TE v International Protection Appeals Tribunal, 22nd Apr

| | [Home ]
[Databases ]
[World Law ]
[Multidatabase Search ]
[Help ]
[Feedback ]
[DONATE ] | |
| # High Court of Ireland Decisions |
| You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >>

TE v The International Protection Appeals Tribunal and Anor (Approved) [2026] IEHC 248 (22 April 2026)
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2026/2026IEHC248.html
Cite as:
[2026] IEHC 248 |
[New search ]

[Printable PDF version ]

[Help ]

APPROVED

REDACTED

AN ARD-CHÚIRT

THE HIGH COURT

---

[2026] IEHC 248

Record No. 2026/12JR

BETWEEN/

TE

APPLICANT

-AND-

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIONS APPEALS TRIBUNAL

AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, HOME AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Conleth Bradley delivered on the 22 nd day of April 2026

INTRODUCTION

---

Preliminary

1. In this application, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review to challenge a number of decisions and acts of the Respondents which culminated in a decision to make a deportation order in relation to the Applicant.

2. In summary, the Applicant seeks to challenge a decision dated 20 th October 2025 made by the International Protection Appeals Tribunal ("the IPAT") of which he was notified on 21 st October 2025 ("the IPAT decision"), the proposal to deport him on 5 th November 2025, the decision in relation to refoulement dated 26 th November 2025 and the making of the deportation dated 26 th November 2025.

3. In terms of sequencing, the Applicant, therefore, seeks to challenge what can be described as ex-ante or upstream administrative decisions which were made prior to the decision to make a deportation order.

4. An extension of time is required in relation to the IPAT decision.

5. Further, it is contended on behalf of the Applicant that insofar as the decision of the Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration ("the Minister") dated 26 th November 2025 made pursuant to s. 50 of the International Protection Act 2015 ("the 2015 Act") which determined that refoulement did not arise in the Applicant's case is concerned, the threshold to be applied to this challenge is the conventional judicial review standard of 'arguability' (rather than the statutory 'substantial grounds') as set out in Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986, as amended ("the RSC 1986"), and the time limit of three months also applies.

6. In seeking to challenge these 'up-stream' decisions, this necessarily involves an examination of the nature of the various decisions which are made in the asylum-immigration code and also points to the statutory provisions which address the time period within which various decisions can be challenged and the circumstances in which the court can grant an extension of time to do so. The Applicant also seeks injunctive relief in relation to the deportation order.

7. As is now well-settled, 'substantial grounds' as prescribed in s. 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, as amended ("the 2000 Act") have been described as being grounds that are reasonable, arguable and weighty and not trivial or tenuous: McNamara v An Bord Pleanála [1995] 2 ILRM 125 as approved in In Re Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999 [2000] IESC 19, [2000] 2 IR 360 at p. 395.

8. I directed that this application for leave to apply for judicial review be made on notice to the Respondents who filed written legal submissions in response to the Applicant's submissions.

Background

---

1. The Applicant was born in Nigeria on 4 th August 1975. He entered the State on 21 st November 2024 and applied for international protection on 22 nd November 2024.

2. The Applicant completed his questionnaire on 22 nd November 2024, which included his preliminary interview. The Applicant attended for interview on 16 th December 2024.

International Protection Office

1. By way of letter in January 2025, pursuant to s. 40 of the 2015 Act, the Applicant received a draft and also a final s. 39 report, each dated 16 th January 2025.

2. In its decision, dated 16 th January 2025, the IPO recommended that the Applicant be refused both refugee status and subsidiary protection on the basis of adverse credibility findings which went to the basis of his claimed fear of persecution. This credibility finding inter alia referred to the Applicant's claims to being a pastor and to have conducted a same-sex marriage ceremony blessing and to have been persecuted as a result.

3. The Applicant was notified of the IPO's recommendation and of the Minister's decision to refuse permission for the Applicant to remain in the State pursuant to s. 49(4) of the 2015 Act.

4. The Applicant appealed this refusal of international protection to the IPAT by Notice of Appeal dated 10 th February 2025.

5. An oral hearing took place before the IPAT over two days, during which the Applicant gave evidence.

International Protection Appeal Tribunal

1. By decision dated 20 th October 2025, communicated under letter dated 21 st October 2025, the IPAT dismissed the Applicant's appeal and rejected the Applicant's credibility and determined that he had not established a well-founded fear of persecution nor a real risk of serious harm if he was returned to Nigeria.

Review application and decision

1. The Applicant then made a 'review application' seeking to remain in the State pursuant to s. 49 of the 2015 Act and solicitors on his behalf made further submissions which included submissions dated 30 th October 2025 and the completion of a s. 49 review form dated 28 th October 2025.

2. Under cover of a letter dated 5 th November 2025, the Applicant was notified of the ministerial review decision made pursuant to s. 49 of the 2015 Act which refused his application by decision dated 3 rd November 2025.

Non-refoulement & deportation

1. On 26 th November 2025 the Minister determined, pursuant to s. 50 of the 2015 Act that the Applicant's removal to Nigeria (and deportation) would not contravene the prohibition on refoulement.

Deportation Order

1. On the same date - 26 th November 2025 - the Minister made a deportation order pursuant to s. 51 of the 2015 Act.

2. Both the non-refoulement decision and the deportation order were sent to the Applicant by post on 9 th December 2025, and received by him on 10 th December 2025.

3. The Applicant seeks to argue that this letter dated 5 th November 2025 did not include what was contended to be the Minister's obligation, pursuant to s. 3(4)(a) of the Immigration Act 1999 ("the 1999 Act") to inform the Applicant of his right to make representations in writing to the Minister within fifteen working days of sending the notification. This argument is addressed later in this judgment.

4. In effect, the Applicant also seeks to isolate the s. 50 (non-refoulement) decision as a separate decision and further seeks to argue that he was entitled to judicially review same pursuant to O. 84 of the RSC 1986 rather than s. 5 of the 2000 Act. The Applicant argues, in this regard, that the threshold of 'arguability' applies rather than the threshold of 'substantial grounds'. Further, the Applicant argues that the s. 50 (non-refoulement) decision and deportation order were posted to him on 9 th December 2025 and that the Applicant did not receive the s. 50 (non-refoulement) decision ** before 10 th December 2025.

5. These judicial review proceedings were initiated on 6 th January 2026, which was 28 days from 9 th December 2025 and 27 days from 10 th December 2025. The Applicant contends that insofar as he maintains that the s. 50 decision can be challenged separately, it was subject to a three month time limitation.

EXTENSION OF TIME

---

1. Insofar as the decision of the IPAT is concerned, s. 5 of the 2000 Act provides that an application for leave to apply for judicial review must made within the period of twenty-eight days commencing on the date on which the person was notified of the decision concerned unless the High Court considers that there is good and sufficient reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made.

2. Section 5(2) of the 2000 Act (as amended) provides as follows:

" An application for leave to apply for judicial review under the Order in respect of any of the matters referred to in subsection (1) (hereafter in this section referred to as an 'application') shall be made within the period of 28 days commencing on the date on which the person was notified of the decision, determination, recommendation, refusal or making of the order concerned unless the High Court considers that there is good and sufficient reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made ".

1. The Supreme Court in G.K. v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 I.R. 418 (" G.K.") clarified that the 2000 Act did not state that time may only be extended if there were good and sufficient reason for the failure to make the application 'within the prescribed period'. At that time, the prescribed period was fourteen days and this was later amended to twenty-eight days.

2. More recently, in Thomson v An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESC 31 (" Thomson ") the Supreme Court addressed similar legislative provisions in the planning code. At para. 66 of his judgment, Woulfe J. observed that it was " important to consider the phrase "good and sufficient reason" in the context of the overall language used in s. 50(8) [of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended] . In G.K. v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 I.R. 418 ("G.K."), Hardiman J., in considering the phrase "good and sufficient reason for extending the period" in s. 5(2)(a) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act, 2000, stated as follows (at 423): "The statute does not say that the time may be extended if there were "good and sufficient reasons for the failure to make the application within the period of fourteen days". A provision in that form would indeed have focused exclusively on the reason for the delay and not on the underlying merits. The phrase actually used "good and sufficient reason for extending the period" does not appear to me to limit the factors to be considered in any way and thus, in principle, to include the merits of the case." Woulfe J. also had regard to the decision of the High Court (Clarke J). in Kelly v Leitrim County Council [2005] 2 IR 404.

