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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

India Thomason v. Denise Bradshaw, as Administratrix of the Estate of David Bradshaw, III

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-CA-0074
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Easton

• Disposition: OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART ON APPEAL 2025-CA-0034-MR AND AFFIRMING ON CROSS-APPEAL 2025-CA-0074-MR

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.2K)

• PDF

Disposition

OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART ON APPEAL 2025-CA-0034-MR AND AFFIRMING ON CROSS-APPEAL 2025-CA-0074-MR

Combined Opinion

RENDERED: MARCH 27, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0034-MR

DENISE BRADSHAW, AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF DAVID BRADSHAW, III, AND
AMANDA GORDON, AS GUARDIAN
FOR DAVID BRADSHAW, IV, AND
DARRIAN BRADSHAW APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LUCY ANNE VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CI-03277

INDIA THOMASON APPELLEE

AND

NO. 2025-CA-0074-MR

INDIA THOMASON CROSS-APPELLANT

CROSS-APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LUCY ANNE VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CI-03277
DENISE BRADSHAW, AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF DAVID BRADSHAW, III, AND
AMANDA GORDON, AS GUARDIAN
FOR DAVID BRADSHAW, IV, AND
DARRIAN BRADSHAW CROSS-APPELLEES

OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
ON APPEAL 2025-CA-0034-MR AND
AFFIRMING ON CROSS-APPEAL 2025-CA-0074-MR

---

BEFORE: ACREE, EASTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: This is an appeal and cross-appeal in a wrongful death case

resulting from a collision between a motorcycle and a school bus after the school

bus driver made a right turn on a red light. After a jury trial, both vehicle operators

were found to be negligent with an apportionment of fault of 67% for the

motorcycle operator and 33% for the bus driver.

The trial court concluded that Kentucky school bus safety standards

prohibiting a right turn on a red light did not apply to the bus driver in this case,

because the Kentucky Board of Education was not authorized to regulate that bus

owner’s operation of a school bus. As a result, the circuit court did not instruct the

-2-
jury about this specific duty as negligence per se.1 We conclude that the school

bus driver was subject to Kentucky school bus safety standards and had a specific

duty not to turn right on a red light. Because the circuit court imposed only the

incomplete duty of “ordinary care” generally to the school bus driver, we reverse

the judgment and remand for a new trial to determine only apportionment of fault.

We find no abuse of discretion in the various evidentiary issues raised by both

sides, and so we otherwise affirm the circuit court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

David Bradshaw (Bradshaw) was operating a motorcycle on North

Broadway in Lexington. He was headed toward town and was in the left lane.

Appellee India Thomason (Thomason) was driving a school bus. Thomason was

turning onto North Broadway from New Circle Road. She had a red light. She

decided to turn right onto North Broadway going in the same direction as

Bradshaw. The bus was going into the left lane too. Bradshaw struck the back of

the school bus. He then hit a wall. He died from his injuries.

1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 446.070 codifies the common law doctrine of negligence per
se. Specifically, it authorizes a civil action when a statutory violation causes harm. In this case,
the question is whether a violation of a regulation issued pursuant to statutory authority caused
harm. Negligence per se extends to regulation violations when the regulation is consistent with
its enabling statute and applies to the safety of the citizenry. See St Luke Hosp. Inc. v. Straub,
354 S.W.3d 529 (Ky. 2011). The Appellants do not argue that the regulation at issue cannot
support negligence per se. Rather, they argue the regulation does not apply.

-3-
The school bus was owned by Lexington-Fayette Urban County

Government (LFUCG). Thomason was employed by LFUCG as the

Transportation Coordinator with the Division of Youth Services. Part of

Thomason’s job duties included providing transportation for Fayette County Public

Schools (FCPS) students attending the Audrey Grievous Center (AGC), formerly

known as the Lexington Day Treatment Center. AGC provides certified school

instruction in accordance with a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between

LFUCG and FCPS.

