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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Pasley

Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: CAAP-24-0000766

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (19.2K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
20-MAR-2026
08:04 AM
Dkt. 114 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ALFRED OSCAR PASLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Alfred Oscar Pasley appeals from

the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit's September 13, 2024

Judgment of Conviction and Sentence. 1 We affirm.

In 2022, a grand jury indicted Pasley on six counts:

Count 1 Kidnapping, in violation of Hawaiʻi Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 707-720(1)(d) (2014), as to
Complaining Witness 1 (CW 1).

Count 2 Attempted Sexual Assault in the First Degree,
in violation of HRS §§ 707-730(1)(a)
(Supp. 2021) and 705-500 (2014), as to CW 1.

1 The Honorable Kelsey T. Kawano presided.
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Count 3 Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, in
violation of HRS §§ 707-701.5 (Supp. 2018)
and 705-500(2), subject to HRS § 706-656
(2014), as to CW 1.

Count 4 Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of
HRS § 707-711(1)(d) (Supp. 2021), as to CW 1.

Count 5 Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree,
in violation of HRS § 707-716(1)(e) (2014),
as to CW 1.

Count 6 Sexual Assault in the Fourth Degree, in
violation of HRS § 707-733(1)(a)
(Supp. 2016), as to Complaining Witness 2
(CW 2).

According to the testimony adduced at trial, on

August 15, 2021, CW 2 was walking on Front Street in Lahaina

after having breakfast with a friend. While walking back to her

car, she passed Pasley. As CW 2 passed Pasley, "he took his

hand and he went up [her] shorts and crossed over into the inner

thigh of [her] leg." She "karate-chopped his hand away," and

Pasley kept walking "like nothing happened."

That same day, CW 1 was visiting Maui and had plans to

go parasailing in Lahaina Harbor. Before parasailing, she went

to use the women's bathroom, and noticed Pasley near the banyan

tree watching her. When she came out of the bathroom stall,

Pasley was standing in the women's restroom wearing a hat,

sunglasses, mask, and holding a knife. Pasley's pants and

underwear were around his ankles and his genitals were exposed.

Pasley came at CW 1 with the knife, and tried to cover

her mouth, saying "yes, bitch" and "shut up, bitch." CW 1 kept

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trying to push his hand away because the knife was getting

closer to her neck. Eventually, CW 1's brother and boyfriend

came into the bathroom after hearing her scream. CW 1 suffered

a cut to her hand from the knife and bruising on her knees.

The jury convicted Pasley on all counts, except

Count 3 (Attempted Murder) for which Pasley was acquitted.

Counts 4 (Assault in the Second Degree) and 5 (Terroristic

Threatening in the First Degree) merged. Pasley appealed.

On appeal, Pasley (1) raises issues related to his

Count 6 (Sexual Assault in the Fourth Degree) conviction,

(2) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to Counts 1

(Kidnapping) and 2 (Attempted Sexual Assault), and (3) contends

trial counsel was ineffective.

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to

the issues raised and the arguments advanced, we resolve the

points of error as discussed below, and affirm.

(1) Pasley raises two issues related to Count 6

(Sexual Assault in the Fourth Degree as to CW 2). Pasley

contends (a) the circuit court erred by admitting evidence

related to Count 6 as evidence establishing Count 6 was excluded

by Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 404(b) and the law of the

case; and (b) the circuit court erred by failing to sua sponte

sever Count 6.

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(a) Pasley first argues that the circuit court erred

by admitting evidence related to Count 6 because any evidence

related to Count 6 was excluded by the circuit court under HRE

Rule 404(b) and the law of the case. According to Pasley, the

circuit court excluded any evidence establishing Count 6 from

being presented under HRE Rule 404(b).

Pasley, however, mischaracterizes the record.

HRE Rule 404(b) prohibits other crimes or acts from

being admitted "to prove the character of a person in order to

show action in conformity therewith."

In its motion to present HRE Rule 404(b) evidence, the

state offered as proof the Count 6 facts and facts from an

incident in 2010:

1. That Count Six of the Indictment alleges that on
   August 15, 2021, [CW 2] was walking on the sidewalk on
   Front Street in Lahaina. Defendant, who she did not know,
   was also walking on the sidewalk. Defendant reached his
   hand up her inner thigh from behind and touched her near
   her genital then continued to [sic] as if nothing happened.

