supply chains to obtain illegal phones, so without
these robberies, he would have had no inventory. Indeed, Yousef was often eager to replenish
his stock, once texting a middleman to complain, “Man try to get more stuff.” R. 110, PageID
1216. Given Yousef’s awareness of where his merchandise came from, combined with his
substantial involvement in the finer details of the robberies, we can infer the existence of an
agreement that the thieves would commit more robberies to maintain Yousef’s inventory of
stolen phones.

In turn, Yousef was as essential to the robbers as the robbers were to Yousef. He
provided them with critical technical and market expertise, “cleaning” stolen phones of
identifying information and locating overseas buyers willing to pay huge markups. He also
provided vital transportation and logistical support. After the robberies on November 15, 2020,
and January 20, 2021, the thieves contacted Yousef the same day, and within hours Yousef was
on the road to pick up the phones and transport them out of state. Thus, he was more like a
“getaway driver in an armed bank robbery” than an impersonal broker offering generalized
services. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.4(B).
No. 25-1426 United States v. Yousef Page 7

Yousef needed the robbers, and the robbers needed Yousef. And when coconspirators
rely on each other’s labor and expertise, there is a strong inference of a single scheme. For
example, in United States v. Cowley, we attributed the conduct of coconspirators to a defendant
who performed “critical tasks” in service of the other participants’ conduct. 800 F. App’x 402,
405 (6th Cir. 2020). And in United States v. Love, we attributed coconspirator conduct to a
defendant who “recruited others and provided logistical support” for the conspiracy. 392 F.
App’x 410, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2010). Given Yousef’s essential contributions to the robbers’
efforts, we have little difficulty concluding that the robberies were part of the same scheme as
Yousef’s transportation and resale of the stolen merchandise.

Yousef disagrees. He maintains that his only scheme was to purchase stolen cell phones
and transport them over state lines, not commit robberies. He was “not interested in how the
robbers obtained the phones.” D. 10 at p.29. Yet his text messages tell a different story. For
example, Yousef encouraged the robberies and even provided specific directives to the robbers,
recommending that they favor certain stores and phone models and providing guidance on how
to evade authorities.

Yousef next argues that the relevant-conduct enhancements were improper under United
States v. McReynolds, 69 F.4th 326 (6th Cir. 2023). There, we reversed the district court’s
decision to hold the defendant responsible for drug quantities attributed to a larger conspiracy
where the defendant was a street-level dealer who occasionally purchased product from the
conspiracy’s supplier. Id. at 333–34. But Yousef’s actions are easily distinguishable from the
McReynolds defendant’s actions. Unlike Yousef, that defendant never “coordinated his . . . sales
with the other conspiracy members or performed a specific service for the conspiracy.” Id. at
333. By contrast, Yousef timed his trips to Michigan to the schedule of robberies. And the
services he provided for the conspiracy were far more specialized than those of a street-level
dealer selling a small fraction of a supplier’s total stock.

Similarities in modus operandi. The robbery-and-resell scheme followed a familiar
pattern. Yousef would encourage his coconspirators to obtain stolen phones, at times directing
the robbers to specific retailers or cities. The robberies would take place. Yousef would meet
with his middleman to pay for the phones. He would then resell the phones for a significant
No. 25-1426 United States v. Yousef Page 8

profit. True, sometimes Yousef would meet directly with a robber instead of a middleman. And
sometimes the coconspirators were forced to improvise to escape the pursuit of law enforcement,
thereby deviating from the usual plan. Still, there are enough similarities to conclude that this
factor favors the government. Yousef offers nothing in response beyond saying the factor is “not
applicable.” D. 10 at p.16.

Coordination of activities. Direct evidence shows extensive coordination among Yousef
and other participants in the conspiracy. Yousef discussed plans for future robberies with
coconspirators, frequently offering advice on which cities to target and which devices to steal.
Over a four-week period, he exchanged over 200 messages with a single middleman, in which
the two discussed logistics, phone models, police investigations, and other topics related to the
robberies. We have held that discussions among coconspirators—about how to carry out the
scheme or how to conceal it—constitute coordination. See Donadeo, 910 F.3d at 897.

Yousef nevertheless argues that the directives he provided to the thieves did not
constitute coordination. He explains that it is “typical for a professional fence to indicate his/her
interest in more stolen goods and to also indicate what brands of goods he/she was willing to
buy.” D. 10 at pp.35–36. But Yousef’s conduct went well beyond that of a neutral buyer.
According to Akevion McCoy, a middleman between Yousef and the individuals responsible for
the January 20, 2021 robbery, Yousef was the only buyer McCoy ever contacted as part of the
scheme. Add to that the same-day pickups, and a picture emerges of Yousef as an active and
enthusiastic participant in a scheme to sell the spoils of armed robberies—as opposed to a
passive buyer who signals what he will buy and waits patiently for inventory to arrive.

Pooling of resources or profits. There is no evidence that Yousef pooled resources or
profits with his coconspirators. This factor weighs in his favor.

Knowledge of the scope of the scheme. Yousef knew about the armed robberies. In text
messages, he stated that his merchandise came from robberies and even shared a news article
describing the robbers’ aggressive tactics.