3. Similarly, adopting Woulfe J.'s assessment of the similar provisions in the planning code, s. 5 of the 2000 Act does not stipulate that time may be extended only if there is good and sufficient reason for the failure to make the application within the period of twenty-eight days but instead refers to "good and sufficient reason" which suggests a 'broader' application of judicial discretion.

4. In contrast, the position in relation to time under the conventional judicial review process in O. 84, r. 21 of the RSC 1986 was reviewed by the Court of Appeal in Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v Health Products Regulatory Authority [2022] IECA 109 (" Arthropharm "), and at para. 87 of his judgment, Murray J. stated as follows:

" (i) The period fixed by Order 84 Rule 21(1) is not a limitation period properly so called (Sfar v Revenue Commissioners [2016] IESC 15 at para. 19 (per McKechnie J.)). The requirement to proceed within that time instead derives from a rule of court which, while having the force of law, is subject to the possibility of an extension if the court is satisfied, in accordance with the relevant law, that time should be extended [MO'S v The Residential Institutions Redress Board [2018] IESC 61, [2019] 1 ILRM 149 ("MO'S") at para. 69 per Finlay Geoghegan J.).

(ii) The effect of the rule is clearly to place an obligation on the party seeking an extension of time to identify on oath the reasons the application was not brought during the period fixed by O.84, r.21(1) and during the time between the expiry of that point and the date on which the application was eventually bought (MO'S at para. 60). It is the obligation of the court when presented with such reasons to assess them 'carefully and critically' [SC SYM Fotovoltaic Energy SRL v Mayo County Council [2018] IEHC 20 at para. 72(7)]. It should undertake this exercise conscious of the purpose underlying the rule in its present form: the present version of O.84 r. 21 'is framed in terms which indicate a clear intent to reduce delay and to further limit time periods which previously existed for applications for judicial review' (Heaphy v Governor of Cork Prison [2018] IECA 125 at para. 99 per Whelan J.).

(iii) Before it can extend time, the court must be satisfied that the reasons so given explain and objectively justify the delay in bringing the application and are sufficient to justify the court in exercising its discretion in favour of the applicant (O'Donnell v Dun Laoghaire Corporation [1991] ILRM 301, at p. 315 to 316; MO'S at para. 60). In this regard the addition of the word 'sufficient' to the 'good reason' previously required by the rule will not in most cases add to the pre- existing test (MO'S at para. 60), although it may be relevant in situations where the explanation given is in theory a good one, but the evidence adduced in support of it is insufficient to sustain it (AB v XY [2019] IECA 326 at para. 44).

(iv) In conducting that exercise the court must take account of all relevant circumstances, including the decision that is sought to be challenged, the nature of the claim that it is invalid and 'any relevant facts and circumstances pertaining to the parties' (MO'S at para. 60). In applying the factors so found, the essential function of the court is to engage in a 'balancing exercise' (AB v XY at para. 46).

(v) In this regard, factors of which account may be taken will include the nature of the order or actions the subject of the application, the conduct of the applicant, the conduct of the respondent, the effect of the decision it is sought to challenge, any steps taken by the parties subsequent to that decision, and the public policy that proceedings relating to the domain of public law take place promptly except where good reason is furnished (De Róiste v. Minister for Defence [2001] 1 IR 190, at p. 208 per Denham J.). The 'blameworthiness' of the applicant is relevant, albeit as only one such factor to be weighed in the balance (Kelly v Leitrim County Council [2005] IEHC 11, [2005] 2 IR 404 at para. 19(d)).

(vi) It follows that the court may be required to balance the rights of an applicant with those of a respondent or notice party, taking into account also the prejudice to either consequent upon the failure of the applicant to proceed to make its application within the time fixed by the rules.

This, in particular, requires the court to take account of the effect of the extension of time upon a third party affected by the decision in question (see AB v. XY at para. 47).

(vii) It is 'probable that in most instances where a court has been satisfied of good and sufficient reason to extend time it will also be in a position to make a positive finding under sub-rule (3)(b) in relation to the circumstances which resulted in the failure to apply within the three month period' (MO'S at para. 100).

(viii) That said, the rule clearly positions an inquiry as to whether the applicant had within its 'control' the effluxion of time: it is clear from the rule that in addition to being satisfied that good and sufficient reasons exist for an extension of time, the court must be satisfied as a matter of fact that the circumstances which resulted in the delay were outside the control of the applicant [per Baker J. in Irish Skydiving Club Ltd. v Kilkenny County Council [2016] IEHC 448 , at para. 9]. Where a delay arises from circumstances which were within the control of the applicant, the court may not extend (id. at para. 10).

(ix) The court is also free to take account the interests underlying the proposed proceedings. Commercial cases - in which the requirements of certainty may be particularly pressing and in which it is reasonable to assume that the parties are well resourced and in a position to readily obtain access to legal advice - may justify a stricter approach than in other types of challenge (MO'S at para. 62; [Hogan, Morgan and Daly] , Administrative Law (5 th Ed. 2019) at para. 18-179). "

1. Conventional judicial review proceedings which commence after 26 th April 2024 are governed by the Rules of the Superior Courts (Order 84) 2024 (S.I. No. 163/2024).

2. Prior to 26 th April 2024, under the then applicable procedure, the three month time limit would only stop running once an ex parte application for leave had been made in open court and once that was done the application was deemed to have been " made " for the purpose of the time limits prescribed by O. 84,r. 21 RSC 1986: Heaney v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 123 (at paragraphs 57 to 65).

3. After 26 th April 2024, an application for leave to apply for judicial review is deemed to be made on the date upon which papers are filed in the Central Office of the High Court.

4. Accordingly, consequent upon S.I. No.163/2024, O. 84 of the RSC 1986 was amended to provide inter alia that the three-month time period within which an application for judicial review must be made stops when the notice and affidavit required by O. 84, r. 20(2)(a) and (b) of the RSC 1986 are filed in the Central Office.

5. In Foley & Anor v Dublin City Council [2026] IECA 51, the Court of Appeal (Meenan J., Hyland J and Anthony M. Collins J.) in the judgment of Collins J., referred to the text of O. 84, r. 21(3) of the RSC 1986 and the discussion of the case-law in Arthropharm and stated that " an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose is subject to the possibility that the court hearing the matter may extend the time to make that application. The High Court can do so only where it is satisfied, on the basis of affidavit evidence, that the reasons for the failure to make the application within the period in R.S.C. O. 84, r. 21(1) explain and objectively justify the delay in bringing the application and that those circumstances were beyond the applicant's control or s/he could not reasonably have anticipated them. Once the High Court is so satisfied it may exercise its discretion as to whether to extend time and in so deciding takes all relevant circumstances into account. "

6. The threshold under O. 84, r. 21 of the RSC 1986 for an extension of time is a higher standard than that contained in s. 5 of the 2000 Act, where in addition to being satisfied that " good and sufficient " reason exists for an extension of time, under O. 84, r. 21 RSC 1986, a court must also be satisfied that factually the circumstances which resulted in the delay were outside the control of an applicant. Section 5 of the 2000 Act does not have a similar requirement.

7. In G (Angola) (Assessment of Credibility) v International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2026] IEHC 143, the High Court (Simons J.) reviewed the above case-law, statutory provisions and Rules of Court and observed at para. 8 of his judgment that "[i] t should be observed that the threshold under Order 84, rule 21 for an extension of time is a higher threshold, insofar as the court, in addition to being satisfied that "good and sufficient" reason exists for an extension of time, must also be satisfied, as a matter of fact, that the circumstances which resulted in the delay were outside the control of the applicant. There is no equivalent requirement under section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 (as amended) ". **

8. Simons J. also referenced the observations of the Supreme Court, at para. 79 of the judgment of Woulfe J. in Thomson, to the effect that it may be very important for an applicant to seek to explain the entire period of delay, and that a failure to do so may normally put the applicant at serious risk of not getting an extension or even give rise to a presumption against the grant of an extension. Simons J. also pointed out that the Supreme Court rejected a submission that any such failure was per se fatal to an application for an extension of time.

THE DECISIONS CHALLENGED BY THE APPLICANT

1. At the beginning of this judgment, I set out the series of decisions which the Applicant seeks liberty to challenge in this application for leave to apply for judicial review.

2. The Applicant, for example, seeks to challenge by way of an order of certiorari the decision of the IPAT dated 20 th October 2025 which was notified to him under cover of a letter dated 21 st October 2025.

3. Section 5 of the 2000 Act applies to the IPAT decision.

4. As mentioned, s. 5 of the 2000 Act prescribes a period of twenty-eight days from the date of notification within which to seek leave to apply for judicial review, subject to the facility of the High Court extending time where there is " good and sufficient " reason to do so. In relation to this decision, i.e., the decision of the IPAT dated 20 th October 2025, communicated by letter dated 21 st October 2025, the time period expired in or around 18 th November 2025.

