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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Murphy

Court of Appeals of Utah

• Citations: 2026 UT App 38

• Docket Number: Case No. 20240145-CA

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (27.4K)

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Combined Opinion

2026 UT App 38

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,
v.
SHAWN PHILLIP MURPHY,
Appellee.

Opinion
No. 20240145‐CA
Filed March 19, 2026

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Patrick Corum
No. 221907614

Derek E. Brown and Natalie M. Edmundson,
Attorneys for Appellant
Freyja Johnson and Hannah Leavitt‐Howell,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Shawn Phillip Murphy was charged with aggravated
sexual abuse and sodomy on a child for incidents that had
occurred many years prior involving the son (Jonathan) of one of
Murphy’s former close friends (Mother).1 The magistrate, citing
lack of evidence at a preliminary hearing to establish probable
cause that Murphy committed the alleged abuse, declined to bind
Murphy over for trial. The State appeals, claiming the magistrate
misapplied the bindover standard. We disagree and affirm the
magistrate’s decision.

1. We use a pseudonym for the then‐minor in this case. State v. Murphy

BACKGROUND

¶2 The allegations of abuse in this case came to light when
Jonathan, who was fifteen years old at the time, was taken to an
emergency room following a mental health episode. During a
subsequent interview at the Children’s Justice Center (CJC),
Jonathan described being abused when he was younger while
being babysat for several hours at night when Mother worked an
evening shift. Jonathan identified his abuser as a male babysitter
named “Shane.” Based on allegations made in the CJC interview,
the State sought to bind Murphy over on two counts of sodomy
on a child and one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child.
The magistrate held a preliminary hearing at which Jonathan and
Mother testified.

¶3 At the preliminary hearing, Jonathan—who was then
eighteen—testified as follows:

 Identification of the babysitter: Jonathan said that the
babysitter was a man named “Shawn” who was a “very
close friend” of Mother and who regularly abused him.
Though Murphy was present at the hearing, Jonathan was
unable to identify him in court as the person who babysat
or abused him. When defense counsel asked Jonathan why
he previously said the babysitter’s name was “Shane” in
the CJC interview, Jonathan explained that it was a
“[s]imple mispronunciation” and that he had “just
generally forgot what his name was.” Jonathan recalled
that when he reported the abuse after the hospital episode,
Mother talked to him “about going to be babysat” and
about who babysat him at the relevant time. Specifically,
Jonathan testified that Mother “reminded [him] what [the
babysitter’s] name was and who [the babysitter] was.”

 Jonathan’s age: Jonathan estimated that he was seven or
eight when Mother would leave him at the babysitter’s
house while she worked. Regarding Jonathan’s age,

20240145‐CA 2 2026 UT App 38
State v. Murphy

defense counsel asked him, “[D]uring [the CJC] interview
you tell the law enforcement officer that you were actually
four years old when you think this happened. Do you
remember telling him that?” Jonathan responded, “I do
not.” And defense counsel followed up with this question:
“As you sit here today, do you know if you went to that
babysitter’s house when you were four, when [you were]
five or six, seven or eight? Can you nail down that time
more clearly?” Jonathan responded, “I really can’t.”

 Time and duration of babysitting: Jonathan said that he stayed
at the babysitter’s house for six to seven hours at a time
while Mother worked at night, stating, “[G]enerally it was
nighttime and my mom would leave me there at his house
and go off to work.” He specifically stated that Mother
would “drop [him] off at [the babysitter’s] home to go to
work every night.” He further said the babysitter never
took him anywhere else, including daycare.

 Initial disclosure of the abuse: Jonathan recalled first
disclosing the abuse to Mother when he was about twelve
years old after his memory was triggered when he saw a
photograph of the babysitter. He said that Mother wanted
to report it then but that he “was a bit iffy on the situation
on whether or not [he] wanted to,” so no report was made
at that time.

 Description of the abuse: Jonathan testified that the babysitter
abused him every time Mother would drop him off at the
babysitter’s house. He said the babysitter would take him
to an upstairs bedroom, lock the door, and engage in
mutual oral sex: “He would undo both his and my pants
and he would have me place his penis in my mouth and he
would have me bite down and shake my head as hard as I
could [and] he would do the same thing to me afterwards.”
Jonathan also recalled an instance where the babysitter

20240145‐CA 3 2026 UT App 38
State v. Murphy

manipulated Jonathan’s penis with his hand for about five
seconds before placing it in his mouth.

¶4 For her part, Mother testified that Murphy was a friend
who babysat Jonathan, but her recollection of the situation
differed from Jonathan’s in several ways.

