State v. Mukhammadjonov - Community Custody Geographic Boundaries Condition Affirmed

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April 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State Of Washington, V. Abdurakhmon B. Mukhammadjonov

Court of Appeals of Washington

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 87610-4

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (20.3K)

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Lead Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 86710-4-I
Respondent,

v. DIVISION ONE

ABDURAKHMON B
MUKHAMMADJONOV, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

CHUNG, J. — Abdurakhmon Mukhammadjonov appeals his criminal sentence for

indecent liberties. He argues a community custody condition ordering he remain within

geographical boundaries is unconstitutionally vague. We disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mukhammadjonov was charged with indecent liberties based on sexual contact

with E.O. in October 2022. A jury found him guilty and the trial court sentenced him on

December 20, 2024. His sentence included 15 months of incarceration and 36 months

on community custody. As part of the standard conditions of community custody for sex

offenses, Mukhammadjonov was required to “[r]emain within geographic boundaries, as

set forth in writing by the [Community Custody Officer (CCO)] or as set forth with SODA

order.” Mukhammadjonov appeals his sentence solely as to this condition.

DISCUSSION

Mukhammadjonov challenges the constitutionality of the community custody

condition regarding geographic boundaries and urges this court to reconsider its
No. 86710-4-I/2

decision in State v. Lundstrom, 34 Wn. App. 2d 977, 572 P.3d 1243 (2025), where we

held that this exact condition is not unconstitutionally vague. 1 The State contends

Lundstrom was correctly decided and further posits that Mukhammadjonov’s challenge

is not ripe for review.

I. Ripeness

We did not address in Lundstrom whether a challenge to the geographic

limitation community custody condition was ripe. Pre-enforcement challenges to

community custody conditions are ripe for review “ ‘ “if the issues raised are primarily

legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final.” ’ ”

State v. Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 786, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010) (quoting State v. Bahl,

164 Wn. 2d 739, 193 P.3d 678 (2008) (quoting First United Methodist Church v. Hr’g

Exam’r for Seattle Landmarks Pres. Bd., 129 Wn.2d 238, 255-56, 916 P.2d 374

(1996))). “ ‘The court must also consider “the hardship to the parties of withholding court

consideration.” ’ ” Id.

We first address whether the issue is primarily legal. “In many cases, vagueness

questions will be amenable to resolution as questions of law.” Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752.

Our Supreme Court has held a vagueness challenge to a community custody condition

is ripe where “many courts have addressed, as legal questions, vagueness challenges

to terms the same as, or comparable to, the terms in the conditions” challenged by an

1 Mukhammadjonov argues that the authority we relied on in Lundstrom “is all unpublished, and

none of it offers any meaningful analysis.” To the contrary, Lundstrom relied on published authority
guiding interpretation of community custody provisions, including, e.g., City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115
Wn.2d 171, 795 P.2d 693 (1990); State v. Ortega, 21 Wn. App. 2d 488, 506 P.3d 1287 (2022); and State
v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 193 P.3d 678 (2008). See Lundstrom, 34 Wn. App. at 980-81. The cases
Mukhammadjonov urges us to consider instead are unpublished and lack precedential value. See GR
14.1. And, in Lundstrom, we explained our reasoning for declining to follow those cases. 34 Wn. App. at
981.

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No. 86710-4-I/3

appellant. See id. at 752. Here, Lundstrom addressed a vagueness challenge to terms

identical to the terms in the condition challenged by Mukhammadjonov. And, indeed,

Mukhammadjonov challenges this court’s legal reasoning in Lundstrom. Accordingly,

following the reasoning in Bahl, we conclude that Mukhammadjonov’s challenge is

primarily legal.

Next, we consider whether the issue requires further factual development.

Conditions that require state action “are not ripe for review until the State attempts to

enforce them because their validity depends on the particular circumstances of the

attempted enforcement.” Valencia, 169 Wn.2d at 789. However, a challenge to a

community custody condition does not require factual development where “[t]he

condition at issue places an immediate restriction on the petitioners’ conduct, without

the necessity that the State take any action.” Id.

The State relies on State v. Cates, 183 Wn.2d 531, 354 P.3d 832 (2015), to

argue that further factual development is needed to consider Mukhammadjonov’s

challenge. But Cates is distinguishable. In Cates, the defendant challenged a

community custody condition that he alleged “require[d] [him] to ‘consent’ to searches

by his CCO, merely upon the CCO’s request, without specifying that the search must be

based on reasonable cause.” Id. at 535. The condition as written, however, did not

authorize any searches, and only allowed the State to inspect “Cates’ residence or

computer . . . ‘to monitor [Cates’] compliance with supervision.’ ” Id. (alteration in

original) (footnotes and citations omitted). Accordingly, the court held that the challenge

was not ripe because the challenge had “no basis in the language of the condition

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No. 86710-4-I/4

actually imposed” and instead relied on “[s]ome future misapplication of the community

custody condition” which would require “[f]urther factual development.” Id.

