John R. Parks v. Drew T. Adams - Easement Dispute

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

John R. Parks, Joe T. Harrison, Joey Harrison, Johnny Bratton, and Tyler Orr v. Drew T. Adams, Abbie G. Adams, the United States of America, and Natural Resources Conservation Service

District Court, W.D. Tennessee

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-01130

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (20)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (54.4K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN R. PARKS, JOE T. HARRISON,
JOEY HARRISON, JOHNNY BRATTON, and
TYLER ORR,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 1:25-cv-01130-JDB-jay

DREW T. ADAMS, ABBIE G. ADAMS,
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and
NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION
SERVICE,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION
In a complaint filed May 30, 2025, the Plaintiffs, John R. Parks, Joe T. Harrison, Joey
Harrison, Johnny Bratton, and Tyler Orr, brought this action against the Defendants, Drew T.
Adams, Abbie G. Adams, the United States of America, and the Natural Resources Conservation
Service (“NRCS”), alleging easement by prescription (Count I), easement by law (Count II), and
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Count III). (Docket Entry
(“D.E.”) 1.) Pending on the Court’s docket is the motion of the United States and NRCS
(collectively, the “Federal Defendants” or the “Movants”) to dismiss the claims against them
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.E. 21.) The
Plaintiffs have responded (D.E. 22), and the Movants have replied (D.E. 24).
FACTS ALLEGED
The facts alleged in the complaint are as follows. On December 16, 1996, Parks purchased
a one-fourth undivided interest in real property located near Locust Grove Road in Dyer County,
Tennessee, described as Map 21 and Parcel 7.01 as recorded in the Dyer County Register of Deeds
Book 311, Page 628 (the “Hunting Property”). Plaintiffs Joe and Joey Harrison together obtained

a one-fourth undivided interest in the Hunting Property in 1999, as did Plaintiffs Bratton in 2006
and Orr in 2024. Parks’ father and uncle had owned adjacent property described as Map 21 and
Parcel 6.03, as recorded in the Dyer County Register of Deeds Book 1035, Page 2788 (the “Adams
Property”) for many years.
In the 1960s, the United States Corps of Engineers enlarged the Obion River channel,
causing the Hunting Property to become landlocked by the river on the northwest side and by
farmland, woods, and/or wetlands owned by others on the remaining sides. In the late 1970s,
Parks’ father and uncle constructed a levee, topped by a pathway, along the eastern side of the
Adams Property. This pathway was the only means of accessing the Hunting Property. While the

parcel was sometimes also accessible by boat from the river channel, the more than twenty-mile
trip was burdensome and dangerous.
Parks’ father and uncle sold the Adams Property to Obion Grain Company, Inc. (the
“Company”) in 1996, which owned the parcel until 2023. Throughout that period, Parks continued
to use the levee path as the sole way of accessing the Hunting Property. In May 2023, the Company
entered into a warranty easement deed in perpetuity (the “Conservation Easement”) with the
United States in exchange for $2,256,488. Before it executed the easement, however, the
Company became aware it did not have sufficient land to secure the easement and entered into a
verbal agreement with Parks to provide an easement across the Adams Property to access the
Hunting Property. In exchange, Parks provided the Company with an easement across land
adjacent to the Adams Property in order to allow the Company to access its property from the road.
The Company never provided Parks with an easement to access the Hunting Property.
On May 26, 2023, the Adams Property was purchased from the Company by Defendants
Drew T. Adams and Abbie G. Adams (the “Adams Defendants”) subject to the Conservation

Easement. During the Adams Defendants’ ownership of the Adams Property, the Plaintiffs
continued to use the levee path to access the Hunting Property. In 2023, however, Drew Adams
informed Parks that the levee would be torn down to allow flooding of the Adams Property by
NRCS. The Adams Defendants subsequently built a fence around the Adams Property which
prohibited access to the Hunting Property by land.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

Rule 12(b)(1) permits the district court to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; the
plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating that either the Constitution or a statute has granted
the court jurisdiction over a given suit, and that it may therefore hear it.” Jude v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 908 F.3d 152, 157 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). “The United States has sovereign immunity and cannot be sued unless it
expressly consents.” Id. Such immunity is “jurisdictional in nature[;] [i]ndeed, the terms of the
United States’ consent to be sued in any court define the court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Id. (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)) (cleaned up). “A waiver of sovereign
immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” United States v. Mitchell, 445
U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] waiver of the Government’s
sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of scope, in favor of the sovereign.” United
States v. Certain Land Situated in the City of Detroit, 361 F.3d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 2004).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Rule 12(b)(6) permits the district court to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The complaint must meet the

pleading standards set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, which requires a complaint to contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). “[T]he plaintiff must allege facts that state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face
and that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Adams v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 154 F.4th 501, 508 (6th Cir. 2025) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the well-pleaded facts allow the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Mattera v. Baffert, 100 F.4th 734, 739 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (cleaned up), reh’g denied, 2024 WL 3206004 (6th Cir. June 10, 2024). The court must

