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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Martin

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 954
• Docket Number: 2025-CA-35

• Judges: Hanseman

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (44.1K)

• PDF

Syllabus

The trial court erred in accepting appellant's Alford plea to attempted murder. The trial court did not inquire into the State's evidence supporting the charge. The trial court also did not inquire about defense counsel's investigation into the strength of the State's case or counsel's recommendations to appellant. The trial court received merely a recitation of appellant's indictment, which is not a sufficient factual basis for a defendant to enter an Alford plea. Absent a proper Alford plea hearing, appellant's plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Appellant's plea vacated, trial court judgment reversed, and matter remanded.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Martin, 2026-Ohio-954.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO :
: C.A. No. 2025-CA-35
Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 25-CR-283
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
JOSHUA BRICE MARTIN : Court)
:
Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION

...........

Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on March 20, 2026, the trial court’s

judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with

the opinion.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE

TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.
OPINION
CLARK C.A. No. 2025-CA-35

LUCAS W. WILDER, Attorney for Appellant
JOHN M. LINTZ, Attorney for Appellee

HANSEMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant Joshua B. Martin appeals his conviction of one count of attempted

murder, a felony of the first degree, which followed his Alford plea. Martin argues the trial

court erred in accepting his Alford plea because the trial court failed to inquire into the State’s

evidence or counsel’s investigation of the case and therefore did not have a sufficient factual

basis to conclude that Martin’s Alford plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Additionally, Martin appeals the trial court’s denial of his pre-sentence motion to withdraw

his plea.

I. Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 2} On March 27, 2023, Martin was indicted for murder, felonious assault, and

discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited premises for an alleged shooting that occurred

on July 24, 2021. Indictment, Clark C.P. No. 2023 CR 0183. Each count contained a firearm

specification that stated Martin committed the offense by discharging a firearm from a motor

vehicle. Id. The indictment did not name a victim or use initials in any of the charges. Id. At

arraignment, Martin entered a not guilty plea and was appointed counsel.

{¶ 3} On November 6, 2024, the State filed a bill of particulars that provided a more

factually detailed account of the State’s case. The bill of particulars stated:

On about July 24, 2021, officers were dispatched to the area of E Grand Ave

and Clifton Ave for reports of shots fired. Officers arrived and saw an individual

suffering a gunshot wound and a crashed vehicle. The individual was later

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identified as Brett Love. It was determined that Josh Martin was in the vehicle

and was giving chest compressions to Brett Love; however, [he] later left. As

the day progressed, Brett Love succumbed to his wound and was pronounced

deceased. Further investigation through eyewitness testimony, social media

data, and ballistic reports revealed that Josh Martin was inside the vehicle with

Brett Love and was shooting at another individual. That individual returned fire

and killed Brett Love.

{¶ 4} On November 27, 2024, Martin filed a notice of self-defense. In his notice,

Martin stated that Robert Gilbert was shooting at Martin’s car and fired shots into Martin’s

house, and that when Gilbert saw Love and Martin, Gilbert intended to kill them both.

Martin’s notice of self-defense indicated that he intended to call four witnesses at trial:

Rhonesia Martin, Brittany Johnson, Jocelyn Greene, and De’Aiyzia Carter.

{¶ 5} Martin’s jury trial was scheduled for April 15, 2025; however, seven days before

the trial, Martin was reindicted. Indictment, Clark C.P. No. 2025 CR 0283. The July 24, 2021

date of the offenses remained the same; but he was charged with the additional offenses of

attempted murder, felonious assault, and tampering with evidence. Id. Additional gun

specifications were added to the charges of attempted murder, felonious assault, and

murder. Id. The indictment again did not provide a name or use initials to identify a victim

associated with the charges. Id.

{¶ 6} At 9 a.m. on the morning of Martin’s jury trial on April 15, 2025, the trial court

was informed that a negotiated plea agreement had been reached and that Martin intended

to enter an Alford plea. Under the agreement, Martin would tender an Alford plea to

attempted murder, and in exchange, the State would dismiss the remaining counts and all

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gun specifications. There was no agreement regarding Martin’s sentence. Instead, the State

agreed to remain silent at sentencing.

