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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Coleman

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 965
• Docket Number: 2024-A-0040

• Judges: Lucci

• Opinion

• Authorities (19)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.8K)

• PDF

Syllabus

CIVIL - sanctions; attorney representing criminal defendant in application to reopen; use of hallucinated artificial intelligence quotes from transcript; fabricated quotations; public artificial intelligence platform; ChatGPT; quotes do not exist; hearing held before appellate panel; admission of misconduct; staff member; paralegal; use of improper artificial intelligence tools; failure to review submission; impugn prosecutor; improper challenge to appellate counsel's effectiveness; claimed remedial measures; continuing education; intra-firm policy; policy had hallmarks of artificial intelligence; appeal to Supreme Court; after sanction hearing respondent used artificial intelligence in a Cuyahoga County criminal case; prosecutor identified improper use; alleged inadvertence; post-hoc action of similar misconduct; inherent judicial authority; control abuse of judicial process; constitutional authority; statutory authority to guard against contempt; Ohio App.R. 23; Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct; candor toward the tribunal; false statements of fact; responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistance; dishonesty; fraud; misrepresentation; deceit; conduct prejudicial to administration of justice; failure to take corrective action; court not bound by private settlement agreement; court need not defer only to disciplinary process; service of judgment upon courts; verification requirements for future filings; mandatory continuing legal education requirements; strike original application to reopen; removal of respondent as counsel; written apologies to those defamed by fabricated filing; compliance and enforcement conditions.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Coleman, 2026-Ohio-965.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHTABULA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2024-A-0040

Plaintiff-Movant
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas

MALIKHI JERMAINE COLEMAN,
Trial Court No. 2022 CR 00416
Defendant,

and

WILLIAM B. NORMAN,

Respondent.

DECISION ON SANCTIONS AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Decided: March 20, 2026
Judgment: Sanctioning Attorney for Misconduct

April R. Grabman, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Dane R. Hixon, Assistant
Prosecutor, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Plaintiff-Movant).

Joseph P. Dunson, Weyls Peters + Chuparkoff, L.L.C., 6505 Rockside Road, Suite 105,
Cleveland, OH 44131 (For Respondent).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

INTRODUCTION

{¶1} On October 9, 2025, after movant, the State of Ohio, and respondent,

Attorney William B. Norman (OH Atty. Regis. No. 0088113), entered into a settlement

agreement relating to respondent’s motion for sanctions, this court entered a judgment
directing movant to file a transcript of the August 28, 2025 hearing and ordering the parties

to file briefs regarding the gravity of the violations admitted by respondent. On November

7, 2025, the parties filed their respective briefs, and respondent was afforded additional

time to submit a reply brief on certain issues raised by movant. Respondent filed the reply

brief on November 21, 2025. This court determined that a post-briefing hearing is

unnecessary. The following sequence of events and findings of fact are the foundations

for this court’s determination on sanctions.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE UNDERLYING MATTER

{¶2} On February 18, 2025, in State v. Coleman, 2025-Ohio-513 (11th Dist.), this

court affirmed the convictions of the appellant in this matter, Malikhi Jermaine Coleman,

for murder, discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises, and improperly

handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, with firearm specifications. On May 19, 2025,

respondent, counsel for Mr. Coleman, filed an application to reopen, supported by an

affidavit executed by Attorney Norman on May 19, 2025, in which he swore, under penalty

of perjury, to the truth of the factual and legal bases of the application. Certain allegations

and features of this application are at the heart of the instant proceedings.

{¶3} In its reply to the application, on May 23, 2025, movant recognized and

acknowledged several factual allegations made by respondent that were false and

premised upon quotations that did not appear in the record. Movant concurrently and

separately moved for sanctions based upon the false representations of alleged

statements made by the prosecution that did not appear in the record:

Far and away the most concerning part of Appellant’s brief is
that he inaccurately cites to the record. Appellee, despite
significant effort, has not been able to locate either of the
quotes attributed to the prosecutor on pages 2 and 4 of

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Case No. 2024-A-0040
Appellant’s brief in the record, and upon examination, page
559- the page Appellant cites to on page 4 for the “legally
inflammatory” statement by the prosecutor- is, in fact, the
court reporter’s signature page, with no statements of any
type by the prosecutor. Appellee has searched through the
trial transcripts as a whole for these statements, and has not
located them. Appellee has also had three members of staff
attempt to find these quotes, with no success. Using the same
method on the correct quotes on page 6, Appellee has located
them within minutes. Appellee also cannot find a “summation”
listed in the record. Indeed, the closest quote Appellee could
find was when the prosecutor stated “He even admits he has
that AK-47 and he’s the one who shoots at Freddie Johnson.
Did cause the death of Freddie Johnson as a proximate result
of committing felonious assault” on page 656 of the trial
transcripts. This is a significantly less inflammatory statement,
and makes no mention of an alleged “duty to retreat.”
Appellant has therefore misled this Court. This is a
sanctionable offense, and not one to be taken lightly.

State’s Opposition to Application to Reopen at p. 6.

Appellant cites to two quotes in the Application to Reopen
which appear not to exist. As such, Appellee and government
staff have wasted significant time in attempting to track down
these quotes and replying to a brief predicated on
fabrications. Additionally, Appellant’s counsel has failed in his
ethical duties by misleading this Court, in violation of Rule 3.3
of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct. Appellee notes
that these false claims are brought in the light of prosecutorial
misconduct and ineffective assistance of both trial and
appellate counsel; thus, these false claims implicate the
reputation and careers of no less than three attorneys. Even
more concerning is that Appellant’s counsel may have done
similarly in prior cases; the Eighth District in State v. Boyd,
2025-Ohio-617 [,] ¶ 49 (8th Dist.), in which Appellant’s counsel
was also counsel for Boyd, noted that several of Boyd’s claims
“[rest] upon a misreading of the transcript and jury
instructions.”

Appellee therefore requests sanctions in the amount of
$6,000, representing the time Appellee’s counsel and staff
spent responding to the application, dismissal of this
application, and any further sanctions as this Court feels
would be appropriate to the gravity of this situation.

PAGE 3 OF 65

Case No. 2024-A-0040
Alternatively, Appellee requests that this Court hold a hearing
to determine the nature of sanctions.

State’s Motion for Sanctions at pp. 1-2.

{¶4} On June 25, 2025, this court filed two judgment entries, one overruling the

application to reopen and the other ordering respondent to show cause regarding why

sanctions should not be ordered. In the judgment denying the application to reopen, this

court underscored that respondent, acting as Mr. Coleman’s counsel, cited alleged

features of the transcript purportedly demonstrating prosecutorial misconduct. This court

recognized that the cited portions of the transcript did not include the inflammatory

statements ascribed to the prosecutor.

{¶5} In the judgment ordering respondent to show cause, this court determined

the prosecutor never made the statements alleged by respondent. This court

acknowledged movant’s claim that the alleged statements were “predicated on

fabrication” and that sanctions should be ordered. As such, respondent was ordered to

show cause why sanctions should not be pursued.

{¶6} On July 10, 2025, respondent admitted a member of his staff used Artificial

Intelligence (“AI”) tools, which improperly generated “hallucinated” quotes that did not

exist. Respondent stated he had taken steps to ensure AI would be properly used in future

cases to avoid repeating the error. Respondent proffered his firm’s purported new AI

policy as an exhibit to his show-cause response. As discussed infra, the policy itself bore

the hallmarks of having been generated by an AI platform, including generic boilerplate

language, unfilled bracketed placeholder fields such as “[Insert Date],” and a scope that

precisely tracked the issues in this case while omitting other critical governance

considerations. This court set the matter for hearing on August 28, 2025.

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Case No. 2024-A-0040
{¶7} During the August 2025 hearing, this court heard from movant’s counsel

and respondent’s counsel. Of significant note, respondent’s counsel admitted “[t]his is a

serious matter. We shouldn’t be here. We’re here because [respondent] screwed up.” T.p.

1. Respondent apologized for his actions and asserted such an error would not happen

again.