“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[.]” Cook v. Ohio Nat’l Life Ins.
Co., 961 F.3d 850, 855 (6th Cir. 2020).
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES AND ANALYSIS
At the outset, the Plaintiffs, in their response to the instant motion, concede that dismissal
of Count II of the complaint as against the Movants is appropriate. Thus, Count II is hereby
DISMISSED as to the Federal Defendants only.
Count I.
Count I alleges that “Plaintiffs used the levee path for access to the Hunting Property in an
open, visible, continuous, notorious manner, uninterrupted, and international manner with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the owners of the Adams Property for twenty-eight . . . years.”
(D.E. 1 ¶ 36.) Therefore, Plaintiffs allege, they have established a prescriptive easement for use
of the levee path to access the Hunting Property that accrued prior to the Company’s entry into the
Conservation Easement with the Government.
The Federal Defendants seek dismissal of Count I under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The

Court will consider the parties’ arguments under subsection (b)(1) first. The Movants assert that
the claim contained in Count I is prohibited by the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (the “QTA”),
which states in pertinent part that “[t]he United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil
action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States
claims an interest[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). The QTA was intended by Congress to “provide the
exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the United States’ title to real
property.” Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983).
The district court is to “interpret a claim under the [QTA] in accordance with principles of federal
law, but look to state law for aid in applying the statute to the facts of the case so long as the state

law is compatible with federal policy.” Burlison v. United States, 533 F.3d 419, 426 (6th Cir.
2008).
“An easement is a right an owner has to some lawful use of the real property of another.”
Coolidge v. Keene, 614 S.W.3d 106, 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Pevear v. Hunt, 924
S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)). In Tennessee, an easement may be created through
various means, including by prescription. Id. To plausibly state a claim of prescriptive easement
under Tennessee law, usage of the property at issue “must be adverse, under claim of right,
continuous, uninterrupted, open, visible, exclusive, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
owner of the servient tenement, and must continue for the full prescription period” which, in
Tennessee, is twenty years. Cumulus Broad., Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 379 (Tenn. 2007). “A
prescriptive easement is not ownership and the right acquired is limited to the specific use.” Id. The burden of proving adverse usage lies with the prescriptive plaintiff. Id. at 377 (cleaned up).
In seeking dismissal of Count I, the Movants rely on subsection (n) of the QTA, which
expressly provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to permit suits against the

United States based upon adverse possession.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(n). By way of response,
Plaintiffs insist that they are not asserting a claim against the Government for adverse possession
but, rather, are claiming a prescriptive easement that vested before the Government acquired its
property interest in 2023. In doing so, they point to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Burlison.
The Burlison plaintiffs owned an interest in a landlocked property near the convergence of
the Mississippi and Hatchie Rivers. Burlison, 533 F.3d at 421. They had no means by which to
access their land except over a historic field access road passing through two other tracts that in
later years became part of a United States wildlife refuge. Id. In 2002, the Government denied
the Burlison plaintiffs use of the access road on the grounds that such use disturbed the waterfowl

and caused damage to the road. Id. at 423. The Burlison plaintiffs brought an action under the
QTA alleging the right to use the access road via various types of easements. Id. at 426.
Of relevance here, the Burlison plaintiffs argued they had an easement by prescription
under Tennessee law. The Court stated:
The [QTA] . . . may foreclose [the Burlison plaintiffs’] claim because it provides
that ‘nothing in this section shall be construed to permit suits against the United
States based upon adverse possession.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(n). [The Burlison
plaintiffs] argue that the [QTA] does not foreclose adverse possession claims that
ripened before the government acquired title to the lands in question. At least three
district courts have reached the conclusion that such suits do not constitute claims
of adverse possession against the United States, but rather are claims of adverse
possession against the prior owner. Tadlock v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 1035,
1037-38 (S.D. Miss. 1990); Brewer v. United States, 562 F. Supp. 128, 133 (E.D.
Mo. 1983); and Watt v. United States, No. 8:00CV552, 2002 WL 87056, at *3 (D.
Neb. Jan. 23, 2002) (unpublished opinion). Thus, [the Burlison plaintiffs’] claim
may be cognizable to the extent that it argues that they had an easement over the
field-access road prior to the government’s purchase of the [adjoining] tracts, rather
than that they obtained an easement against the government via adverse possession.

Id. at 428. The Burlison court did not clearly resolve the issue regarding prescriptive easements
in this Circuit, however, finding instead that the plaintiffs possessed an easement by reservation.
Id.
In reply, the Federal Defendants submit that the plain language of subsection (n) does not
differentiate between adverse possession claims under the QTA that accrue prior to the time when
the United States acquired its property interest, as was the case in Burlison and the cases cited
therein, and a case in which the claim vests after the Government’s acquisition of a property
interest. In support of their position, Movants cite to Hallauer v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., No.
CV-11-212-RMP, 2012 WL 3880055 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2012). In Hallauer, the plaintiffs
claimed a prescriptive easement in a roadway over land owned by the United States that accrued
prior to the Government’s acquisition of its interest. Hallauer, 2012 WL 3880055, at *5. The
district court recognized that there was some disagreement among federal courts as to the scope of
subsection (n), comparing Burlison to Dolan v. Madison, 197 F. App’x 724, 728 (10th Cir. 2006),
in which the appellate court identified the lower court as having held subsection (n) “to bar any
claims for adverse possession, regardless of when the claim may have accrued.” Id. (cleaned up).
The Hallauer court ultimately sided with Dolan, holding that
[k]eeping in mind the fact that the QTA acts as a waiver of sovereign immunity,
and conditions on waivers are to be construed strictly, the Court concludes that the
plain language of [§] 2409a(n) bars all claims based on adverse possession, no
matter when the claim accrued.