{¶ 7} When the trial court asked Martin’s counsel if the State’s recitation of the plea

agreement was his understanding, Martin’s counsel stated “I want the Court to be aware

that Mr. Martin is not admitting that he did anything wrong here. He [is] just taking advantage

of what he believes to be a better deal in—a better deal tha[n] he would have by pleading

than going to trial.” Plea Hearing Tr. 4. Thereafter, the trial court provided the usual

advisements under Crim.R. 11 that accompany a guilty plea, but not the advisements

attendant to an Alford plea. Id.

{¶ 8} When the trial court asked the State to provide a factual statement on the record

supporting the charge of attempted murder, the State merely stated, “On July 24, 2021, the

Defendant was a passenger in a motor vehicle when he purposefully shot a firearm at Robert

Gilbert in an attempt to kill him. This all happened in the area of Grand Avenue and Clifton

Avenue in Clark County, Ohio.” Plea Hearing Tr. 20.

{¶ 9} After the State’s succinct recitation of the facts, the trial court failed to ask Martin

any questions. The trial court also did not discuss Martin’s self-defense claim. The trial court

did not ask the State to provide details of the evidence it had supporting the charge of

attempted murder, nor did it ask Martin’s counsel what he learned during his investigation of

the evidence in the case. Instead, the trial court stated, “The Court, after placing the

indictment on the record and hearing the facts that would support that, does find that there

is sufficient evidence for the conviction of attempted murder.” Id. at 20. The court ordered a

presentence investigation report and set the matter for sentencing on May 6, 2025.

{¶ 10} On May 5, 2025, the day before Martin’s sentencing hearing, Martin filed a

motion to withdraw his plea indicating that he had made a mistake in entering his Alford plea

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and that he wanted to have a jury trial on all charges. Prior to sentencing Martin on May 6,

2025, the trial court heard arguments from Martin’s counsel and the State regarding the

motion to withdraw the plea. The trial court overruled the motion.

{¶ 11} Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court allowed Martin’s counsel to present

evidence in mitigation. Martin’s counsel presented to the trial court evidence in the case,

including Defendant’s Exhibits A through S. Of note, according to the record, Martin was a

front seat passenger in a vehicle driven by Brett Love, the deceased. On July 24, 2021, Love

drove past Robert Gilbert and fired two shots out of the passenger side window of the

vehicle. As Martin and Love drove away, Gilbert fired eight shots at Love’s vehicle, with one

of the bullets penetrating the rear of the vehicle and going into the back of Love’s head. Five

witnesses who were interviewed by law enforcement did not indicate that Martin fired any

shots.

{¶ 12} After hearing approximately one hour of evidence in the case, the trial court

asked Martin if there was anything he would like to say prior to sentencing, to which Martin

responded that he was “truly innocent in this situation.” Sentencing Tr. 43. The court

sentenced Martin to an indefinite prison term of eight to twelve years. This appeal followed.

{¶ 13} Martin raises two assignments of error related to his Alford plea. However, as

set forth below, because we hold that Martin’s Alford plea was not knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary, we do not address the trial court’s denial of Martin’s pre-sentence motion to

withdraw his plea.

II. Martin’s Assignment of Error

{¶ 14} Martin’s first assignment of error states:

MARTIN DID NOT ENTER A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY

ALFORD PLEA AND THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE

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CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR ACCEPTING [MARTIN’S] ALFORD

PLEA.

{¶ 15} Martin argues the trial court erred by accepting his Alford plea because the

court failed to obtain a sufficient factual basis for the offense, and therefore, failed to weigh

whether the evidence was strong enough against Martin’s claim of innocence to determine

that Martin’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

III. Alford Plea and Its Requirements

{¶ 16} In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the United States Supreme

Court held that a defendant who maintains his innocence may, nevertheless, enter a plea to

an offense or offenses with which he is charged. The Court held that a defendant “may

voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence

even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime”

when the “defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea

and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.” Id. at 37.

