State Of Karnataka vs Santhosh Kumar C - Supreme Court Judgment

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State Of Karnataka vs Santhosh Kumar C on 23 March, 2026

Author: Vikram Nath

Bench: Vikram Nath

2026 INSC 276

                                                                          REPORTABLE
                                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                              Civil Appeal No.                             of 2026
                              (Arising out of SLP (C) No.35896 of 2025)

                     STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.                          …APPELLANT(S)

                                                        VERSUS

                     SANTHOSH KUMAR C                                  ...RESPONDENT(S)

                                                       JUDGMENT Vikram Nath, J.

1. Leave granted.
   

2. The present appeal arises from the judgment and order
                           dated 21.04.2025 passed by the High Court of
                           Karnataka at Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as the
                           “High Court”) in Writ Petition No. 24455 of 2023 (S-
                           KSAT), whereby the High Court allowed the writ petition
                           filed by the respondent and set aside the order dated
                           13.10.2023          passed    by     the    Karnataka    State
   
                           Administrative Tribunal, Bengaluru (hereinafter referred
   

   17:54:58 IST

                           to as the “Tribunal”) in Application No. 4990 of 2022, as
   

   Reason:

well as the communication dated 27.06.2022 issued by
the Department of Personnel and Administrative
Reforms, Government of Karnataka (hereinafter referred
to as “DPAR”). By the said judgment and order, the High
Court directed the appellants, namely the State of
Karnataka and its authorities, to consider the case of the
respondent for appointment to the post in question.

1. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows:

3.1. The Karnataka Public Service Commission (hereinafter
referred to as the “KPSC”) issued a notification dated
03.11.2011 inviting applications for recruitment to 362
posts of Karnataka Gazetted Probationers in Group A
and Group B Services under the Karnataka Recruitment
of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive
Examinations) Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as
the “1997 Rules”).

3.2. The respondent, who is an ex-serviceman, participated
in the said selection process. Upon conclusion of the
process, the KPSC published the final select list on
21.03.2014. In the General Merit Ex-Military Person
category (hereinafter referred to as the “GM/Ex-MP
category”), one Sri Aiyappa M.A. was selected to the post
of Assistant Commissioner, Karnataka Administrative
Service, Group A, Junior Scale. The respondent was not
selected to that post. He was, however, selected to the

post of Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,
Group A, pursuant to the same recruitment.
3.3. According to the record, Sri Aiyappa M.A. did not
undergo the mandatory medical examination or police
verification and did not report for duty. The respondent,
on the other hand, was appointed as Assistant
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Group A, by
notification dated 05.05.2022 and joined duty on
09.05.2022.

3.4. On 26.05.2022, the respondent submitted a
representation to DPAR, claiming that since Sri Aiyappa
M.A. had not joined, the post of Assistant Commissioner,
Karnataka Administrative Service, Group A, Junior
Scale, under the GM/Ex-MP category remained unfilled
and ought to be offered to him. The basis of the claim
was that he was immediately next below the selected
candidate and had indicated preference for the said post.
3.5. By communication dated 27.06.2022, DPAR rejected the
respondent’s request. The communication stated that
under the 1997 Rules there was no provision for
preparation of an additional select list and that a post
left unfilled on account of non-reporting by a selected
candidate was required to be treated as a fresh vacancy
to be filled in a subsequent recruitment.
3.6. Aggrieved by the said communication, the respondent
filed Application No. 4990 of 2022 before the Tribunal

under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act,
1985. In the said application, he questioned the
communication dated 27.06.2022 and sought a
direction to the respondents therein to select and
appoint him to the post of Assistant Commissioner,
Karnataka Administrative Service, Group A, Junior
Scale, under the GM/Ex-MP category against the
vacancy said to have remained unfilled on account of the
non-reporting of Sri Aiyappa M.A.
3.7. The appellants and the KPSC opposed the application.
Their stand was that the 2011 recruitment process had
culminated in a final select list corresponding to the
vacancies notified, that the 1997 Rules did not
contemplate any additional or waiting list, and that in
view of sub-rule (3) of Rule 4 and Rule 11 of the 1997
Rules, a vacancy arising on account of non-joining by a
selected candidate could not be filled by operating the
same select list.

3.8. By order dated 13.10.2023, the Tribunal dismissed the
application. The Tribunal held that there was no
provision under the 1997 Rules for preparing an
additional select list and that a post not filled on account
of non-reporting by a selected candidate had to be
treated as a fresh vacancy. The Tribunal also accepted
the stand of the appellants that the vacancy, if any, had
to be filled only through a fresh recruitment process.