Section 1 of the MOA describes AGC as:

a treatment program with an educational component
operated by the LFUCG in conjunction with the
Kentucky Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) and the
Fayette County Public Schools (FCPS) for Lexington
Fayette County middle and high school youth.
The mission of the Center is to provide youth with the
academic, behavior, and social skills needed to
successfully transition back to their home schools and
graduate.

In addition to therapeutic services, students receive state-mandated

educational instruction provided by certified public school teachers employed by

FCPS on the AGC premises. Although the MOA is silent on the issue of

transportation on regular school days, FCPS students are required to either ride the

school bus owned by LFUCG or have a parent transport them to and from AGC.

-4-
At the time of the collision, Thomason was dropping off her last

FCPS student for that school day. Thomason was driving a traditional yellow

school bus affixed with signs and markings required by regulation, including the

“Right Turn on Red Prohibited” sign on the right rear bumper.

Appellants brought this wrongful death lawsuit against LFUCG as the

owner of the bus and against Thomason as the driver in both her individual and

official capacities. LFUCG and Thomason, in her official capacity, filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment based on sovereign immunity. In May 2023, the trial court

granted the motion and dismissed all claims against LFUCG and Thomason in her

official capacity, leaving only her individual liability to be determined.

In November 2023, the trial court entered an order related to several

motions to exclude expert testimony and decided to reserve the issue of the school

bus driver’s duties for a later date. The contested issue was specifically about

whether Thomason could turn right on a red light while driving this school bus.

After the filing of briefs related to the issue, the trial court conducted a hearing. In

April 2024, the circuit court ruled that Thomason’s duty was not that of a school

bus driver, so she had no specific duty of care not to make a right turn on a red

light while operating a school bus owned by LFUCG.

The case proceeded to trial in November 2024. Photographs of the

bus showing a “Right Turn on Red Prohibited” sign were admitted into evidence

-5-
without any explanation about how the trial court had ruled on the issue of whether

that prohibition applied to Thomason. As the jury began deliberations, the first

question they asked was whether this sign on the back of the bus reflected

Kentucky law, and whether the sign in the picture was evidence the jury could use.

Counsel specifically requested the circuit court to advise the jury about its ruling

that this regulation did not apply to Thomason, but the trial court refused. Instead,

the trial court advised the jury that “the legal duties of Ms. Thomas and Mr.

Bradshaw are set forth in the instructions. The photo is in evidence.” We will not

speculate on whether that particular response cleared up any jury confusion.

Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellants, finding

both parties at fault and apportioning that fault two-to-one to Bradshaw as

compared to Thomason. The jury awarded compensatory damages but rejected

Appellants’ claim for punitive damages, finding no evidence of gross negligence or

wanton conduct by Thomason. Appellants filed this timely appeal, and Thomason

filed a cross-appeal. All issues have been properly preserved, and all briefs are

compliant with the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a legal duty exists is purely a question of law, and questions

of law are generally resolved by the court, not the jury. Bartley v Commonwealth,

400 S.W.3d 714, 726 (Ky. 2013) (citations omitted). Issues of law are reviewed de

-6-
novo by the appellate courts. Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Department of Revenue,

294 S.W.3d 10, 16 (Ky. App. 2008) (citations omitted). Issues concerning the trial

court’s evidentiary rulings, including the admission of expert testimony, are

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson,

11 S.W.3d 575, 577–78 (Ky. 2000). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the

trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound

legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)

(citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

APPEAL 2025-CA-0034

Appellants claim the following errors on appeal: (1) the circuit court

erroneously concluded that KRS 156.160, KRS 189.540, and 2018 702 KAR2

5:080 did not apply to Thomason based on the argument that the Kentucky Board

of Education did not have authority to regulate LFUCG’s school bus operations,

and, as a result, the circuit court applied the wrong legal duty; (2) related to their

first argument, they insist that the circuit court misinterpreted Cornette v.