 Identification of the babysitter: Mother confidently identified
Murphy in court and asserted he had been Jonathan’s only
babysitter. Mother stated that Jonathan spent every other
weekend with his father.2

 Jonathan’s age: Mother testified that Murphy babysat
Jonathan only between August and December 2009, when
Jonathan was about three or four years old.

 Time and duration of babysitting: Mother stated that the
babysitting occurred in the mornings and lasted for only
about one hour each day. Murphy would pick them up,
drive Mother to the TRAX station so she could travel to
work, and then watch Jonathan until his daycare facility
opened at 7:00 a.m.

 Initial disclosure of abuse: Mother testified that Jonathan told
her—in what she described as a “constant conversation”
beginning when he was about seven years old and lasting
until he was a teenager—that something happened with
his babysitter. Mother said that Jonathan’s first comment
came after she asked him if he remembered Murphy—with
no indication that a photograph triggered the memory—
and Jonathan said that he did not like Murphy because
Murphy “used to show his penis” to him. Mother never
reported the allegation because she “didn’t think . . . a

1. No testimony was given about babysitters who might have been employed while Jonathan was in the care of his father.

20240145‐CA 4 2026 UT App 38
State v. Murphy

decision like that” was up to her since she “wasn’t the one
who was sexually abused.”

¶5 Following the testimony, the State asked the magistrate to
bind Murphy over on two counts of sodomy on a child and one
count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The magistrate noted
that the case was a close call on bindover and, rather than ruling
immediately, indicated that he wanted to re‐listen to the
testimony and conscientiously consider it before deciding. The
magistrate noted that while it was unusual to take a bindover
decision under advisement, that is what he felt he needed to do.

¶6 The magistrate ultimately declined to bind Murphy over
for trial. While the magistrate found that probable cause
supported the allegation that Jonathan had been sexually abused,
he found that there was no credible evidence that Murphy
committed the abuse. The magistrate noted, “[T]he element in
question is identity. . . . The evidence here is so wholly
inconsistent as to the when and the who as to render the testimony
regarding identity just simply incredible and as wholly lacking
and incapable of supporting a reasonable inference that the
defendant is the person that [Jonathan] is talking about.” The
magistrate observed that Jonathan could not identify Murphy in
court, even though “there was not a whole lot of choices” of
people in the courtroom—with Murphy and the prosecutor being
“the only two real possibilities.” The magistrate found that the
discrepancies involving the timing and duration of the abuse and
Jonathan’s age to be “significant” because they cast serious doubt
on the identity of the alleged abuser. Specifically, the magistrate
found himself “hung up on” the following differences in
Jonathan’s and Mother’s testimony:

 seven to eight years old versus three to four years old when
the abuse occurred;

 six to seven hours versus one hour for the duration of the
babysitting sessions;

20240145‐CA 5 2026 UT App 38
State v. Murphy

 the abuse occurring at night versus in the morning; and

 Jonathan remaining at the babysitter’s house all night
versus being taken to daycare.

These circumstances, the magistrate concluded, “do not go
together without more, without some kind of explanation as to
why, why the discrepancy.” He also found that Mother “was not
credible with a lot of the details” and that “she was fairly scattered
with a lot of the details surrounding the circumstances and was
contradictory in some important ways with [Jonathan’s]
testimony.” Thus, the magistrate concluded that while Jonathan
“testified very credibly that something happened, . . . the totality
of the testimony does not support a reasonable inference that Mr.
Murphy is the person that did those things to him.” Given these
inconsistencies, the magistrate ruled that the State had “not
presented credible evidence to support a bindover,” and he
accordingly dismissed the case against Murphy. The State appeals
the magistrate’s decision to deny bindover.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 The sole issue on appeal is whether the magistrate
erroneously refused to bind Murphy over on two counts of
sodomy on a child and one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a
child. “A decision to bind over a criminal defendant for trial
presents a mixed question of law and fact and requires the
application of the appropriate bindover standard to the
underlying factual findings.” State v. Smith, 2022 UT App 82, ¶ 8,
514 P.3d 620 (cleaned up), aff’d, 2024 UT 13, 548 P.3d 874. “In this
context, appellate courts give limited deference to a magistrate’s
application of the bindover standard to the facts of each case.”
State v. Prisbrey, 2020 UT App 172, ¶ 18, 479 P.3d 1126 (cleaned
up).

