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March 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Snyder, C.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 93 MDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Lane

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (15.2K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by Lane

J-A04041-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
COREY EUGENE SNYDER :
:
Appellant : No. 93 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 2, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-44-CR-0000305-2023

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
COREY EUGENE SNYDER :
:
Appellant : No. 94 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 20, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-44-CR-0000697-2024

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED MARCH 24, 2026

In these consolidated appeals, Corey Eugene Snyder (“Snyder”) appeals

from the judgments of sentence imposed following his jury convictions at trial

docket CP-44-CR-0000697-2024 (“Docket 697”), and non-jury convictions at

trial docket CP-44-CR-0000305-2023 (“Docket 305”), both for firearms

offenses. We affirm.
J-A04041-26

We glean the following undisputed facts from the suppression hearing

notes of testimony. Snyder was on parole at the time of the underlying

offenses. His approved residential address was 14130 Croghan Pike in Mount

Union (the “Croghan Residence.”). Snyder agreed to and signed the written

rules (the “Rules of Supervision”) of his parole, which prohibited him from

possessing firearms, possessing or consuming alcohol or controlled

substances, and changing his residence without permission. The Rules of

Supervision also provided:

. . . A [parole officer] may visit you at your residence or such
other place as they deem necessary. When requested, you will
provide access to your residence. Your [parole officer] has the
authority to search your person, place of residence or vehicle
without a warrant if the [parole officer] has reasonable suspicion
you are in violation of these rules.

Mifflin County Office of Probation and Parole Rules of Supervision, signed

9/2/21, at 1, exhibit to Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/25.

In April 2023, Snyder’s parole officer, Chantz Swartz (“PO Swartz”),

“viewed a video . . . publicly posted on Facebook that involved [Snyder]

possessing alcohol and a firearm, therefore violating the Rules of Supervision.”

Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/25, at 2. PO Swartz scheduled an appointment with

Snyder for May 12, 2023, and Snyder’s girlfriend drove him there. Snyder

first submitted to a drug test, which showed a positive result for marijuana.

PO Swartz then asked Snyder “where he had been staying,” and Snyder

replied that he stayed at his girlfriend’s home, at 200 Bentwood Lane,

-2-
J-A04041-26

McVeytown (the “Bentwood Residence”), three times a week.1 N.T., 6/11/24,

at 38. PO Swartz informed Snyder that he viewed the Facebook video, and

Snyder said the authorities “wouldn’t find [the gun] because he threw it over

the bank [sic].” Id. at 38-39.

Based on the parole violations evidenced in the Facebook video and

Snyder’s positive drug test, PO Swartz decided to search the Bentwood

Residence. See id. at 40, 51. PO Swartz placed Snyder in handcuffs and,

along with at least one other officer, transported him to the Bentwood

Residence. PO Swartz “treat[ed this] as his residence because [he said] he

stay[ed] there three days a week.” Id. at 57.

Snyder provided the officers with the passcode to enter the house.

Snyder sat in the living room while PO Swartz watched him for officer safety

and other parole officers searched the house. Snyder remained handcuffed

the entire time, and at no point did the officers provide him with Miranda2

warnings.

The parole officers found suspected cocaine, suspected

methamphetamine, and a “conversion kit for a handgun,” which PO Swartz

described as capable of “turning a handgun into . . . a smaller rifle.” N.T.,

6/11/24, at 42. PO Swartz questioned Snyder about it and asked where the

---

1Snyder’s mother, and subsequently her estate, owned both the Croghan
Residence and the Bentwood Residence.

2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

-3-
J-A04041-26

gun was. Id. at 43. Snyder replied “there was no gun in the” house, but PO

Swartz believed he “was lying to” him and told him “it would go faster if he

just was cooperative.” Id. at 43, 59. Snyder then said that “the last time he

saw [the gun,] it was in the [pickup] truck” parked on the property. Id. at

1. Upon further questioning, Snyder told the officers where the keys were.

Officers used the key to open the truck and discovered a handgun inside.