5. This application for judicial review was filed in the Central Office on 6 th January 2026. The Applicant therefore seeks leave to challenge the IPAT decision approximately thirty-nine days after the expiration of the twenty-eight day statutory period.

6. As set out above, the reasons offered in seeking an extension of time in this application must be viewed and assessed on the basis that s.5 does not stipulate that time may only be extended if there are good and sufficient reason for the failure to make the application within the prescribed period - in this case twenty-eight days but rather, the reference to " good and sufficient reason " for extending the period which involves broader considerations than the position which existed between 21 st October 2025 and 18 th November 2025.

7. The Applicant's Affidavit dated 6 th January 2026 does not address the requirement to extend time directly.

8. At paragraph 22 of his Affidavit, sworn on 6 th January 2026, he refers to the reliefs set out at paragraphs 1 to 13 of the Statement of Grounds.

9. Under sub-heading D - Reliefs Sought of the Statement of Grounds, the Applicant seeks at para. 8 "[a] n Order of Certiorari quashing the decision of the Second Named Respondent [i.e., the IPAT] on 20 th October 2025 to uphold the decision of the International Protection Officer and refuse the Applicant's Appeal. "

10. At paragraph 11 of the Statement of Grounds, the Applicant seeks: "[i] f and where necessary an Order enlarging time for the making of the within Application or any part thereof ".

11. Under the sub-heading E - Grounds upon which such Reliefs are Sought, the Applicant states as follows at para. 7:

" 7. The Court is asked to enlarge time to consider the Applicant's application for Judicial Review of the Second Respondent's decision of October 2025. This is in circumstances where previous hard working representatives overlooked the core issue being as to the credibility of the Applicant's claims of ministry and having conducted a same-sex marriage ceremony/blessing, focusing instead on the risk of refoulement in such circumstances it found ".

1. On the morning of the hearing of this application before me, the Applicant's solicitor, Ms. Ursula Atueyi, Principal at ACSK Solicitors furnished an Affidavit, sworn on 3 rd February 2026, in which avers inter alia that:

" 17. I say that the Applicant was not in a position to make an application for Judicial Review sooner as he was not advised of such an option. As appears from the representations on his behalf in respect of the Applicant's s49 application, such representation and advice appear not to have been adequate. I say the Applicant was in receipt of legal aid and as is common such practitioners are over-stretched and under resourced. As appears Counsel was not instructed. In any event, legal aid is very rarely granted for Judicial Review.

18. I say that the Applicant came to us on 18/12/25 and his authority was signed on 18/12/25. We sent such papers as were available to Counsel on 18 th December 2025, the second-last day of the Michaelmas Term. I say we calculated the time period as that relating to the deportation order, same being 6 th January 2026. I say that we did not receive the full file from the Applicant's previous representatives until 5 th January 2026. Notwithstanding the Christmas period, it was not initially apparent and not until the full file was received of grounds to challenge decisions outside of 28 days. The Applicant had a consultation with Counsel on 5 th January after which papers were filed on 6 th January 2026.

19. I say as has been submitted matters moved with particular speed when the Applicant's Appeal was refused. As appears his s49 application was made promptly, a negative decision made on 3 rd November 2025, within two weeks of the IPAT decision, and also within 28 days of same. The Applicant was notified of proposals to deport him two-days later on 5 th November 2025. I say that it is unlikely the Applicant or his representatives would have had any expectation of receiving the said decisions in that timeline. Exactly three weeks later (15 working days) on 26 th November, a decision was made in respect of s50. On the same day, and also barely outside of 28 days from the IPAT decision, [sic.] date of Applicant notified of the IPAT decision to be confirmed, a decision was made to deport. During the 28 day period following notification of the IPAT decision and shortly afterwards the Applicant had to also consider a negative s49 decision and a proposal to deport, and then on 10 th December a negative s50 decision, and a deportation order. It is fair to say that the Applicant acted promptly as possible in that within days he had consulted new solicitors. Had all papers been available and Counsel in a position to draft papers before the Central Office closed on 24 th December, this would have been still outside 28 days for decisions/acts other than the s50 decision and the deportation order and unlikely to have come before the Court before it did. I say while the 28 days did not fall within the Christmas period it was not possible to file sooner than 6 th January because of the Christmas period ".

1. In this Affidavit, Ms. Atueyi, in addition to addressing the time issues as set out above, refers to errors in the s. 49 representations which were made on behalf of the Applicant and which she states were not " picked up " in the s. 49 decision and the s. 50 decision made by the Respondents. The errors refer to references to the Applicant practising Islam, and related matters, and the Applicant being pursued by Fulami herdsmen. It is suggested that these matters may have been copied from reliance placed, in error, on a different and separate precedent submission and that they have no application to the Applicant.

2. At paras 34 to 36 of the Applicant's Counsel's submissions dated 23 rd January 2026, the following is submitted:

" 34. Where it is noted that the decision of Mr Justice Keane in NN v The Minister for Justice and Equality & Ors [2017] IEHC 99, states that it is not good law to extend time solely on the grounds of a different opinion of Counsel than that of another at an earlier time, the Court at paragraph 21 followed and relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in G.K. v Minister of Justice [2002] 2 I.R. 418 and its finding that 'good and sufficient reason for extending the period' includes an assessment of the merits of the case. The authority cited is clear that if the legislature intended grounds to be restricted to solely explaining reasons for delay, the wording of the Statute would say so but does not so. Nevertheless the Court is asked to consider not only the Applicant's grounds in respect of the IPAT decision are arguable (as per G.K.) and substantial in their similarity and alignment to (K) Zimbabwe, but also the speed of the timeline following the Second Respondent's refusal of the Applicant's appeal on 20 th October 2025.

35. Following the said refusal on 20 th October 2025, an application for leave to remain pursuant to s49 of the 2015 Act was made on behalf of the Applicant which was refused by letter and decision of 3 rd November. This was followed on 5 th November by the notification by the First Respondent of her proposal to deport the Applicant, but not informing the Applicant of his right to make further representations within 15 working days or at all, followed in exactly 15 working days and on 26 th November by the First [Respondent's] [sic.] s50 decision and deportation Order, sent on 9 th December 2025.

36. In respect of the notification letter of the First Respondent dated 5 th November 2025 insofar as the Applicant was not informed of their right to make further representations, this could not be remedied without the information not provided, nor a Judicial Review application made without that information. Notwithstanding the substance and merits of the ground, it is also of wider interest to other applicants for the issue to be determined. "

1. In accordance with s. 5 of the 2000 Act, and as set out above, I have considered the application for an extension of time as broadly as possible, including receiving an affidavit on the morning of this application from the Applicant's solicitor and considering the matters referred to therein.

2. Ultimately, the gravamen of the Applicant's explanation in this regard centres on the advice he initially received as being (too) focused on the risk of refoulement and taking steps to address that issue rather than on, and at the expense of, addressing the arguments in relation to the credibility findings of the Applicant's claims of ministry and having conducted a same-sex marriage ceremony/blessing, which the Applicant now relies upon (and also referred to in Ms. Atueyi's recent Affidavit).

3. In G.K. v The IPAT & Ors [2022] IEHC 204, the High Court (Barr J.) refused to extend the time notwithstanding that no fault was attributed to the applicant but only his legal advisors and observed as follows at para. 56 of his judgment:

" Although there are potential significant consequences for the applicant, he is bound by the actions of his agent. He was legally represented at all points of his application for international protection, and those legal advisors must be taken to have known the relevant time periods within which to bring a challenge to the decision of the respondent. In considering this, the court has had regard to the extent of the delay. The delay is not merely a small number of days outside the 28-day window, but the 51-day delay represents significant delay on the part of those agents. This is particularly so, given that their client had expressed to them that he wanted to challenge the respondent's decision ".

1. Further, having regard to the entirety of the explanations offered, I do not consider that they fall within the ambit of the matters referred to in the Article 26 reference in relation to In Re Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999 [2000] IESC 19; [2000] 2 IR 360, where in addressing the then applicable fourteen day period, the Supreme Court observed that at p. 394 "[t] he court is satisfied that the discretion of the High Court to extend the 14 day period is sufficiently wide to enable persons who, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including language difficulties, communication difficulties, difficulties with regard to legal advice or otherwise, have shown reasonable diligence, to have sufficient access to the courts for the purpose of seeking judicial review in accordance with their constitutional rights."