Commonwealth, 899 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. App. 1995), which resulted in the

application of an incomplete legal duty of care; (3) next the circuit court erred

when it decided a genuine issue of fact that Thomason was permitted to turn right

2
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.

-7-
on a red light instead of allowing the jury to decide that as a fact; (4) then the

circuit court erred when it denied Appellants’ request to introduce evidence about

Thomason’s operator’s license; and (5) finally, the trial court erred in allowing the

testimony of Appellee’s expert that Bradshaw was operating his motorcycle at a

high rate of speed or in excess of the speed limit, and in refusing to admonish the

jury to disregard this testimony.

AGC IS PART OF A PUBLIC SCHOOL

Appellants’ first three challenges concern a central issue: whether the

bus Thomason was driving on the day of the collision was a “school bus” subject

to the prohibition against making a right turn on a red light. The answer to this

question is resolved by first determining whether AGC is a public school and then

determining whether the bus owned by LFUCG but transporting FCPS students,

who also attend AGC, is a “school bus” subject to Kentucky school bus safety

standards. We answer both questions in the affirmative.

Kentucky Constitution § 183 provides that “[t]he General Assembly

shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common

schools throughout the State.” KRS 158.030(1) defines “Common school” as a

secondary school of the state, supported in whole or in part by public taxation,

taught by a certified teacher for a minimum school term as defined by KRS

158.070. “Common school” is a term synonymous with “public” school. It is a

-8-
term treated as mutually exclusive with nonpublic school by the provisions of KRS

159.030. Fannin v. Williams, 655 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Ky. 1983) (citations omitted).

KRS Chapter 159 governs “Compulsory Attendance” and spans KRS

159.010 through KRS 159.990. These provisions require Kentucky parents to

“send” their children who are between the ages of six and sixteen to school. KRS

159.010. The exemptions from compulsory attendance at public schools

recognized in KRS 159.030(1) include a child “(b) [who] is enrolled and in regular

attendance in a private, parochial, or church regular day school.”

While Thomason argued, and the trial court agreed, that AGC was not

a school but rather a “treatment program” with an educational component,

Kentucky law requires children to attend “school.” And Ch. 159 classifies schools

as either (1) public, (2) private, (3) parochial, or (4) church. There is no option for

attendance of a “program.” Since AGC students are required to attend school, and

there is no evidence that AGC students receive state-mandated educational

instruction anywhere else, we must determine that AGC is part of a public school.

The operational framework between AGC, LFUCG, and FCPS is

articulated in the MOA. Pursuant to this agreement, LFUCG provides therapeutic

services to AGC middle and high school students, including group and individual

counseling sessions. FCPS is responsible for public school instruction at 6 hours

per day for 177 days annually, with instruction for extended days, as required by

-9-
Kentucky law and the Kentucky Educational Collaborative for State Agency

Children (KECSAC).3

FCPS is responsible for employing and supervising teachers and

support staff in following KECSAC guidelines and must inform LFUCG of the

number of students that will be in the AGC program for the regular school year

after KECSAC funding has been confirmed.4 The purchase and provision of all

instructions, supplies, books, and reference materials are provided by FCPS. All

grades, attendance, and other information regarding students’ progress at AGC is

transferred to the student’s assigned or “home” school within timeframes

established by FCPS.

AGC provides education to students in the custody of the

Commonwealth referred to them by JCC, the Department for Community Based

Services, Truancy Court, and the Family Accountability, Intervention and

Response Team. Section 2 of the AGC Student Handbook provides that teaching

staff are employed by Fayette County Board of Education and all grades are

transferable to and from FCPS. AGC students graduate from high school in the

3
KECSAC is a statewide collaborative that works with state agencies, school districts, and local
programs to ensure that state agency children receive a quality education comparable to all
Kentucky students. “State Agency Children” are those children in the custody or supervision of
the Commonwealth and served in programs funded and/or operated by DJJ.