{¶ 17} In discussing Alford, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted that a court “‘will accept

a plea of guilty, even though defendant accompanies his plea with a statement that he is not

guilty, on a determination that incriminatory evidence establishes such a high probability of

conviction as to satisfy the requirement that there be a “factual basis for the plea” before

judgment can be entered thereon.’” State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 94 fn. 1 (1971),

quoting Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 119 (D.C.Cir. 1967).

{¶ 18} While the Supreme Court of Ohio did not discuss the heightened requirements

of a trial court when taking an Alford plea, the Court held “[w]here the record affirmatively

discloses that: (1) defendant’s guilty plea was not the result of coercion, deception or

intimidation; (2) counsel was present at the time of the plea; (3) counsel’s advice was

6
competent in light of the circumstances surrounding the indictment; (4) the plea was made

with the understanding of the nature of the charges; and, (5) defendant was motivated either

by a desire to seek a lesser penalty or a fear of the consequences of a jury trial, or both, the

guilty plea has been voluntarily and intelligently made.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.

If the record of an Alford plea fails to include any one of these factors, the plea is involuntary

and will be vacated. State v. Padgett, 67 Ohio App.3d 332 (2d Dist. 1990).

{¶ 19} We have previously discussed a trial court’s duty in accepting an Alford plea,

stating “[b]ecause an Alford plea involves a rational calculation that is significantly different

from the calculation made by a defendant who admits he is guilty, the obligation of the trial

judge with respect to the taking of an Alford plea is correspondingly different. The trial judge

must ascertain that notwithstanding the defendant’s protestations of innocence, he has

made a rational calculation that it is in his best interest to accept the plea bargain offered by

the prosecutor.” Id. at 338.

{¶ 20} We explained that taking an Alford plea “requires more than a routine litany.”

Id. “This requires, at a minimum, inquiry of the defendant concerning his reasons for deciding

to plead guilty notwithstanding his protestations of innocence; it may require, in addition,

inquiry concerning the state’s evidence in order to determine that the likelihood of the

defendant’s being convicted of offenses of equal or greater magnitude than the offenses to

which he is pleading guilty is great enough to warrant an intelligent decision to plead guilty.”

Id. at 338-339.

{¶ 21} “‘Because of the importance of protecting the innocent and of insuring that

guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent choice, various state and federal court

decisions properly caution that pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be

accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea, [citations omitted]; and until the judge

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taking the plea has inquired into and sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of

trial and the claim of innocence.’” (Bracketed text in original.) Padgett, 67 Ohio App.3d at

338, quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 38, fn. 10.

IV. Discussion

{¶ 22} As held by Alford, before accepting an Alford plea, a trial court, after a

presentation of facts, must make a determination that the record “contains strong evidence

of actual guilt” to safeguard a defendant’s constitutional right to enter a plea knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily. Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. In Alford, the defendant’s plea was

properly accepted by the trial court based on a sufficient factual basis for the plea:

The defendant in Alford was charged with first-degree murder, a capital

offense. The defendant entered a guilty plea to a reduced charge of murder in

the second degree, which involved a lesser penalty. The record showed that

defendant’s attorney had interviewed the witnesses whom defendant claimed

would substantiate his innocence, and each gave contradictory statements

that strongly indicated his guilt. Defendant’s attorney recommended the guilty

plea to the lesser offense, but left the decision to defendant. Before

defendant’s guilty plea was accepted by the court, the court heard the sworn

testimony of a police officer who summarized the State’s case, plus the

testimony of two other witnesses who stated that defendant had left home with

his gun after stating that he intended to kill the victim and returned later,

declaring that he had carried out the killing. Defendant took the stand, told his

version of the events that contradicted the State’s evidence, and stated “that

he was pleading guilty because he faced the threat of the death penalty if he

did not do so.” [Alford, 400 U.S. at 28.] He also stated that he relied on his

8
attorney’s recommendation in making the decision to plead guilty. And,

defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief on which the trial court had

conducted an evidentiary hearing, after which the trial court denied the petition

on a finding that “the plea was ‘willingly, knowingly, and understandingly’ made

on the advice of competent counsel and in the face of a strong prosecution

case.” [Id. at 29.] Based on these factors, the Alford Court found that the

Defendant’s guilty plea was valid.

