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March 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

T.D. v. Ullom

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 1009
• Docket Number: 2025-CA-00061

• Judges: King

• Opinion

• Authorities (23)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (63.6K)

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Syllabus

Civil stalking protection order

Combined Opinion

[Cite as T.D. v. Ullom, 2026-Ohio-1009.]

COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

T.D. Case No. 2025-CA-00061

Petitioner - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas,
Case No. 23CV001277
GARY ULLOM
Judgment: Affirmed
Respondent – Appellant
Date of Judgment Entry: March 24, 2026

BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; David M. Gormley, Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: SAMUEL H. SHAMANSKY, DONALD L. REGENSBURGER,
ASHTON C. GAITANOS, for Defendant-Appellant.

King, P.J.

{¶ 1} Respondent-Appellant Gary Ullom appeals the May 1, 2024 judgment of the

Licking County Court of Common Pleas which granted T.D.'s petition for a civil stalking

protection order (CSPO) which named T.D. and her family as protected parties. We affirm

the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} This matter involves Ullom's behavior towards two neighbors, C.V. and his

family and T.D. and her family.

{¶ 3} Ullom and T.D. are neighbors residing in Newark, Ohio. T.D. and her family

live next door to Ullom. In the years leading up to T.D.'s petition for a protection order,

their relationship had deteriorated. Ullom and C.V. are also neighbors. C.V.'s home is
across the street from Ullom's. Due to concerns similar to those of T.D., C.V. also filed a

petition for a protection order on November 8, 2023. The facts of each matter overlap.

{¶ 4} The incident that caused each petitioner to request a protection order took

place on November 7, 2023. On that day, Ullom became angry with T.D. for allegedly

blowing debris onto the side of his freshly power washed house. The same day, he

attempted to hit T.D. with his tractor. Following these incidents, Ullom contacted his friend

and neighbor of 30 years, R.C. Appellant told R.C. he was angry about the incident with

T.D. and wanted to "take some neighbors out." He also made threats of committing

"suicide by cop." Transcript of Trial (T.) at 40. While R.C. alleged he did not think appellant

would carry out the threats, he was concerned enough to make a call to a family member

of T.D. to warn her and C.V.'s family of the threat. This warning, in turn prompted a call

to the Sherriff's Department. Ullom was ultimately transported to Licking Memorial

Hospital due to his threat of suicide, and was also charged with aggravated menacing.

{¶ 5} Leading up to T.D.'s petition Ullom had become increasingly hostile with

T.D. and her husband, P.D. In June, 2022, T.D. was having a graduation party for her

son. During the party appellant became angry about a car parked "over the line" on his

property. Petitioner's Exhibit 4. C.V. T.D. had the car moved and believed that ended the

matter. But shortly thereafter, Ullom started shooting his guns outside in his yard while

the graduation party was taking place. When questioned by T.D., appellant retorted "you

don't know who you're fucking with" and reached for his hip where he often had a gun

tucked into the waistband of his pants. Petitioner's Exhibits 8 and 9. The Sheriff's

Department became involved and addressed the matter with Ullom. Ullom then erected
a sign in his yard which read "Someone lied! Making false reports to the Licking County

Sheriff is a crime." Petitioner's Exhibit 5.

{¶ 6} When P.D. was running for the Licking Valley School Board in 2023, Ullom

made posts on social media expressing his contempt for T.D.'s spouse P.D. In September

2023, Ullom made a post on the Madison Township Facebook page stating he had been

disrespected by "spoiled brats and cowards (my neighbors)" and further posted "obviously

he's afraid of the old man." Petitioner's Exhibit F.

{¶ 7} Following the November 7, 2023 incident, the trial court issued an ex parte

civil stalking protection order (CSPO) and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing on

December 19, 2023.

{¶ 8} Ullom requested and received two continuances which moved the final

hearing to March 1, 2024. On that date, C.V., who was acting pro se, asked that the

hearing be continued so that he could reissue subpoenas. He was unaware that he

needed to reissue subpoenas after each continuance. T.D. had also operated under the

same assumption and therefore joined C.V.'s request. The magistrate granted the request

and set the final hearing for April 4, 2024.