4
MOA Section IV, TR: Vol. III, p. 465.

-10-
Fayette County School District upon completion of a minimum of twenty-two (22)

credits in compliance with state and local requirements. AGC students can also

earn advanced college placement credits through the Fayette County School

District. And both AGC and FCPS hold AGC out as a non-traditional “school” on

their respective websites.

There is no evidence, or even argument, that AGC is a parochial or

church school. AGC has no religious affiliations. AGC is also not a private

school. AGC students do not elect to attend AGC and do not pay private tuition

for their instruction at AGC. Stephanie Hong, Directory of Youth Services at

LFUCG, testified that students attending AGC are required, or court-ordered, to

attend AGC’s program. These students are removed from their public assigned or

“home” school and involuntarily placed in the AGC program where they receive

necessary therapeutic interventions and state-mandated educational instruction that

the school district, FCPS, is required to provide.

The evidence clearly establishes that AGC is a public school, often

referred to as an alternative school. FCPS meets its state-mandated educational

obligation by outsourcing it to LFUCG by contract. This school facility may be

owned by LFUCG, but it is operated in part by the county school district, FCPS.

This school is supported by public taxation, and students there receive state-

mandated educational instruction from certified teachers in timeframes required by

-11-
Kentucky law. AGC meets the definition of “common” or public school, and a

public school is included in the acceptable classifications of schools for state-

mandated education.

THOMASON WAS PROHIBITED FROM
TURNING RIGHT ON A RED LIGHT

Having determined that AGC students are public school students, we

next determine whether the bus transporting these students is a school bus subject

to safety standards promulgated by the Kentucky Board of Education. As we will

discuss below, Kentucky statutes authorize the Board of Education to promulgate

administrative regulations establishing standards school districts shall meet in the

transportation of children to and from school. The trial court determined that these

authorizing statutes and resulting bus safety regulations were not binding on

LFUCG or Thomason because the Kentucky Board of Education is not authorized

to regulate LFUCG’s operation of buses. Specifically, the trial court determined

that LFUCG was neither a school district nor a “private” contractor and so its

buses and bus drivers were not subject to school bus safety regulations.

Two statutes authorize the Kentucky Board of Education to

promulgate regulations concerning transportation of public school students on

school buses: KRS 156.160 and KRS 189.540. As a result of these authorizing

statutes, the Kentucky Board of Education promulgated 2018 702 KAR 5:080,

which prohibits a right turn on a red light by a school bus. The trial court ruled

-12-
that the authorizing statutes were inapplicable to this case, and, as a result, 2018

702 KAR 5:080 did not apply. The effect of this ruling was to impose on

Thomason a duty of only ordinary care, which permitted her to make a right turn

on a red light to the extent other drivers were permitted to do so.

AGC STUDENTS ARE TRANSPORTED BY THE AUTHORITY
OF THE FAYETTE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

KRS 156.160(1), provides as follows:

With the advice of the Local Superintendents Advisory
Council, the Kentucky Board of Education shall
promulgate administrative regulations establishing
standards which school districts shall meet in student,
program, service, and operational performance. These
regulations shall comply with the expected outcomes for
students and schools set forth in KRS 158.6451.
Administrative regulations shall be promulgated for the
following:

...

(k) The transportation of children to and from school.

KRS 156.153(3) defines the term “school bus” as:

any motor vehicle which meets the standards and
specifications for school buses as provided by law or by
the standards or specifications of the Kentucky
Department of Education authorized by law and used
solely in transporting school children and school
employees to and from school under the supervision and
control and at the direction of school authorities . . . .

The circuit court determined that KRS 156.160 did not apply to the

bus at issue in this case because this statute regulates school districts, and LFUCG

-13-
is not a school district. The circuit court’s focus was narrowly on the status of the

bus owner rather than on the use of the bus.

As we have said, AGC meets the definition of a public school, and

buses going to and from that location are used for public school student

transportation. While LFUCG has contractually agreed with FCPS to assume

transportation duties during the regular school day, they do so on behalf of FCPS.