3.9. The respondent thereafter challenged the Tribunal’s
order by filing Writ Petition No. 24455 of 2023 (S-KSAT)
before the High Court contending that since the selected
candidate had not even undergone the mandatory
medical examination, the vacancy continued to remain
unfilled and should go to the candidate immediately next
below. On behalf of the appellants and the KPSC, it was
contended that mere inclusion in the select list did not
confer a justiciable right to appointment and that Rule
11(3) of the 1997 Rules governed the matter.
3.10. By the impugned judgment and order dated 21.04.2025,
the High Court allowed the writ petition. The High Court
held that the vacancy in question continued to remain
unfilled since the selected candidate had not undergone
the mandatory medical examination. It further held that
Rule 11(3) of the 1997 Rules was not attracted in the
facts of the case. On that basis, the High Court quashed
the order dated 13.10.2023 passed by the Tribunal and
the communication dated 27.06.2022, and directed the
appellants to consider the case of the respondent for
appointment to the post in question.

1. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated
   

   21.04.2025 passed by the High Court, the appellants
   have approached this Court in the present appeal.

2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
   

   perused the material on record. The question that falls

   for consideration in the present appeal is whether, under
   the 1997 Rules, a vacancy arising in the course of the
   2011 recruitment process on account of a selected
   candidate not undergoing the mandatory pre-
   appointment formalities or not reporting for duty could
   be claimed, as of right, by the respondent on the ground
   that he was immediately next below in the order of
   selection, or whether such vacancy had to be treated in
   accordance with the governing rules as a vacancy to be
   filled only through a subsequent recruitment process.

3. In order to answer the controversy in the present appeal,
   

   it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions of the
   1997 Rules.

Firstly, Sub-rule (3) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules
provides as follows:

“The candidates who apply for the competitive
examinations shall clearly indicate in their
application forms the services or posts for which
they wish to be considered for appointment in the
order of preference. They shall not be considered
for such of the service or posts which are not
preferred by them.”

Moreover, Rule 11 of the 1997 Rules, to the extent
relevant, provides as follows:

“11. List of candidates suitable for appointment.

(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule
4 and Rule 8, and the number of posts advertised
for each of the services in Group A and Group B,
the Commission shall prepare separate list of
names of the candidates equal to the available
number of vacancies considered suitable for
appointment for each of the said services in Group
A and Group B arranged in the order of merit
determined on the basis of total marks secured in
the main examination comprising written
examination and personality test.
Provided that the name of a candidate shall not be
included in more than one such list.

(2) The list prepared under sub-rule (1) shall be
published by the Commission in the Official
Gazette and the copies thereof shall be forwarded
to the Government together with the marks
secured by each of the candidates in the written
examination and personality test and to each
candidate whose name is included in such list.
(3) Candidates whose names are included in the
list prepared in accordance with the provisions of
sub-rule (1) shall be considered for appointment to
the vacancies notified in each of the services and

        groups of posts in the order in which their names
        appear in the list.

Provided that no candidate shall be appointed
unless the Government is satisfied after such
enquiry and verification as may be considered
necessary that the candidate is suitable for such
appointment.”

    A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions shows that
    the scheme of the 1997 Rules is one of recruitment
    against notified vacancies, with the candidates being
    considered on the basis of merit and their indicated
    order of preference. The list contemplated by Rule 11 is
    not an open-ended reservoir of candidates, but a
    service-wise list prepared equal to the number of
    available vacancies and meant to operate in respect of
    the vacancies notified in that recruitment itself.

1. A proper appreciation of the aforesaid provisions reveals
   

   that the scheme of the 1997 Rules is not one of mere
   abstract ranking, but of a structured and service-
   specific selection against notified vacancies. Each
   candidate is required to indicate the services or posts for
   which he seeks consideration and that too in the order
   of preference. Rule 11, in turn, contemplates
   preparation of separate lists, equal to the available

   number of vacancies, for each of the services and groups
   of posts advertised. The proviso to Rule 11(1), which
   stipulates that the name of a candidate shall not be
   included in more than one such list, further underlines
   the same position. Rule 11(3), when read with Rule
   11(1), indicates that the list is prepared for consideration
   of candidates against the finite vacancies notified in that
   recruitment. The Rule does not indicate that the list is
   to continue as an open-ended source of appointment
   even after the notified vacancies have been exhausted or
   the selection process has otherwise run its course.