{¶8} Counsel for respondent further stated that respondent “is not a babe in the

woods when it comes to AI, and he was not a babe in the woods when it comes to AI

when this happened. He understands the difference between a public AI generative tool

like ChatGPT, and a proprietary fee subscription based AI tool like Westlaw.” Id. at 10.

Respondent explained that he advised his staff not to upload sensitive materials to public

AI generative tools, but his staff did so anyway. Despite respondent’s apparent knowledge

and awareness of the AI platforms and their dangers, he failed to review the application

filed in this court (which was prepared by a non-attorney staff member). Counsel for

respondent stated, “At that point, it was [respondent’s] responsibility to read that brief, to

look at those quotes, to stop and say those aren’t real, or let me investigate. That’s where

he failed. He didn’t catch it . . . . He didn’t catch the hallucinated quotes. That was wrong.

That’s his responsibility.” Id.

{¶9} Later, this court was informed that the parties entered into a settlement

agreement, which was filed simultaneously with movant’s withdrawal of its motion for

sanctions.

{¶10} On October 9, 2025, this court filed an order noting that it was not bound

by the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement. This court ordered movant to file the

transcript of the August 2025 hearing; this court also ordered the parties to file briefs

PAGE 5 OF 65

Case No. 2024-A-0040
regarding the gravity of the violations and the applicable good faith or bad faith of

respondent’s misconduct. The transcript of proceedings was filed on October 20, 2025.

Moreover, the parties filed their respective briefs on November 7, 2025.

{¶11} In its brief, movant observed it had “discovered that [respondent’s] new

policies and procedures [relating to AI] are not proving effective.” To this point, movant

identified a “Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea,” filed by respondent in State v. Saker, CR-

25-701703-A, in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. In that motion, filed on

October 29, 2025—two months after the sanctions hearing in this court—respondent cited

questionable citations, one of which could not be found. Movant also pointed out that, at

the end of one section of respondent’s Cuyahoga County motion, the following quote

occurs: “Would you like me to draft the next argument section (e.g., argument 1 – B on

the ‘nature of the charge’ omission) in the same tone and format so your brief reads as a

seamless multi-print memorandum?” Movant submitted that such statements are found

at the end of output prepared by the AI platform ChatGPT—the very platform at issue in

this case.

{¶12} In its brief, movant emphasized the seriousness and gravity of the

misconduct, pointing out this court’s observation that if respondent’s conduct was

intentional, it could be criminal. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Stafford, 2012-Ohio-

909 (suspending an attorney who recklessly made false statements to a court). Movant

argued respondent’s misconduct was therefore committed “willfully” or in “bad faith.”

{¶13} Movant additionally noted that respondent was on notice that the application

for reconsideration filed in this matter contained spurious quotations but still he did not

withdraw the application or amend the same. Movant also pointed out that respondent

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Case No. 2024-A-0040
admitted he was not unfamiliar with public AI platforms but apparently ratified such usage

in the preparation of the application to this court. Movant additionally underscored that

respondent implemented new policies on AI usage but continued to use the platform in

the Cuyahoga County matter after the August 28, 2025 hearing.

{¶14} Next, movant directed this court to its concern that, after learning that a

paralegal in respondent’s firm prepared the application at issue, such preparation might

rise to the level of unauthorized practice of law. By his own admission, respondent did not

adequately review the filing prepared by the paralegal before filing it. Movant, while

touching on the problems relating to a paralegal practicing law, additionally highlighted

the ethical pitfalls of an attorney failing to or inadequately reviewing filings prepared by a

non-lawyer.

{¶15} In respondent’s brief, he again recognized the seriousness of the matters

but claimed he did not act with ill intent or bad faith. Respondent averred he did not act

with a dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing. Still, respondent recognized and

admitted his paralegal prepared the application and he “made a mistake—albeit a serious

one—by not catching the AI hallucination generated by his para-professional . . . .”

Ultimately, respondent maintained this court should not issue additional sanctions

because he (1) admitted his misconduct and was apologetic, and (2) he and movant

settled movant’s fee claim for $2,000. Respondent requested this court to afford him

additional time to respond to movant’s citation of Saker and its arguments vis-à-vis

unauthorized practice of law. Movant agreed that respondent should have the opportunity

to respond to these points, and this court granted the request.

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Case No. 2024-A-0040
{¶16} On November 21, 2025, respondent filed his reply brief in response to the

foregoing issues. In relation to movant’s citation to Saker, respondent acknowledged the

filing identified by movant. He pointed out, however, he withdrew the motion after catching

“his mistake in e-filing the draft with inaccurate AI information.” Respondent observed he

moved to strike the original motion and filed a separate motion without the possible

citation errors and alleged AI prompting. Respondent maintained the original filing was

an early draft that was accidentally filed.

{¶17} Respondent further argued that “Saker has nothing to do with this case.” He

maintained that the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction over

whether he should face any consequences for filing the initial motion and therefore his

actions or omissions in that case are not the business of this court.

{¶18} Next, in response to movant’s points relating to the possibility of

unauthorized practice of law, respondent argued that “[t]his court cannot issue an order

that suspends [respondent’s] law license . . . .” As such, he asserted this court lacks the

authority “to investigate or determine” an unauthorized practice of law claim.

{¶19} Respondent, however, acknowledged his paralegal or “para-professional”

is not an attorney and that respondent is responsible for supervising his “non-lawyer

subordinate.” Respondent recognized he failed to properly supervise his paralegal by “not

adequately reviewing the draft of the application to re-open . . . .” Respondent admitted

his paralegal uploaded the draft of the application to ChatGPT, a public generative AI tool,

and the public tool “hallucinated” inaccurate trial transcript quotes that were improperly

attributed to the prosecutor in closing argument at trial. While respondent asserts that he

reviewed the application, he “did not catch the hallucinated transcript quotes.”

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Case No. 2024-A-0040
Respondent concedes he should have “caught them.” And “his failure to catch them

resulted in the submission of inaccurate data for this court’s consideration.”

{¶20} Respondent acknowledges this court’s discretion to order sanctions but

exhorts the court to refrain from doing so.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

{¶21} Based upon the filings, admissions, briefs, and the transcript of the August

28, 2025 hearing, this court makes the following factual findings:

{¶22} On May 19, 2025, respondent filed an application to reopen the appeal of

Malikhi Jermaine Coleman in this court. The application alleged prosecutorial misconduct

during closing argument at trial and cited specific quotations from the trial transcript

purportedly demonstrating that the prosecutor had made inflammatory, improper

statements.

{¶23} The alleged quotations attributed to the prosecutor did not appear in the trial

transcript. The statements were entirely fabricated. They were not paraphrases,

approximations, or loose characterizations of actual statements; they were wholesale

inventions that bore no resemblance to the record. Movant and this court, however, used

time and resources in an attempt to verify the statements.

{¶24} The fabricated quotations were generated by ChatGPT, a publicly available

generative artificial-intelligence platform. Respondent’s paralegal, a non-attorney staff

member, uploaded materials relating to the case to ChatGPT and used the platform’s

output in preparing the application to reopen. The AI tool produced false transcript

quotations—a phenomenon known as “hallucination”—and these fabricated quotations

were incorporated into the filing submitted to this court.

PAGE 9 OF 65

Case No. 2024-A-0040
{¶25} The fabricated quotations did not merely misrepresent the record in the

abstract. They ascribed specific, inflammatory statements to an identifiable individual—

the trial prosecutor—that were never uttered. The fabricated quotations also impugned

the trial judge, implying that the court permitted improper prosecutorial statements without

correction, limiting statement, or other remedy. And the application’s claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel on direct appeal necessarily impugned prior appellate

counsel, suggesting that counsel had failed to raise a meritorious claim of prosecutorial

misconduct. The statements were never made. They were hallucinations that respondent

did not check or address. Moreover, movant brought the hallucinations to respondent’s

attention in its responsive filing. Respondent still did not withdraw the allegations. These

were not victimless fabrications. They constituted defamatory allegations against real

persons and officers of the court as well as the court itself.