The Fayette County School District is responsible for transportation of its students,

but there is no requirement that the school district own the bus. It is enough that

school transportation happens “at the direction of” school authorities. KRS

156.153(3).

To rule otherwise would create an unintended loophole, based on

ownership of the bus, which allows a different, reduced, standard of school bus

safety for students attending court-ordered public alternative schools as compared

to those students attending their public “home” school. Such a loophole would be

contrary to the spirit of the law in ensuring the safe transportation of public school

children. But the parties have also argued about another authorizing statute, and

we should address this argument as well.

LFUCG IS A CONTRACTOR FOR
FAYETTE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS

The second authorizing statute is KRS 189.540(1), which provides:

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(1)(a) The Kentucky Board of Education shall
promulgate administrative regulations to govern the
design and operation of all Kentucky school buses and to
govern the operation of passenger vehicles owned,
leased, or privately contracted by the district that
transport students under KRS 156.153(3).

(b) The board shall, with the advice and aid of the
Department of Kentucky State Police and the
Transportation Cabinet, enforce the administrative
regulations governing the operation of all school buses,
whether owned by a school district or privately
contracted, and all passenger vehicles owned, leased, or
privately contracted by the district that transport students
under KRS 156.153(3).

(c) The administrative regulations covering the operation
shall by reference be made a part of any contract with a
school district. Every school district and private
contractor referred to under this subsection shall be
subject to those regulations.

...

(3) Any employee of any school district who violates
any of the administrative regulations in any contract
executed on behalf of a school district shall be subject to
removal from office. Any person operating a school bus
or passenger vehicle to transport students under contract
with a school district who fails to comply with any of the
administrative regulations shall be guilty of breach of
contract and the contract shall be canceled after proper
notice and a hearing by the responsible officers of such
school district.

(4)(a) Any person who operates a school bus shall be
required to possess a commercial driver’s license issued
pursuant to KRS 281A.170 with a school bus
endorsement as described in KRS 281A.175.

-15-
This statute presents problems with how language is used within the

various sections. Subsections (1)(a) and (3) separate school buses from passenger

vehicles “privately contracted.” Subsection (1)(b) then makes a reference to “all

school buses, whether owned by a school district or privately contracted.” But

Subsections (1)(c) and (3) also have provisions referring to “any contract.” The

circuit court relied on the “privately contracted” language and then relied heavily

on this Court’s decision in Cornette v. Commonwealth, supra. Ultimately, the

circuit court determined that KRS 189.540 did not apply because this statute only

applies to school districts and their private contractors, and LFUCG is not a

private contractor but rather a public entity.

The trial court based its determination on several factors. First, the

MOA between the LFUCG and the FCPS describes AGC as a treatment program

with an educational component operated by LFUCG in conjunction with other

agencies. Next, the trial court relied on Appellants’ own description of AGC as a

collaborative program and contractor. The trial court construed AGC to be “an

LFUCG program/school for which the LFUCG contracts with FCPS for certain

educational components.” So, according to the circuit court, LFUCG was not the

“private contractor” for FCPS, but rather, FCPS was a contractor for LFUCG.

Based on this conclusion, the circuit court reasoned that KRS 189.540 and the

regulations it authorizes are not binding upon an employee of LFUCG.

-16-
Again, AGC is a public-school facility, owned and operated, in part,

by LFUCG. FCPS outsourced its student transportation obligation for AGC

students in the Fayette County School District to LFUCG by contractual

agreement. If, conversely, FCPS was the private contractor for LFUCG, FCPS

would have used its own school buses. Instead, FCPS outsourced its transportation

responsibility to LFUCG, a contractor, who purchased the school bus at issue for

the purpose of transporting students to their court-ordered public alternative school

in the Fayette County School District.