20240145‐CA 6 2026 UT App 38
State v. Murphy

ANALYSIS

¶8 “A defendant may be bound over for trial only if the
prosecution produces evidence sufficient to demonstrate
probable cause that the charged crimes were committed.” State v.
Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ¶ 8, 289 P.3d 444 (cleaned up); accord State v.
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 20, 137 P.3d 787; see also Utah R. Crim. P.
7B(b) (“If from the evidence the magistrate finds probable cause
to believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it, the magistrate must order that the
defendant be bound over for trial.”). This requirement “is aimed
at ferreting out groundless and improvident prosecutions,
relieving the accused from the substantial degradation and
expense incident to a modern criminal trial when the charges
against him are unwarranted or the evidence insufficient.”
Ramirez, 2012 UT 59, ¶ 8 (cleaned up).

¶9 As our supreme court has explained,

The key word that elevates magistrates’ role beyond
that of a mere rubber stamp for the prosecution is
“reasonable.” Indeed, the prosecution has not
carried its burden if it merely shows belief rather
than reasonable belief. Inclusion of the word
“reasonable” in this standard suggests that, at some
level of inconsistency or incredibility, evidence
becomes incapable of satisfying the probable cause
standard. When that is the case, magistrates are
empowered to deny bindover.

Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 22. And “although magistrates may not
prefer one piece of credible evidence over a conflicting piece of
credible evidence in making their bindover determination, they
may disregard or discount as incredible evidence that is not
capable of supporting a reasonable belief as to an element of the
prosecutor’s claim.” Id. ¶ 25. This means that “when evidence
becomes so contradictory, inconsistent, or unbelievable that it is

20240145‐CA 7 2026 UT App 38
State v. Murphy

unreasonable to base belief of an element of the prosecutor’s claim
on that evidence, magistrates need not give credence to that
evidence.” Id. But “to justify binding a defendant over for trial, the
prosecution need not present evidence capable of supporting a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor is the prosecution
required to eliminate alternative inferences that could be drawn
from the evidence in favor of the defense.” State v. Smith, 2022 UT
App 82, ¶ 11, 514 P.3d 620 (cleaned up), aff’d, 2024 UT 13, 548 P.3d
874.

¶10 Accordingly, a magistrate may deny bindover “when the
evidence, considered under the totality of the circumstances, is
wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove
some issue which supports the prosecution’s claim.” State v.
Prisbrey, 2020 UT App 172, ¶ 22, 479 P.3d 1126 (cleaned up). In
other words, “a magistrate may properly deny bindover where
the facts presented by the prosecution provide no more than a
basis for speculation.” Id. (cleaned up). While “the line separating
speculation from reasonable inference can at times be faint,” the
two are distinct. Id. ¶ 23 (cleaned up). “An inference is a
conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a
logical consequence from them,” and speculation entails “the act
or practice of theorizing about matters over which there is no
certain knowledge at hand.” Id. (cleaned up). “In short, the
difference between an inference and speculation depends on
whether the underlying facts support the conclusion.” Salt Lake
City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 73, ¶ 12, 358 P.3d 1067.

¶11 Here, the magistrate struggled to find sufficient evidence
that Murphy was the one who perpetrated the abuse of Jonathan.
In the magistrate’s words, “[T]he element in question is
identity. . . . The evidence here is so wholly inconsistent as to the
when and the who as to render the testimony regarding identity
just simply incredible and as wholly lacking and incapable of
supporting a reasonable inference that the defendant is the person
that [Jonathan] is talking about.” We agree that the magistrate

20240145‐CA 8 2026 UT App 38
State v. Murphy

acted within his limited discretion when he determined that the
evidence presented did not “demonstrate probable cause that the
charged crimes were committed” by Murphy. See Ramirez, 2012
UT 59, ¶ 8 (cleaned up). For the following reasons—and while
being cognizant that “magistrates may not prefer one piece of
credible evidence over a conflicting piece of credible evidence in
making their bindover determination,” see Virgin, 2006 UT 29,
¶ 25—the magistrate here correctly concluded that the facts
presented by the State provided only a speculative basis to
support probable cause to conclude that Murphy was the
individual who abused Jonathan.

¶12 First, Jonathan was unable to identify Murphy as the
perpetrator of the abuse in court even though there were only two
potential candidates present in court from whom to choose.
Jonathan’s inability to identify Murphy as his babysitter—along
with the lack of other evidence identifying Murphy as the
babysitter during the time that the abuse occurred—does not
provide probable cause to conclude that Murphy committed the
charged crimes.

¶13 Second, Jonathan’s age at the time of the abuse does not
support probable cause to believe that Murphy was the abuser.
Jonathan first testified that he was about seven or eight when he
stayed at the babysitter’s house, but when asked if he could “nail
down” his age with greater precision, he said that he could not,
and he agreed that he could not say if he was four, five, six, seven,
or eight years old at the time of the abuse. Mother had testified
that Murphy babysat Jonathan when he was about three or four
years old. Thus, based on Mother’s testimony, there was only a
speculative basis to conclude that Murphy was the babysitter
during the period of time Jonathan said the abuse happened.
Indeed, if Jonathan was to be believed that the abuse happened
consistently with his original testimony—when he was seven or
eight—then Murphy is actually excluded.

