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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Shubin

Idaho Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 51713

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (295)

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Combined Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51713

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: March 26, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
LACEY LOUISE SHUBIN, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Steven Hippler and Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, District Judges.

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance and possession of
drug paraphernalia, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly A. Coster, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.

MELANSON, Judge Pro Tem
Lacey Louise Shubin appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Officers responded to the parking lot of a grocery store for a welfare check. The reporting
party advised that there was a woman, later identified as Shubin, “asleep or passed out” inside a
vehicle. The reporting party had attempted to wake Shubin by knocking on the vehicle window,
but she did not respond. The reporting party spent about one hour inside the grocery store, and
when she came back outside, Shubin was in the same position. The reporting party tried to wake
Shubin again and then called 911. When officers arrived, one patrol vehicle parked in front of

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Shubin’s vehicle and the other patrol vehicle parked behind it so that her vehicle was unable to
leave.
The officers approached the vehicle on foot and observed Shubin in the driver’s seat, she
was alone in the vehicle, the engine was running, and the keys were in the ignition. Shubin was
slumped over to the right toward the center console. For approximately 10-15 seconds, the officers
watched Shubin and evaluated the situation. One of the officers reported that Shubin’s eyes were
partially open, “then shut really quickly.” An officer then loudly announced himself and knocked
on the vehicle window. Shubin awoke and acknowledged the officer’s presence. The officer asked
Shubin to turn the vehicle off, which she did.
The officer talked to Shubin for about one minute while she was in the vehicle. Shubin
denied that she had been sleeping and said she was just looking at her phone. Shubin also said that
she had only been in the vehicle for a few minutes. Shubin said she did not need medical attention.
The officer then asked Shubin to exit the vehicle, and she did.
Outside the vehicle, the officer asked questions about Shubin’s health; if she was on any
medications; whether she had ever fallen asleep at the wheel before; and when she had last slept,
eaten, and consumed alcohol. Shubin responded to the questions but seemed confused and offered
irrelevant information. Shubin stated that she was “kind of” an alcoholic but had not consumed
alcohol the previous night. The officer reported that he smelled alcohol coming from Shubin. The
officer performed the gaze nystagmus test which did not indicate alcohol impairment. The officer
still believed Shubin was unable to safely drive and asked if she had anyone that could pick her up
from the parking lot.
The officer asked if the other officers present could search Shubin’s vehicle and she
consented. The other officers located drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine in the vehicle.
Shubin was arrested and transported to the jail, where methamphetamine was found on her person.
Shubin was charged with possession of a controlled substance (I.C. § 37-2732(c)), possession of
drug paraphernalia (I.C. § 37-2734A), and introduction of contraband into a correctional facility
(I.C. §§ 18-2510(3), 19-2520F).
Prior to trial, Shubin filed a motion to suppress, arguing the officers unlawfully extended
the seizure. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and a trial was held. Shubin was

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found guilty of possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia and was
found not guilty for the introduction of contraband into a correctional facility. Shubin appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Shubin argues the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress.
Specifically, Shubin asserts the officers were not justified in extending the seizure after they
confirmed she was not in need of assistance. Shubin further contends the extended seizure was
not supported by specific articulable facts sufficient to support reasonable suspicion. The State
responds that Shubin has failed to show that the district court erred in denying the motion to
suppress because the extension of Shubin’s detention was supported by reasonable suspicion. We
agree.
The determination of whether an investigative detention is reasonable requires a dual
inquiry--whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. State v.
Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357,
361, 17 P.3d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 2000). An investigative detention is permissible if it is based
upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is
about to be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223
(Ct. App. 2003). Such a detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931; State v. Gutierrez, 137

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Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461, 465 (Ct. App. 2002). Where a person is detained, the scope of the
detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d
at 931; Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 361, 17 P.3d at 305. In this regard, we must focus on the intensity
of the detention, as well as its duration. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931. The scope of the
intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each
case. Id.; Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 361, 17 P.3d at 305. Brief inquiries not otherwise related to the
initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily violate a detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights. Roe,
140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d at 931.
The community caretaking function involves the duty of police officers to help individuals
an officer believes may be in need of assistance. State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442, 445, 34 P.3d
1125, 1128 (Ct. App. 2001). In order for an officer’s intrusion to be justified by the community
caretaking function, the officer must possess a subjective belief that the individual is in need of
immediate assistance. Id. Under the community caretaking function, law enforcement has the
authority to conduct a temporary seizure when a vehicle threatens public safety. State v. Van
Zanten, 173 Idaho 620, 625, 546 P.3d 163, 168 (2024).
The district court found that the officers were concerned that Shubin needed immediate
medical assistance when they first approached her. The district court found that, while the officer
did not note any immediate signs of drugs or alcohol, he testified that Shubin’s disoriented
responses to the officer’s questions during their initial conversation had caused him concern for
Shubin’s mental state. Based on this concern, the officer asked Shubin to exit her vehicle so they
could discuss the situation. When Shubin exited her vehicle, approximately one minute had passed
since the officer first woke Shubin up. Shubin shared with the officer that Shubin had taken a
sleeping pill and drank alcohol the night before and had not eaten food since the prior day. Shubin
told the officer that Shubin was “kind of” an alcoholic and had a previous driving under the
influence conviction. The officer noted that he smelled alcohol on her breath. Shubin was unable
to provide any explanation for why she was unconscious in a running vehicle. The officer then
asked Shubin if the other officers could search Shubin’s vehicle for illegal drugs and she
immediately consented. During the search, the officer continued to talk to Shubin and encouraged
her to call someone to come pick her up because the officer remained concerned about Shubin’s
ability to safely drive her vehicle. Shubin agreed someone could come get her, but her phone was

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dead, and she could not remember anyone’s phone number. At this time, the officers searching
Shubin’s vehicle found a pipe containing methamphetamine and she was arrested.
The State conceded to the district court that Shubin was seized for the entire police
encounter because the officers’ patrol vehicles were blocking Shubin’s vehicle from leaving. On
appeal, Shubin does not dispute that the initial seizure was justified by the community caretaking
function. Shubin argued below and maintains on appeal that the officer did not have reasonable
suspicion to order Shubin to exit her vehicle. However, the district court found that the
circumstances leading up to the exit order gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Shubin was
potentially driving while intoxicated or otherwise unsafe to drive. The officer knew Shubin had
been passed out in a running vehicle and was unable to be roused, although the officer did not yet
know that Shubin had been there for over an hour. The officer also noted Shubin was mumbling
while speaking and lacked awareness that she had just been unconscious. Finally, the officer noted
Shubin’s disorientated condition which led the officer to be concerned for Shubin’s mental state.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the officer was justified in asking Shubin to exit her
vehicle based on the officer’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Shubin consented to the
search of her vehicle while the officer attempted to help Shubin acquire a ride to safely leave the
parking lot. The district court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, including the
record and testimony from the officer at the scene. The district court’s conclusion that these
findings were sufficient to support reasonable suspicion adequate to justify briefly extending the
detention was not error. Shubin has failed to show that the district court erred in denying her
motion to suppress.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Shubin has failed to show the district court erred in finding that her detention was supported
by reasonable suspicion and in denying her motion to suppress. Accordingly, Shubin’s judgment
of conviction for possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia is
affirmed.
Chief Judge TRIBE and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR.

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