We recognize the confusion created by reference in the statute to a

“private contractor” when the contract is with a public entity. The point is that

FCPS entered into a contract for transportation. To say that the statute does not

apply to this contractor status defeats the very purpose of the statute, and we

believe would lead to an absurd and unintended result. As we have already said,

apart from the somewhat inconsistent “private” contractor language in KRS

189.540, the transportation duty for school buses imposed by KRS 156.153 and

KRS 156.160 applies, regardless of any “private” contractor status under KRS

189.540.

KRS 158.110(4) also provides that Boards of Education shall adopt

policies to ensure the comfort, health, and safety of the pupils who are transported

consistent with the regulations of the Kentucky Board of Education regarding the

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transportation of pupils. There is no dispute that LFUCG purchased the bus for the

purpose of providing transportation of pupils. And although Appellee argues that

Kentucky school bus safety standards do not apply to LFUCG buses, LFUCG

ensured its traditional yellow school bus did comply. The purchase order for the

school bus at issue required compliance with the Kentucky Department of

Education Master Agreement ensuring minimum specifications for school district

equipment. Whether LFUCG believed such compliance was necessary, or this was

simply a gratuitous acquiescence, we determine that Kentucky school bus safety

standards did in fact apply to the bus operated by Thomason on the day of the

collision.

Basically, Thomason asks us to believe that AGC is not a school and

that the traditional yellow bus with flashing red lights transporting public school

students is not a school bus. Thomason then also appears to ask us to believe that

other drivers will appreciate the “Right Turn on Red Prohibited” sign on the rear

bumper of this bus does not really apply to that particular bus. For the reasons we

have stated, we decline to do so.

At this point we note the reliance on Cornette is misplaced. That case

also involved a challenge to an administrative regulation, the promulgation of

which was authorized by KRS 156.160 and KRS 189.540. The regulation applied

in that case required post-accident drug testing of public-school bus drivers under

-18-
certain conditions,5 and the constitutional challenge made concerned whether the

Kentucky Department of Education had the authority to regulate only its buses or

its drivers as well. This Court upheld the constitutionality of the regulation,

finding “the state’s interest in insuring the safety of school children must be

balanced against the privacy interests of the bus drivers.” Cornette, 899 S.W.2d at

508. While the Court in Cornette noted that the General Assembly may enact

legislation that applies to public schools, but not necessarily private schools to the

same extent, AGC again is not a private school.

Thomason owed a specific duty of care required of Kentucky public

school bus drivers not to make a right turn on a red light. The circuit court

imposed an incomplete legal standard of care. We must now address to what

extent this error impacted the proceedings in the circuit court.

“When a statutory duty is supported by evidence, it must be

incorporated into a jury instruction as a ‘specific duty.’” Henson v. Klein, 319

S.W.3d 413, 421 (Ky. 2010). A failure to give a specific duty based on negligence

per se is a harmless error only when no evidence at the trial shows that the injuries

claimed resulted from that violation. See Tucker v. Ragland-Potter Co., 148

5
702 KAR 5:080 requires drug testing of public-school bus drivers following an accident
resulting in bodily injury or in $1000.00 property damage, except when the bus is struck while
legally parked.

-19-
S.W.2d 691, 696 (Ky. 1952). That cannot be said in this case. So, we must decide

what must be done on remand.

We do not believe that a retrial on the question of negligence

generally is required. Without question, the evidence supports the findings by the

jury that both vehicle operators at least violated their general duty of ordinary care.

Damages are by design in jury instructions completely separate from

apportionment of fault. As we will explain in our further analysis, we find no

errors in the evidentiary rulings of the circuit court which could have impacted the

determinations of negligence. Nothing impairs the previous assessment of

damages.6 We conclude then that the error affects only the apportionment of fault

determinations. And thus, only that question must be addressed at a new trial.

THOMASON’S TYPE OF LICENSE

Appellants’ fourth contention is that the trial court erred when it

denied their Motion for Reconsideration. This argument relates to the

admissibility of evidence of what type of driver’s license Thomason had.

Appellants argue an “S” endorsement was required to comply with Kentucky

school bus standards and so Thomason also should have held the “S” endorsement

on her license, which she did not have.