Unlike the challenge in Cates, Mukhammadjonov’s challenge concerns the

language of the condition imposed and is independent of the “particular circumstances

of the attempted enforcement.” See Valencia, 169 Wn.2d at 789. Accordingly, the issue

is ripe.

II. Vagueness

“[T]he due process vagueness doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment and

article I, section 3 of the state constitution requires that citizens have fair warning of

proscribed conduct.” Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752. To that end, “a community custody

condition is unconstitutionally vague if it ‘(1) . . . does not define the criminal offense

with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is

proscribed, or (2) . . . does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect

against arbitrary enforcement.’ ” State v. Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d 671, 678, 425 P.3d 847

(2018) (alterations in the original) (quoting City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d

171, 178, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)).

In Lundstrom, we held that the community custody condition requiring

compliance with CCO-imposed geographical limitations is not unconstitutionally vague.

34 Wn. App. at 983. As to whether the condition was sufficiently definite, we reasoned,

Under RCW 9.94A.703(1)(b), the sentencing court must order that the
offender “comply with any conditions imposed by [the Department of
Corrections (DOC)] under RCW 9.94A.704.” And under RCW
9.94A.704(3)(b), DOC must instruct an offender to “[r]emain within
prescribed geographical boundaries.”

Here, the sentencing court complied with that statutory mandate. It
ordered Lundstrom to “[r]emain within geographic boundaries, as set forth

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No. 86710-4-I/5

in writing by the [CCO] or as set forth with SODA order.” And a person of
ordinary intelligence can understand what the condition proscribes. Its
plain language requires that Lundstrom adhere to any geographic
restrictions that a CCO or SODA order “set[s] forth in writing.”

Id. at 980 (alteration in the original).

Mukhammadjonov argues that, in so concluding, “Lundstrom improperly read a

limiting standard into the [geographic boundary community custody] condition that is not

written there, and which is from a statute that is not referenced in the condition.”

Mukhammadjonov contends that instead, “[a] geographical restriction condition, when

imposed, needs to be filled with content. That content must put the person on

reasonable notice of what must be done to comply with the condition.” In other words,

he suggests a condition must be sufficiently definite based on the condition’s language

alone. In support of his contention that “[c]ommunity custody conditions are assessed

as written,” Mukhammadjonov cites Valencia, which stated, “either the condition as

written provides constitutional notice and protection against arbitrary enforcement or it

does not.” 169 Wn.2d at 789. However, the court made this statement in its discussion

of ripeness, explaining that, as discussed above, a challenge to a community custody

condition is ripe for review when the “question is not fact dependent” and when the

question is whether “the condition as written provides constitutional notice and

protection against arbitrary enforcement or it does not.” 169 Wn.2d at 789. Valencia did

not purport to confine the vagueness analysis to the four corners of the condition.

Instead, to determine whether a person of ordinary intelligence is provided fair

warning as to what the law proscribes, we consider “the context of the entire

enactment,” not just the challenged language “in a vacuum.” City of Spokane, 115

Wn.2d at 180. Indeed, we give the condition’s language “a sensible, meaningful, and

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No. 86710-4-I/6

practical interpretation.” Id. Mukhammadjonov ignores these interpretive guidelines by

urging that the constitutional vagueness inquiry depends on the language of the

condition alone.

Further, Mukhammadjonov argues that, even considering the condition in a

broader context, the condition is unconstitutionally vague because it lacks ascertainable

standards to protect against arbitrary enforcement, contrary to our decision in

Lundstrom. We disagree.

As the State notes, arguing that the condition is vague conflates two questions:

“whether a vague condition can be rendered unvague by deferring to the CCO’s

subjective assessment of what is meant to be prohibited” and the different question of

“whether state law may grant [DOC] the authority to establish geographic boundary

conditions in the first instance.” 2 Mukhammadjonov’s first argument is premised on a

line of cases that began with Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, and includes State v. Irwin, 191 Wn.

App. 644, 364 P.3d 830 (2015), and State v. Magaña, 197 Wn. App. 189, 389 P.3d 654

(2016). In Bahl, the court held a community custody condition prohibiting the defendant

from “possess[ing] or access[ing] pornographic materials, as directed by the supervising

[CCO],” was unconstitutionally vague. 164 Wn.2d at 743. Relying on Bahl, the courts in

Irwin and Magaña similarly held that a community custody condition prohibiting the

probationer from frequenting areas where children were known to congregate or other

areas as defined by the supervising CCO 3 was unconstitutionally vague because the

2 The State relies on an unpublished decision that set out this analysis, State v. Boese, No.

86684-4-I (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2025) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/866834.pdf. We adopt the reasoning in Boese and cite to it under
GR 14.1(c).
3 The conditions at issue in Magaña and Irwin each had slightly different language. The condition

in Irwin read: “Do not frequent areas where minor children are known to congregate, as defined by the
supervising CCO.” 191 Wn. App. at 652. The condition in Magaña was more specific, reading: “Do not