{¶26} Respondent was not unfamiliar with artificial intelligence tools. His own

counsel conceded at the August 28, 2025 hearing that respondent “is not a babe in the

woods when it comes to AI” and that he “understands the difference between a public AI

generative tool like ChatGPT, and a proprietary fee subscription based AI tool like

Westlaw.” T.p. 10. Respondent was aware, or should have been aware, of the well-

documented risks of AI hallucination, including the generation of fabricated legal citations,

false quotations, and fictional case holdings.

{¶27} Despite this knowledge, respondent permitted a non-attorney staff member

to use a public generative AI tool in the preparation of a filing to this court without

adequate supervision, training, or verification protocols. Respondent has admitted to his

omissions and conduct.

PAGE 10 OF 65

Case No. 2024-A-0040
{¶28} Respondent did not independently verify the quotations attributed to the

prosecutor against the trial transcript before filing the application. This failure occurred

despite respondent’s obligation as the attorney of record to ensure the accuracy and

veracity of all filings bearing his signature and submitted to a court, to which he swore in

an affidavit.

{¶29} The fabricated quotations were not minor or inconsequential. They formed

the substantive core of the application to reopen, which alleged prosecutorial

misconduct—a serious allegation that, if substantiated, could have resulted in the

reopening of a final, appellate judgment and, potentially, reversal of Mr. Coleman’s

convictions. The false quotations, had they been afforded credibility, would have

constituted a fraud upon this court and a grave injustice against the prosecution and the

administration of justice.

{¶30} When movant identified the fabrications in its reply brief and moved for

sanctions, respondent did not withdraw the application, amend the filing, or notify the

court of the errors. More than one month elapsed between the filing of the motion for

sanctions and this court’s ruling, during which time respondent took no corrective action.

This fact is relevant and significant to this court’s findings.

{¶31} Respondent’s remedial measures, including the creation of an internal AI

policy and completion of continuing legal education courses on AI, were undertaken only

after movant requested sanctions. These measures were reactive, not proactive.

Moreover, the AI policy proffered by respondent bore the hallmarks of having itself been

generated by an AI platform. The policy contained unfilled bracketed placeholders such

as “[Insert Date]” where respondent’s own firm-specific information should have

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Case No. 2024-A-0040
appeared, inconsistent formatting, typical of AI-generated templates, redundant

language, and a scope that precisely mirrored the issues in this case while omitting other

critical AI governance considerations. Respondent did not appear to take the minimal step

of substituting his firm’s actual data where the AI tool had placed brackets indicating

customization was required. The proffering of an AI-generated AI policy as a remedial

measure in a case involving the submission of AI-generated fabrications to this court is,

at best, ironic. It suggests that respondent’s engagement with the consequences of his

misconduct has been superficial.

{¶32} Despite the August 28, 2025 sanctions hearing in this court, respondent

continued to use ChatGPT in his legal practice. On October 29, 2025—two months after

the hearing—respondent filed a “Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea” in State v. Saker, CR-

25-701703-A, in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. That motion contained

at least one citation that could not be located and, critically, included a ChatGPT prompt

embedded in the text of the filing itself: “Would you like me to draft the next argument

section (e.g., argument 1 – B on the ‘nature of the charge’ omission) in the same tone

and format so your brief reads as a seamless multi-print memorandum?” This language

is unmistakably the output of a generative AI platform, not the work product of an attorney.

{¶33} Respondent acknowledged the Saker filing but characterized it as an

inadvertently filed early draft. He maintained that he later withdrew the motion and filed a

corrected version. Regardless of whether the filing was accidental, the Saker filing

demonstrates that respondent’s self-imposed corrective measures were not effective in

preventing the recurrence of AI-related errors in his practice. And respondent appears to

believe this court has no “jurisdiction” to consider the subsequent act of unmonitored AI

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Case No. 2024-A-0040
use in the Cuyahoga County matter. Respondent’s action occurred after this court’s

hearing relating to the underlying matter and is therefore relevant to our consideration on

sanctions.

{¶34} Of critical importance, after this court denied respondent’s application to

reopen on June 25, 2025, respondent filed an appeal of that denial to the Supreme Court

of Ohio on August 6, 2025 (Case No. 2025-1020). In pursuing that appeal, respondent

did not withdraw or amend the application containing the fabricated quotations. Nor did

respondent inform the Supreme Court of Ohio that the application to reopen—the very

filing from which respondent sought to challenge our denial—had been predicated upon

fabricated transcript quotations generated by an AI tool. Respondent thus doubled down

on the filing, effectively asking the Supreme Court to review this court’s denial of an

application that respondent knew, or should have known, was, in part, built upon false

representations. Rather than correcting the record, respondent perpetuated the false

narrative by challenging the denial without candor about the infirmity of the underlying

filing. Respondent never withdrew the notice of appeal. This conduct is relevant both to

respondent’s good faith and to the scope of harm caused by his misconduct. The Ohio

Supreme Court, on October 14, 2025, declined to accept jurisdiction of the appeal

pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 7.08(B)(4).

{¶35} Respondent has acknowledged and admitted that: (a) his paralegal used

ChatGPT to prepare the application to reopen; (b) the AI tool generated hallucinated

transcript quotations; (c) respondent failed to verify the quotations before filing; (d) the

quotations were false and did not appear in the record; (e) the filing constituted a serious

error; and (f) respondent bears full responsibility for the content of the filing.

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Case No. 2024-A-0040
{¶36} The parties entered into a settlement agreement whereby respondent

agreed to pay $2,000 to the Ashtabula County Prosecutor’s Office. Movant

simultaneously withdrew its motion for sanctions. This court, however, noted in its

October 9, 2025 order that it is not bound by the terms of the parties’ settlement

agreement. The court’s obligation to protect the integrity of the judicial process is

independent of, and cannot be compromised by, a private agreement between litigants.

{¶37} Respondent has additional matters currently pending before this court. His

conduct in this case, if left unsanctioned, could continue to affect the administration of

justice in this court across those matters.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. SOURCES OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

{¶38} Before addressing the specific violations, this court identifies the sources of

authority upon which it relies in addressing respondent’s misconduct.

A. The Inherent Authority of Courts

{¶39} It is well established that courts possess inherent authority to manage

proceedings essential to their function, to control the conduct of those who appear before

them, and to sanction conduct that abuses the judicial process. This authority exists

independent of statute or rule. Inherent powers are those “‘necessary to the exercise of

all others.’” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980), quoting United

States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812). These powers derive from the “control necessarily

vested in courts to manage their own affairs . . . .” Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S.

626, 630 (1962). Such power does not only exist in trial courts, but in appellate courts as

well. Great Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Shenkin, 2015 WL 13928758, *2 (6th Cir. June 15, 2015)

PAGE 14 OF 65

Case No. 2024-A-0040
(an appellate “court possesses inherent powers to sanction a party”). As the United States

Supreme Court explained in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991):

It has long been understood that “[c]ertain implied powers
must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature
of their institution,” powers “which cannot be dispensed with
in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all
others.” United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 . . . (1812);
see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 .
. . (1980) (citing Hudson). For this reason, “Courts of justice
are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very
creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum,
in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates.”
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227 . . . (1821); see also Ex
parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510 . . . (1874). These powers
are “governed not by rule or statute but by the control
necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as
to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”
Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-631 . . . (1962).

{¶40} The Court held that this inherent power includes the ability “to fashion an

appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers at 44-45.

The inherent authority is “‘particularly appropriate when the offending parties have

practiced a fraud upon the court.’” Id. at 44, quoting NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television

& Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 139 (W.D.La. 1989). However, “[b]ecause of their very

potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Chambers at

44. This court is mindful that inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and

discretion. Each sanction imposed herein is individually justified, serves a distinct

remedial or protective purpose, and is calibrated to the specific harms caused by

respondent’s misconduct. That respondent settled the movant’s fee claim does not

address the institutional harm to this court, the reputational harm to the individuals

defamed by the fabricated quotations, or the systemic risk posed by the continued

submission of unverified AI-generated content. A private settlement between litigants

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Case No. 2024-A-0040
cannot remediate harm to the court itself or to the administration of justice—interests that

belong to the public, not the parties.

{¶41} The ancient origin of a court’s inherent authority was underscored in Link v.

Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-630 (1962), where the Court observed that the

power to sanction “is of ancient origin, having its roots in judgments of nonsuit and non

prosequitur entered at common law, e.g., 3 Blackstone, Commentaries (1768), 295-296,

and dismissals for want of prosecution of bills in equity, e.g., id., at 451.” The Court

confirmed that this authority is “an inherent power,” governed not by rule or statute but by

the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs. Id. at 630.

{¶42} In Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764, the Court extended this authority to

the assessment of attorney fees, recognizing the “‘well-acknowledged’ inherent power of

a court to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices.” Quoting Link at 632.

Critically, the Court held that inherent powers “are those which ‘are necessary to the

exercise of all others,’” Roadway Express at 764, quoting Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, and that

“[b]ecause inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be

exercised with restraint and discretion.” (Citations omitted.) Roadway Express at 764. The

Court acknowledged that “bad faith” for purposes of inherent-authority sanctions is not

restricted to the filing of the action itself: “‘“[B]ad faith” may be found, not only in the actions

that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation.’” Id. at 765, quoting Hall v.

Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). And the Court made plain that the power over attorneys is

at least as great as that over litigants: “If a court may tax counsel fees against a party who

has litigated in bad faith, it certainly may assess those expenses against counsel who

willfully abuse judicial processes.” (Citation omitted.) Roadway Express at 766.

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Case No. 2024-A-0040
{¶43} Critically, the Supreme Court held in Chambers that the availability of other

sanctioning mechanisms, whether statutory or rule-based, does not displace the court’s

inherent power. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 49-50. The Court further refined the limits of

inherent authority sanctions in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101,

107-108 (2017), holding that fee awards under inherent authority should be compensatory

rather than punitive and that a causal link must exist between the misconduct and the

fees incurred. This court is mindful of this limitation in crafting the sanctions herein.

B. Ohio Constitutional and Statutory Authority

{¶44} The Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 5, vests the Supreme Court of

Ohio with rule-making authority and general superintendence over all courts in the state.

This constitutional foundation provides the underpinning for the procedural authority

exercised by all Ohio courts. Ohio appellate courts, as courts created by the Ohio

Constitution, Article IV, Section 1, possess inherent powers necessary to effectuate their

constitutional functions.

{¶45} R.C. 2705.02 authorizes courts to punish contempt of court. Ohio appellate

courts have recognized that contempt statutes codify, rather than create, the inherent

contempt power. See, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873) (“The power to

punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation

of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and

writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice.”).

{¶46} R.C. 2323.51 provides authority to award attorney fees and expenses for

frivolous conduct, which includes conduct that is not warranted under existing law and

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cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal

of existing law, or assertions that lack evidentiary support.

{¶47} The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that a court’s inherent power to

address attorney misconduct is distinct from, and coexists with, the Supreme Court’s

exclusive authority over attorney discipline. In Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 31 Ohio

St.3d 256, 259-260 (1987), the Court held that a trial court has the “‘inherent power to

regulate the practice before it and protect the integrity of its proceedings,’” including the

“‘“authority and duty to see to the ethical conduct of attorneys.”’” Id., quoting Royal

Indemn. Co. v. J.C. Penney Co., 27 Ohio St.3d 31, 33-34 (1986), quoting Hahn v. Boeing

Co., 95 Wash.2d 28, 34 (1980). This includes the inherent authority of dismissal or

disqualification from a case if an attorney cannot or will not comply with his professional

obligations when representing a client. Mentor Lagoons at 259. The Court was emphatic:

“This power is distinct from the exclusive authority of the Supreme Court of Ohio over

attorney disciplinary proceedings, and does not conflict with such power.” (Citation

omitted.) Id. Indeed, the Court hastened to “approve and encourage courts throughout

this state in their efforts to halt unprofessional conduct and meet their responsibilities in

reporting violations . . . .” Id. at 260.

{¶48} In Royal Indemn. Co. at 34, the Supreme Court of Ohio confirmed that

“[d]isciplinary proceedings, contempt sanctions and court revocation of pro hac vice

privileges are distinct, but not exclusive methods of addressing attorney misconduct.”

(Citations omitted.) The Court recognized that while it exercises exclusive jurisdiction over

the admission and discipline of attorneys under Section 2(B)(1)(g), Article IV of the Ohio

Constitution, “a trial court retains the ‘authority and duty to see to the ethical conduct of

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attorneys in proceedings before it.’” Id., quoting Hahn at 34.1 The Court further observed

that an attorney may face sanctions from a trial court and discipline from the Supreme

Court for the same conduct, because “revocation of pro hac vice admissions, disciplinary

procedures and contempt sanctions are separate and distinct methods of addressing

attorney misconduct, and the appropriateness of one is not dependent on the availability

of another.” Royal Indemn. Co. at 34.

{¶49} Ohio appellate courts have applied these principles directly. In DiCuccio v.

Lindsmith, 2018-Ohio-2320, ¶ 30 (10th Dist.), the court confirmed that courts possess

inherent authority to sanction “where that party’s conduct thwarts the administration of

justice, disobeys court orders, abuses the judicial process, or when it is otherwise

necessary for the administration of justice and protection of judicial powers and

processes.” Id., citing Telecom Ltd. v. Wisehart & Wisehart, Inc., 2012-Ohio-4376, ¶ 15

(10th Dist.); and Ceol v. Zion Indus., Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 286, 289 (9th Dist. 1992).

{¶50} Most recently, in Gamble v. Gamble, 2025-Ohio-2381, ¶ 26-27 (12th Dist.),

the Twelfth District Court of Appeals exercised its inherent authority to impose sanctions

against a party who submitted a brief exhibiting the hallmarks of AI-generated content,

including nonexistent cases and miscited authorities. In doing so, the court cited the

growing body of federal authority addressing AI-related misconduct, including Gonzalez

v. Texas Taxpayers & Research Assoc., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16801 (W.D.Tex. Jan. 29,

2025); and Versant Funding LLC v. Teras Breakbulk Ocean Navigation Ents., LLC, 2025

WL 1440351 (S.D.Fla. May 20, 2025). Gamble confirms that Ohio appellate courts

1. Although we are an appellate court, we, in effect, sit as a trial court in this matter. While the matter is “sui generis,” without the authority to preside over collateral misconduct/sanction proceedings, the concept of appellate misconduct has no meaning.

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possess the same inherent authority exercised by trial courts across the country to

sanction AI-related misconduct.

C. Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure

{¶51} App.R. 23 authorizes courts of appeals to award damages, including

reasonable attorney fees, when an appeal is determined to be frivolous. While the instant

proceeding is a post-appeal application to reopen rather than an appeal itself, the

principle underlying App.R. 23—that appellate courts possess authority to sanction

frivolous filings—is informative.

D. Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct

{¶52} The Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, while enforced through

disciplinary proceedings administered by the Supreme Court of Ohio, also inform the

standards of conduct expected of attorneys practicing before this court. Violations of

these rules are relevant to the court’s determination of whether misconduct occurred and

to the gravity of such misconduct. As discussed below, respondent’s conduct implicates

multiple provisions of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.

E. Why Inherent Authority Is Necessary and Appropriate in This Case

{¶53} This court invokes its inherent authority because no single existing rule or

statute adequately addresses the full scope of respondent’s misconduct. Ohio Civ.R. 11,

which requires attorneys to certify that filings are well-grounded in fact and warranted by

existing law, does not by its terms apply in appellate proceedings. App.R. 23 is limited to

frivolous appeals. R.C. 2323.51 addresses frivolous conduct but may not encompass

every dimension of the misconduct here. The inherent authority of the court fills these

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gaps and provides the necessary foundation for a comprehensive response to conduct

that strikes at the very heart of the judicial process.

{¶54} As the Supreme Court recognized in Chambers, the inherent power is

“‘particularly appropriate when the offending parties have practiced a fraud upon the

court.’” 501 U.S. at 44, quoting NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 139. The submission of

fabricated transcript quotations to an appellate court is precisely such conduct. It is not

merely negligent; it is an assault on the integrity of the appellate process, which depends

entirely upon the fidelity of the record and the candor of counsel.