2. The first proviso to Rule 11(3) also makes it clear that
   

   inclusion in the list does not by itself result in
   appointment. Appointment remains subject to such
   enquiry and verification as may be considered necessary
   and to the satisfaction of the Government regarding
   suitability. Significantly, the 1997 Rules do not provide
   for any reserve list, waiting list, or additional list. Nor do
   they contain any provision enabling the State to revert
   to the same list and travel further downward to fill a post
   left unfilled on account of non-completion of pre-
   appointment formalities or non-joining by a selected
   candidate. The scheme of the 1997 Rules, therefore, is
   of recruitment against notified vacancies through
   service-wise lists prepared to the extent of available

   vacancies, and not of continued operation of the same
   list beyond its statutory framework.

3. The above understanding also accords with the settled
   

   principle that inclusion of a candidate’s name in a select
   list does not by itself confer an indefeasible right to
   appointment. A select list makes a candidate eligible for
   consideration in accordance with the governing rules. It
   does not create a vested right to claim appointment
   dehors the statutory framework. In Shankarsan Dash
   v. Union of India1, this Court held that even where
   vacancies exist, a candidate whose name appears in the
   select list does not acquire an indefeasible right to
   appointment, unless the relevant rules so indicate. Similarly, in Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi2, and
   State of Orissa v. Rajkishore Nanda3, this Court has
   held that appointments must conform to the notified
   vacancies and the governing rules, and that a select list
   cannot be operated in a manner not contemplated by the
   statutory scheme.

4. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, in
   our considered opinion, the respondent’s claim cannot
   be sustained. The respondent does not point to any
   provision in the 1997 Rules under which a candidate
   placed below a selected candidate acquires a right to be

1 (1991) 3 SCC 47
2 (2010) 2 SCC 637
3 (2010) 6 SCC 777

   appointed to a post left unfilled on account of non-

completion of pre-appointment formalities or non-
joining. In the absence of such a provision, the mere fact
that a selected candidate did not join cannot, by itself,
create an enforceable right in favour of the respondent.

1. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the
   present case, we find ourselves unable to sustain the
   claim of the respondent. The respondent was not
   excluded from the recruitment process altogether. He
   participated in the selection pursuant to the notification
   dated 03.11.2011 and was in fact selected and
   appointed to the post of Assistant Commissioner of
   Commercial Taxes, Group A, under the same
   recruitment. He joined duty on 09.05.2022. His present
   claim, therefore, is not one arising from total non-
   selection, but a claim to appointment to another post,
   namely Assistant Commissioner, Karnataka
   Administrative Service, Group A, Junior Scale, on the
   ground that the selected candidate to that post did not
   undergo the mandatory medical examination, police
   verification, or report for duty.

2. The foundation of the respondent’s case is that, since
   the selected candidate did not complete the pre-
   appointment process, the vacancy must necessarily go
   to him as the candidate immediately next below. The
   respondent has also sought to place reliance on the

   circumstance that he had indicated preference for the
   said post. In our view, neither of these circumstances
   can, by themselves, create an enforceable right in his
   favour. Under the 1997 Rules, the relevant question is
   not merely whether a post remained unfilled in fact, but
   whether the Rules permit such post to be filled by
   reverting to the same select list and moving downward
   to another candidate. As already noticed, the 1997 Rules
   contain no such enabling provision.

3. The matter assumes greater significance when one bears
   in mind the structure of the selection itself. The
   recruitment was to multiple services and posts in Group
   A and Group B. The Rules required candidates to
   indicate their order of preference. The KPSC was then to
   prepare separate lists, equal to the number of vacancies,
   for the respective services and groups of posts. The
   process, therefore, was one of service-wise selection and
   allocation against notified vacancies. Once that exercise
   had culminated in publication of the final list and
   appointments were made in accordance therewith, the
   respondent could not claim, in the absence of express
   statutory sanction, that he should be shifted to another
   post merely because the selected candidate for that post
   did not complete the pre-appointment formalities or did
   not join.

4. There is yet another feature which dissuades us from
   accepting the respondent’s claim as one of clear
   entitlement. Even on the material placed on record,
   including the respondent’s own subsequent stand, his
   asserted position as the person exclusively entitled to
   the vacancy is not free from difficulty. The record
   indicates that there were candidates above the
   respondent, and the respondent himself appears to have
   sought to explain why such candidates ought not to be
   considered. We do not propose to enter into the
   comparative position of such candidates, since none of
   them is before us. However, that circumstance itself is
   sufficient to show that the respondent’s claim was not
   one of an automatic or self-evident right. A writ of
   mandamus directing consideration for appointment
   against such a vacancy could not have been issued on
   so uncertain a premise.