2. In the circumstances and taking a broad view of the factors in the exercise of my discretion, I do not consider that there is good and sufficient reason for extending the period within which to challenge the IPAT decision and I refuse the application to do so.

3. Notwithstanding my finding in this regard, I shall consider the grounds upon which the Applicant seeks leave to challenge the IPAT decision.

4. The chronology of the suite of decisions which comprise an individual's engagement with the asylum code have been set out earlier in this judgment. Insofar as the IPAT decision is concerned, the standard by which this challenge is assessed is that of 'substantial grounds'.

5. In the Applicant's Statement of Grounds, the following is set out at grounds 4 and 5:

" 4. The Second Named Respondent's decision in consideration of the Applicant's credibility as to his ministry and to have conducted a same sex marriage ceremony falls in line with the judgment of Simons J. in K (Zimbabwee) [sic.] v IPAT [2023] IEHC 6 to assess credibility "by reference to the full picture that emerges from the available evidence and information taken as a whole, when rationally analysed and fairly weighed".

(5) Further, the Second Respondent failed to follow the principle set out in the "United National High Commissioner for Refugees" Beyond Proof: credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems at page 180 where it states: "A fact is not implausible because it would not occur in the personal life of the decision-maker. Instead, it might be wholly plausible when considered in the context of the applicant's gender, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, education or social and cultural background."

1. The general principles governing the assessment of general credibility were set out by the High Court (Cooke J.) in I.R. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2009] IEHC 510, [2015] 4 IR 144. At p. 151 of his judgment, Cooke J. observed that "[t] he High Court on judicial review must not succumb to the temptation or fall into the trap of substituting its own view for that of the primary decision maker. "

2. In the report of the IPO pursuant to s. 39 of the 2015 Act dated 16 th January 2025, the issue of credibility is addressed at pp. 4-7 (of 16).

3. At the beginning of section (5) of this report and decision, it is stated that all documentation and representations furnished by the Applicant, or on behalf of the Applicant, have been considered in the investigation of the application and in the preparation of the report and that in accordance with s. 28 of the 2015 Act, the IPO has assessed the credibility of the Applicant's claim having regard to all relevant matters. The report then sets out the material facts of the Applicant's claim under a series of bullet points. The IPO considered the Applicant's claim that he was targeted in Nigeria for at an LGBT wedding as follows:

" The Applicant is a Pentecostal pastor

The Applicant stated at interview that he has been Pentecostal pastor since 2015 (S35 Q24 P4). He was asked to provide information about this ministry and responded: "It was located in Uromi in Obeidu" (S35 Q25 P4). He was asked if he was alone or with others and responded: "I was on my own" (S35 Q26 P4). He was asked what type of ministry it was and responded "It was about charity. My ministry was about love. We were Pentecostal"(S35 Q27 P4). He was asked whether his church was part of a larger church organisation and responded: "On my own" (S35 Q28 P4). He stated that his congregation numbered 122 (S35 Q29 P4). He was asked [sic.] why he decided to start a ministry and responded: "I started because I was interested in taking care of people" (S35 Q32 P5). He was asked what motivated him to move his life from Ekpoma to start the ministry and responded: "I had a dream. A vision. I was brought up Catholic but I dreamed that I should go preach" (S35 Q33 P5).

The Applicant was asked questions about his ministry and provided vague and generic answers lacking in detail, specificity and depth. This is considered to undermine the credibility of his claim to be a Pentecostal pastor.

The Applicant was asked if he could provide any evidence of his preaching and responded: "No" (S35 Q34 P5). He was asked if his ministry had an online presence and responded: "No" (S35 Q31 P5). In the context of a nine-year career as a pastor in one church the Applicant's lack of evidence or of any digital footprint is considered to undermine the credibility of the scheme to be a Pentecostal pastor.

Available country information ** [underlining added in this judgment] indicates that Pentecostal churches are generally hostile to LGBT identity. It was put to the Applicant that post Pentecostal churches took this view. He responded: "Most but not all. The Anglicans do" (S35 Q56 P7).

The Applicant was advised that Anglicanism is not a strand of Pentecostalism (S35 Q57 P7). He responded: "Are they not? What about Orthodox?" (S35 Q58 P8). It was put to Applicant that it was surprising that a Pentecostal pastor would not be aware of the difference between such diverse strands of Christianity, as Pentecostalism, Anglicanism and Orthodoxy. He responded: "I don't know" (S35 Q59 P8). He was asked to explain the differences between these churches and responded: "In most cases Pentecostal is a break [sic.] off from Catholic or Anglican. Catholic and Anglican are more orthodox with a head." (S35 Q60 P8). The Applicant demonstrated a limited understanding of the differences between major Christian sects not consistent with his claim to be a Pentecostal pastor. This is considered to undermine the credibility of his claim to be a Pentecostal pastor.

The Applicant conducted a same-sex wedding

The Applicant was asked to provide information about the couple who sought to be married. He responded: "They were a couple who happen to be members of my church, a young couple. Because of my preaching and talking about love I do not discriminate as it is not my duty" (S35 Q44 P6). He was asked to provide information about them and responded: "They were my members" (S35 Q45 P6). He was asked for their names and responded: [XXXXXXXX ]. He stated that they were 30 and 32 and have been part of his congregation for three years. (S35 Q47-48 P7). He stated that they approached him about the marriage in December 2023 (S35 Q49 P7) and that before that he had [sic.] suspected they were LGBT [S3 Q50 P7]. The Applicant was asked for detail about the ceremony and responded: "we did not want to be elaborate. It was just a blessing" (S35 Q35 P7). He was asked if there were any readings and did not answer the question posed: "They exchanged rings"(S35 Q54 P7). The Applicant provided a vague generic and insubstantial account of the persons who contacted him to perform a same sex marriage and of the wedding ceremony itself. This is considered to undermine the credibility of his account.

Available country information ** [Underlining added in this judgment] indicates that Pentecostal churches are generally hostile to LGBT activity and identities (Ref 3). It is noteworthy that LGBT activity and identities are heavily prosecuted in Nigeria (Refs 1-2). The Applicant was asked if he was aware that under Nigerian law officiating at an LGBT wedding was a crime (Ref 4). He responded: "Yes" (S35 Q65 P8). It is noted that this is the first time in the course of his protection application that the Applicant has made reference to the legal situation in Nigeria. He was asked why no one had called the police and responded: "As long as I was running I don't know" (S35 Q66 P8). The Applicant was asked if he had been aware when he staged the wedding that it was against Pentecostal teachings against the law in Nigeria. He responded: "The religion does not classify or notice sex, colour, love is love." (S35 Q67 P8). The Applicant was asked why he would risk his church by carrying out an illegal act and responded: "Like I said I was basing my emphasis on love" (S35 Q70 P9). The Applicant was advised that getting married in a church in a small community in Obeidu was a dangerous thing for [XXXXXXXXXX ] to do as it would draw attention. He was asked why they would draw this attention to themselves in a country were LGBT activity was illegal. He responded: "It was their personal decision" (S35 Q69 P9). The Applicant demonstrated an ignorance of and lack of consideration of the position of his church and the Nigerian authorities towards LGBT marriage which is considered to undermine the credibility of his account.

In light of the foregoing the Applicant's claim that he was targeted in Nigeria for officiating at an LGBT wedding is not accepted as a material fact.

For the reasons outlined above, I find that only some of the material elements of the Applicant's claim are credible on the balance of probabilities coupled with, where appropriate, the benefit of the doubt. However, the facts/aspects that have been accepted as credible will be considered for the purposes of assessing whether there is a well-founded fear of persecution/real risk of serious harm. The accepted facts are:

The Applicant is a 49 year old Christian Edo man from Edo State who is married and has three children two of whom are minor ".

1. In his Affidavit sworn on 6 th January, the Applicant avers inter alia that by letter dated January 2025 pursuant to s. 40 of the 2015 Act, he received a draft and also a final s. 39 report, each report dated 16 th January 2025 and these reports are exhibited. He states that "[t] he said reports recommended and determined respectively that I should not be granted International Protection or Subsidiary Protection, and largely on the basis that my claims as to being a Pastor, to have conducted a marriage ceremony involving a same sex couple and to have been persecuted as a result were not credible. "

2. The Applicant states that he appealed the decision of the IPO and that by letter dated 21 st October 2025, he was informed that his appeal to the IPAT was refused and states that:

" The said decision dated 20 th October 2025 finds my claim to be externally consistent with conditions in Nigeria for the LGBT community. However, the decision also includes at paragraph 25 and in respect of a finding that I did not demonstrate internal consistency:

"It is particularly pertinent to this finding that the Appellant was clear in his application form and interview that he was performing a marriage ceremony for the couple in question, but later changed this to merely a blessing in his testimony to the Tribunal."

