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March 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Ryan Steinhoff v. Matthew Malovrh

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-1252

• Judges: Scudder

• Opinion

• Authorities (16)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.4K)

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Combined Opinion

                        by [Michael Yale Scudder Jr.](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8633/michael-yale-scudder-jr/)

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 24-1252
RYAN STEINHOFF,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MATTHEW MALOVRH, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 3:21-cv-00664-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.

---

ARGUED FEBRUARY 26, 2026 — DECIDED MARCH 24, 2026

---

Before EASTERBROOK, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. On October 28, 2018, law enforce-
ment officers executed a search warrant for methampheta-
mine on a rural property in Wisconsin. They believed that
Ryan Steinhoff, an alleged drug dealer with a history of vio-
lent crime, lived on the property. When officers found Stein-
hoff in a camper during the search, he at first appeared coop-
erative and exited as instructed. But an officer quickly tackled
him to the ground and, somewhere in the scuffle, the barrel of
2 No. 24-1252

another officer’s M16 rifle hit Steinhoff’s head, leaving a gash
requiring stitches. The record contains body-camera footage
of the incident, but we cannot tell whether the blow to the
head was intentional, as Steinhoff would have it, or acci-
dental, as the second officer insists.
In the end, we affirm the district court’s award of qualified
immunity to the first officer but reverse as to the second be-
cause disputed facts require Steinhoff’s Fourth Amendment
excessive force claim to go to a jury.
I
A
In 2018, the Taylor County Sheriff’s Department investi-
gated a methamphetamine trafficking operation involving
Ryan Steinhoff. On October 27, Detective Cody Kowalczyk
applied for a warrant to search a property in Medford, Wis-
consin, where he believed Steinhoff and others involved in
the operation were living. The warrant application explained
that law enforcement had arranged a controlled purchase of
methamphetamine from Steinhoff earlier that month, that
Steinhoff had a history of violent crime, and that his mental
health was under evaluation in a pending misdemeanor case.
A Taylor County judge approved the application and au-
thorized a search for evidence of methamphetamine posses-
sion in violation of Wisconsin law. The property in question
contained a two-story main residence and multiple small out-
buildings. Due to the property’s size and the number of indi-
viduals believed to be present, law enforcement assembled a
SWAT team of officers from Taylor County and neighboring
Clark County to conduct the search. The team included De-
tective Kowalczyk, Clark County Drug Investigator Matthew
No. 24-1252 3

Malovrh, Clark County Patrol Captain Charles Ramberg, and
Clark County Deputy Joshua Niemi.
The SWAT team assembled early on the morning of Octo-
ber 28, 2018. Detective Kowalczyk and another officer briefed
everyone on the investigation, the plan for executing the war-
rant, and the criminal histories of individuals they might en-
counter during the search, including Steinhoff. They in-
formed the team that Steinhoff had prior convictions, includ-
ing for robbery with use of force, aggravated battery, and re-
sisting an officer. The briefing also cautioned that Steinhoff
and others might try to flee.
Just before 6:00 a.m. and under the cover of darkness, the
team initiated the search. After clearing the main residence
with Taylor County law enforcement, Detective Kowalczyk
went to assist the Clark County team at the southern end of
the property. In that area, Captain Ramberg saw three camp-
ers and noticed a light on in one. Law enforcement ap-
proached it and announced their presence. Upon opening the
door, Captain Ramberg saw a blanket hanging in the door-
way, which Steinhoff was standing behind. An officer pulled
the blanket down, and someone ordered Steinhoff to show his
hands. The officers could see that his hands were empty, and
nobody observed any visible sign of a weapon.
The rest of Steinhoff’s encounter with law enforcement
comes from Deputy Niemi’s body-camera. But the footage is
dark, grainy, at times obscured, and does not clearly depict
the takedown of Steinhoff. And it all happened in a matter of
seconds.
The video shows that as Deputy Niemi approached the
camper, Detective Kowalczyk, Investigator Malovrh, and
4 No. 24-1252