2. That on December 4, 2010, J.T. was walking on the
   sidewalk in Chinatown in Honolulu. Defendant, who she did
   not know, was also walking on the sidewalk. Defendant
   reached his hand by her inner thigh from behind and touched
   her near her genitals, he then continued on as if nothing
   happened. The Defendant has been provided in discovery the
   [Honolulu Police Department] police report, 10-433101, that
   documents this incident.[ 2]

Fairly read, the State attempted to show that the

facts in Count 6 were similar to the facts in the 2010 Incident

arguing, "In this case there [are] striking similarities between

2 The incident that occurred on December 4, 2010 is referred to as the
2010 Incident.
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the two instances. The encounters were so brief the State

believes that it is important to show two (2) almost identical

encounters cannot be shrugged off and [sic] a mistake or

accident."

The circuit court denied the State's motion,

explaining that although the evidence from the 2010 Incident is

relevant to Count 6, the probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In other words,

the circuit court excluded evidence from the 2010 Incident; the

circuit court did not bar the State from introducing evidence to

establish the elements of Count 6.

Thus, Pasley's argument that the circuit court

excluded any evidence related to Count 6 under HRE Rule 404(b)

is wholly without merit.

(b) Pasley also contends that the circuit court erred

by failing to sua sponte sever Count 6. According to Pasley,

the prejudice to him was high because the State needed Count 6

to show "sexual intent" as to Counts 1 and 2.

Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 14

provides,

If it appears that a defendant or the government is
prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in a
charge or by such joinder for trial together, the court may
order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a
severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief
justice requires.

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Based on the evidence presented at trial, Pasley

attacked CW 1 in the women's bathroom with a knife while his

penis was exposed. The State did not need the facts of Count 6

to show "sexual intent" as Pasley argues.

The circuit court did not err by not sua sponte

severing Count 6.

(2) Next, Pasley challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence for Counts 1 (Kidnapping) and 2 (Attempted Sexual

Assault in the First Degree). Pasley confines his sufficiency

argument to the evidence of his "pants around his ankles,"

arguing it "is hardly sufficient evidence to enable a person of

reasonable caution to support a conclusion that the attack was

intended to 'subject the [attacked] to a sexual offense' or 'to

subject [the complaining witness] to an act of sexual

penetration by strong compulsion.'" (Brackets in original)

(first quoting HRS § 707-720(1)(d), then quoting HRS § 707-

730(1)(a)).

This court reviews sufficiency of the evidence claims

as follows:

[E]vidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in
the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate
court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to
support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the
case was before a judge or jury. The test on appeal is not
whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but
whether there was substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the trier of fact.

State v. Yuen, 154 Hawaiʻi 434, 444, 555 P.3d 121, 131 (2024)

(quoting State v. Richie, 88 Hawaiʻi 19, 33, 960 P.2d 1227, 1241
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(1998)). "'Substantial evidence' as to every material element

of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of

sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of

reasonable caution to support a conclusion." Id. (quoting

Richie, 88 Hawaiʻi at 33, 960 P.2d at 1241).

We have consistently held that since intent can rarely be
proved by direct evidence, proof by circumstantial evidence
and reasonable inferences arising from circumstances
surrounding the act is sufficient to establish the
requisite intent. Thus, the mind of an alleged offender
may be read from his acts, conduct, and inferences fairly
drawn from all the circumstances.

State v. Kiese, 126 Hawaiʻi 494, 502-03, 273 P.3d 1180, 1188-89

(2012) (quoting State v. Sadino, 64 Haw. 427, 430, 642 P.2d 534,

536-37 (1982)).

As to Count 1 (Kidnapping), the State had to prove

that Pasley "intentionally or knowingly restrain[ed] another

person with intent to: . . . Inflict bodily injury upon that

person or subject that person to a sexual offense." HRS § 707-

720(1)(d) (emphases added).

According to CW 1's testimony, Pasley blocked her in

bathroom stall and came at her with a knife, and she suffered

bodily injury, including bruises to her knees. In viewing this

testimony in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this

testimony was sufficient to support intent to inflict bodily

injury. As the statute is written in the disjunctive, intent to

"subject that person to a sexual offense" need not be addressed.

See, e.g., State v. Rogan, 156 Hawaiʻi 233, 239, 573 P.3d 616,

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622 (2025) ("The import of the word 'or' is clear. It is a

disjunctive that signals an alternative.").