However, notwithstanding such further points as are to be made in this respect, as appears in the said documents exhibited at paragraphs 7 and 8 within I did then distinguish the ceremony as a blessing. "

1. The documents referred to by the Applicant are a copy of the questionnaire dated 22 nd November 2024 which he exhibited (under "A") and a copy of the s. 35 report which is also exhibited (under "B").

2. By letter dated 21 st October 2025, the IPAT decision was sent to the Applicant with a copy sent to the Minister, the Applicant's legal representative and the making of the decision was communicated to the representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In this covering letter, the Applicant was also informed that he could make further submissions to the Minister pursuant to s. 49 of the 2015 Act or alternatively that he had the option pursuant to s. 48 of the 2015 Act of returning voluntarily to his country of origin.

3. The decision of the IPAT member dated 20 th October 2025 is comprehensive and runs to 54 paragraphs. It is divided as follows.

4. The case data is set out with the various participants listed and it is recorded that an oral hearing took place on 23 rd September 2025 and on 6 th October 2025.

5. Those present at the hearing are then outlined.

6. The decision then sets out the introduction and case history.

7. This confirms, for example, that under the cover of a letter in January 2025, the IPO recommended by decision dated 16 th January 2025, taken pursuant to s. 39(3)(c) of the 2015 Act that the Applicant should not be given either a refugee declaration or a subsidiary protection declaration because the material facts that were central to his claim were not accepted as credible and that the Applicant was also refused permission to remain in the State under the provisions of s. 49 of the 2015 Act.

8. At para. 5, the IPAT decision notes that by " Notice of Appeal dated 10 th February, 2025 the [Applicant] appealed the recommendation of the IPO to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') on 29 grounds in total, largely concerned with the credibility analysis undertaken by the IPO as well as applicable legislation and language difficulties " and at para. 6 that "[f] or the avoidance of doubt, those grounds are noted by the Tribunal and will be borne in mind throughout the decision hereunder. "

9. At para. 8, the IPAT decision states that "[i] n advance of the oral hearing of the appeal on the 23 rd September, 2025 the legal adviser for the Appellant submitted several documents in support of his application, set out below, whose contents have been fully taken into account in the making of the decision herein. "

10. The decision set outs the " Case Facts and Documents-Appellant " from paras 10 to 14.

11. At para. 13, the IPAT decision then records in detail in a question and answer format, and over a number of pages, the evidence of the Applicant in response to specific questions put to him by his legal representative, including inter alia in relation to the Applicant's answers about his role as a minister and the establishment of the church. At para. 14, the documents which were relied upon by the applicant before both the IPO and the IPAT are listed.

12. The IPAT decision, at paras 15 to 18, sets out the " Assessment of Facts and Circumstances - Nationality and Statelessness " stating inter alia that the IPAT has assessed the nationality of the Applicant pursuant to the provisions of s. 28 of the 2015 Act and accepts on the balance of probabilities that he is a national of Nigeria.

13. The decision, commencing at para. 19, sets out the " Assessment of Facts and Circumstances - Other elements of the Claim " and the IPAT introduces this part of his assessment as follows at paras 19 to 21:

" 19. In view of the fact that he gave consistent evidence in respect of these matters, and that nothing arose during the hearing that could cast doubt on these elements of his claim, in terms of the Appellant's broader personal circumstances, the Tribunal accepts on the balance of probabilities that he is a Nigerian man, 50 years of age, of Christian faith and Edo ethnicity, married with three children.

20. The Tribunal assesses the remaining material factual issues of the Appellant's claim to be as follows:

• That the Appellant, a pastor, is under threat in Nigeria for blessing/marrying a same-sex couple

21. The Tribunal will now assess these material facts in order to determine whether, on the balance of probabilities, and, applying, if appropriate, the benefit of the doubt, it accepts them. "

1. The IPAT decision then addresses the " Individual Position and Personal Circumstances ".

2. Under the sub-heading, " That the [Applicant] , a pastor, is under threat in Nigeria for blessing/marrying a same-sex couple ", the IPAT then sets out, again in some detail beginning at para. 22 and continuing over a number of pages and paragraphs, questions which the IPAT puts to the Applicant and the answers given, including where the Applicant's legal representative contributes.

3. The IPAT then states at para. 23 of his decision that: " In determining the credibility of this aspect of the [Applicant's] claim, it is first necessary to consider external consistency to determine the prima facie likelihood of this material fact based on the submissions and country of origin information." In this respect, the following information is relevant:

• " According to the US Department of State "2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nigeria":

o "The law effectively rendered illegal all forms of activity supporting or promoting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) rights. The law criminalized the registration, operation, or participation in so-called gay clubs, societies, or organizations and further prohibited any support to such organizations. Rights groups reported the law had a significant chilling effect on free association."

o "...the law criminalizing LGBTQI+ free association and assembly effectively prevented openly LGBTQI+ persons from running for office."

o "The law criminalized same-sex marriage, same-sex relationships, membership in LGBTQI+ rights groups, and the public display of same-sex "amorous affection." In the 12 states with sharia, adults convicted of engaging in same-sex sexual conduct could be sentenced to execution by stoning. Authorities actively enforced this law, but capital punishment was never carried out."

o "Facially neutral laws, such as those against "unlawful assembly" and "public nuisance," were disproportionately applied against LGBTQI+ persons or those perceived to be LGBTQI+. On June 24, police arrested 24 persons perceived to be LGBTQI+ at a private party in Abuja. The arrestees were charged with unlawful assembly and public nuisance; all were free on bail at years' end although charges were pending."

o "On August 27, police in Delta State raided a "white party" organized by the LGBTQI+ community and detained more than 200 individuals. Police alleged the event was a same-sex wedding, but some civil society organization representatives stated authorities had fabricated this allegation to justify the raid. By September 28, all detainees were released on bail, although charges were pending at year's end."

o "Violence and Harassment: LGBTQI+ persons reported violence, threats (including extortion), and harassment based on actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity or expression, including by state actors. On August 29, a man age 27 physically assaulted a transgender woman, reportedly targeted for her identity, and forced her to transfer money into his bank account. The man was charged with crimes related to theft and assault. The case was pending at year's end."

o "LGBTQI+ persons were targeted via social media apps by criminals. A gay man reported to an NGO he had travelled from Lagos to Ogun State in December to meet a man he had communicated with on a social media app. He stated that when he arrived at the address, a gang assaulted him and forced him to reveal his ATM card PIN. The gang then withdrew his savings and took out two loans in his name."

o "Discrimination: The law did not prohibit discrimination by state or nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics. LGBTQI+ persons reported discrimination in employment, housing, and access to healthcare based on their real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity or expression. The law criminalized same sex marriage and civil unions."

• According to Freedom House "Freedom in the World 2025: Nigeria":

o "In light of obstacles including a 2014 law that criminalized same-sex relationships and advocacy for LGBT+ people's rights, openly LGBT+ people are deterred from running for office or working to advance their political interests.'

o "LGBT+ people face extensive official and societal discrimination. Those convicted of engaging in same-sex relationships can be imprisoned for as long as 14 years, and 12 northern states maintain the death penalty for same-sex activity. LGBT+ people are also subject to assault by police officers during arrest, extortion attempts, and discrimination when accessing public and private services. High-profile attacks on LGBT+ targets continued in 2024. In April, for example, a mob attacked the home of a suspected leader of an LGBT+ group in Abuja, and a popular cross-dressing social media user was killed in August, also in the capital. In October, a same-sex couple was harassed and publicly beaten in River State." "

1. After setting this country of origin information out, the IPAT states as follows at para. 24 of its decision:

" With regard to the aforementioned country of origin information, it is accepted at the outset that the situation in Nigeria is such that LGBT+ individuals would be reasonably likely to face persecution there on that basis. There also appears to be some degree of support in the COI for that persecution to extend out to also include those who advocate for the rights of LGBT+ individuals, although nothing to support the more particular circumstances of the Appellant's claim. However, absence of evidence is not equal to evidence of absence and the overall credibility of the Appellant in respect of this material fact will now be considered. "

1. These matters are then considered by the IPAT at paras 25 to 33 as follows:

" 25. In relation to internal consistency, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the evidence given by the [Applicant] outlined above demonstrates sufficient internal consistency when compared with his questionnaire and s. 35 interview. It is particularly pertinent to this finding that the Appellant was clear in his application form and interview that he was performing a marriage ceremony for the couple in question, but later changed this to merely a blessing in his testimony to the Tribunal. He also gave an account that appeared to contradict the account he claimed to have given to the police in the report provided by him. Relatedly, this also contradicts his claim in the application form that he did not report his problems to the police. Furthermore, he gave an inconsistent account of how long his wife spent in the hospital with regard to the letter provided. These matters taken together are considered to undermine the credibility of the material fact.