II. THE VIOLATIONS

{¶55} This court finds, based upon respondent’s admissions and the record before

this court, that respondent’s conduct constitutes the following violations:

A. Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1): Candor Toward the Tribunal – False Statements of Fact

{¶56} Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1) provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly “make a

false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material

fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer. . . .” Respondent submitted an

application to reopen containing fabricated quotations attributed to the prosecutor—

statements that never occurred during closing argument or at any point in the trial

proceedings. These quotations were presented to this court as verbatim excerpts from

the trial transcript. They were not verifiable, and respondent admitted they were

hallucinations. They were the fabricated output of a generative AI tool.

{¶57} While respondent contends he did not knowingly submit false statements,

the rule also imposes a duty to correct. After movant identified the fabrications in its

motion for sanctions, respondent neither withdrew the application nor filed an amended

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version correcting the false statements. The failure to correct, after being put on notice of

the materiality and falsity, is itself a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1). Moreover,

respondent’s subsequent appeal of this court’s denial to the Supreme Court of Ohio—

without disclosing the fabricated nature of certain material aspects of the underlying

filing—compounded the violation by perpetuating the uncorrected false statements before

a higher tribunal. The distinction respondent draws between knowing falsity and negligent

failure to verify is not persuasive. Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1) imposes not only a prohibition

on knowingly making false statements but also an affirmative duty to correct false

statements previously made to the tribunal. Once movant identified the fabricated

quotations in its reply brief and motion for sanctions, respondent was on actual notice that

his filing contained false statements of material fact. At that point, the duty to correct

attached irrespective of respondent’s state of mind at the time of the original filing.

Respondent cannot reasonably contend that movant’s identification of the fabrications

relieved him of his own independent obligation to correct the record. The duty to correct

is personal to the attorney who made the false statement; it cannot be discharged

vicariously through an adversary’s filing.

B. Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(3): Offering False Evidence

{¶58} Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(3) prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer

knows to be false. The fabricated transcript quotations were offered as evidence of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. They purported

to be direct quotations from the record of proceedings. They were, in substance and

effect, fabricated evidence. Movant aptly characterized the conduct as “the equivalent of

fabricated evidence being provided to this Court, quotes that were not in the record, that

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claim to have been in the record.” T.p. 4. Even assuming respondent did not know the

quotations were false at the time of filing, his continued failure to withdraw or correct the

false evidence after learning of its falsity satisfies the rule’s requirements. An attorney

who learns that evidence he has offered to a tribunal is false has a duty to take reasonable

remedial measures, including disclosure to the tribunal. Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(3) must be

read in conjunction with the remedial obligations imposed by the rule as a whole.

Respondent’s post-notice inaction converted what might have been an innocent initial

submission into a sustained offering of evidence he knew, or by then had every reason

to know, was false.

C. Prof.Cond.R. 1.1: Competence

{¶59} Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 requires a lawyer to “provide competent representation to

a client,” which requires “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation

reasonably necessary for the representation.” Competence in the modern legal landscape

requires an attorney to understand the tools he or she employs in the practice of law,

including artificial intelligence tools. An attorney who uses AI in the preparation of legal

filings must understand the technology sufficiently to recognize its limitations, including

the well-documented tendency of generative AI platforms to produce hallucinated content.

{¶60} Respondent’s counsel conceded that respondent understood the distinction

between public and proprietary AI tools and was on the “forefront of technology in this

area.” T.p. 10. Yet respondent failed to verify the AI-generated content against the actual

trial transcript—a fundamental act of professional diligence to which respondent’s counsel

admitted. Counsel’s candid concession that respondent “personally check[s] each and

every quote to the transcript and each and every quote to the case law” in current practice

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(T.p. 17) constitutes a tacit acknowledgment that he was not performing this basic

verification prior to the misconduct in this case. Competence under Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 is

not measured solely by an attorney’s general track record; it requires the knowledge, skill,

thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for each particular representation.

The filing at issue was not a minor oversight in a routine matter. By his own admission,

via counsel, respondent “screwed up.” It was an application to reopen a final appellate

judgment in a criminal case—a proceeding with significant consequences for the

appellant and the integrity of the appellate process. An attorney who delegates the

preparation of such a filing to a non-attorney, permits the use of a tool known to fabricate

content, and then fails to verify the output against the actual record has not provided the

thoroughness and preparation that is demanded under the law and rules of professional

conduct. That respondent now verifies each quotation personally is a welcome reform,

but it is also an admission that his prior practice fell below the standard of competence

required under the rules of professional conduct.

D. Prof.Cond.R. 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistance

{¶61} Prof.Cond.R. 5.3 requires a lawyer who has direct supervisory authority

over a nonlawyer to “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the [nonlawyer’s] conduct is

compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. . . .” Respondent admitted that

a non-attorney paralegal prepared the application to reopen. Respondent admitted that

the paralegal uploaded case materials to ChatGPT, a public generative AI tool, in

contravention of respondent’s own stated policy. Respondent’s failure to adequately

supervise the paralegal’s work product and to verify the accuracy of the filing before

submission constitutes a failure to fulfill his supervisory responsibilities under

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Prof.Cond.R. 5.3. That rule provides guidance for “responsibilities regarding nonlawyer

assistants.”

{¶62} The delegation of the preparation of an appellate filing to a paralegal,

without meaningful review, raises additional concerns under the foregoing rule. The

preparation of an application to reopen a criminal appeal requires legal analysis,

knowledge of appellate standards, familiarity with the trial record, and the exercise of legal

judgment. While paralegals may assist attorneys in the preparation of filings, the

substantive legal work and the ultimate responsibility for the accuracy and propriety of the

filing remain with the attorney. An attorney’s obligation under Prof.Cond.R. 5.3 cannot be

satisfied by a general directive not to use certain AI tools; it requires active supervision

and meaningful review of work product. The existence of a policy, standing alone, does

not satisfy the supervisory obligation imposed by Prof.Cond.R. 5.3. The rule requires

reasonable efforts to ensure that the nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible with the lawyer’s

professional obligations. A policy that is neither monitored nor enforced is no policy at all.

Moreover, respondent’s obligation was not limited to issuing directives; it extended to

reviewing the work product generated under his supervision before filing it with a court.

This court does not require attorneys to redo all delegated work, but it does require them

to review filings that bear the attorneys’ signatures and are submitted to a court under

penalty of perjury—particularly filings that attribute specific quotations to identifiable

individuals. The standard is meaningful review, not blind ratification.

E. Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c): Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation

{¶63} Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer

to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. . . .” The

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submission of fabricated transcript quotations to this court constitutes misrepresentation,

regardless of whether respondent personally authored the false statements or was aware

of their falsity at the time of filing. An attorney who signs and files a document containing

fabricated content has made a representation to the court that the content is accurate and

reliable. Respondent’s signature on the application and accompanying affidavit was his

personal assurance to this court that the statements contained therein were truthful. They

were not. This court does not hold that negligent failure to verify, standing alone,

constitutes dishonesty or fraud. However, the analysis does not end with the initial filing.

When respondent was put on notice that the filing contained fabricated quotations and

thereafter took no corrective action—and indeed pursued an appeal of the denial to the

Supreme Court of Ohio without disclosing the infirmity—the conduct moved beyond mere

negligence. An attorney who knows a representation to the court is false and allows it to

stand has made that false representation on his or her own. The misrepresentation is not

the initial filing in isolation; it is the continued assertion of the filing’s validity through

silence and affirmative reliance upon it in subsequent proceedings.

F. Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d): Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice

{¶64} Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from engaging “in conduct that is

prejudicial to the administration of justice. . . .” Respondent’s misconduct prejudiced the

administration of justice in multiple respects. First, it required the movant to expend time

and resources identifying and responding to fabricated allegations—time and resources

that the Ashtabula County Prosecutor’s Office, as a publicly funded entity, could ill afford.

Second, it required this court to devote substantial judicial resources to investigating the

matter, conducting a hearing, ordering briefing, and adjudicating the sanctions

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proceeding—resources that would otherwise have been directed to the legitimate

business of this court. Third, and most fundamentally, the submission of fabricated

evidence to a court of law undermines public confidence in the integrity of the judicial

system.