As to Count 2 (Attempted Sexual Assault in the First

Degree), the State had to prove that (1) Pasley "intentionally

engaged in conduct;" (2) "under the circumstances as [Pasley]

believed them to be, the conduct constituted a substantial step

in a course of conduct;" and (3) Pasley "intended that course of

conduct to culminate in sexual penetration with" CW 1. State v.

Bailey, 126 Hawaiʻi 383, 404-05, 271 P.3d 1142, 1163-64 (2012);

see HRS §§ 705-500(1)(b) and 707-730(1)(b).

CW 1's testimony shows that Pasley attacked her in a

women's bathroom, wearing a mask, hat, and sunglasses with his

pants and underwear around his ankles, yelling things like "yes,

bitch" and "shut up, bitch," while trying to cover her mouth.

CW 1's boyfriend testified that Pasley's genitalia were exposed.

When viewing this evidence in the light most favorable

to the State, the testimony adduced at trial was sufficient to

show Pasley intended his course of conduct "to culminate in

sexual penetration" of CW 1.

(3) Finally, Pasley contends trial counsel was

ineffective for (a) not objecting to, or moving for a mistrial

based on, the admission of the Count 6 evidence; (b) not moving

to sever Count 6; and (c) not moving for judgment of acquittal.

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For ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the

defendant must establish "1) that there were specific errors or

omissions reflecting counsel's lack of skill, judgment, or

diligence; and 2) that such errors or omissions resulted in

either the withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially

meritorious defense." Yuen, 154 Hawaiʻi at 444, 555 P.3d at 131

(quoting State v. Wakisaka, 102 Hawaiʻi 504, 513-14, 78 P.3d 317,

326-27 (2003)).

(a) Pasley argues that trial counsel was ineffective

for not objecting to, or moving for a mistrial based on, the

admission of the Count 6 evidence.

To the extent the evidence establishing the elements

of Count 6 was not excluded under HRE Rule 404(b) as discussed

above, counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to, or not

moving for a mistrial based on, admissible evidence. See

Richie, 88 Hawaiʻi at 40, 960 P.2d at 1248 ("Failing to object to

admissible evidence cannot be considered error or omission.").

(b) Pasley argues that trial counsel was ineffective

for not moving to sever Count 6. Pasley again argues that the

joinder of Count 6 impacted the evidence as to Counts 1 and 2.

As discussed above, Pasley did not show that his lack-

of-sexual-intent defense was potentially meritorious or that it

was substantially impaired by the lack of severance. See Yuen,

154 Hawaiʻi at 444, 555 P.3d at 131. As to Count 1, the lack-of-

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sexual-intent defense was not meritorious because that count

involved "bodily injury" (i.e., bruising of CW 1's knees) and

did not rely exclusively on sexual intent. And on Count 2, the

lack-of-sexual-intent defense was not meritorious where CW 1

testified, inter alia, that Pasley approached her with his pants

down while she was alone in the women's bathroom, and that she

believed Pasley's exposed penis was erect.

Thus, to the extent Pasley relies on a lack-of-sexual-

intent defense, Pasley fails to show a "withdrawal or

substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense."

See Yuen, 154 Hawaiʻi at 444, 555 P.3d at 131 (citation omitted).

(c) Pasley argues that defense counsel was

ineffective for not moving for a judgment of acquittal.

"[T]he failure to file a motion for judgment of

acquittal within the time allowed has not precluded a court from

reviewing the case on appeal to avoid manifest injustice."

State v. Chen, 77 Hawai‘i 329, 333, 884 P.2d 392, 396

(App. 1994). "Also, while acknowledging a defendant's failure

to file or renew a motion for judgment of acquittal, courts have

examined the sufficiency of the evidence although ultimately

affirming the convictions." Id.

Pasley's sufficiency of the evidence argument was

addressed above. Because there was sufficient evidence to

support Pasley's convictions, there was no "withdrawal or

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substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense."

See Yuen, 154 Hawaiʻi at 444, 555 P.3d at 131 (citation omitted).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's

September 13, 2024 Judgment of Conviction and Sentence.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, March 20, 2026.

On the briefs: /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Chief Judge
Kai Lawrence,
for Defendant-Appellant. /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Associate Judge
Gerald K. Enriques,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
County of Maui, Associate Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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