26. In relation to the issue of sufficiency of detail, the successive accounts provided by the Appellant in his documentation, to the IPO and before the Tribunal were reasonably detailed in terms. However, he was vague about a number of important matters including what kind of ownership he had over the church, the specifics of his claimed faith, how he escaped Nigeria and who assisted him, as well as other matters of lesser significance. On balance, this is considered to undermine the credibility of this material fact, albeit to a limited degree.

27. However, in relation to plausibility, whilst the [Applicant's] broad claim might be plausible with regard to the COI considered in the external consistency analysis above, a number of matters more specific to his claim are not considered plausible. In particular, it is not considered plausible that he would have no documents of any kind that prove his ownership of the church, no photographs of himself or the church in question, that he would as a pastor have so little knowledge of the Pentecostal church that he would conflate it with the Anglican and Orthodox churches (as was apparent from the section 35 interview), that he would provide a public blessing or marriage to a same-sex couple in a small community who were strongly against such practices, and that he would be able to arrange travel from Lagos through a google search with an LGBT organisation based in the USA (which he also remained significantly vague about in all respects).

28. The [Applicant] has provided certain documentation that is described as going in support of this aspect of his claim. It is particularly relevant that he has provided a police report related to the damage to his church, as well as a digital advertisement for an "Agape Pentecostal" event. In relation to the police report, this is given very little weight in light of the fact that the [Applicant's] account is not consistent with the statement provided therein, which mentions him almost being lynched and being saved by a community leader. Regarding the latter, which may be described as a digital flyer, this is also given little weight as it does not contain the [Applicant's] name, is not an official document of any sort and cannot be verified in any way. He has also provided a certificate which is claimed to support his qualification as a pastor: this is also given little weight in light of the [Applicant's] clear lack of knowledge about the Pentecostal faith as demonstrated during the section 35 interview, which his reply to the Tribunal is not considered to adequately address.

29. Regarding the medical report described as supporting the attack on his wife, the Tribunal conducted enquiries to determine the authenticity of this document but was unable to access any website for the hospital named, although the address appears to be the same. However, it is particularly notable that the document was apparently written on the 21 st June 2024, but nonetheless describes the patient as being admitted on the night of this date and then being discharged after three days. This, combined with the [Applicant's] inconsistent account of how long his wife spent in the hospital, is considered to greatly limit the weight of this document such that the Tribunal is not satisfied as to its authenticity, notwithstanding that formal authentication is not within its capacity.

30. In addition, the [Applicant's] has also provided a news article which is consistent with his broad claim. The Tribunal has not been able to verify this article through the "Factual News" website, but the Applicant did produce a hard copy during the oral hearing. In those circumstances, whilst authentication is still beyond the capacity of the Tribunal, this news article may be given greater weight should the Applicant be entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

31. Regarding the benefit of the doubt, it is required that for such an entitlement to arise, an [Applicant's] general credibility must first be established. In light of the significant credibility concerns considered above, it is considered that the [Applicant's] general credibility has not been established and for this reason he is not entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

32. In the preceding circumstances, the [Applicant's] claim that he was under threat in Nigeria for performing or blessing a same sex marriage as a pastor is not accepted as credible with regard to the credibility indicators of internal consistency, sufficiency of detail and plausibility.

33. In those circumstances, the underlying basis of his claim is rejected and there is no further basis upon which the [Applicant] seeks international protection. "

1. The IPAT's " Conclusion on Assessment of Facts and Circumstances " are set out at paras 34 and 35.

2. Under the sub-heading " Analysis of well-founded fear ", the IPAT addressed persecution at paras 37 to 39 stating inter alia that " the only accepted material fact " was the Applicant's " nationality and certain specified personal circumstances outlined at paragraph 19 above " and he was " not satisfied that this supports a finding that the [Applicant] has been subjected to persecution, for a Convention reason or otherwise."

3. At paras 40 to 42 of his decision, the IPAT addresses the " Objective basis for the claimed fear of persecution " and refers to the following country information reports:

" 40. The Tribunal has assessed the accepted material facts and the following country information (whether or not referred to expressly elsewhere in the body of this decision) in order to objectively assess the level of risk of persecution, if any, facing the Appellant in Nigeria, his country of origin:

· US Department of State "2023-2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nigeria"

· Freedom House "Freedom in the World 2025: Nigeria"

· EUAA "Country Guidance 2021: Nigeria"; "Country Focus 2024: Nigeria"

41. With regard to the country of origin information, which does not support a finding that he would be at any reasonably likely risk of persecution should he be returned to Nigeria based on any of those personal circumstances set out at paragraph 19 above, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Appellant could reasonably be expected to safely return to Nigeria.

42. Considering the accepted material facts and the country information relevant to the analysis, the Tribunal does not find that there is a reasonable chance that if the Appellant were to be returned to his country of origin he would face a well-founded fear of persecution. "

1. The comprehensive and detailed decisions of the IPO and IPAT, referred to above, meet the approach outlined in R.A. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297 where, whilst addressing the position prior to the 2015 Act, the Court of Appeal stated that the obligation on a decision-maker was to consider only relevant country of origin information and it was not necessary to consider country of origin information in a ritualised or mechanistic fashion in every single case, regardless of the personal circumstances of an applicant or the nature of the claim made by an applicant.

2. Further, the approach of both the IPO and IPAT in their respective decisions, is consistent with the following statement of principle set out by the Court of Appeal R.A. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal and referenced by the High Court (Simons J.) in P (Zimbabwe) v IPAT & Ors [2025] IEHC 403 at para. 40 of his judgment:

" It is our view that credibility findings can only really be made on the basis of a complete understanding of the entire picture. It is our view that one cannot assess a claim without placing that claim into the context of the background information of the country of origin. In other words, the probative value of the evidence must be evaluated in the light of what is known about the conditions in the claimant's country of origin. "

1. The High Court (Simons J.) carried out a similar analysis at paras 37 to 48 in his judgment K(Zimbabwe) v IPAT & Ors [2023] IEHC 6, which is sought to be relied upon by the Applicant.

2. The Applicant, therefore, has failed to establish substantial grounds for contending either that: (i) the IPAT's decision in consideration of the Applicant's credibility as to his ministry and to have conducted a same-sex marriage ceremony is in any way inconsistent with the judgment of Simons J. in K (Zimbabwe) v IPAT [2023] IEHC 6 and the assessment of credibility by reference to the full picture that emerges from the available evidence and information taken as a whole, when rationally analysed and fairly weighed; or (ii) that the IPAT's decision failed to follow the principle set out in the United Nation s High Commissioner for Refugees ' Beyond Proof: credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems ' at p.180, as contended for.

3. In section 5 of the report of the review carried out under s. 49(7) of the 2015 Act dated 3 rd November 2025 under the sub-headings " Section 49(3)(b)-Humanitarian Considerations " ** and ** " General humanitarian considerations ", reference is made to representations having been received inter alia and in this regard the following extract of those representations which were received are quoted in the report (as underlined) followed by commentary (which is in bold script):

" " the applicant faced intense backlash in Nigeria after officiating the marriage of two LGBT members of his congregation...Following the marriage, the community responded with hostility, resulting in vandalism of his car and the ransacking of his home and church. Due to increasing threats, he and his family fled to Benin City for several weeks before moving to Lagos. On 21 June, a group of armed assailants carried out a violent attack on their residence in Lagos while the applicant was away. During this assault, his wife was assaulted and questioned about his whereabouts. Due to growing concerns for their safety, he made the important decision to leave Nigeria. He sought help from members of the LGBT community, who arranged a connection with a mariner able to assist his escape. He successfully left Nigeria on 20 October 2024 and arrived in Ireland on 21 November 2024, where he quickly applied for international protection. The applicant is deeply worried that the community in Uromi will turn against him, potentially leading to deadly violence, because of the actions he took in marrying an LGBT couple. The applicant continues to express a legitimate concern regarding potential life-threatening risks upon returning to his country of origin, primarily due to threats from his community. This situation highlights the critical issue of whether the state provides adequate protection, as the authorities have done nothing to safeguard the applicant. " *It is noted that the submissions made on behalf of the applicant in support of his review of the Permission to Remain decision do not include any new or further information or evidence in relation to humanitarian considerations beyond which has previously been considered by the IPO or IPAT. Therefore, no new information or a change of circumstances has been advised and the credibility findings of the Tribunal remain valid in this case*** ".