{¶65} As the movant’s counsel observed at the hearing, had the fabricated

quotations not been detected, the result could have been “massively prejudicial to the

administration” of justice. T.p. 22. While this court confirms, dis-confirms, and cross-

references all cited sources, the movant’s statements are still of significant import. The

integrity of the appellate process depends upon the accuracy of the record and the candor

of counsel. When either is compromised, the entire system is diminished. That the

fabrications were detected does not diminish the prejudice to the administration of justice;

it merely means the worst consequences were averted. The detection required the

expenditure of significant resources by movant—32.1 documented hours of staff time—

and by this court. The argument that the system “worked as intended” proves too much

and only serves to further implicate respondent in misconduct. Neither this court nor

movant should serve as a vetting body for another’s lack of diligence. If we were to follow

such logic, no fraud upon the court could ever be sanctioned so long as the fraud was

ultimately discovered. The harm to the administration of justice is not limited to the

outcome of the underlying application; it includes the diversion of judicial and

prosecutorial resources, the reputational harm to the individuals falsely accused, and the

erosion of the court's ability to rely upon the representations of counsel. These harms

materialized regardless of the application’s ultimate disposition.

G. Failure to Take Corrective Action

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{¶66} Separate and apart from the initial filing of the application containing

fabricated quotations, this court finds that respondent’s failure to take corrective action

after being notified of the errors constitutes an independent ground for sanctions.

Respondent never withdrew or amended the application containing the false quotations—

not after movant identified the fabrications, not after the show cause order, not after the

hearing, and not at any point during the pendency of these proceedings. Courts across

the country that have addressed AI-related misconduct have consistently recognized that

voluntary correction is the single strongest mitigating factor in sanctions analysis. See,

e.g., Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F.Supp.3d 443, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (imposing

heightened sanctions where attorneys doubled down on fabricated citations rather than

immediately correcting the record). The absence of voluntary correction here aggravates

the misconduct. The duty to correct a false statement to a tribunal is not excused by the

adversary’s identification of the falsehood. The obligation is personal and independent.

The court was aware of the fabrications through the motion for sanctions and its own

confirmation. This does not relieve respondent of his duty to withdraw, amend, or

otherwise correct the filing. An attorney who leaves a fabricated filing in the record of a

court, uncorrected and unamended, has made a continuing representation that the filing

is legitimate. The argument that withdrawal would have been “redundant” conflates and

disregards an attorney’s duty and discounts the court’s awareness of the problem. These

are distinct matters. Moreover, when respondent appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio

without correcting the record, the argument that correction was unnecessary because the

issue was already before this court loses whatever force it might otherwise have had.

Respondent was aware of the misstatements and proceeded without correction.

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H. Recurrence of AI-Related Errors: The Saker Filing

{¶67} While this court recognizes respondent’s contention that the Saker matter

is beyond this court’s jurisdiction, the Saker filing is relevant to the sanctions

determination in this case for two reasons. First, it bears directly on the sincerity and

effectiveness of respondent’s self-imposed remedial measures. An attorney who

represents to the court that he has implemented new policies and procedures to prevent

AI-related errors, and then files a document in another court two months later containing

a ChatGPT prompt embedded in the text of a legal filing, has demonstrated that his

remedial measures are ineffective. Second, the Saker filing is relevant to this court’s

assessment of whether additional, court-imposed safeguards are necessary to protect

the judicial system from future harm.

{¶68} This court does not adjudicate respondent’s conduct in the Saker matter,

and respondent’s rights in that proceeding are unaffected by this order. However, the

relevance of the Saker filing to the sanctions determination in this case is straightforward:

respondent represented to this court that he had implemented remedial measures to

prevent the recurrence of AI-related errors. The Saker filing, which respondent himself

acknowledged, is probative of whether those representations were accurate and whether

the self-imposed measures were effective. A court is entitled to consider the credibility

and effectiveness of an attorney’s professed remedial measures when determining the

appropriate scope of sanctions. This is not an adjudication of the Cuyahoga County

matter; it is an assessment of respondent’s credibility and the adequacy of his corrective

actions in this case, and consideration of the Saker filing as evidence of a continuing

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pattern relevant to the nature and scope of sanctions warranted here. Respondent was

afforded the opportunity to brief this issue and did so; due process does not require more.

III. THE COURT’S INDEPENDENT OBLIGATION TO ACT

A. The Court Is Not Bound by a Private Settlement Agreement

{¶69} The parties’ settlement agreement resolves the movant’s claim for attorney

fees. It does not, and cannot, resolve the court’s independent interest in maintaining the

integrity of the proceedings before it. A court’s authority to sanction misconduct is not

merely a remedy available to aggrieved parties; it is an exercise of the court’s inherent

power to protect the judicial process itself. The interests at stake transcend the interests

of the litigants. Private parties cannot, by agreement, divest a court of its obligation to

address conduct that undermines the administration of justice. See Great Am. Life Ins.

Co., 2015 WL 13928758, at *2 (an appellate court possesses inherent powers derived

not from rules or statutes to impose proper sanctions for conduct abusing the judicial

process).

{¶70} This principle is well established. In Chambers, the Supreme Court

recognized that the inherent power to sanction includes the ability to act sua sponte—that

is, on the court’s own initiative—to address conduct that abuses the judicial process. 501

U.S. at 43-45. The withdrawal of movant’s sanctions motion does not extinguish this

court’s independent authority to act. The settlement agreement resolved movant’s

particularized claim for attorney fees. It did not, and could not, address the court’s

independent institutional interests. Settlements are designed to achieve finality between

the parties to the agreement; they do not bind non-parties, and the court is not a party to

the settlement. Nor does the referral to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel render this

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court’s sanctions redundant. The disciplinary process may take months or years to

conclude, and its outcome is uncertain. If courts routinely deferred to the disciplinary

process whenever misconduct implicated the Rules of Professional Conduct, the court

before which the fraud was perpetrated—the institution most immediately harmed—would

be left without a timely remedy. The sanctions imposed here address the immediate harm

to these proceedings; the disciplinary referral addresses respondent’s broader fitness to

practice. See, e.g., Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. Marshall, 2009-Ohio-501, ¶ 19 (“[t]he primary

purpose of the disciplinary process is to protect the public from lawyers who are unworthy

of the trust and confidence essential to the attorney-client relationship and to allow us to

ascertain the lawyer’s fitness to practice law”). These are distinct functions requiring

distinct action.

B. The Court Must Not Defer Solely to the Disciplinary Process

{¶71} Respondent suggests, implicitly if not explicitly, that professional discipline

is more appropriately administered through the Supreme Court of Ohio’s disciplinary

process. While this court recognizes the vital role of the disciplinary system and, as

discussed below, refers respondent’s conduct to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel for

investigation, deference to the disciplinary process does not relieve this court of its own

responsibilities.

{¶72} The disciplinary process and the court’s sanctioning authority serve distinct

functions. The disciplinary process addresses an attorney’s fitness to practice law. The

court’s sanctioning authority protects the integrity of the proceedings before it,

compensates parties harmed by misconduct, deters future misconduct, and vindicates

the court’s authority. These functions are complementary, not mutually exclusive.

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{¶73} If courts were to defer routinely to the disciplinary process whenever

attorney misconduct implicated the Rules of Professional Conduct, the practical result

would be to leave the immediate harm unaddressed. Disciplinary proceedings are, by

design, deliberative processes that may take months or years to resolve. Meanwhile, the

court before which the misconduct occurred—the court that was directly deceived—would

remain powerless to address the harm. This court will not abdicate its responsibility to

safeguard the integrity of its own proceedings.

{¶74} The disciplinary process, however vital, cannot perform the functions that

only this court can perform. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel cannot vindicate the

authority of this court. It cannot restore the integrity of this court’s record. It cannot remedy

the reputational harm inflicted upon the trial prosecutor, the defense attorney at trial, the

trial judge, and prior appellate counsel by fabricated allegations filed in this court’s

proceedings. It cannot deter future misconduct before this court, especially where this

court has the authority to act where its processes are abused. It cannot ensure that filings

submitted to this court are accurate and reliable. These are obligations that belong to this

court alone, arising from its constitutional role as a court of record vested with the judicial

power of this state. If this court does not act to protect the integrity of its own proceedings,

no other court, agency, or authority can do so in its stead. The question is not whether

the disciplinary system exists-it does, and this court invokes it. The question is whether

this court will fulfill its own independent obligation to safeguard the judicial process.