State v. Gossard, 2003-Ohio-3770, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 23} We have applied and followed Alford on numerous occasions and affirmed a

trial court’s acceptance of an Alford plea when the trial court required a sufficient factual

basis to support the offense being pleaded to and determined that the defendant was making

his plea voluntarily, despite the defendant’s failure to admit guilt or continued affirmations of

being innocent. We have previously included a large portion of a trial court’s record in our

opinion “to exhibit a textbook example of how to conduct a plea hearing with an Alford

situation.” State v. Williams, 1993 WL 102632, *5 (2d Dist.). To summarize, in Williams, the

trial court required the prosecutor to explain the evidence he possessed that supported the

charge against the defendant. The prosecutor recited the witnesses who would testify and

the nature of their testimony, which included identification of a palm print and a fingerprint

found at the scene as the defendant’s. The trial court engaged in a lengthy dialogue with the

defendant, asking him if he had talked to his attorney about the risk of going to trial versus

entering a plea when he believed he did not commit the offense.

{¶ 24} We have similarly upheld a trial court’s determination that a defendant’s Alford

plea was voluntarily made after the trial court heard evidence from the prosecutor that

supported the charge against the defendant. State v. Adkins, 2015-Ohio-4605 (2d Dist.). In

9
that case, the trial court received summaries of the State’s case and witness testimony, and

it heard that the State had photographs and medical records of the victim documenting her

injuries. The trial court found that “the state had strong evidence indicating guilt and that

there was a [sufficient] factual basis for the plea.” Id. at ¶ 16.

{¶ 25} Likewise, we affirmed the voluntariness of an Alford plea when the trial court

noted that in taking an Alford plea,

it needed “to investigate the strength of the State’s case by having a case

detective * * * take the witness stand and, under oath, summarize the evidence

that was accumulated by the State,” to hear from defense counsel about what

he had done “to investigate the strength of the State’s case” and whether

counsel recommended the plea to [the defendant], and to hear from [the

defendant] himself about “why he want[ed] to enter into this plea agreement

and enter into the Alford plea of guilt.”

State v. Schalk, 2020-Ohio-3392, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), quoting the trial court. The trial court heard

testimony from the detective assigned to the defendant’s case and sought from defense

counsel a detailed account of his investigation into the strength of the state’s case as well

as his legal recommendation to the defendant. Id. at ¶ 7-10, 12. The trial court also asked

the defendant to explain why he was entering his Alford plea. Id. at ¶ 13.

{¶ 26} By contrast, we have vacated Alford pleas as involuntarily made when trial

courts failed to inquire into the evidence supporting the charge. We have also found trial

courts deficient in accepting Alford pleas when they did not determine that the defendant’s

decision to plead was a rational calculation to plead notwithstanding the defendant’s

affirmations of being innocent. This court previously determined there was an insufficient

factual basis upon which the trial court could have accepted an Alford plea to rape when the

10
State’s recitation of evidence merely stated that the defendant had “licked (the victim’s)

vaginal area.” State v. Gossard, 2003-Ohio-3770, ¶ 14-15 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 27} In reversing the defendant’s Alford plea in Gossard, we stated that “the record

does not portray what, if anything, Gossard’s counsel did to investigate the strength of the

State’s case. The record does not reflect that Gossard’s attorney recommended the guilty

plea. The court heard no sworn testimony concerning the evidence against Gossard but

instead relied on a summary of evidence the prosecutor presented, which represented to

the court in general terms that Gossard had admitted his criminal conduct to investigating

officers. Gossard never stated or explained what his motivation was for entering the Alford

plea, instead giving only monosyllabic responses to the trial court’s leading questions on the

matter.” Id. at ¶ 10.