{¶ 9} Before the hearing began, the magistrate ruled the C.V. and T.D. hearings

would be consolidated as the witness lists were the same.

{¶ 10} After hearing the evidence and taking the matter under consideration, on

May 1, 2024, the magistrate issued a CSPO designating T.D., P.D. and their son as

protected parties.
{¶ 11} On May 15, 2024, Ullom filed objections to the magistrate's decision and

filed supplemental objections on December 25, 2024. On July 15, 2025, the trial court

denied Ullom's objections.

{¶ 12} Ullom filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for

consideration. He raises six assignments of error as follows:

I

{¶ 13} "THE TRIAL COURT’S ISSUANCE OF A CSPO WAS NOT SUPPORTED

BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND COMPARABLE PROVISIONS OF THE

OHIO CONSTITUTION"

II

{¶ 14} "THE TRIAL COURT REPEATEDLY ALLOWED APPELLEE TO ELICIT

PREJUDICIAL AND INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY IN VIOLATION OF THE OHIO RULES

OF EVIDENCE, THEREBY DEPRIVING APPELLANT OF HIS RIGHTS TO DUE

PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND

COMPARABLE PROVISIONS OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION."

III

{¶ 15} "THE TRIAL COURT'S ISSUANCE OF A CSPO WAS AGAINST THE

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO

DUE PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND COMPARABLE

PROVISIONS OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION"

IV

{¶ 16} "THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL

STANDARD IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS

GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED

STATES CONSTITUTION AND COMPARABLE PROVISIONS OF THE OHIO

CONSTITUTION."

V

{¶ 17} "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY CONSOLIDATING

THE C.V. CASE WITH THE T.D. CASE MID-HEARING, THEREBY VIOLATING

APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AS

GUARANTEED BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED

STATES CONSTITUTION AND COMPARABLE PROVISIONS OF THE OHIO

CONSTITUTION."

VI

{¶ 18} "THE TRIAL COURT'S CONTINUANCE OF THE FINAL HEARING IN THIS

CASE CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHICH RESULTED IN

PREJUDICE TO APPELLANT."

I, III, IV

{¶ 19} For ease of discussion, we address Ullom's first, third, and fourth

assignments of error together. In his first assignment of error, Ullom argues the issuance

of a CSPO is not supported by sufficient evidence. In his third assignment of error, he
argues the issuance of a CSPO is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In his

fourth assignment of error, Ullom accuses the trial court of crafting a new legal standard

when it determined Ullom knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused T.D. to

believe she would be physically harmed. According to Ullom, apprehension of harm or

distress is insufficient. We disagree with each of these arguments.

Standard of Review

{¶ 20} When the appellant asserts that there was not a preponderance of

competent, credible evidence to support the CSPO, our standard of review is whether

there was sufficient, credible evidence to support a finding that the respondent engaged

in acts of menacing by stalking. S.M. v. T.G., 2025-Ohio-1448, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.)

{¶ 21} Sufficiency of the evidence "is a test of adequacy. Whether the evidence is

legally sufficient to sustain a verdict [decision] is a question of law." State v. Thompkins,

78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). Weight of the evidence concerns "the inclination of the

greater amount of credible evidence" supporting one side over the other. Eastley v.

Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179 ¶ 12, applying State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52. We must

not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court where there exists some competent

and credible evidence supporting the judgment rendered by the trial court. Eastley v.

Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179. The weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility of

the witnesses are issues for the trier of fact. State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 189

(1990). The trier of fact "has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and

credibility of each witness, something that does not translate well on the written page."

Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418 (1997).
Civil Stalking Protection Orders

{¶ 22} A civil staking protection order "is a special statutory remedy that is

designed to prevent violence." Bey v. Rasawehr, 2020-Ohio-3301 ¶ 16. "To be entitled to

a civil stalking protection order, a petitioner must show, by a preponderance of the

evidence that the respondent engaged in menacing by stalking, a violation of R.C.