Yousef does not dispute that he knew about the robberies. Instead, he argues that such
knowledge has little bearing here because “[e]very professional fence knows that he/she is
No. 25-1426 United States v. Yousef Page 9

buying stolen goods.” Id. at 36. And Yousef does not stop there. He contends that the district
court’s application of a professional-fence enhancement—which he does not challenge—
categorically prohibits us from implicating him in the robbers’ conduct. A fence, he explains, is
a person who buys and sells stolen goods, thereby “induc[ing] others to commit property crimes
by providing them with a ready market for their stolen goods.” United States v. Nicolescu, 17
F.4th 706, 723 (6th Cir. 2021). It follows, then, that a person who sells goods that he stole
himself cannot be a fence because the only theft crimes he induces are his own. So, Yousef
concludes, if the district court is correct that he is a professional fence—meaning he strictly sells
property stolen by others—then it is impossible for conduct related to the theft of that same
property to be attributed to him for sentencing.

For this point, Yousef relies on Nicolescu. There, we held that the district court erred in
applying fence enhancements to conspirators in a fraud and identity-theft scheme, where the
participants stole and sold credit card information. Id. at 713. We reasoned that a defendant
cannot be both fence and thief, because a person cannot “‘receive’ goods he himself stole.” Id. at
722. But Nicolescu does not help Yousef. Nicolescu addresses when we may apply the fence
enhancement. It says nothing about whether a fence can be subject to other enhancements.

Length and degree of Yousef’s participation in the scheme. Yousef had significant
involvement in the robbery-and-resale scheme. Without Yousef, there is no scheme, as he seems
to be the only coconspirator with the means, skills, and opportunities to make the robberies a
reliably profitable enterprise. And he participated for the duration of scheme. To that end, cell-
phone data and license-plate toll records show Yousef’s involvement in eleven robberies over the
course of nearly a year. In these robberies, Yousef’s coconspirators, at Yousef’s request and for
his benefit, stole merchandise valued at $330,194.93.

Yousef’s only response is that there were multiple schemes, not a single scheme. But we
have addressed and rejected this argument.

---

A majority of the Donadeo factors supports the district court’s findings that the
possession of firearms, theft of a cell phone from a store employee, and physical restraint of store
No. 25-1426 United States v. Yousef Page 10

employees during the robberies were within the scope of Yousef’s jointly undertaken criminal
activity. And because Yousef does not contest that these actions were in furtherance of criminal
activity and reasonably foreseeable, the district court did not err in applying the theft, dangerous-
weapon, and physical-restraint enhancements.

B.

Next, Yousef challenges the district court’s application of the sophisticated-means
enhancement. We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings
for clear error. United States v. Nunley, 29 F.4th 824, 830 (6th Cir. 2022). Our caselaw has not
resolved whether we review the application of the enhancement to those factual findings for clear
error or de novo. United States v. Karasarides, 159 F.4th 972, 997 (6th Cir. 2025). But because
Yousef’s challenge fails under either standard, we need not take a side in the debate.

The Sentencing Guidelines call for a two-level enhancement for use of sophisticated
means. The sophisticated-means enhancement applies when “the offense . . . involved
sophisticated means and the defendant intentionally engaged in or caused the conduct
constituting sophisticated means.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). “Sophisticated means” are
“especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or
concealment of an offense.” United States v. Simmerman, 850 F.3d 829, 833 (6th Cir. 2017)
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B)). Such conduct includes “hiding assets or transactions, or
both, through the use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial accounts.” Id.
But that is not the only conduct that qualifies as sophisticated means. In determining the
sophistication of the offense, we consider the “totality of the defendant’s conduct.” United
States v. Chappelle, 78 F.4th 854, 862 (6th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). An otherwise simple
theft may nevertheless trigger the enhancement if the means to conceal the theft were
sophisticated. See Simmerman, 850 F.3d at 833.

The district court did not err in applying the sophisticated-means enhancement. The clear
weight of the evidence supports its determination that Yousef, using his technical expertise in
cell-phone repair, bypassed phone manufacturers’ anti-theft mechanisms to ensure the devices
were saleable. Yousef explained that he could “clean” a stolen phone of identifying information
No. 25-1426 United States v. Yousef Page 11

so that it could be used without detection. In fact, text messages show that he would charge $75
to perform this service on a single phone, indicating the value of this specialized knowledge. He
also relied on his technical expertise when he advised the thieves to avoid older cell phone
models because they are easier for authorities to track. So even if the robberies lacked
sophistication, Yousef’s efforts to avoid detection—for himself, his coconspirators, and his
customers—were those of an industry pro. See id. (upholding a sophisticated-means
enhancement where a bank employee, who stole money by simply taking it out of the vault, used
specialized industry and company knowledge to conceal her crime).

Moreover, Yousef operated on a global scale. One investigator testified that some of the
goods stolen in the January 20, 2021 robbery ended up in Hong Kong and Dubai, where an
unlocked, untraceable iPhone fetches a much higher price than in the United States. Yousef
knew about these specialized markets and knew how to place his merchandise there—again, not
the conduct of an ordinary dealer in black-market goods. And aside from the scheme’s
international component, selling phones stolen in Michigan to buyers in Illinois suffices to
support a sophisticated-means enhancement, as the use of multiple jurisdictions in furtherance of
a crime is a signature example of sophisticated means. See United States v. Woodson, 960 F.3d
852, 854 (6th Cir. 2020); see also U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B).

Yousef asserts that he did only what was necessary to ensure the goods were marketable
and profitable, and therefore his conduct was not “especially complex or especially intricate.”
See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B). But whether Yousef’s conduct was normal or ordinary
behavior for a person dealing in stolen cell phones has no bearing on its sophistication. Even if
Yousef is correct that success in his chosen enterprise requires the sophistication seen here, that
only justifies why the enhancement applies: without sophistication, Yousef would not have been
able to maintain his illegal scheme and evade authorities for as long as he did.

III.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.