Abdication of that obligation, in deference to a process that serves a different purpose,

would itself be a failure of judicial duty and function to silently ratify misconduct that cannot

be effectively addressed via the disciplinary process alone.

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{¶75} Moreover, courts that have addressed AI-related misconduct have

consistently exercised their sanctioning authority directly, imposing monetary sanctions,

requiring corrective measures, striking filings, and referring the matter for disciplinary

investigation. See, e.g., Mata, 678 F.Supp.3d 443; Wadsworth v. Walmart, Inc., 348

F.R.D. 489 (D.Wyo. 2025); United States v. Hayes, 763 F.Supp.3d 1054 (E.D.Cal. 2025);

In re Baby Boy, 271 N.E.3d 524 (Ill.App. 2025). These courts did not abdicate their

authority to the disciplinary system. Neither shall this court.

C. The Emerging Crisis of AI Misconduct Demands Judicial Engagement

{¶76} This court writes at an inflection point in the legal profession. The rapid

proliferation of generative artificial intelligence tools has created a crisis of integrity in the

courts. Across the country, courts at every level—federal and state, trial and appellate—

have confronted cases involving the submission of AI-generated fabricated legal

authorities and evidence. These cases have arisen with alarming frequency and show no

signs of abating.

{¶77} The phenomenon is not merely a technological curiosity. It strikes at the

foundation of the adversarial system, which depends upon the assumption that the legal

authorities and evidence cited by counsel are real and the factual representations made

to the court are accurate. When that assumption is violated—whether through intentional

fabrication or reckless reliance on AI-generated content—the entire system is

compromised.

{¶78} Courts that fail to respond to AI misconduct with appropriate sanctions send

a dangerous message: that the submission of fabricated content carries no meaningful

consequences. This court will not contribute to that message. The sanctions imposed

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herein are intended not only to address the specific misconduct in this case, but to serve

as a clear signal to members of the bar that AI-related misconduct will be taken seriously

by this court and, this court hopes, by courts throughout the State of Ohio.

IV. GOOD FAITH OR BAD FAITH

{¶79} Under Chambers, 501 U.S. 32, and its progeny, the imposition of sanctions

under a court’s inherent authority requires, at minimum, a finding of bad faith, vexatious

conduct, or willful abuse of the judicial process. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 766.

{¶80} Respondent contends he acted in good faith—that his failure to detect the

fabricated quotations was an honest mistake, albeit a serious one. This court has

considered respondent’s argument carefully and determines that the totality of the

circumstances demonstrates, at minimum, a reckless disregard for the truth amounting

to bad faith.

{¶81} Several factors support this conclusion. First, respondent was not ignorant

of AI’s limitations. His own counsel conceded at the hearing that respondent was

sophisticated in his understanding of AI tools. An attorney who understands the risks of

AI hallucination and nonetheless permits unverified AI-generated content to be filed in an

appellate court acts with a degree of recklessness that transcends mere negligence.

{¶82} Second, the nature of the fabricated content is significant. The application

did not merely cite a questionable legal proposition or misstate a procedural standard. It

attributed specific, inflammatory statements to a real person—the trial prosecutor—that

that person never made. This is not the kind of error that results from good-faith

carelessness; it is the kind of error that results from a failure to perform the most basic

verification of the assertions being made to the court.

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{¶83} Third, respondent’s failure to take corrective action after being put on notice

of the fabrications further undercuts any claim of good faith. A good-faith actor, upon

learning that a filing contains fabricated quotations, would immediately move to withdraw

the application or amend the filing. Respondent did neither. He did not withdraw the

application. He did not file an amended version. He did not notify this court that the filing

was infirm. Instead, he allowed the fabricated filing to remain in the record of this court

without correction.

{¶84} Fourth, respondent’s conduct before the Supreme Court of Ohio is among

the most telling indicators of bad faith. After this court denied the application to reopen—

an application respondent knew or should have known was predicated on AI-generated

fabrications—respondent appealed the denial to the Supreme Court. In doing so,

respondent did not withdraw the fabricated filing, did not amend the false representations,

and did not inform the Supreme Court that the application, the denial of which he was

challenging, had been, in significant part, built upon hallucinated transcript quotations.

This was not the conduct of an attorney who had made an innocent mistake and was

eager to correct the record. This was the conduct of an attorney who, having been caught

submitting fabricated evidence to one court, sought to leverage the same fabricated filing

before a higher court without disclosure. The doubling down on a filing known to contain

false representations is fundamentally inconsistent with good faith.

{¶85} Fifth, the subsequent Saker filing demonstrates that respondent’s professed

commitment to preventing future AI errors was not matched by his actual practice. The

inclusion of a ChatGPT prompt in a court filing—two months after a sanctions hearing in

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this court addressing the very same conduct—suggests that respondent has not

internalized the gravity of his obligations.

{¶86} The AI policy submitted to this court bore the hallmarks of AI generation,

complete with unfilled bracketed placeholders where the attorney’s own firm-specific

information should have appeared. An attorney who submits an AI-generated AI policy as

evidence of his commitment to responsible AI use—without even completing the

template’s placeholder fields—has not demonstrated a genuine commitment to reform.

{¶87} This court therefore finds that respondent’s conduct is contemptuous and

committed in violation of Civ.R. 11 and was committed willfully or with reckless disregard

for his professional obligations, constituting bad faith sufficient to warrant sanctions under

the court’s inherent and contempt authority, as well as Civ.R. 11.

V. SANCTIONS

{¶88} In fashioning sanctions, this court is guided by the principle that sanctions

must be proportionate to the misconduct, tailored to address the specific harms caused,

and designed to serve the purposes for which the court’s sanctioning authority exists: to

compensate for harm, to deter future misconduct, to punish bad faith conduct, to protect

the integrity of the judicial process, and to preserve public confidence in the administration

of justice. The court also considers respondent’s admissions, his expressions of remorse,

and the mitigating factors he has raised. Each sanction imposed serves a distinct purpose

and addresses a distinct dimension of respondent’s misconduct. The monetary sanction

is compensatory. The referral to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel fulfills this court’s

mandatory reporting obligation. The notification requirement ensures that courts before

which respondent appears can exercise informed oversight. The certification requirement

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formalizes duties that every attorney already bears. The CLE requirement addresses the

knowledge deficiencies that gave rise to the misconduct. The striking of the application

protects the integrity of the court’s records. The removal of counsel protects Mr.

Coleman’s right to effective representation. The apology letters address the reputational

harm to individuals falsely accused. No single sanction, standing alone, would adequately

address the full scope of the misconduct. The certification and notification requirements

impose no burden beyond transparency—a burden that is a direct and proportionate

consequence of respondent’s demonstrated inability to ensure the accuracy of his filings

without external accountability.

{¶89} This court imposes the following sanctions:

A. Monetary Sanction: $2,000 Fine, With Credit for $2,000 Already Paid

{¶90} Respondent shall pay a monetary sanction in the amount of $2,000.

Respondent shall receive credit for the $2,000 payment already made to the Ashtabula

County Prosecutor’s Office pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement.

{¶91} While the settlement payment satisfies the monetary component of this

sanction, this court emphasizes that the payment is credited against the court’s

independently imposed sanction—it does not serve as a substitute for it. The court’s

authority to levy a monetary sanction exists independent of, and is not extinguished by,

the parties’ private agreement. This court imposes the sanction to establish, as a matter

of precedent, that courts possess and will exercise the inherent authority to impose

monetary sanctions for AI-related misconduct that constitutes bad faith abuse of the

judicial process. The amount imposed is compensatory in nature, well within the range of

documented costs incurred by movant and this court in addressing respondent’s

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misconduct—movant alone documented 32.1 hours of staff time devoted to the matter—

and is proportionate to the sanctions imposed by courts across the country in comparable

AI-related cases. See, e.g., Wadsworth, 348 F.R.D. at 499 ($3,000 and $1,000 fines);

Mata, 678 F.Supp.3d at 466 ($5,000 penalty jointly and severally imposed); Mid Central

Operating Engineers Health & Welfare Fund v. HoosierVac, 2025 WL 574234 (S.D.Ind.