2903.11, against the person seeking the order." Tumblin v. Jackson, 2006-Ohio-3270 (5th

Dist.). "Preponderance of the evidence" is "evidence which is of greater weight or more

convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which

as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not." Black's

Law Dictionary 1182 (6th Ed. 1990).

{¶ 23} R.C. 2903.211(A), menacing by stalking provides in relevant part:

(1) No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly

cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical

harm to the other person or a family or household member of the

other person or cause mental distress to the other person or a family

or household member of the other person. In addition to any other

basis for the other person’s belief that the offender will cause

physical harm to the other person or the other person’s family or

household member or mental distress to the other person or the

other person’s family or household member, the other person’s belief

or mental distress may be based on words or conduct of the offender

that are directed at or identify a corporation, association, or other
organization that employs the other person or to which the other

person belongs.

(2) No person, through the use of any form of written communication

or any electronic method of remotely transferring information,

including, but not limited to, any computer, computer network,

computer program, computer system, or telecommunication device

shall post a message or use any intentionally written or verbal

graphic gesture with purpose to do either of the following:

(a) Violate division (A)(1) of this section;

...

{¶ 24} "A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware

that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a

certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that

such circumstances probably exist." R.C. 2901.22(B). Whether a person acts knowingly

can only be determined, absent a defendant's admission, from all the surrounding facts

and circumstances, including the doing of the act itself. State v. Jacobs, 2021-Ohio-1611,

¶ 16 (5th Dist.) citing State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563 (1st Dist. 2001).

{¶ 25} A "pattern of conduct" is defined as "two or more actions or incidents

closely related in time, whether or not there has been a prior conviction based on any of

those actions or incidents." R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). "'In determining what constitutes a

pattern of conduct, courts must take every action of the respondent into consideration,

even if some of the actions in isolation do not seem particularly threatening.'" R.W.B. v.
T.V., 2024-Ohio-584, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), quoting Lewis v. Jacobs, 2013-Ohio-3461, ¶ 10 (2d

Dist.).

{¶ 26} R.C. 2903.211(D)(2) states:

(2) "Mental distress" means any of the following:

(a) Any mental illness or condition that involves some temporary

substantial incapacity;

(b) Any mental illness or condition that would normally require

psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental

health services, whether or not any person requested or received

psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental

health services.

{¶ 27} Mental distress need not be incapacitating or debilitating, and expert

testimony is not required. Rufener v. Hutson, 2012-Ohio-5061 (8th Dist.); Jenkins v.

Jenkins, 2007-Ohio-422 (10th Dist.). Contrary to Ullom's assertion that apprehension of

physical harm is insufficient to establish menacing by stalking, in Z.J. v. R.M., 2023-Ohio-

3552 (5th Dist.) this court found the statute does not require that the victim actually

experience mental distress or physical harm, but only that the victim believes the stalker

will cause mental distress or physical harm. Id. ¶11. Recognizing a conflict with our

holding in Z.J. and holdings in decisions in the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Districts, which

found a victim must actually experience mental distress, this court entered an order

certifying a conflict. No. 2022 CA 0071 (5th Dist. Mar. 4, 2024).
{¶ 28} The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed that a conflict existed and ordered the

parties to brief the conflict question certified by this court: "'Whether R.C. 2903.211(A)(1)

requires a victim to actually experience mental distress or only believe that the stalker will

cause the victim physical harm or mental distress, for a court to issue a civil stalking

protection order.'" Z.J. v. R.M., 2024-Ohio-1507, quoting No. 2022 CA 0071, at 7 (5th

Dist. Mar. 4, 2024). The Court affirmed this court's interpretation of the statute and held

"that a petitioner's belief that an offender will cause him mental distress is grounds for

showing a violation of the menacing-by-stalking statute to obtain a civil stalking protection

order." Z.J. v. R.M, 2025-Ohio-5662, ¶3.

