State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hukam Chand - Criminal Appeal

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• Know your Kanoon - Doc Gen Hub - Counter Argument - Case Predict AI - Talk with IK Doc -... Upgrade to Premium [Cites 27, Cited by 0 ] ### Supreme Court of India

The State Of Himachal Pradesh vs Hukam Chand Alias Monu on 24 March, 2026

Author: Sanjay Karol

Bench: Sanjay Karol

2026 INSC 290

                                                                        REPORTABLE

                                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1275 OF 2015

                     STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                      ... APPELLANT(S)

                                                         Versus

                     HUKUM CHAND ALIAS MONU                        ... RESPONDENT(S)

                                                  JUDGMENT SANJAY KAROL, J.

1.    The State of Himachal Pradesh, aggrieved by final judgment
                    and order dated 3rd June 2014 in Criminal Appeal No 721 of 20081
                    whereby the learned Division Bench set aside the findings of guilt Signature Not Verified and consequent sentence returned by the District and Sessions Digitally signed by RAJNI MUKHI Date: 2026.03.24 19:27:40 IST 1 Reason: Impugned judgment Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018                      Page 1 of 19 Judge, Mandi2 in Sessions Case No. 12 of 2008 in terms of the
   

   judgment dated 12th September 2008 and instead, entered a finding
   of acquittal against the respondent-accused, has preferred this
   appeal.

2.  A nine-year-old girl was sent by her mother to fetch
   

   buttermilk bright and early in the morning of 27th August 2007,
   however, the brightness was soon extinguished. She was taken into
   a cowshed by the neighbour’s son and sexually assaulted. Upon
   returning home, she described the horrifying incident to her mother
   and later in the day to her father, who was a mason by profession
   and worked elsewhere. He made a couple of phone calls, including
   one to the little girl’s maternal uncle, who visited their home
   subsequently and they went and filed the First Information Report3
   with the police. The victim was medically examined, and her
   bloodstained clothes were handed over to the authorities. Upon
   conclusion of the investigation, the police filed a charge sheet under Sections 376, 201 of the Indian Penal Code,18604 and Section 3(xii) 2 Trial Court 3 FIR No. 355 of 2007 registered at PS Sunder Nagar 4 IPC Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 2 of 19 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
   Atrocities) Act, 19895.

3.    The Trial Court, having appreciated the testimony of sixteen
   

   witnesses for the prosecution and three for the defense, convicted
   the accused under Section 376 IPC and the offence under the SC/ST
   Act, and acquitted him under Section 201 IPC. The sentence
   awarded was rigorous imprisonment for ten years and a fine of Rs.
   10,000/- for the former offence, with a further rigorous
   imprisonment of one year in default of payment of fine. For the
   latter offence, imprisonment of the same description for five years
   and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- with a further rigorous imprisonment of
   one year in default of payment of fine. To arrive at this conclusion,
   reliance was placed on the testimony of the victim, and its
   corroboration by subsequent witnesses such as her parents, the
   medical witnesses and also the person from whom she was sent to
   fetch buttermilk, altogether forming a web of factors pointing to the
   guilt of the accused-respondent.

5 SC/ST Act Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 3 of 19

1. The impugned judgment reverses these findings. The sum and substance of the High Court’s reasoning is that major contradictions in the witness testimonies have been ignored by the Trial Court. It was found that the prosecution version suffered from serious improbabilities. The prosecutrix had apparently gone to fetch lassi from a house that was about 8 kilometers away. This meant she would have had to travel approximately 16 kilometers to go and return within two hours, which appeared to the Court to be highly improbable. Next considered was the aspect of the acrimonious relationship between the two families in so far as alleged theft of grass and fuelwood from the accused’s land. Importantly, a quarrel had taken place between the families on the very same day as the alleged incident. The prosecutrix herself admitted that her parents had cut grass from the accused’s land that day and that tensions already existed. Further, the Court found material contradictions and inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecutrix, her mother, her father, and her maternal uncle. There were differences regarding how and when the incident was reported, who went where before lodging the FIR, and whether the maternal uncle came to the house or met them on the road. These inconsistencies were considered significant.