6
Thomason’s negligence in the operation of the school bus was ordinary driver negligence and
would not sustain an award of punitive damages. See M.T. v. Saum, 3 F. Supp. 3d 617, 624-25
(W.D. Ky. 2014).

-20-
The circuit court did not err in excluding this evidence. As the

Kentucky Supreme Court explained over 25 years ago, the absence of a proper

license is not evidence that a driver did not exercise ordinary care or otherwise

properly operate her vehicle. Rentschler v. Lewis, 33 S.W.3d 518, 519-21 (Ky.

2000). This argument confuses the issues; it is a waste of time, and any probative

value of evidence of what kind of license Thomason had is outweighed by the

danger of undue prejudice. KRE7 403.

TESTIMONY OF PETER CURLESS

Appellants’ final contention is that the trial court erred in allowing the

testimony of Appellee’s expert, Peter Curless, that Bradshaw was operating his

motorcycle at a high rate of speed or in excess of the speed limit and by not

admonishing the jury to disregard this testimony.

Prior to trial, Appellants attempted to prevent Curless from

speculating as to speed and to limit his testimony. In its November 2024 Order,

the trial court ruled that Curless was “permitted to testify that the decedent was

traveling in the low 40’s at the time of the collision but he cannot testify that the

decedent was driving at a ‘high rate’ or ‘excessive speed.’”8 At trial, Curless

estimated that the bus was possibly going 26 mph at the point of impact and that

7
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
8
TR: Vol. XII, pg. 2909.

-21-
the motorcycle was going faster than the bus. Appellants moved to have the trial

court admonish the jury regarding the Curless’s testimony that the motorcycle was

“going at a high rate of speed.” The trial court refused. We cannot say this was an

abuse of discretion as the testimony did not include a speed more than the low

40’s. Curless complied with the permissible limitations imposed by the trial

court’s November 2024 Order.

CROSS-APPEAL 2025-CA-0074

MARIJUANA EVIDENCE

Thomason raises four issues in her cross-appeal. The first error

concerns the trial court’s exclusion of marijuana evidence, including testimony

offered by defense toxicologist Mike Ward (Ward). The trial court granted

Appellants’ motion to exclude this evidence, upon finding no expert would opine

that Bradshaw was operating under the affects of THC at the time of the collision.

The trial court reasoned that “without such expert testimony, the presence of THC

in the decedent’s blood or on his person is not relevant and must be excluded.”9

Thomason argues this evidence should have been admitted as relevant

under KRE 401/402 and KRE 702. She insists that comparative fault and

causation turned on why Bradshaw was weaving through traffic and attempting a

pass using a road shoulder. Thomason proffered blood toxicology, recovery of a

9
TR: Vol. VIII, p. 1730.

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bagged leafy substance, and Ward’s testimony explaining delta-9-THC’s

established effects on perception, attention, reaction time, and psychomotor

control. Thomason insists this information would have given jurors specialized

context to evaluate the observed driving.

But Ward admittedly could not opine that Bradshaw was impaired at

the time of the crash. Ward was not certain of the last time Bradshaw may have

used marijuana prior to the crash, and there was no evidence Bradshaw consumed

marijuana near the time of the crash.10

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence.

The trial court is tasked with balancing the probative value of evidence against

danger of undue prejudice as required by KRE 403. The language of KRE 403 is

carefully calculated to leave trial judges with extraordinary discretion in the

application and use of KRE 403. Probus v. Commonwealth, 578 S.W.3d 339, 347

(Ky. 2019) (citations omitted).

The trial court’s ruling excluding the marijuana evidence and Ward’s

testimony is supported by sound legal principles and consistent with the holding of

the Kentucky Supreme Court in Burton v. Commonwealth, 300 S.W.3d 126, 137-

38 (Ky. 2009), wherein our highest court found that a trial court correctly excludes

10
Deposition testimony of Mike Ward, August 28, 2023, at 33:10-36:1, 35:16-36:1, 39: 25-40:3,
41:1-10, 45:21-46:5, 48: 20-24; TR: Vol. V, p. 1056-71.