At that juncture, PO Swartz contacted the Pennsylvania State Police

(PSP), who advised they would obtain a search warrant and dispatch an

officer. The parole officers ceased their search. In the PSP’s subsequent

search pursuant to the search warrant, they

seized multiple rounds of ammunition, suspected cocaine,
suspected methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a
handgun, a set of brass knuckles, and a gun safe. PSP obtained
another search warrant for the gun safe, which [contained] eight
firearms, one of which was a sawed-off shotgun with a barrel
length of twelve and one-half . . . inches.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/25, at 3.

The Commonwealth charged Snyder with, inter alia, two counts of

prohibited offensive weapons3 and nine counts of persons not to possess

firearms.4 Snyder filed a pre-trial motion, seeking suppression of the evidence

---

3 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a) (defining prohibited offensive weapons as
making, repair, selling, using, or possessing any offense weapon). The trial
court referred to this offense as “make repairs to offense weapons.” Trial
Court Opinion, 3/21/25, at 4.

4 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).

-4-
J-A04041-26

seized, on the grounds that the parole officers committed an illegal

warrantless entry and search of a residence where Snyder was an overnight

guest and had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Snyder also sought

suppression of the statements he made to PO Swartz, as well as any evidence

discovered as a result thereof, citing the lack of Miranda warnings.

The trial court conducted a suppression hearing, at which PO Swartz

testified as summarized above. Snyder did not testify. The trial court denied

Snyder’s motion to suppress. See Order and Opinion, 7/26/24. The court

subsequently granted Snyder’s motion for reconsideration, but ultimately

denied the motion again. See Order and Opinion, 9/26/24.

Upon motion by the Commonwealth, the trial court severed the charges

of persons not to possess firearms charges for trial, and listed those charges

at Docket 697. A jury found Snyder guilty of nine counts of persons not to

possess firearms. On December 20, 2024, the trial court imposed sentence.

Meanwhile, the two charges of prohibited offensive weapons, which

remained on Docket 305, proceeded to a separate jury trial. The jury found

him guilty of both counts. On January 2, 2025, the trial court imposed

sentence, resulting in an aggregate sentence, across both trial dockets, of ten

to twenty years’ imprisonment, followed by one year’s reentry supervision.

Snyder did not file any post-sentence motions, but filed timely notices

of appeal at each docket. He and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1. This Court sua sponte consolidated the two appeals.

-5-
J-A04041-26

Snyder presents three issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Snyder’s] motion
to suppress by finding that he did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy to the place searched?

II. Whether the trial court erred in denying or failing to address
[Snyder’s] motion to suppress challenging the probation
officers’ warrantless entry into a private residence?

III. Whether the trial court erred in denying or failing to address
[Snyder’s] motion to suppress prior to trial challenging
probation’s custodial interrogation without first advising him
of his Miranda warnings?

Snyder’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

We address together Snyder’s first two issues, which challenge the trial

court’s denial of suppression with regard to the search of the house. Snyder

avers the trial court erred in: (1) finding that he did not have a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the Bentwood Residence; and (2) denying relief on

his challenge to the warrantless search of that residence.

We consider the applicable standard of review:

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the
suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression

-6-
J-A04041-26

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. McClellan, 178 A.3d 874, 880-81 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citation omitted). “With respect to a suppression court’s factual findings, ‘it

is the sole province of the suppression court to weigh the credibility of the

witnesses. Further, the suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part

or none of the evidence presented.’” Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267

A.3d 492, 499 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

With respect to persons on parole, this Court has explained:

A parolee has limited Fourth Amendment rights because of a
diminished expectation of privacy. A “parolee’s signing of a parole
agreement giving his parole officer permission to conduct a
warrantless search does not mean either that the parole officer
can conduct a search at any time and for any reason or that the
parolee relinquishes his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches.”

However, under [now numbered Section 6182 of the Prisons
and Parole Code,5] “Supervisory relationship to offenders,” an
Agent of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole may
conduct a warrantless property search “if there is reasonable
suspicion to believe that the real or other property in the
possession or under the control of the offender contains
contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of
supervision[,]” subsection 6182(2)[.6]

---

5 See 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 101-7301. The McClellan decision addressed the then-
in effect Section 6153 of the Prisons and Parole Code. In 2021, the legislature
renumbered that statute to 6182, with the same title and near-identical
language to that quoted above.