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 4 of 19 Still further, the Court also questioned the conduct of the
prosecutrix’s mother. She stated that she had become aware of the
incident in the morning when she noticed bloodstains, yet no
immediate report was made. Instead, the matter was disclosed only
after the father returned home at night, and the FIR was lodged the
next morning. The Court found this delay relevant in the overall
evaluation of the case. With respect to the SC/ST Act charges, the
Court noted that these provisions were not included in the original
FIR. They were added later by the supervising officer. Similarly, Section 201 IPC was added later, even though the Investigating
Officer did not find grounds for it during the initial investigation.

Although the medical evidence indicated that the
prosecutrix had been exposed to a sexual act, the Court held that
medical opinion alone could not be treated as substantive evidence.
In view of the inconsistencies and surrounding circumstances, the
medical evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction.

1. The State challenges the said judgment in these proceedings.
   

   At the outset, a disturbing fact must be acknowledged. The
   Legislature had as far back as 1983 introduced a provision into IPC seeking to protect the identity of the victim of the offence under Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 5 of 19 Section 376 IPC, in the aftermath of the State of Maharashtra v.
   Tukaram6. The amendment was made apparently to address a
   specific mischief that emerged starkly from the way sexual offence
   cases were handled: the public disclosure of a survivor’s identity.
   Before 1983, there was no statutory bar on publishing the name or
   particulars of a woman against whom a sexual offence was alleged;
   Court reporting and media coverage could expose survivors to social
   stigma, ostracism, and lifelong reputational harm. This perspective
   is reflected in academic discussions on the evolution of the law on
   sexual assault7, which identify the 1983 amendments as marking the
   beginning of a victim-centred orientation in Indian criminal law;
   protections such as in-camera trials, evidentiary presumptions, and
   anonymity were designed to reduce the barriers and fears that
   previously discouraged reporting and effective prosecution of
   sexual offences. Clearly, the intent of this Section has been given a
   miss in these proceedings. The name of the victim is treated like that
   of any other witness and is freely used throughout the record. This
   must be deprecated in the strongest terms. In fact, this Court has 6 (1979) 2 SCC 143 7 Shruti Bedi, The Indian Rape Law: Vocabulary of Protest, Reactionary Legislations and
   Quality of Equality Culture, Udayana Journal of law and Culture, Vol 7 No.1, (2023)
   https://doi.org/10.24843/UJLC.2023.v07.i01.p01 Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 6 of 19 noticed earlier also that the mandate of this provision is not being
   followed.

2.    Moving further, it is important to note that this is a case of
   

   differing views from the Trial Court and the High Court. The effect
   of this Court interfering in this appeal would be that an acquittal
   would be set aside despite the well-established position that this
   Court is loath to interfere in acquittals unless the said conclusion has
   been arrived at in disregard of principles of law or on an entirely
   misdirected analysis of evidence leading to injustice. This Court
   recently in State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg8, observed as follows:

“15. Having appreciated the provisions and the judgments as
aforesaid, let us now proceed to consider whether, in view of the
evidence, the High Court was justified in setting aside the
findings of the Trial Court. However, prior to that we will
undertake the task of examining the scope of this Court's power
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in criminal
matters.

15.1 In Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar, it was held:

“25. It may be highlighted at the outset that although the powers
vested in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are
wide, this Court in a criminal appeal by special leave will
ordinarily loath to enter into a fresh reappraisement of evidence
and question the credibility of witnesses when there is a
concurrent finding of fact, save for certain exceptional
circumstances. While it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal
application, it has been affirmed time and again that except 8 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2801 Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 7 of 19 where the assessment of the High Court is vitiated by an error
of law or procedure, or is based on misreading of evidence, or
is inconsistent with the evidence and thus has led to a perverse
finding, this Court will refrain from interfering with the findings
of the courts below.”
15.2 On a reading of various judgements, viz., Ramaniklal
Gokaldas v. State of Gujarat, Nadodi Jayaraman v. State of
T.N., Banwari Ram v. State of U.P., the generally accepted
standard - which it ought to be stated, is not a rule - is that when
the Courts below concurred, this Court does not enter into the
reappreciation of the evidence, in a criminal case. In the present
case, the Courts below have, in fact, arrived at opposite findings
and as such, to set the matter to rest either by conviction or
acquittal, this Court must analyse the evidence on record.”