{¶ 29} In evaluating a claim of mental distress, an objective standard is to be

applied to the impact upon a victim's state of mind as it relates to threatening

communications. Fleckner v. Fleckner, 2008-Ohio-4000 (10th Dist.).

Analysis

The Testimony

{¶ 30} T.D. testified about events leading up to November 7, 2023, the day before

she filed her petition. She described a strained relationship with Ullom including a couple

incidents in summer 2022 during her son's graduation party. During the party Ullom

became enraged when one of T.D.'s guests "parked over the line" on their narrow, shared

lane. Petitioner's Exhibit 4. He yelled at the guests and texted P.D. The guests were

shaken by Ullom's behavior. T.D. had them move their vehicle and she had words with

Ullom, and asked him to leave them alone. Ullom responded by telling T.D. "you don't

know who you're F-ing with" and reaching for his hip where T.D. knew Ullom often carried

a gun. T. 173. T.D. introduced photos she took of a shirtless Ullom with a gun tucked into
the back waistband of his pants. Petitioner' Exhibits 8 and 9. Thereafter, Ullom began

shooting his guns in his backyard while the party was still going on. T.D. called police and

officers arrived to handle the matter. T. 174. Later, Ullom then erected a sign in his yard

which read "Someone lied! Making false reports to the Licking County Sheriff is a crime."

Petitioner's Exhibit 5.

{¶ 31} Then on November 7, 2023, T.D. was outside mulching leaves on her riding

mower when Ullom attempted to hit her with his tractor which had a snow plow mounted

on the front. T. 155. T.D. swerved and went to the rear of her property to escape Ullom.

Id. She watched as Ullom made circles for quite a while around the spot where he had

attempted to hit her. T. 156.

{¶ 32} Later that day, her daughter was given a ride home by a friend. T.D.

watched as the two sat in T.D.'s driveway and observed that Ullom had his truck backed

up against her daughter's friend's bumper, blocking her from backing up. She continued

to observe as Ullom "peeled out" and left. T.D. called 911. T. 161-162.

{¶ 33} Following that incident, and on the same evening, T.D. learned of Ullom's

threat to "take out" his neighbors and commit "suicide by cop." She spoke with the

deputies who arrived about both issues. T.D. called R.C. and put him on speaker phone

so she and Deputy Riddle could confirm Ullom's threats. Initially deputies could not locate

Ullom and advised T.D. to call when he returned. When she did several deputies

responded to handle the matter. T.D. testified these events were frightening. T. 162-165.

Ullom's Arguments

{¶ 34} Ullom argues he did not act with the requisite mental state as he never

directly threatened T.D. and her family and there is no evidence that he was aware that
his discussion with R.C. would be relayed to T.D. Yet as noted above, one "acts

knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct

will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature." R.C.

2901.22(B). Telling one neighbor you wish to "take out" other neighbors and then commit

"suicide by cop," will probably cause that neighbor to alert those potentially in harm's way.

{¶ 35} Additionally, as the Ninth District Court of Appeals has found, "R.C.

2903.211(A)(1) does not require proof that the offender explicitly threatened the victim."

M.B. v. L.D., 2023-Ohio-3560, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.). "'Instead, the offender's knowledge that

the conduct will result in the victim fearing physical harm or suffering mental distress can

be inferred by the circumstances.'" Id., quoting State v. Smith, 2012-Ohio-335, ¶ 20 (9th

Dist.). Ullom posted his knowledge that his neighbors feared him on Facebook.

Petitioner's Exhibit 31. While Ullom argues his Facebook post contained in Petitioner's

Exhibit 31 does not name T.D. or any of her family members, it explicitly refers to his

"neighbor attempting to get elected to the school board. . ." a reference that can only be

T.D.'s husband P.D. In the post, Ullom refers to his neighbors as "spoiled brats" and

"cowards" then states "[o]bviously he is afraid of the old man." While Ullom argues the

Facebook posts do not justify a menacing by stalking finding or the issuance of a CSPO,

the posts were just one example of several and provide context to other incidents.