6
No. 86710-4-I/7

condition afforded too much discretion to the CCO and was thus subject to arbitrary

enforcement. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 654-55; Magaña, 197 Wn. App. at 201. Relying on

Bahl, the court in Irwin reasoned, “the fact that a CCO could ‘direct what falls within the

condition only ma[de] the vagueness problem more apparent, since it virtually

acknowledge[d] that on its face it d[id] not provide ascertainable standards for

enforcement.’ ” 191 Wn. App. at 654 (quoting Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 758). And relying on

Irwin, the Magaña court reasoned, “While the condition lists several prohibited locations

and explains that the list covers places where children are known to congregate, the

CCO’s designation authority is not tied to either the list or the explanatory statement. As

written, the discretion conferred on the CCO . . . is boundless.” 197 Wn. App. at 201.

As we explained in Boese,

Bahl and Irwin both explain that when the court sets a condition that
imposes a vague restriction—to avoid “pornography” or places “where
there may be children”—the problem is not cured by asking a CCO to try
to define the court's intended prohibition. This hews to the traditional
framework for the “void for vagueness” doctrine. The doctrine has been
used to invalidate “two kinds” of criminal laws, “laws that define criminal
offenses and laws that fix the permissible sentences for criminal
offenses.” Beckles v. United States, 580 U.S. 256, 262, 137 S. Ct. 886,
197 L. Ed. 2d 145 (2017). Bahl and Irwin involved laws of the first kind. In
both cases, the challenged condition too vaguely defined what the
defendant was prohibited from doing.

Boese, No. 86684-4-I, slip op. at 7-8. By contrast, the condition here “does not purport

to prohibit [the probationer] from any place. It requires only that [the probationer] follow

a geographical restriction that is separately imposed.” Id. at 8. In other words, “the court

frequent parks, schools, malls, family missions or establishments where children are known to congregate
or other areas as defined by supervising CCO.” 197 Wn. App. at 200. In both cases, we found the
conditions unconstitutionally vague.

7
No. 86710-4-I/8

has not imposed any geographical restriction, but only a requirement that if one is

established it be followed.” Id. An ordinary person can understand this requirement.

Further, the condition does not give the CCO unfettered power to “direct what

falls within the condition,” Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 758, by defining a term of the condition,

as was the case in Magaña, Irwin, and Bahl. See Lundstrom, 34 Wn. App. at 982

(distinguishing Irwin on this basis). In Lundstrom, we explained that the CCO’s

discretion is not unfettered in setting geographic boundaries as a community custody

condition because RCW 9.94A.704(7)(b) limits the CCO’s authority “to conditions

‘reasonably related to . . . [t]he crime of conviction, the offender's risk of reoffending, or

the safety of the community.’ ” Id. at 981. Mukhammadjonov argues that this conclusion

“is wrong,” because “RCW 9.94A.704(7)(b) places no affirmative parameters on the

CCO’s authority to impose conditions” and, instead, “it outlines an administrative

process for the person subject to community custody conditions to object to a condition

imposed by the CCO.” We disagree.

Again, in reviewing the challenged condition, we assess whether “the condition

as written provides constitutional notice and protection against arbitrary enforcement.”

Valencia, 169 Wn.2d at 789. And in so doing, we look at “the context of the entire

enactment,” not just the challenged language “in a vacuum.” City of Spokane, 115

Wn.2d at 180. Here, the statute identifies limitations on DOC-imposed community

custody conditions:

Within 10 business days of receiving notice of a condition imposed or
modified by the department, an offender may request an administrative
review under rules adopted by the department. The condition shall remain
in effect if the reviewing officer finds that it is reasonably related to at least
one of the following: The crime of conviction, the offender’s risk of
reoffending, or the safety of the community.

8
No. 86710-4-I/9

RCW 9.94A.704(7)(b).

Even though, as Mukhammadjonov notes, this language is set out in the context

of the administrative process for challenging a condition, that administrative process is

part of the relevant statutory scheme. Therefore, because the statute provides

parameters that protect against arbitrary enforcement by a CCO, the condition is not

void for vagueness. 4

Finally, Mukhammadjonov asks this court to “clarify” the condition by “us[ing] the

authorized language set forth in RCW 9.94A.703(1)(b): ‘Require the offender to comply

with any conditions imposed by the department under RCW 9.94A.704,’ ” thereby

“explicitly tying [the condition] to the DOC’s authority to impose conditions under RCW

9.94A.704, rendering this aspect of the sentence definite and certain.” For the reasons

articulated above, the condition does not require such clarification.

We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

4 Should a CCO impose geographic restrictions that Mukhammadjonov deems impermissibly

vague, at that point, review of the language of those restrictions is available under RCW 9.94A.704(7)(b).

9