1. This goes to the crux of the Applicant's argument, as set out above, where it is contended on behalf of the Applicant that his previous " representatives overlooked the core issue being as to the credibility of the Applicant's claims of ministry and having conducted a same-sex marriage ceremony/blessing, focusing instead on the risk of refoulement in such circumstances it found ".

2. However, for the reasons which I have just set out, the Applicant has not established substantial grounds for challenging either the decision of the IPO or the IPAT in this regard.

Deportation Order

1. Turning to the Applicant's application seeking leave to apply for judicial review to challenge the Deportation Order, the threshold of 'substantial grounds' prescribed in the 2000 Act also applies to this decision.

2. The Applicant's arguments are centred on the application of s. 3(4) of the 1999 Act when in fact the Deportation Order in this case was made under s. 51 of the 2015 Act.

3. The Applicant contends that the ministerial letter of notification of the deportation order dated 5 th November 2025 failed to comply with s. 3(4)(a) of the 1999 Act and inform him of his right to make representations in writing to the Minister within fifteen working days of the sending of the said notification and that he was denied the opportunity to make further representations in respect of his applications for international protection and leave to remain.

4. Section 3(4) of the 2015 Act provides as follows:

" A notification of a proposal of the Minister under s.3(3) shall include—

(a) a statement that the person concerned may make representations in writing to the Minister within 15 working days of the sending to him or her of the notification, (b) subject to subsection (4A), a statement that the person may leave the State before the Minister decides the matter and shall require the person to so inform the Minister in writing and to furnish the Minister with information concerning his or her arrangements for leaving,

(c) a statement that the person may consent to the making of the deportation order within 15 working days of the sending to him or her of the notification and that the Minister shall thereupon arrange for the removal of the person from the State as soon as practicable, and

(d) any other information which the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances.

(4A) The provisions of ** subsection (4)(b) ** shall not apply where— ** (a) the person has been by a final judgment convicted in the State of a serious offence, or **

(b) the Minister is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for regarding the person as a danger to the security of the State. "

1. Section 50 of the 2015 Act provides for the prohibition of refoulement in the following terms:

" (1) A person shall not be expelled or returned in any manner whatsoever to the frontier of a territory where, in the opinion of the Minister (a) the life or freedom of the person would be threatened for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, or (b) there is a serious risk that the person would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

(2) In forming his or her opinion of the matters referred to in subsection (1), the Minister shall have regard to— (a) the information (if any) submitted by the person under subsection (3), and (b) any relevant information presented by the person in his or her application for international protection, including any statement made by him or her at his or her preliminary interview and personal interview.

(3) A person shall, where he or she becomes aware of a change of circumstances that would be relevant to the formation of an opinion by the Minister under this section, inform the Minister forthwith of that change.

(4) A person who, but for the operation of subsection (1), would be the subject of a deportation order under section 51 shall be given permission to remain in the State.

(5) A permission given under this section shall be deemed to be a permission given under section 4 of the Act of 2004 and that Act shall apply accordingly.

(6) A reference in any enactment to a permission under section 4 of the Act of 2004 shall be construed as including a reference to a permission given under this section.

(7) In this section "person" means a person who is, or was, an applicant. "

1. Section 51 of the 2015 Act provides for the making of a deportation order and that subject to s. 50 ** (prohibition of refoulement) and s. 51(1A), the Minister shall make an order under this section (deportation order) in relation to a person where the Minister: (a) has refused under s. 47 both to give a refugee declaration and to give a subsidiary protection to the person; and (b) is satisfied that s. 48(5) does not apply in respect of the person; and (c) has refused under s. 49(4) to give the person a permission under that section.

2. Section 51(4)(a) of the 2015 Act provides that a deportation order made under this section shall be deemed to be a deportation order made under s. 3(1) of the Act of 1999, and accordingly that Act (other than subsections (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9)(b) and (12) of s. 3) shall apply to the deportation order.

3. As mentioned, the Applicant's challenge in this regard is misconceived in that grounds 1 to 3 of the Statement of Grounds are predicated on the contention that the Minister failed to notify the Applicant pursuant to s. 3(4)(a) of the 1999 Act within fifteen days of the deportation notification, when the deportation order and notification of that deportation order, in this case, was made pursuant to s. 51 of the 2015 Act and consequent upon the earlier suite of decisions made under the 2015 Act, as set out earlier in this judgment.

4. Further in this regard, it is also argued on behalf of the Applicant that the Minister's decision dated 26 th November 2025 pursuant to s. 50 of the 2015 Act which determined that refoulement did not arise in the Applicant's case is governed by the conventional judicial review standard of 'arguability' (rather than the statutory 'substantial grounds') in O. 84 of the RSC 1986 and the time limit of three months. In the Applicant's written and oral submissions reference is made to the making of a decision pursuant to s. 50 of the 2015 Act that the Applicant was not at risk of refoulement in circumstances where he had not been informed of his right to make further representations.

5. For the reasons already referred to, the Applicant is mistaken in his argument that s. 3(4)(a) of the 1999 Act applies.

6. In addition, the argument that the s. 50 decision is a separate decision to which the conventional judicial review threshold and time limits apply was rejected by the High Court (Gearty J.) in ED & AD (Zimbabwe) v Minster for Justice and Equality [2024] IEHC 303 where, at para. 1.3 of her judgment, Gearty J. held that t here was no statutory requirement for a separate decision in respect of information received under s.50 of the 2015 Act to be made in writing and what was required was that the Applicants, in that case, understand the reasons for the deportation orders and that s.50 of the 2015 Act ensures the continuing responsibility of the Minister to maintain the prohibition on refoulement.

7. At paras 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, Gearty J. stated as follows:

" (2.3) Section 5 refers specifically to s.51 but not to s.50. The Applicant sought to argue that a decision to accept information under s.50 is a separate decision to a decision to deport under s.51 and is not included in the statutorily imposed time-limit of 28 days. This cannot be correct for the reasons set out below.

(2.4 )The Applicant relies on AWK v The Minister for Justice [2020] IESC 10 but that is authority, it seems to me, for the opposite conclusion. As in AWK, the section in question here, s.50, is a necessary staging post on the way to a s.51 decision. As in A.W.K., the section should be read in its context. The effect of a different time limit (and three months is the time limit argued for, as set out in O.84) would be that an interim decision on new information submitted under s.50 could be challenged long after a deportation order had been made by a Minister under s.51, who did not realise that her earlier decision was about to be reviewed. That simply does not make sense. To use the words of McKechnie J. in AWK, the result would be discordant with the remaining legislation.

(2.5) Further, to allow a challenge to a s.50 decision after a s.51 decision has issued and 28 days have passed would not be conducive to a fair and effective system of deportation. Allowing a challenge to the process by which an order was made at any time within three months while confining any other challenge to the deportation order to a period of 28 days does not make logistical sense."

1. A similar sequential, or bifurcated, argument to that sought to be made on behalf of the Applicant in this case, was rejected by the High Court (Kelly J., as he then was) in Kinsella v Dundalk Town Council & Anor [2004] IEHC 373, where it had been argued that an earlier decision in a planning process was captured by the conventional judicial review process in O. 84 of the RSC 1986 and hence the threshold of arguability applied rather than the threshold of substantial grounds which, it was accepted, applied to the challenge to the subsequent planning permission:

" As I have already pointed out the applicant wishes to apply for leave to seek certiorari against the decision to grant planning permission of 3 rd August, 2004, or alternatively the decision of the Town Council of 25 th June, 2004,whereby, it decided that the further information submitted on behalf of Coverfield did not contain significant additional data. It is accepted by the applicant that the only basis upon which the decision to grant planning permission can be criticised is by reference to the decision of the 25 th June, 2004. It is argued that if the decision of 25 th June, 2004, is invalid then it must follow that the decision to grant permission is likewise invalid.

It was suggested on the part of the applicant that whilst the application for leave to apply for certiorari against the decision to grant permission undoubtedly fell within the ambit of s. 50, the application for leave to apply for certiorari in respect of the decision of 25 th June, 2004, did not. It was said that it fell to be decided by reference to ordinary judicial review principles and that the threshold of arguable case identified by the Supreme Court in G v DPP [1994] 1 I.R. 374 was all that had to be achieved.