{¶ 36} T.D. testified regarding the graduation incidents and then three separate

incidents that took place on November 7, 2023. Contrary to Ullom's argument, we find the

summer 2022 incidents were not too remote in time to the November 2023 incidents to

establish a course of conduct. "Because the statute does not specifically state what

constitutes incidents "closely related in time," whether the incidents in question were
"closely related in time" should be resolved by the trier of fact "considering the evidence

in the context of all the circumstances of the case." State v. Honeycutt, 2002 Ohio 3490,

¶26 (2d District).

{¶ 37} Ullom additionally argues T.D. never testified she believed Ullom would

cause her mental distress or fear of physical harm, but the record reflects that she did.

After testifying about Ullom's irresponsible use of firearms on his property while a

graduation party was going on next door, T.D. stated she introduced the photos of Ullom

with a gun in his waistband "to show what I'm living with. The constant fear." T. 170.

{¶ 38} Ullom also argues the trial court erred in including T.D.'s husband and son

as protected parties in the CSPO because neither testified at the CSPO hearing. We

disagree. Obviously, the trial court found T.D.'s testimony credible when she stated Ullom

has a history of stalking her family members and when she stated his behavior was only

escalating. T. 166. We find no prejudice to Ullom if T.D.'s family is included in the CSPO,

and Ullom points to none.

{¶ 39} Finally, Ullom argues the trial court's decision is against the manifest weight

of the evidence. In support of his argument, he points to the testimony of R.C. which he

characterizes as too contradictory to be of any evidentiary value.

{¶ 40} We first note that even on a cold transcript, it is apparent R.C. was evasive

and less than cooperative during the hearing. He did, however, testify he took steps to

alert T.D. and C.V. of Ullom's threats "just to be sure everybody's going to be safe." T.

1. He was therefore concerned enough by Ullom's statements to take proactive steps.

{¶ 41} Ullom additionally argues R.C. testified he found nothing alarming about

Ullom's statements because he "talks like that all the time." But whether or not R.C. found
Ullom's statements alarming is not relevant to whether T.D experienced mental distress

or feared physical harm based on the same statements, as R.C. was not the party seeking

a CSPO.

{¶ 42} Ullom has failed to show the trial court granted the CSPO against the

manifest weight of the evidence. T.D. provided competent, credible evidence to support

the trial court's finding that Ullom engaged in a pattern of conduct which satisfied the

requirements of R.C. 2903.211(A) and 2903.211(D). Accordingly, Ullom's first, third, and

fourth assignments of error are overruled.

II

{¶ 43} In his second assignment of error, Ullom alleges the magistrate erroneously

admitted hearsay statements which denied him due process and a fair trial. We disagree.

Bench Trial

{¶ 44} We begin by noting Ullom's case was tried to the bench. "We must presume,

in reviewing a bench trial, that the trial court considered nothing but relevant and

competent evidence in reaching its verdict. 'The presumption may be overcome only by

an affirmative showing to the contrary by the appellant.' " State v. Mackey, 2014-Ohio-

2288, ¶ 8 (5th Dist.) citing State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71 (1991). In a bench trial, the

trial court acts as a factfinder and "is presumed to be able to sort out the irrelevant and

prejudicial evidence from that which was probative and admissible." State v. Parker,

2002-Ohio-2688, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). In fact, during the hearing in the instant matter, after

numerous objections based on hearsay and relevance, the trial court advised counsel for

Ullom "Okay, well look, I know how to take what information is relevant and appropriate.
You don't need to object to everything. . . I also know what's relevant and what's not and

will make that determination when I make my decision." T. 164-165.

Ullom's Hearsay Complaints

{¶ 45} Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted." Evid.R. 801(C).

{¶ 46} Ullom first takes issue with testimony related to how T.D. learned Ullom had

made threats of harm on November 7, 2023. According to Ullom, neither the responding

officers nor the petitioners heard any threats directly from him, and therefore any

testimony regarding his statements was inadmissible hearsay.