Captain Ramberg surrounded the doorway. The latter two
carried rifles. The officers ordered Steinhoff to come out and
show his hands. Steinhoff exited the camper as an officer di-
rected him to “get out,” and “turn around.” Once down the
camper stairs, Steinhoff began to turn around and raise his
hands. He then stopped with his back to the officers, partially
facing an open field.
But from there the video is too dark, and the takedown too
swift, to know exactly what happened next. Steinhoff claims
he stopped and stood still with his hands up, while Detective
Kowalczyk and Investigator Malovrh contend that he began
walking away toward the field, as if to flee. Regardless, the
footage shows that Detective Kowalczyk tackled Steinhoff
from behind about three seconds after he exited the camper.
Then Investigator Malovrh helped restrain him on the
ground, including by placing his knee on Steinhoff while De-
tective Kowalczyk handcuffed him.
At some point during the encounter, a rifle barrel struck
Steinhoff’s ear, causing a cut that required at least nine
stitches. Steinhoff testified that he saw the rifle barrel swing
toward the side of his head and hit him while he was still
standing. The video also contains an audible “clink” as Detec-
tive Kowalczyk begins the takedown, with Steinhoff main-
taining that the sound is that of the rifle hitting him in the
head.
Based on these events, Steinhoff believes that Investigator
Malovrh intentionally struck him in the head with his rifle just
as the takedown began. Investigator Malovrh denies any in-
volvement in the initial tackle and believes that if his rifle hit
Steinhoff at all, it was by accident while assisting Detective
Kowalczyk after Steinhoff fell.
No. 24-1252 5

B
Steinhoff invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sued Detective
Kowalczyk, Investigator Malovrh, and Captain Ramberg for
using excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment
during the takedown, when the rifle struck him, and when
Investigator Malovrh placed his knee on his neck, head, or
upper back while he was handcuffed. He added Clark and
Taylor Counties as defendants for indemnification purposes.
The officer defendants moved for summary judgment and
claimed qualified immunity. Steinhoff moved for partial sum-
mary judgment against Detective Kowalczyk.
The district court entered summary judgment for Captain
Ramberg because Steinhoff conceded that the officer did not
use excessive force against him. It also denied Investigator
Malovrh summary judgment on the limited aspect of the
claim that he used excessive force when he kneeled on Stein-
hoff. That claim went to trial where a jury found for Investi-
gator Malovrh. Neither of those claims are on appeal.
Moving to Detective Kowalczyk, the district court ob-
served that, even assuming Steinhoff did not try to flee, a jury
would “almost certainly” find that “an objective officer’s use
of force in taking Steinhoff to the ground and subdu[ing] him
was not unreasonable” given the “murky dynamics” of an
early morning drug raid. The district court further concluded
that Detective Kowalczyk was entitled to qualified immunity
because Steinhoff did not identify clearly established law
“prohibiting the use of a takedown under the dynamic cir-
cumstances presented.”
Finally, the district court concluded that no reasonable
jury could find that Investigator Malovrh intentionally hit
6 No. 24-1252

Steinhoff with his rifle. Even if he accidentally hit Steinhoff,
the district court determined that this unintentional use of
force would not have been excessive and therefore granted
summary judgment without reaching qualified immunity.
Steinhoff now asks us to reverse the district court’s entry
of summary judgment for Detective Kowalczyk and Investi-
gator Malovrh related to the tackle and rifle strike and, sepa-
rately, the denial of his corresponding motion against Detec-
tive Kowalczyk.
II
A
We review a district court’s award of summary judgment
on qualified immunity grounds by examining the facts anew
and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party, here Steinhoff. See Neita v. City of Chicago, 148
F.4th 916, 930 (7th Cir. 2025).
When an officer invokes qualified immunity, the burden
falls to the plaintiff to show not only that the officer’s conduct
violated a federal right, but also that the right was clearly es-
tablished at the time of the alleged violation. See District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018). We may address
these prongs in any order. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236 (2009).
The Fourth Amendment governs the use of force during
the execution of a search warrant. See Muehler v. Mena, 544
U.S. 93, 98–99 (2005). “[O]fficers executing a search warrant
for contraband have the authority” to detain persons on the
premises during the search, id. at 98, to further certain law en-
forcement interests: “officer safety, facilitating the completion
of the search, and preventing flight,” Bailey v. United States,
No. 24-1252 7