I rejected that submission at an early stage in the hearing for reasons which I enunciated then. I took the view that it was quite clear that the whole thrust and ambition of these proceedings was to quash the decision of 3 rd August, 2004. As the applicant was quite plainly questioning the validity of the decision to grant planning permission he could not avoid or evade meeting the necessary threshold of proof required under s. 50 of the Planning and Development Act, 2000. Indeed as I pointed out in giving my ruling on this topic, if the applicant were correct in his submission in this regard an absurd result could be achieved which would be entirely contrary to the letter and intent of s. 50.

Accordingly, as I ruled at the outset it is necessary for the applicant to demonstrate substantial grounds for contending that the decisions which he impugns in these proceedings are invalid or ought to be quashed. "

Question of injunction

1. The Applicant also seeks an injunction restraining his deportation.

2. The test to be applied in an injunction application is that out by the Supreme Court in Okunade v Minister for Justice [2012] IESC 49; [2012] 3 IR 152 (" Okunade "). The Okunade test was applied in CC & Ors v The Minister for Justice & Ors [2016] IESC 48; [2016] 2 I.R. 680 (" CC ") in the context of an injunction application pending an appeal to the Supreme Court and in MD v The Board of Secondary School [2024] IESC 11 (" MD ").

3. The overarching aim and approach in Okunade is to minimise the risk of injustice.

4. In considering the application for an injunction in this case, I do so on the assumption that the first limb of the Okunade test set out at para. 104(a) of the judgment of Clarke J. has been satisfied and therefore that the Applicant has raised a stateable or arguable case.

5. Generally, the second limb of the test then involves a balancing exercise where a court must weigh and assess the potential injustice that might result from, on the one hand, intervening in favour of an applicant only to find that he subsequently loses, as opposed to not intervening in favour of an applicant only to find that he prevails in his substantive action.

6. On the facts of the Applicant's case, as I have determined that he has not established substantial grounds to be granted leave to challenge the decisions of the Respondents in this case, the question of being granted an interlocutory injunction does not arise on the facts of the Applicant's case.

7. However , even if the Applicant had been granted leave, in relation to any of the decisions which are sought to be impugned, I do not consider, having regard to the judgment of Clarke J. in Okunade, and for the following reasons, that he would be entitled to an injunction to restrain his deportation.

8. Assuming, for example, that the Applicant had satisfied the first limb of the test in Okunade (para. 104) and had established an arguable case, and further assuming that he had been granted leave to apply for judicial review (on substantial grounds), in considering the second limb as to where the greatest risk of injustice would lie, the decision in Okunade (para. 104) makes clear that I should: (i) give all appropriate weight to the orderly implementation of measures which are prima facie valid; (ii) give such weight as may be appropriate (if any) to any public interest in the orderly operation of the particular scheme in which the measure under challenge was made; (iii) give appropriate weight (if any) to any additional factors arising on the facts of the Applicant's case which would heighten the risk to the public interest of the specific measure under challenge not being implemented pending resolution of the proceedings; and (iv) give all due weight to the consequences for the applicant of being required to comply with the measure under challenge in circumstances where that measure may be found to be unlawful. (On the facts of this case, and on the assumption ex hypothesi of leave having been granted, the question of damages does not arise and the facts of the Applicant's case, relative to such similar challenges, does not involve overly complex issues, and for the reasons outlined, the Applicant's challenge could be characterised as weaker rather stronger).

9. In applying these principles to immigration cases, generally, and in carrying out a balancing exercise, Clarke J. observed at paras 107 and 108 of Okunade, in recognising the legitimate entitlement of the executive to control its borders, as an important aspect of the public interest of the State, that a significant (and high) weight needs to be attached to the implementation of decisions made in the immigration process which are prima facie valid. This must be balanced, on the other hand, against the possible injustice to an applicant, where he to successfully challenge a deportation order and is therefore a factor to which weight must also be given independent of any additional consequences that might be said to flow from deportation on the facts of any individual case.

10. At para. 109 of his judgment in Okunade, Clarke J. explained how this balancing exercise would be applied in the context of respective assertions made by an applicant and those on behalf of the Minister in that case, as follows:

" However, in the absence of any additional factors on either side, it seems to me that, if faced simply with an assertion on the part of the first respondent that it is desired that a deportation order be enforced unless and until it be found invalid and an assertion on the part of an applicant that the applicant in question does not wish to run the risk of being deported only to be readmitted if the relevant proceedings are sufficiently successful, the position of the first respondent would win out. It should also be taken into account that, at least in many cases, the result of a successful judicial review challenge will not necessarily lead to the applicant in question being entitled to remain indefinitely in Ireland or if already out of Ireland to be entitled to come back to Ireland for the purposes of remaining here indefinitely. In very many cases the only consequence of a successful challenge is, as has been pointed out, that issues of substance will require to be considered again or that some further process will need to be engaged in before a final decision is made. That too is a factor to which appropriate weight should be attached and which favours, in the absence of material countervailing factors, the implementation of a deportation order. Of course, where the presence of the relevant applicant in Ireland might be necessary to enable any subsequent process to be conducted or hearing to be held, that factor too would need to be taken into account, although there are many ways (such as an by appropriate undertaking) by which such attendance, if found necessary, could be facilitated. "

1. In terms of the matters set out at para. 104 of Okunade, a factor in favour of the Applicant is that there is no suggestion of him being engaged in activity contrary to the public interest to which significant additional weight would lie on the side of refusing an injunction. At para. 37 of the written legal submissions on the Applicant's behalf, it is, however, baldly submitted, without any further detail that " in respect of interlocutory relief, it is submitted that the balance of convenience favours the Applicant, where if his claim is ultimately upheld is at risk of refoulement if returned to Nigeria. "

2. On the other side of the balancing exercise, is the fact that in response to the Applicant's submissions, the Minister in considering the making of the deportation order had decided that the Applicant's removal would not give rise to refoulement as per s. 50 of the 2015 Act and, as mentioned, there are a suite of administrative decisions in the process leading up to, and then including the deportation order, which are presumptively valid.

3. Further, other than the contentions and arguments made in his application for international protection and the submissions which he has made at each step of the process in relation to each administrative decision, the Applicant has not pointed to additional factors in the sense of the practical consequences for him of being deported pending the conclusion of the judicial review process which would sway the balance in his favour. The Applicant's further submission of making an application seeking the revocation of the deportation order does not, for example, have suspensive effect: GT v Minister for Justice & Ors [2025] IEHC 133. Further, assuming leave to apply for judicial review had been granted on the grounds relied upon by the Applicant, he has not set out why his presence at the hearing of the judicial review proceedings would be required. The Applicant, for example, has not pointed to any material prejudice in the presentation of the case at trial which would be caused by his absence.

4. In addition, having regard to the matters at para. 111 of Okunade, the Applicant has not demonstrated that his proposed deportation, even on a temporary basis, would cause more than the ordinary disruption in being removed from Ireland such as a particular risk to him or a specific risk of irremediable damage.

5. It is submitted on the Applicant's behalf that his wife and children are in Nigeria. Therefore, in assessing this interlocutory application made on behalf of the Applicant and having regard to the factors outlined in para. 113 of the judgment of Clarke J. in Okunade, assuming that leave had been granted and that a substantive hearing was pending, the deportation of the Applicant would not result in, for example, disruption of family life which might otherwise have been established in Ireland for a significant period of time.

6. In balancing these various factors in the Applicant's case, I consider that 'the default position' described by Clarke J. at para. 110 of Okunade, applies and accordingly the Applicant is not entitled to an injunction.

CONCLUSION

1. For the reasons set out in this judgment, this application for leave to apply by way of judicial review to challenge the decision of the IPAT dated 20 th October 2025 (and notification dated 21 st October 2025), the proposal to deport dated 5 th November 2025, the s. 50 decision in relation to refoulement dated 26 th November 2025, the s. 51 decision to deport dated 26 th November 2025 and the injunction application, are hereby refused.

2. My provisional view is that as the Respondents have been entirely successful in opposing this application for judicial review, they are presumptively entitled to their costs of this application having regard to the provisions of ss. 168 and 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 and pursuant to the provisions of O. 99 of the (recast) Rules of the Superior Courts 1986.

3. If any of the parties seek a different order, or if any other matters arise, the parties' solicitors can contact the Registrar and the matter can be mentioned on a date which is mutually convenient.

CONLETH BRADLEY

22 nd April 2026

---

BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2026/2026IEHC248.html