20240145‐CA 9 2026 UT App 38
State v. Murphy

¶14 Third, the time of day Jonathan claimed the abuse occurred
excludes Murphy as the babysitter who committed the abuse.
Jonathan testified that the abuse occurred at night. Mother
testified that Murphy babysat Jonathan in the mornings. If
Murphy’s babysitting services were limited to the morning hours
as Mother testified, he could not have been the person who
committed the abuse under Jonathan’s version of the events.

¶15 Fourth, the contrasting and inconsistent testimony of
Jonathan and Mother about the length of time Jonathan spent with
the babysitter excluded Murphy as the offender. The magistrate
correctly concluded that there was a significant difference
“between being babysat for maybe an hour and six or seven
hours.” The abusive babysitter Jonathan described cannot have
been Murphy since—as Mother testified—Murphy did not
supervise Jonathan for so many hours at a stretch.

¶16 Fifth, the circumstances of the babysitting did not indicate
that Murphy was the abuser. Jonathan said that the babysitter
who abused him did so during the hours he spent at the
babysitter’s house while Mother worked at night. In contrast,
Mother testified that Murphy babysat Jonathan for about an hour
after Murphy would pick them up from her residence and drive
her to the TRAX station, after which Murphy would drop
Jonathan off at daycare. If the accounts given by Jonathan and
Mother are both credited, Murphy cannot have been the
perpetrator because the role he played does not align with that of
the abuser Jonathan described.

¶17 Under these circumstances, the magistrate acted within his
limited discretion when he determined that the facts presented
required too much speculation regarding Murphy’s involvement
in the abuse. Even when the magistrate fully credited the
testimony provided by both Jonathan and Mother and viewed
that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
State failed to meet its burden. To bind Murphy over, the

20240145‐CA 10 2026 UT App 38
State v. Murphy

magistrate would have been required to disregard significant
portions of Jonathan’s testimony regarding the specifics of the
abuse—an action the court is not permitted to take. See State v.
Jones, 2016 UT 4, ¶ 13, 365 P.3d 1212 (“The magistrate may
disregard or discredit the prosecution’s evidence only when it is
wholly lacking and incapable of creating a reasonable inference
regarding a portion of the prosecution’s claim. It is therefore not
appropriate for a magistrate to evaluate the totality of the
evidence in search of the most reasonable inference at a
preliminary hearing.” (cleaned up)). Thus, fully crediting both
Jonathan’s and Mother’s testimony, the magistrate could only
speculate about whether Murphy was the person who committed
the acts described by Jonathan—an undertaking beyond the
magistrate’s authority in this context. See id. (“A magistrate has
discretion to decline bindover only where the facts presented by
the prosecution provide no more than a basis for speculation.”
(cleaned up)).

¶18 To be clear, this matter did not involve choosing among
competing credible evidence, which is not allowed at bindover.
See Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 25 (“[M]agistrates may not prefer one
piece of credible evidence over a conflicting piece of credible
evidence in making their bindover determination . . . .”). Rather,
the magistrate was faced with mutually exclusive evidence that
was “not capable of supporting a reasonable belief” that Murphy
was the babysitter who sexually abused Jonathan. See id. For
Murphy to have been bound over on the evidence the State
produced, the magistrate would have been required to rely on
unreasonable inferences moored in unacceptable speculation.
Accordingly, the record demonstrates that the magistrate
accepted the testimony of Jonathan and Mother rather than
ignoring—or attempting to reconcile—conflicting details within
that testimony. Since neither Mother nor Jonathan provided
sufficient evidence to identify Murphy as the individual who
committed the abuse, the State failed to satisfy its burden of
producing reasonably believable, non‐speculative evidence to

20240145‐CA 11 2026 UT App 38
State v. Murphy

support probable cause to believe that Murphy was the abuser.
On the contrary, crediting the testimony of both witnesses, the
magistrate had no choice but to conclude that there was
insufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that
Murphy was the person who committed the abuse. Consequently,
the magistrate acted within his limited discretion in denying
bindover.

CONCLUSION

¶19 The evidence here did not provide probable cause to
believe that Murphy was the babysitter who abused Jonathan.
Accordingly, the magistrate did not exceed his discretion in
declining to bind Murphy over for trial, and we affirm the
magistrate’s order.

20240145‐CA 12 2026 UT App 38