{¶ 28} Other courts have vacated Alford pleas when the trial court failed to adequately

determine that there was a sufficient factual basis to support the charge or charges

underlying the Alford pleas. See State v. Hughes, 2021-Ohio-111, ¶ 2 (4th Dist.) (“The

intelligence and voluntariness of an Alford plea must be established by evidence in the

record supporting guilt. Because of the complete absence of the basic facts surrounding the

charge, the trial court could not evaluate the intelligence and voluntariness of Hughes’s

decision to plead guilty notwithstanding his insistence of innocence. Because the record

does not disclose all of the required factors for finding Hughes voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently entered into the Alford plea, we sustain his assignment of error, vacate his plea,

and remand this case.”); State v. Timmons, 2019-Ohio-2723, ¶ 11 (7th Dist.) (“Because the

record does not support a finding that the trial court properly held a heightened Alford inquiry,

and because the state failed to provide background information as to the facts and evidence

11
of the case, we cannot find that Appellant entered into his Alford plea knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily.”).

{¶ 29} Turning to the record in this case, the trial court failed to require the state to

present a sufficient factual basis to support the charge of attempted murder. The plea

hearing transcript reveals that the state stated, “On July 24, 2021, the Defendant was a

passenger in a motor vehicle when he purposefully shot a firearm at Robert Gilbert in an

attempt to kill him. This all happened in the area of Grand Avenue and Clifton Avenue in

Clark County, Ohio.” Plea Hearing Tr. 20. The mere recitation of an indictment is insufficient

to establish an adequate factual basis to support a charge for the purposes of taking an

Alford plea. The trial court lacked a sufficient factual basis to accept Martin’s Alford plea to

attempted murder.

{¶ 30} The record in this case also reveals that the trial court failed to make any

inquiry into defense counsel’s investigation of the State’s evidence or to ask Martin specific

questions regarding his desire to plea as opposed to going to trial. The plea colloquy lacked

any dialogue with Martin or his counsel regarding the evidence to be presented at trial

regarding self-defense. Nor did the trial court discuss with Martin the State’s burden to prove

at trial that he did not act in self-defense. The trial court did not make any specific findings

that the state had strong evidence indicating guilt before accepting Martin’s Alford plea. As

a result, the trial court failed to adequately determine that Martin made a rational calculation

to submit a plea notwithstanding his belief that he is innocent of the charge.

{¶ 31} While the State urges this court to affirm Martin’s plea arguing that the record

shows the existence of all five factors set out by Piacella, we disagree. Because the trial

court failed to inquire into defense counsel’s investigation of the case or counsel’s

recommendations to Martin regarding his decision to plead versus going to trial on self-

12
defense—or any other defense theory—the record does not show that counsel’s advice was

competent in light of the circumstances surrounding the indictment or that Martin’s decision

to plea was made with the understanding of the nature of the charges. Although it might be

true that Martin was motivated to accept a lesser penalty by pleading instead of risking guilty

verdicts on all counts with accompanying firearm specifications, the record before us does

not clearly and unequivocally establish this. Adkins, 2015-Ohio-4605, at ¶ 13 (2d Dist.),

quoting Gossard, 2003-Ohio-3770, at ¶ 12 (2d Dist.) (“‘a Defendant’s decision to enter the

plea against his protestations of factual innocence [must be] clearly and unequivocally

supported by evidence that he exercised that calculus for the purpose of avoiding some

more onerous penalty that he risks by, instead, going to trial on the charges against him.’”).

{¶ 32} Accordingly, we cannot conclude on this record that Martin’s plea was

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. We therefore sustain Martin’s first assignment of error.

Given that we have sustained Martin’s first assignment of error regarding his plea, we need

not address whether the trial court erred in overruling his pre-sentence motion to withdraw

his plea, and his second assignment of error is moot.

V. Conclusion

{¶ 33} Having sustained Martin’s first assignment of error, his plea is vacated, the trial

court’s judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

.............

TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.

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