The above observations were followed and referred in State of H.P.
v. Chaman Lal9.
7. Before proceeding further, however, it is important to also
take note of principles qua appreciation of the testimony of child
witnesses. In State of Rajasthan v. Chatra10 this Court through one
of us, (Sanjay Karol J.,) formulated the following principles for the
appreciation of the testimony of child witnesses:

“22. Recently, a coordinate Bench of this Court in [State of
M.P. v. Balveer Singh State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh, (2025) 8
SCC 545] speaking through J.B. Pardiwala, J., considered a
large number of prior decisions of this Court to lay down
guidelines for the appreciation of the evidence of a child witness.
9
2026 SCC OnLine SC 85 10 (2025) 8 SCC 613 Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 8 of 19 We have perused through the same. Reference can also be made
to other judgments in [State of M.P. v. Ramesh State of
M.P. v. Ramesh, (2011) 4 SCC 786 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 493]
; Panchhi v. State of U.P. [Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7
SCC 177 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1561] ; and [State of U.P. v. Ashok
Dixit State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit, (2000) 3 SCC 70 : 2000 SCC
(Cri) 579] , etc.

1. The principles that can be adduced from an overview of the aforesaid decisions, are:

23.1. No hard and fast rule can be laid down qua testing the
competency of a child witness to testify at trial.
23.2. Whether or not a given child witness will testify is a matter
of the trial Judge being satisfied as to the ability and competence
of the said witness. To determine the same the Judge is to look
to the manner of the witness, intelligence, or lack thereof, as may
be apparent; an understanding of the distinction between truth
and falsehood, etc.
23.3. The non-administration of oath to a child witness will not
render their testimony doubtful or unusable.
23.4. The trial Judge must be alive to the possibility of the child
witness being swayed, influenced and tutored, for in their
innocence, such matters are of ease for those who may wish to
influence the outcome of the trial, in one direction or another.
23.5. Seeking corroboration, therefore, of the testimony of a
child witness, is well-placed practical wisdom.
23.6. There is no bar to cross-examination of a child witness. If
the said witness has withstood the cross-examination, the
prosecution would be entirely within their rights to seek
conviction even solely relying thereon.”
(emphasis supplied)

An earlier instance in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh11 is also noteworthy. It was held:
11
(2019) 16 SCC 759 Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 9 of 19 “10. The conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of
the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence. The conviction can be
based solely on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no
corroboration be required unless there are compelling reasons
which necessitate the courts to insist for corroboration of her
statement. Corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix is
not a requirement of law, but a guidance of prudence under the
given facts and circumstances. Minor contractions or small
discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing the evidence
of the prosecutrix.
11. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme
Court that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in
a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from
any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not
render it unworthy of credence. As a general rule, there is no
reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence.
However, having regard to the circumstances of the case,
medical evidence may not be available. In such cases, solitary
testimony of the prosecutrix would be sufficient to base the
conviction, if it inspires the confidence of the court.

1. When it comes to inconsistencies and omissions in testimonies, which is one of the primary grounds on which the reasoning of the High Court rests, it is well recognised that human perception, memory and narration are imperfect. As such, the Court has consistently held that minor inconsistencies or trivial discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses do not by themselves make the evidence unreliable. In State of U.P. v. M. K. Anthony12, this Court explained that while appreciating evidence, courts must 12 (1985) 1 SCC 505 Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 10 of 19 not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. Variations in trivial matters that do not affect the core of the case should not lead to rejection of credible testimony in its entirety. The evidence must be assessed as a whole to determine whether it carries the ring of truth. Similarly, in Appabhai v. State of Gujarat13, the Court cautioned against placing undue weight on minor contradictions or omissions. Truthful witnesses may differ in detail due to normal lapses of memory or differences in perception. The essential question is whether the inconsistencies materially compromise the backbone of the prosecution narrative. In State of Rajasthan v. Kalki14, the Court distinguished between normal discrepancies arising from errors of observation or memory and material discrepancies that go to the core of the case. Only the latter undermine the prosecution in a substantial manner. [See also:

[Rakesh v. State of Uttar Pradesh15]