5. In the end, the respondent’s case rests on an
   assumption that whenever a selected candidate does not
   complete the pre-appointment requirements or does not
   report for duty, the post must pass on to the next
   candidate below. Such an assumption may have held
   good only if the governing rules expressly so provided. In
   the absence of any such provision in the 1997 Rules, the
   respondent could claim no more than what the statutory
   framework permitted. That framework did not confer

   upon him any enforceable right to appointment to the
   post in question.

6. The requirement of preference under sub-rule (3) of Rule
   4 furnishes an additional reason for caution. The
   recruitment in question was not to a single post, but to
   multiple services and groups of posts in Group A and
   Group B. Candidates were required to indicate their
   preferences, and the KPSC was required to prepare
   separate lists corresponding to the vacancies in each
   service or group of posts. The process was, therefore, not
   one of a single linear progression where, upon one
   candidate falling out, the next candidate would
   necessarily step into the very same post. Any such post
   facto adjustment would risk unsettling a service-wise
   and preference-based allocation exercise which had
   already attained finality.

7. The observation of the High Court that the principle that
   inclusion in the select list does not confer a right to
   appointment would not apply because the Government
   had already decided to appoint, also does not commend
   acceptance. The decision of the Government to fill the
   notified vacancies cannot be equated with creation of a
   right in favour of every candidate below the selected
   candidate to claim automatic substitution in the event
   of non-joining. The right, if any, must arise from the
   Rules themselves. In the absence of any provision in the

   1997 Rules enabling such substitution, the respondent
   could not claim appointment merely because one
   selected candidate did not complete the pre-
   appointment process.

8. The position is further reinforced by the Karnataka Civil
   Services (Validation of Selection and Appointment of
   2011 Batch Gazetted Probationers) Act, 2022
   (hereinafter referred to as the “Validation Act”). Section
   3 thereof validates the selection of the 2011 batch
   Gazetted Probationers made by the KPSC and mandates
   issuance of appointment orders as per the KPSC
   selection list. It further provides that no suit or other
   proceeding shall be maintained for review of any such
   appointment made in accordance with the provisions of
   the Act. Though the Validation Act may not by itself
   conclude the entire controversy, it certainly underscores
   the legislative intent to attach finality to the 2011
   selection and appointments as made in accordance with
   the KPSC selection list. A direction which, in effect,
   reopens that concluded process and compels recourse to
   a mode of appointment not contemplated by the 1997
   Rules would be plainly inconsistent with such legislative
   finality.

9. The principal reason for the impugned order of the High
   Court is that, since the selected candidate did not
   undergo the mandatory medical examination, the post

   continued to remain unfilled and, therefore, the
   respondent, being the candidate immediately next
   below, ought to have been considered against that post.
   In our view, this approach conflates the factual existence
   of an unfilled post with the legal question as to the
   permissible mode of filling it. Even if it were assumed
   that the post continued to remain vacant in fact, the
   further question still remained whether the 1997 Rules
   permitted the same select list to be operated for filling
   such post. It is precisely on that question that the High
   Court, with respect, fell into error. The High Court was
   also not justified in holding that Rule 11(3) of the 1997
   Rules had no application to the case at hand. On the
   contrary, Rule 11(3), read with Rule 11(1) and sub-rule
   (3) of Rule 4, lies at the heart of the controversy. It is
   these provisions which delineate the scope of the select
   list, the manner in which service-wise consideration is
   to take place, and the limits within which appointments
   may be made against the vacancies notified in that
   recruitment. Once the Rules themselves define the
   contours of the list and do not provide for any reserve or
   additional list, the absence of a selected candidate from
   the field cannot enlarge the statutory operation of the
   list.

10. In our considered view, therefore, the impugned
    judgment cannot be sustained. The Tribunal was right

    in holding that the 1997 Rules do not contemplate
    preparation or operation of any additional or waiting list,
    and that a post left unfilled on account of non-
    completion of pre-appointment formalities or non-
    joining by a selected candidate could not be claimed by
    the respondent as of right from the same selection
    process. The High Court erred in quashing the
    communication dated 27.06.2022 issued by DPAR and
    the order dated 13.10.2023 passed by the Tribunal.

11. In view of the above discussion and analysis, the appeal
    is allowed.

12. The impugned judgment and order dated 21.04.2025
    passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 24455 of
    2023 (S-KSAT) is set aside and the writ petition stands
    dismissed.

13. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

…………..........................J.
[VIKRAM NATH]

                              ………….........................J.
                                  [SANDEEP MEHTA]

NEW DELHI
MARCH 23, 2026.