Id. (internal citation omitted).
Even if Plaintiffs’ claim for a prescriptive easement here could survive a Rule 12(b)(1)
challenge, the complaint fails under Rule 12(b)(6). It is the position of the Federal Defendants that
the complaint does not sufficiently allege that use of the levee path was “adverse, under claim of
right” or “continuous, uninterrupted” as required by Tennessee law. See Cumulus Broad., 226
S.W.3d at 379, supra.

Because it is dispositive, the Court will only consider the Movants’ assertion as to the
adversity element of the prescriptive easement claim. To be “adverse” under Tennessee law,
the use must be under a claim of right inconsistent with or contrary to the interest
of the owner and of such a character that it is difficult or impossible to account for
it except on the presumption of a grant; or use under a claim of right known to the
owner of a servient tenement; or use whenever desired without license, or
permission asked, or objection made such as the owner of an easement would make
of it, disregarding entirely the claims of the owner of the land.

Shoffner v. Urevbu, No. W2024-00464-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 2795279, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Oct. 1, 2025) (quoting House v. Close, 346 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961)). On the other
hand, “[p]ermissive uses of property are not adverse to the owner and, therefore, cannot constitute
adverse possession.” See id. at *15 (quoting Pierce v. Delashmitt, No. E2011-02748-COA-R3-
CV, 2012 WL 5839949, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2012)).
As previously quoted at the beginning of this section, Plaintiffs aver that they “used the
levee path for access to the Hunting Property in an open, visible, continuous, notorious manner,
uninterrupted, and international manner with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owners of the
Adams Property for twenty-eight . . . years.” (D.E. 1 ¶ 36.) In response to the Federal Defendants’
challenge, the Plaintiffs submit that “[u]se that is . . . without permission for decades raises a
presumption of adversity under Tennessee law.” (D.E. 22 at PageID 118.) However, it is the
response to the motion to dismiss, not the complaint, which purports to allege use of the path
without permission. Nor does the complaint contain facts to support such an averment. This
Circuit has held that “[t]he court may not take into account additional facts asserted in a
memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss, because such memoranda do not constitute
pleadings under Rule 7(a)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Bates v. Green Farms Condo.
Ass’n, 958 F.3d 470, 483 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal ellipses omitted). While plaintiffs may move to
amend their complaint if they believe additional facts are necessary, they may not “amend their

complaint in an opposition brief or ask the court to consider new allegations (or evidence) not
contained in the complaint.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs have not moved to amend their complaint. Nor
did they seek leave to file a surreply in order to address the Movants’ arguments as to the
sufficiency of the complaint’s adversity claim.
In light of Plaintiffs’ failure to plausibly allege all of the elements of a prescriptive
easement claim against the Federal Defendants, the motion to dismiss Count I as to the Movants
is GRANTED.
Count III.
This count avers that the United States’ actions through the NRCS in prohibiting Plaintiffs

from accessing the Hunting Property amounts to a taking without just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. The clause provides that private property may not “be taken
for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const., amend. V. “[T]he plain language of the
Takings Clause requires the payment of compensation whenever the government acquires private
property for a public purpose[.]” Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S. 383, 392 (2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “A primary objective of the Takings Clause is to prevent the government ‘from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.’” Lifestyle Cmtys., Ltd. v. City of Worthington, Ohio, 165 F.4th 1013,
1021 (6th Cir. 2026) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
The Federal Defendants maintain in the instant motion that, to the extent Plaintiffs seek
$10,000 or more in compensation pursuant to their takings claim, it should be dismissed for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, which vests exclusive
jurisdiction over such claims in the Court of Federal Claims. Brott v. United States, 858 F.3d 425,
428-29 (6th Cir. 2017). The parties are in agreement, however, that the so-called Little Tucker

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a)(2), provides the federal district courts concurrent jurisdiction over non-
tort claims against the United States for money damages so long as they do not exceed $10,000.1 Id. The Movants further argue that, assuming the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction
pursuant to the Little Tucker Act, the takings claim cannot survive Rule 12(b)(6). As set forth
above, Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege a property interest in the form of a prescriptive
easement in the levee path as against the Movants. Thus, they cannot sustain a claim that their
property was taken absent just compensation. Accordingly, the Federal Defendant’s motion to
dismiss Count III is also GRANTED.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the motion of the Federal Defendants to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ allegations against them is GRANTED. This matter will proceed against the Adams
Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of April 2026.
s/ J. DANIEL BREEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1Plaintiffs seek in their complaint “just compensation . . . in an amount to be determined at
trial.” (D.E. 1 at PageID 7.)