In](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1680975/) conclusion, it may be said that a truthful witness may make
honest mistakes or omit immaterial details, and such normal
variation should not result in wholesale rejection of evidence.
However, when omissions or contradictions relate to material facts 13 1988 Supp SCC 241 14 (1981) 2 SCC 752 15 (2021) 7 SCC 188 Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 11 of 19 that form the foundation of the prosecution’s version, they assume
significance and may create reasonable doubt.
9. Keeping the aforesaid principles in view, we now move to the
appreciation of evidence. We have perused all the testimonies. The
following is a snapshot of the main witnesses:

PW-1, who is aged 9-10 years, is the victim/prosecutrix. In her
examination-in-chief she has positively identified the accused-
respondent as being present in Court, and he being the one who took
her to the cow-shed and committed sexual assault on her. She
described informing her mother and later father of the incident, and
also the subsequent actions of the father leading to the registration
of the FIR. Certain facts elicited in the cross-examination are that
the parents of the victim and the accused respondent had quarreled
several times over the alleged theft of grass. She has categorically
denied the suggestion that she was not sexually assaulted and the
injury to her private parts was a result of her mother’s insertion of
her finger, therein, in order to frame the accused. The one
significant departure from the testimony of other witnesses, that can
be noticed here is that she has specifically deposed qua the factum
of the respondent accused’s mother coming to PW-2, the mother of
the prosecutrix and requesting her not to disclose this incident to the Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 12 of 19 villagers. However, this position has been specifically denied by
DW-2, Phula Devi. Nothing has been discussed about the same in
cross-examination.

PW-2, namely Roshani Devi, testified that the prosecutrix
informed her about the acts of the respondent accused, which she
relayed to DW-2 too, and the latter asked her to refrain from
disclosure as it would bring disrepute to both families. She
categorically said that she disclosed the incident to her husband,
PW-3, namely Jia Lal, upon his return home at 9:30 pm in the
evening, and was scolded for not having done so earlier. Jia Lal
called up Hemraj PW-15 who apparently called them to the road,
whereafter all of them, together, went to the police station to lodge
the FIR. In her cross-examination she has denied that the incident
is fabricated in order to teach the family of the respondent-accused,
a lesson. She further denied injuring PW-1 on purpose to that end.

PW-5 was Suresh Kumar, who was the person from whom
the prosecutrix was sent to secure buttermilk. It is while coming
back from having bought buttermilk that the alleged incident took
place. PW-5 positively states that the prosecutrix did take
buttermilk from him.
Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 13 of 19
PW-7, namely Dr. Sushma Dutta, Medical Officer, Civil
Hospital, Sundar Nagar, deposed that although the medical
examination of the prosecutrix had taken place one day after the
alleged incident, i.e., on 28th July 2007, the victim was wearing the
same clothes that she allegedly had on, at the time of the incident.
The injuries reported were as follows:

“Local examination:

Mens pubis not well developed public hairs absent. There
was lacerated wound on right paraurethral region of size 1 x
1/2 c.m. red looking with slight bleeding on touch.

1. There was lacerated wound on left paraurethral region of size 2x2x1/2 c.m. which also bleed on touch. Vagina could admit little finger easily. Hymen was torn at position 9’ clock. There was no injury seen around anus.

Vaginal swabs and smear were taken. Clothes were
preserve, sealed and handed over to the police. Public hair
were not available for examination. There was no history of any
disease or any drug in take.

Vide chemical analysis report reported by Chemical
Examiner vide Ext. PH, human blood was present on the salwar
of the victim, but no semen was present. This report was shown
to me by the police on 13.02.2007.

In my opinion, she has been exposed to sexual act and
my opinion remained the same after the report of Chemical
Examiner. The probable duration of injuries was within 48
hours. I issued the MLC Ext. PJ which bears my signatures and
is in my hand. The victim was referred to Z.H. Mandi for age
verification vide X-ray from Ext. PK by me, shirt Ext. P1 and
salwar Ext. P2 are the same.”

   Nothing in the cross-examination substantially dislodges the

testimony in the examination-in-chief.