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testimony of a toxicologist where he cannot establish when a defendant ingests

illegal substances or whether he was impaired at the time of the accident.

OTHER TESTIMONY OF PETER CURLESS

The second issue raised in the cross-appeal concerns the trial court’s

exclusion of expert Curless from offering his opinion that Thomason’s right turn

on red was safe, reasonable, and not a contributing cause of the collision.

Appellees argue that Curless, a mechanical engineer with three decades of

experience in accident reconstruction, was eminently qualified to offer such an

opinion.

The trial court excluded the testimony upon finding that whether the

collision “involved a right hand turn on red” or was the result of an “aggressive

passing maneuver” are matters best left to the discretion of the jury to determine

based upon the evidence presented by the parties. The trial court concluded that

expert opinion on these issues will not assist the trier of fact.11 This determination

was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.

TESTIMONY OF OFFICER HOGAN

The third issue raised in the Cross-Appeal concerns the trial court’s

exclusion of testimony of Officer Hogan (Hogan), a Lexington Police Officer, as to

11
TR: Vol. VIII, p. 1729.

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causation. The trial court found that Hogan was not properly disclosed as an

expert witness based on the following:

The Answers to Interrogatories did nothing more than
state that a police officer “may” be called to testify.
Defendant did not identify the person, the subject matter,
or the substance on which the expert was expected to
testify. Similarly, the Witness List identified Officer
Hogan, but did not identify the subject matter or
substance on which he is expected to testify.

Relying on this Court’s decision in Clephas v. Garlock, Inc., 168 S.W.3d 389, (Ky.

App. 2004), the trial court ruled that, because Hogan was not properly identified as

an expert witness, he could not testify as an expert but could offer lay witness

testimony regarding his observations and actions at the scene of the collision.

Appellees argue that the trial court’s remedy swept too broadly. We disagree.

A generalized statement outlining a broad subject matter about which

an expert may testify does not sufficiently apprise the other party of the

information needed to prepare for trial as contemplated and mandated by the notice

requirements of CR 26.02(4)(a). Clephas, 168 S.W.3d at 393-94. The trial court

did not abuse its discretion in limiting Hogan’s testimony to lay observations and

actions at the scene.

CURATIVE INSTRUCTION

The fourth and final issue raised in the cross-appeal concerns the trial

court’s refusal to issue a curative instruction to the jury regarding the status of the

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bus driver’s right to turn right at a red light. This issue is rendered moot by our

decision on the direct appeal.

CONCLUSION

Because AGC is in part a public school with FCPS students attending

and being transported to and from it, Thomason was driving a school bus which

was prohibited from turning right on a red light. Because the circuit court did not

instruct the jury on this specific duty, we reverse the apportionment of fault portion

of the judgment for a new trial limited to that issue. A new trial on an issue

provides a clean slate as to the trial of that issue with new rulings on evidence

which may be presented on the retrial of that issue. See generally Proceedings at

New Trial in Civil Cases, 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 396. With our rulings as to

the evidentiary issues raised in this appeal of the first trial, we express no opinion

on such future rulings by the circuit court.

The jury will be instructed as before on the duties of the operators but

with the addition of this specific duty owed by Thomason. The jury will then be

instructed that it has been determined that both operators violated their duties, and

the jury is only to determine apportionment of fault. The jury will not be informed

of the prior apportionment of fault, nor will they be told of any amounts of

damages awarded. While the jury may wonder about damages, it will suffice for

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the circuit court to inform the jury that damages have been determined and that

they are not to speculate as to the amount.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS/CROSS- BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-
APPELLEES: APPELLANT:

Megan E. Ziegman Barbara A. Kriz
Kendra L. Rimbert Cael T. Henshaw
Louisville, Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky

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