6 At this point in the discussion, the McClellan Court referred to then-in effect

subsection 6153(d)(3), which provided that a parole officer may conduct a
warrantless property search “in the absence of exigent circumstances [if] prior
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

-7-
J-A04041-26

Subsection [6182(d)(4)] addresses the formulation of
reasonable suspicion to support a property search without a
warrant:

. . . The existence of reasonable suspicion to search
shall be determined in accordance with constitutional
search and seizure provisions as applied by judicial
decision. In accordance with such case law, the following
factors, where applicable, may be taken into account:

(i) The observations of [agents].

(ii) Information provided by others.

(iii) The activities of the . . . offender.

(iv) Information provided by the . . . offender.

(v) The experience of [agents] with the . . .
offender.

(vi) The experience of [agents] in similar
circumstances.

(vii) The prior criminal and supervisory history of
the . . .offender.

(viii) The need to verify compliance with the
conditions of supervision.

61 Pa.C.S.A. § [6182(d)(4)(i)-(viii)].

McClellan, 178 A.3d at 881 (some citations omitted and emphasis and

paragraph break added).

---

approval of a supervisor is obtained.” McClellan , 178 A.3d at 881. The
current section 6182 does not include an analogous provision, and we have
omitted it in our quotation above.

-8-
J-A04041-26

For ease of review, at this juncture we set forth the trial court’s rationale

for denying relief on Snyder’s challenge to the warrantless search of the

Bentwood Residence. The court reasoned that the “threshold issue” was

whether Snyder “was residing at an unapproved residence,” as the

Commonwealth argued, or “was acting as an overnight guest,” as Snyder

maintained. Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/25, at 3. The court agreed with the

former, finding that the Bentwood Residence was in fact Snyder’s residence.

In support, the court considered that Snyder admitted to residing there three

times per week, and he provided the officers with the keycode to unlock the

door. The court thus found that Snyder “did not have a reasonable

expectation of privacy [there,] and . . . was susceptible to a warrantless search

of the property” per both the Rules of Supervision and Section 6182(d)(2).7

Id. at 5-6. Specifically, Snyder “was in control of the Bentwood [R]esidence”

pursuant to the language of Section 6182(d)(2). Id. at 6.

On appeal, Snyder: (1) insists that he was an overnight guest at the

Bentwood Residence; and (2) argues he had a reasonable expectation of

privacy there. Snyder asserts that “[w]hile a parolee has a diminished

---

7 The trial court’s opinion cited Section 9912(d)(2) of the Judicial Code, 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 101-9914, which pertains to a probation officer’s authority to
conduct a warrantless search of property. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9912(d)(2).
Here, PO Swartz was acting in his capacity as a parole officer. Nevertheless,
we note the language of Section 9912(d)(2) is identical to that in Section 6182
of the Prisons and Parole Code, save the references to a probation and parole
agent.

-9-
J-A04041-26

expectation of privacy, an expectation privacy still remains” and a trial court

must review the facts “of each case to determine whether probation/parole

officers had specific, articulable, reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrantless

search of the place[.]” Snyder’s Brief at 26. Snyder avers that here, the

evidence positively established the factors, set forth in caselaw, for

determining a defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy “in another

person’s home.” Id. at 22. Snyder maintains: he knew the key code — the

equivalent of having a key to the premises; he had unlimited access to the

premises; he stored possessions, and engaged in illegal activity, in the

premises; he could exclude others from the home, as the doors were locked

and he knew the key code; and he expressed a subjective expectation of

privacy, as evidenced by his acknowledgment that he stayed there three

nights per week. Snyder alleges that “his parole status [did] not distinguish

[sic] his expectation of privacy from that of any other ‘overnight guest.’” Id.

at 27.

In his second issue, Snyder asserts “that absent exigent circumstances

or consent, the probation officers’ warrantless entry into a private residence

where [he] had been an overnight guest was unlawful.” Id. at 29. Snyder

also avers there was no valid consent, by the resident — his girlfriend — to

search the premises.