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 14 of 19 PW-10 was Dr. S.K. Fotedar, Medical Officer, CHC, Ratti.
He is the one who examined the respondent accused. He deposed
that the accused was capable of sexual intercourse. The injury that
he suffered was testified to be possible in the course of agricultural
work. The description of the injury is as follows:

One superficial abrasion 0.5 cm x 0.75 cm on right ear, medially
on pinna opposite right mastoid with blood stains on mastoid
area. No fresh bleedings was present. The wound was 24 to 36
hours old.

But at the same time, it was further submitted that an injury is not
necessary on the commission of rape.
10. We may observe that the approach adopted by the High Court
is one of attempting to pick holes in a case that otherwise has
withstood the test of cross-examination. The prosecutrix has
positively identified the respondent-accused and has unequivocally
stated that it was he who forced himself upon her. Not even a shred
of doubt could be created by cross-examination on these two most
essential points. Neither the testimony of the mother nor the father,
that supported the version of the prosecutrix could be credibly
questioned. The discrepancy that does appear pertains to the alleged
quarrel between the families of the prosecutrix and the accused-

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 15 of 19 respondent. The prosecutrix and PW-2 state that repeated quarrels
between the two families were a regular feature but PW-3 submits
otherwise. That apart, one major improbability noticed by the High
Court was that the prosecutrix had travelled 16 kms to and fro from
the house of PW-5 within two hours. This has been observed to be
almost impossible.

1. Be that as it may. Even if it is the case that to travel 16
   kilometres was not possible in two hours, it still is an uncontroverted
   reality that the factum of sexual assault has not been disturbed. In
   proving the occurrence of an offence within a particular time frame,
   the Court does not look for mathematical precision. For the purposes
   of argument, even if the alleged time frame is extended by an hour,
   the possibility of the occurrence of the offence is still not shaken.

2. At this stage, let us deal with the rejection of the medical
   evidence of PW-7 on account of 16 kilometre distance being
   improbable and the apparent site map which is a part of record. In
   the considered view of the High Court, these two combined falsify
   the medical evidence. It is well-established that medical evidence is
   in the nature of expert opinion and is corroborative in nature. It is
   equally well established that medical evidence when it contravenes Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 16 of 19 other credible evidence particularly ocular evidence, then in such a
   situation, it can be kept aside or ignored. That is not the case here.
   It cannot be lost sight of that the expert evidence squarely
   corroborates the evidence of the prosecutrix, that she was sexually
   assaulted. In her evidence, at the cost of repetition, it may be stated
   positively that she identified him and attributed the act to him. The
   same has not been challenged or questioned by the process of law.
   Then the question is, on the basis of some alleged improbability of
   time, can we ignore other credible evidence? We think not. That
   would be a stand entirely in contravention of law.

3. As already [referred above](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1680975/), the evidence of the prosecutrix
   

   alone, in matters such as these is sufficient to convict the accused.
   As such, on PW-1’s evidence alone the offence stands established.
   The evidence of others only adds further credence to the statement
   of the victim. We may add that animosity is a double-edged sword
   and if given undue weight, may lead to injustice, in view of the
   uncontroverted testimony of the victim.

4. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment acquitting
   the respondent- accused cannot stand and is required to be set aside.

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 17 of 19 Appeal is accordingly allowed. He is directed to surrender forthwith
and serve the remainder of the sentence.

1. In the end, we direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to all the Registrars General of the High Courts to ensure that in all matters dated prior to the passing of this Court’s judgment in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India16 which has mandated the non-disclosure of the victim’s identity, and still pending, the proscription in Section 228-A IPC is followed strictly. This has been the long-standing position in law but, it has not been followed. The primary reason thereamongst, one supposes, is the general indifference of the Courts below and possibly even the lack of awareness of the deep stigma that follows such offences. Immediate reference can be made to State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh17 which touched upon this issue in connection with Section 327 CrPC, and also Bhupinder Sharma v. State of HP18. Suffice it to say that both these judgments were pronounced by this Court much prior to the incident in question.

16 (2019) 2 SCC 703 17 (1996) 2 SCC 384 18 (2003) 8 SCC 551 Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 18 of 19 Pending applications, if any, shall be disposed of.

......................................................................J.
(SANJAY KAROL)

                     ........................................................................J.
                     (NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

New Delhi;

March 24, 2026 Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 19 of 19