568 U.S. 186, 194 (2013). Inherent in the power to detain is the
“authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention.”
Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98–99.
As with other Fourth Amendment seizures, we ask
whether “the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” Gra-
ham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). We consider, for in-
stance, “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or oth-
ers, and whether he is actively resisting” or “attempting to
evade” detention “by flight.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100,
103 (2018) (per curiam) (cleaned up). The reasonableness in-
quiry also accounts for “the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments” about the proper use
of force in dynamic situations. Id. (cleaned up). This last ob-
servation is front and center of our analysis here because “the
execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of
transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic
efforts to conceal or destroy evidence.” Michigan v. Summers,
452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981).
As for the second prong of the qualified immunity inquiry,
a constitutional right is clearly established if existing prece-
dent “place[s] the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021). Put
another way, the law in place at the time of the challenged
conduct must demonstrate that “a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Smith v.
Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 742 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
Time and again the Supreme Court has emphasized the
necessity of defining clearly established law with specificity.
See, e.g., Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. ----, 2026 WL 795469, at *2
8 No. 24-1252

(Mar. 23, 2026); Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63–64. With Fourth Amend-
ment excessive force claims, the Court has further under-
scored that precedent at the time of the challenged conduct
must “‘squarely govern[]’ the specific facts at issue” to create
clearly established law because “[u]se of excessive force is an
area of the law ‘in which the result depends very much on the
facts of each case.’” Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104–05 (quoting Mul-
lenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015) (per curiam)).
B
We begin with the claim against Detective Kowalczyk.
The video evidence does not definitively show whether,
upon exiting the camper, Steinhoff tried to flee. So we assume
for the purpose of Detective Kowalczyk’s summary judgment
motion that Steinhoff complied with the SWAT team’s orders
to turn around and, presumably, to stay put. But even so, we
cannot conclude that Detective Kowalczyk violated clearly es-
tablished law when he tackled Steinhoff.
What stands out most are the circumstances in which the
takedown occurred—a search for evidence of drug possession
involving individuals with a history of violence and risk of
flight. This is precisely the kind of dangerous situation that
requires officers to make the split-second judgments that of-
ten justify the protection of qualified immunity. See Summers,
452 U.S. at 702; see also Muehler, 544 U.S. at 99 (reiterating that
“the risk of harm to officers and occupants is minimized ‘if
the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the
situation’” (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703)).
The SWAT team knew that it would need to secure multi-
ple people who might try to flee, resist, or destroy evidence,
and that there might be firearms present. See Muehler, 452 U.S.
No. 24-1252 9

at 108 (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that executing a
search warrant in a dangerous context may justify “over-
whelming force and surprise in order to secure the premises
as promptly as possible”). Swift action was essential. We are
not aware of any clearly established law that would have put
Detective Kowalczyk on notice that his action in tackling
Steinhoff amounted to a Fourth Amendment violation.
Steinhoff disagrees, relying in large part on Alicea v.
Thomas, 815 F.3d 283 (7th Cir. 2016), and Miller v. Gonzalez, 761
F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2014), for the proposition that an officer can-
not use substantial force against a non-resisting suspect. Al-
icea involved the pursuit of a felony-burglary suspect who
fled from law enforcement and ended up in an empty above-
ground pool in a backyard. See 815 F.3d at 286, 288. We con-
cluded that an officer used excessive force when he assisted
his dog into the pool and commanded him to bite and hold
the suspect after the person had already complied with the
officer’s command (at gunpoint) to raise his hands. See id. at
286, 289–90. We emphasized that it was broad daylight and
that the suspect would have had to vault out of the pool to
escape, giving the officer plenty of time to apprehend him. See
id. at 289–90.
Miller presents a similar fact pattern. Officers investigating
a stabbing came upon a man who admitted that he was on
probation for burglary and disorderly conduct. See 761 F.3d
at 824. The man, now a suspect, fled, eventually hopping a
fence into an enclosed yard. See id. An officer held him at gun-
point and ordered him to the ground. See id. at 825. After the
suspect was on his stomach for about 10 seconds, the officer
jumped over the fence and landed on him, breaking his jaw.
See id. at 825, 828. We held that this use of force was excessive
10 No. 24-1252