After careful review of the record, we determine the record supports the

trial court’s suppression ruling. See McClellan, 178 A.3d at 880-81. While

• 10 - J-A04041-26

arguing to this Court that he was merely an overnight guest at the Bentwood

Residence, Snyder does not challenge the trial court’s determination that he

in fact resided there. He does not present any discussion why this initial

finding was in error. In any event, the record supports the court’s reasoning.

As the court observed, Snyder plainly told officer Swartz that he resided or

lived there three days a week with his girlfriend, and he knew the keycode to

unlock the door.

On this factual premise — that Snyder’s residence was the Bentwood

Residence — we next consider whether Officer Swartz had reasonable

suspicion to believe he was committing a parole violation, as required by both

the Rules of Supervision and Section 6182(d)(2) before the officer could

conduct a warrantless search. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6182(d)(2) (stating that a

parole agent may conduct a property search “if there is reasonable suspicion

to believe that the real or other property in the possession of or under the

control of the . . . offender contains contraband or other evidence of violations

of the conditions of supervision); see also Rules of Supervision at 1 (providing

that Snyder’s parole officer “has the authority to search [his] person, place of

residence or vehicle without a warrant if the [officer] has reasonable suspicion

[he was] in violation of these rules”).

We determine the record supports the trial court’s finding that PO

Swartz possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion. See McClellan, 178

A.3d at 880. At the suppression hearing, PO Swartz provided uncontroverted

• 11 - J-A04041-26

testimony that he viewed a Facebook video showing Snyder consuming alcohol

and possessing a firearm. At the May 2024 parole appointment, Snyder tested

positive for marijuana use. We further note that he changed his residence

without prior approval. All of this conduct would have violated the terms of

Snyder’s supervision. In light of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did

not err in finding the warrantless search was valid.

On this basis, we further determine that no relief is due on Snyder’s

additional claims — that the warrantless search was improper because there

were no exigent circumstances or a valid consent to search. Even absent

exigent circumstances or consent, PO Swartz had the authority to search the

Bentwood Residence pursuant to the Rules of Supervision and Section

6182(d)(2). Snyder’s first and second issues are meritless.

In his final issue, Snyder asserts that the trial court erred in denying

relief on his claim that the lack of Miranda warnings was unlawful. The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

The Fifth Amendment provides “no person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]”
U.S. Const. amend. V. This prohibition . . . “‘privileges [a
defendant] not to answer official questions put to him in any other
proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the
answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.’”

Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 375 (Pa. 2015) (some citations

omitted and emphasis added).

. . . A parolee does not lose the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination merely because of conviction. Parolees,
like any other individual, must be given Miranda warnings when

• 12 - J-A04041-26

subject to custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation is
defined as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way[.]”

An individual is in custody if he is “physically denied his
freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation
in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or
movement is restricted by the interrogation.” . . . The standard
for determining whether an encounter is custodial is an objective
one, focusing on the totality of the circumstances with due
consideration given to the reasonable impression conveyed to the
individual being questioned.

Id. at 376 (citations omitted).

In Cooley, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered Minnesota v.

Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984), in which the United States Supreme Court

addressed the difference between custodial interrogation and a
routine probation interview, determining a probationer must
invoke his privilege against self-incrimination when questioned
during the latter, as the privilege is not self-executing, and a
probation requirement to appear at the meeting and be
completely honest does not violate a probationer’s Fifth
Amendment rights. See [Murphy, 465 U.S.] at 429-37. . . .

Cooley, 118 A.3d at 378.

We consider the facts in Cooley, on which Snyder relies. In that case,

a parole agent received information that the defendant, a parolee, possessed

firearms and may have sold drugs in his home. Cooley, 118 A.3d at 371-72.