{¶ 47} The record reflects that Ullom made his statements to R.C. R.C. then spoke

to both the responding officers and T.D. about Ullom's statements. T. 52, 163. R.C

testified at the CSPO hearing regarding the threats Ullom made and was cross-examined

by counsel for Ullom. Ullom's own statements to R.C. are simply not hearsay. Evid.R.

801(D)(2)(a).

{¶ 48} Next, as to the testimony of the responding officers, "Ohio courts have long

held that out-of-court statements are admissible to explain the actions of a police officer

during an investigation and are not hearsay." State v. Johnson, 2018-Ohio-1389, ¶ 44

(8th Dist.), citing State v. Davis, 2008-Ohio-2. Both Deputy Buehler and Deputy Riddle

spoke directly to R.C. regarding Ullom's statements indicating he wished to harm himself

and "take some neighbors with him." T. 40, 52. Based on these reports, the deputies

eventually located Ullom, and transported him to the Licking Memorial Hospital for

treatment. T. 35-36. Their testimony, therefore, explained the actions of the deputies
based on the reports of R.C. and the petitioners. At worst, the testimony of the responding

deputies and the petitioners regarding the threats was cumulative to R.C.'s testimony.

Thus, even assuming, arguendo, the admission of the deputies' testimony was erroneous,

"the erroneous admission or exclusion of hearsay, cumulative to properly admitted

testimony, constitutes harmless error." State v. Hogg, 2011-Ohio-6454, ¶ 46 (10th Dist.).

{¶ 49} Third, Ullom argues the trial court erroneously admitted a police report

replete with inadmissible hearsay into evidence. In support of his argument, Ullom cites

to this court's decision in State v. Granderson, 2008-Ohio-3757 (5th Dist.) wherein we

noted that police reports are generally inadmissible hearsay and should not be submitted

to a jury. Id. at 435, emphasis added. But as discussed above, this was a trial to the

bench. Moreover, we have reviewed the judgment entry granting the CSPO and note that

it contains no mention of the police report as a basis for granting T.D.'s petition.

{¶ 50} Next, Ullom makes a passing reference to hearsay evidence admitted in

violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Ullom fails, however to provide a

clue as to which witnesses this argument applies to. "It is not the duty of this Court to

develop an argument in support of an assignment of error if one exists." State v. Untied,

2007-Ohio-1804, ¶ 141. Consequently, we may disregard arguments if an appellant fails

to identify the relevant portions of the record upon which he bases his argument. See

App.R. 12(A)(2).

{¶ 51} Finally, we note counsel for Ullom has made disparaging remarks

throughout his brief against the trial court in this and the companion matter including

accusing the court of bias, providing legal advice to pro se parties, crafting its own legal

standards, and lacking in a fundamental understanding of the hearsay rules. Appellant's
brief at 19, 23-25. We would caution counsel against making such comments about any

tribunal, particularly when the misunderstanding here appears to lie with counsel.

{¶ 52} Ullom has failed to overcome the presumption that the trial court considered

only relevant competent evidence in reaching its verdict. Accordingly, Ullom's hearsay

arguments are without merit and the second assignment of error is overruled.

V

{¶ 53} In his fifth assignment of error, Ullom argues the trial court abused its

discretion in consolidating the C.V. and T.D. cases into one trial. We disagree.

{¶ 54} Civ.R. 42(A)(1)(a) provides that "If actions before the court involve common

questions of law or fact, the court may . . . join for . . . trial any and all matters at issue in

the actions." The decision to consolidate or join cases for trial under Civ.R. 42(A) rests

within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed on

appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Siuda v. Howard, 2002-Ohio-2292, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.).

When deciding whether to join cases for trial, the trial court "must determine if there is a

sufficient commonality of issues and parties to warrant consolidating the cases for trial.

Id.

{¶ 55} "Abuse of discretion" means an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or

unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87 (1985). Most

instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable,

rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary. AAAA Ent., Inc. v. River Place

Community Urban Redev. Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). An unreasonable

decision is one backed by no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.