and not protected by qualified immunity because the suspect
was already prone and subdued at gunpoint. See id. at 829–
30.
Neither Alicea nor Miller help Steinhoff. Neither concerned
the execution of a search warrant for drugs across a large
property where officers expected to encounter armed, violent,
or flight-ready individuals. They only involved a single sus-
pect. And that suspect was boxed in at a distance from law
enforcement, giving the officer time to reassess the threat
level and calibrate his use of force. In short, the officers in Al-
icea and Miller were not under pressure to make rapid deci-
sions to control a potentially dangerous situation. This case is
the opposite in every way.
Steinhoff cites a host of other cases, but they are similarly
devoid of high-stakes drug raids often requiring quick police
action. And most involve uses of force on people who were
both compliant and suspected of non-violent crimes, or the
use of gratuitous force on someone who was already sub-
dued.
In the end, then, we affirm the district court’s award of
qualified immunity to Detective Kowalczyk and, accordingly,
its denial of Steinhoff’s cross-motion.
C
We see the analysis for Investigator Malovrh differently.
To our eye, Steinhoff’s primary contention is that Investigator
Malovrh intentionally hit him in the head with his rifle as De-
tective Kowalczyk tackled him. But describing an argument
is different from knowing what happened. And that is the cir-
cumstance we find ourselves in here.
No. 24-1252 11

Steinhoff did not claim to see who hit him. Nor does the
body-camera footage show what transpired during the
takedown. And while Investigator Malovrh claims he joined
in once Steinhoff was on the ground, Detective Kowalczyk
testified that Investigator Malovrh assisted from the start. We
cannot reach any conclusions on qualified immunity without
knowing the material facts. But there is enough circumstantial
evidence of an intentional use of excessive force to send this
question to trial.
A jury could find that Investigator Malovrh’s rifle hit
Steinhoff while he was standing, which is inconsistent with
Investigator Malovrh’s insistence that he only jumped into the
fray once Steinhoff was on the ground. Steinhoff testified that
he saw a rifle swing and hit him while he was still upright.
The audible “clink” in the video could corroborate that the
rifle made contact while he was standing. More, Captain
Ramberg was the only other officer nearby with a rifle, yet all
agree that he took no part in the takedown. That Investigator
Malovrh’s rifle allegedly hit Steinhoff while he was standing,
and with enough force to inflict a deep cut, further indicates
that the blow may have been intentional.
Lesser factors also inform our judgment. After the
takedown for instance, Steinhoff complained about what hap-
pened, saying, “my ear’s split with that gun you hit me with.”
Somebody responded, “[w]ell, don’t take off—try to take off
when we’re giving you orders.” But it is unclear which officer
made the comment. A jury could find that the officer, having
seen the incident, implicitly acknowledged that Investigator
Malovrh hit Steinhoff intentionally. See Miller, 761 F.3d at 828
(holding that a jury could conclude that an officer who
12 No. 24-1252

jumped onto a suspect intended to injure them when he re-
plied to the suspect’s complaint, “I told you not to run”).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Steinhoff,
we cannot conclude that Investigator Malovrh is entitled to
qualified immunity at summary judgment. A blow to the
head with a rifle could qualify as deadly use of force because
it may pose a “substantial risk of serious bodily harm.” Becker
v. Elfreich, 821 F.3d 920, 925 (7th Cir. 2016); see Sallenger v.
Oakes, 473 F.3d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that blows
with fists and a flashlight to the back of a head may be deadly
force). And an officer cannot use deadly force against a non-
resisting suspect. See Gant v. Hartman, 924 F.3d 445, 451 (7th
Cir. 2019) (citing pre-2018 cases). Again, though, we do not
know what happened. Investigator Malovrh may reinvoke
qualified immunity at trial as the facts develop, including
through special interrogatories. See Smith, 10 F.4th at 749–50;
Strand v. Minchuk, 910 F.3d 909, 918–19 (7th Cir. 2018).
We recognize that Steinhoff has an alternative line of ar-
gument—that if Investigator Malovrh unintentionally hit him
with his rifle during an intentional and, in Steinhoff’s view,
excessive tackle, Investigator Malovrh is liable for a Fourth
Amendment violation. We do not pass upon this theory ex-
cept to observe that its viability can be also sorted out with
additional fact-finding at trial.

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In the final analysis, we AFFIRM the district court’s entry
of qualified immunity to Detective Kowalczyk and the corre-
sponding denial of partial summary judgment for Steinhoff.
But we REVERSE the district court’s entry of summary
No. 24-1252 13

judgment for Investigator Malovrh. We REMAND the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.