At the agent’s request, the defendant reported to the parole office. See id.

at 372. Upon arrival, the agent handcuffed the defendant, searched him for

weapons and found none, and informed him that agents would search his

home for firearms and drugs. See id. Another parole agent asked the

• 13 - J-A04041-26

defendant if there were guns at his home; the defendant admitted there was

a gun in his living room. See id. The agents transported the defendant, still

in handcuffs, to his home, conducted a search, and recovered a handgun and

marijuana. See id. Upon further questioning, the defendant stated that a

vehicle was his, and when asked whether there was a gun in it, he admitted

there was. See id. The office agents used his keys to open the vehicle and

found a handgun. For this entire duration, the defendant “remained in

handcuffs and was never given Miranda warnings.” Id. Ultimately, the trial

court denied his motion to suppress and a jury found him guilty of firearms

and drug offenses. See id.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether “a

parole agent must issue Miranda warnings to a parolee when he is in custody

and questioned about new crimes.” Cooley, 118 A.3d at 374 (emphasis

added). The Court held in the affirmative. See id. at 379. While the focus

of the Court’s review was whether the defendant was in custody for Miranda

purposes, the fact that the parole agents were questioning him about new

crimes was critical.8 The Court reasoned:

[The defendant was] accused of crimes for which he was not
on parole; there was no “interview” or dialogue related to the
conditions of his parole or parole violations. . . .

---

8 See also Cooley, 118 A.3d at 374 n.6 (acknowledging the defendant’s
contention that the question, of whether “Miranda warnings are required
during custodial interrogation by a parole agent regarding new crimes,” was
an issue of first impression) (emphasis added).

• 14 - J-A04041-26

After handcuffing, [the defendant] was searched; nothing
was found. There is no evidence the agents felt threatened after
that, but the restraints were not removed. No one told [the
defendant] he was not under arrest or that he was restrained
pursuant to routine policy. Instead, the parole agents stated
he was being investigated for new crimes; their
interrogation and search was unquestionably aimed at
crimes for which he was not on parole. . . .

Cooley, 118 A.3d at 379 (emphases added). Based on the totality of the

circumstances, the Cooley Court found that the defendant “was subject to

custodial interrogation, and . . . the parole agents’ failure to administer

Miranda warnings violated [his] Fifth Amendment rights.” Id.

On appeal, Snyder maintains that individuals on parole retain their

rights under Miranda. He avers the facts in this case “are nearly identical to

those in” Cooley, which “warrant[s] suppression of all evidence.” Snyder’s

Brief at 44. Snyder asserts that here, there was a custodial interrogation, as

he “was detained, handcuffed, placed in an interview room, and questioned

about a new crime — the Facebook video where he appeared to be in

possession of a gun.” Snyder’s Brief at 43.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court acknowledged that it did not

address the Miranda issue at the time of its suppression rulings. However,

the court determined that Snyder’s claim was meritless. It first reasoned that

“Miranda and the Self-Incrimination clause do not pertain to ‘nontestimonial

evidence [that was] obtained as a result of voluntary statements.’” Trial

Court Opinion, 3/21/25, at 8 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. v. Patane, 542

U.S. 630 (2004)). The court then found that Snyder made his statements

• 15 - J-A04041-26

voluntarily, given that he was [initially] reluctant to provide any
information about the firearm for a considerable amount of time,
[and despite] being questioned about it multiple times. [Snyder]
refused to disclose any information to the officers from the time
he was at the [parole] office and even into the officers’ search of
the Bentwood [R]esidence[. Snyder] then offered his confession
once [PO] Swartz told [him] that the search would be quicker if
[he] was cooperative.

Id. at 8-9.

After careful review of the record, we uphold the trial court’s denial of

relief, albeit on different grounds. See Commonwealth v. Seeney, 316 A.3d

645, 651 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2024) (stating we may affirm a suppression ruling

on any basis). We reject Snyder’s claim that the underlying facts are

analogous to those in Cooley. Snyder ignores the salient fact in Cooley —

that the interrogation of the defendant focused on new crimes. In contrast,

here, all of PO Swartz’s questioning pertained to suspected violations of

Snyder’s parole conditions. Accordingly, Cooley is distinguishable and does

not govern this matter. As Snyder has failed to establish grounds for relief,

we uphold the trial court’s ruling.

For the foregoing reasons, we determine that none of Snyder’s issues

merit relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

• 16 - J-A04041-26

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/24/2026

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