Id. "It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo, would
not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing

reasoning processes that would support a contrary result." Id.

{¶ 56} In the instant matter, the facts of the two cases were nearly identical, each

required the same witnesses, and the questions of law in each matter were identical.

While Ullom argues the consolidation deprived him of a fair opportunity to prepare and

respond, he does not explain how. Indeed, the hearings were scheduled for the same day

and further, due to the parallel facts and witnesses of each matter, if counsel for Ullom

was prepared for one case, he was prepared for both. Ullom further alleges consolidation

created confusion as to what evidence could be considered in each matter. But once

again, this was a trial to the bench and it is therefore presumed that the trial court was

able to sort out the irrelevant and prejudicial evidence from that which was probative and

admissible in each case. State v. Parker, 2002-Ohio-2688, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 57} The fifth assignment of error is overruled.

VI

{¶ 58} In his final assignment of error, Ullom argues the trial court abused its

discretion when it granted petitioner T.D.'s request for a continuance. We disagree.

{¶ 59} The grant or denial of a continuance rests within the trial court's sound

discretion. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67 (1981). In determining whether a trial

court abused its discretion in denying a motion for a continuance, an appellate court

should consider the following factors: (1) the length of the delay requested; (2) whether

other continuances have been requested and received; (3) the inconvenience to

witnesses, opposing counsel, and the court; (4) whether there is a legitimate reason for

the continuance; (5) whether the defendant contributed to the circumstances giving rise
to the need for the continuance, and other relevant factors, depending on the unique facts

of each case. Unger, supra, at 67-68, 423 N.E.2d 1078. The reviewing court must also

weigh the potential prejudice to the movant against the trial court's right to control its own

docket. In re Barnick, 2007-Ohio-1720, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing Unger.

{¶ 60} Here, C.V. testified in his own case first. T.D. was not in the courtroom

during C.V.'s testimony. When C.V. began discussing what he was told by responding

officers on November 7, 2023, Ullom objected based on hearsay. T. 12. C.V. who was

proceeding pro se, indicated he had issued subpoenas before the originally scheduled

hearing for the law enforcement officers involved to be present for the hearing and he

assumed they were therefore present that day. However, Ullom twice requested and was

granted continuances. C.V. stated he was under the impression that subpoenas

automatically reissued when a continuance was granted. T. 14. When the trial court

advised C.V. his assumption was incorrect, he requested a continuance in order to

reissue the subpoenas and the trial court granted the same. Ullom objected stating "the

witness has already been sworn in and we're here prepared to proceed." T. 15.

{¶ 61} Thereafter, T.D. was brought into the courtroom and the trial court explained

it had granted C.V.'s request for a continuance and C.V. explained to T.D. why he had

requested the continuance. T.D. was also proceeding pro se and had also not reissued

her subpoenas for the deputies following the continuances requested and granted by

Ullom. T.D. therefore also requested a continuance in order to reissue her subpoenas. T.

18-19.

{¶ 62} Here on appeal, Ullom argues the trial court's decision was an abuse of

discretion and suggests bias. He argues "[t]he clear purpose of the continuance was to
directly benefit Appellee by giving her the opportunity to prepare admissible evidence and

testimony," yet still ultimately "allowed Appellee to repeatedly elicit hearsay testimony

throughout the final hearing anyway, thereby rendering the continuance entirely

unnecessary and arbitrary." Brief of Appellant at 25.

{¶ 63} First, we have already found Ullom's hearsay arguments are groundless.

Second, we reject Ullom's speculation as to the trial court's motivation when the record

clearly reflects the continuance was granted for the sole purpose of allowing petitioners

to reissue their subpoenas and nothing more. T. 20.

{¶ 64} The record further reflects Ullom requested and was granted two

continuances. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to grant T.D.'s

motion for a single continuance so that she could reissue subpoenas.
{¶ 65} The final assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 66} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the

Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

{¶ 67} Costs to Appellant.

By: King, P.J.

Hoffman, J. and

Gormley, J. concur.