2025) ($15,000 sanction). That respondent owes no additional payment as a practical

matter does not diminish the significance of this court’s exercise of its sanctioning

authority.

{¶92} This court recognizes that Haeger, 581 U.S. at 107-108, counsels that

inherent-authority sanctions should be compensatory rather than punitive. The $2,000

amount is well within the range of documented costs incurred by movant and this court in

addressing respondent’s misconduct and is therefore compensatory in nature.

B. Referral to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel

{¶93} This court refers respondent’s conduct to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel

of the Supreme Court of Ohio (ODC) for investigation. In fact, informing ODC is

mandatory. Prof.Cond.R. 8.3(a) (“[a] lawyer who possesses unprivileged knowledge of a

violation of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a question as to any

lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform a

disciplinary authority empowered to investigate or act upon such a violation”). The

conduct described in this judgment entry implicates multiple provisions of the Ohio Rules

of Professional Conduct, including Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (competence), Prof.Cond.R.

3.3(a)(1) and (a)(3) (candor toward the tribunal), Prof.Cond.R. 5.3 (responsibilities

regarding nonlawyer assistance), Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

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misrepresentation), and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of

justice).

{¶94} As discussed above, this court’s imposition of sanctions and the disciplinary

process serve complementary functions. They serve different purposes and have different

burdens of proof (for the disciplinary process: clear and convincing evidence). The

disciplinary system is uniquely positioned to assess respondent’s fitness to practice law,

to investigate whether this conduct is part of a broader pattern, and to impose the full

range of disciplinary measures available under the Supreme Court Rules for the

Government of the Bar of Ohio. This referral is not a disposition on the merits; it is a

notification to the appropriate authority that conduct warranting investigation has been

identified by a court before which the respondent practiced.

{¶95} The administrator of this court shall send a copy of this judgment entry, with

a notation of referral, to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel via electronic mail upon its

filing.

C. Service Upon Courts and Judges for Two Years

{¶96} For a period of two years from the date of this judgment entry, respondent

shall serve a copy of this judgment entry upon the presiding judge or administrative judge

of every court in which respondent files a new appearance, enters a new case, or

otherwise undertakes representation. Such service shall be made within 14 days of

respondent’s first filing in each such court. Respondent shall file proof of such service

with this court within seven days of serving each judge.

{¶97} This sanction serves multiple purposes. First, it ensures that courts before

which respondent practices are informed of his prior misconduct and can exercise

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appropriate vigilance in reviewing his filings. Second, it serves a continuing deterrent

function, requiring respondent to confront the consequences of his misconduct each time

he enters a new case. Third, it protects the administration of justice by placing courts on

notice of the potential for AI-related errors in respondent’s filings. Courts that have

addressed comparable AI misconduct have imposed similar notification requirements.

See, e.g., Mata, 678 F.Supp.3d at 466 (requiring attorneys to send copies of the sanctions

order to judges falsely identified in fabricated citations); Hayes, 763 F.Supp.3d at 1073

(ordering copies of order to all district and magistrate judges).

D. Certification and Verification Requirements for Future Filings

{¶98} For a period of two years from the date of this judgment entry, every filing

submitted by respondent to any Ohio court shall include a signed certification that:

(a) all citations to legal authority contained in the filing have
been independently verified by the attorney of record as being
real, accurately quoted, and still valid;

(b) all quotations attributed to any person, transcript, or
document have been verified against the original source by
the attorney of record;

(c) all factual representations contained in the filing have been
verified by the attorney of record as having evidentiary
support in the record or other reliable source;

(d) to the extent any portion of the filing was drafted with the
assistance of a generative artificial intelligence tool, the
attorney of record has disclosed the use of such tool and has
independently verified all AI-generated content; and

(e) the attorney of record has personally reviewed the entire
filing for accuracy, completeness, and compliance with all
applicable rules.

{¶99} This certification requirement is a prophylactic measure designed to prevent

the recurrence of the very conduct at issue in this case. It imposes no burden beyond

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what every attorney should already be doing as a matter of professional obligation. The

requirement merely formalizes and makes explicit the duty that respondent admittedly

failed to fulfill.

E. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

{¶100} Within 150 days of the filing of this judgment entry, respondent shall

complete no fewer than six hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) specifically

focused on the following topics: (a) the ethical use of artificial intelligence in the practice

of law; (b) the professional responsibility implications of AI-generated content; (c) attorney

supervision of nonlawyer assistants in the context of AI tools; and (d) candor toward the

tribunal and the duty to verify filings. These CLE hours shall be in addition to, and not

counted toward, respondent’s regular biennial CLE requirements.

{¶101} Respondent shall file proof of completion with this court within seven days

of completing the required CLE. Respondent’s counsel indicated at the August 28, 2025

hearing that respondent had voluntarily completed some CLE courses related to AI. While

this court acknowledges and credits respondent’s voluntary efforts, the CLE required by

this order is a separate, mandatory obligation that must be fulfilled in its entirety.

{¶102} Courts across the country have recognized the value of mandatory CLE as

a component of AI-related sanctions. See, e.g., In re Rodney Richburg, 671 B.R. 918,

926 (Bankr.D.S.C. 2025) (ordering three hours of CLE on AI ethics). The educational

component of sanctions serves the dual purpose of remediation—ensuring that the

sanctioned attorney possesses the knowledge necessary to use AI responsibly—and

deterrence—signaling to the profession that courts take AI competence seriously.

F. Striking of the Application to Reopen

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{¶103} The application to reopen filed by respondent on May 19, 2025, is hereby

stricken from the record of this court. The filing contains fabricated quotations that

constitute false representations to this court. It should not remain in the record as though

it were a legitimate legal filing. While this court has already denied the application on the

merits, the striking of the filing serves the additional purpose of ensuring that the

fabricated content is formally repudiated and does not remain as part of the permanent

record of this case without notation of its infirmity.

{¶104} Striking filings that contain AI-generated fabrications is a recognized

sanction in AI-related misconduct cases. See, e.g., In re Will of Samuel, 82 Misc.3d 616,

626 (N.Y.Surr. 2024) (striking pleading containing AI-generated fabricated cases);

Powhatan County School Board v. Skinger, 2025 WL 1559593, *11 (E.D.Va. June 2,

2025) (striking filings under the court’s inherent authority). The integrity of the court’s

records demands that filings containing known fabrications be treated accordingly.

G. Removal of Respondent as Counsel for Malikhi Jermaine Coleman

{¶105} Respondent is hereby removed as counsel for Malikhi Jermaine Coleman

in this case and in any related proceedings. Respondent shall take no further action on

behalf of Mr. Coleman in this court.

{¶106} This sanction is warranted for several reasons. First, respondent’s

misconduct was committed in the course of his representation of Mr. Coleman. The filing

that formed the basis of this sanctions proceeding was submitted on Mr. Coleman’s

behalf, and the fabricated quotations were used to support allegations of prosecutorial

misconduct in Mr. Coleman’s criminal case. Mr. Coleman is the direct victim of

respondent’s incompetence: his application to reopen was denied because the

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allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, which formed a significant basis of the

application, were premised on fabricated evidence. A defendant’s right to counsel of

choice, while significant, is not absolute, more so, in the case of counsel selected or

appointed by the court for the benefit of the defendant and paid at public expense. It must

yield when the attorney’s continued representation would undermine the integrity of the

proceedings or create a conflict between the attorney’s interests and the client’s interests.

Here, respondent’s misconduct was committed in the course of Mr. Coleman’s

representation, and respondent has been sanctioned for that very misconduct.

Respondent now faces potential disciplinary proceedings arising from his conduct in Mr.

Coleman’s case. The resulting conflict between respondent’s personal interest in

minimizing the consequences of his own misconduct and Mr. Coleman’s interest in

vigorous, unconflicted representation is apparent. This court’s concern is not hypothetical:

Mr. Coleman’s application to reopen was denied because its substantive core was

fabricated. Mr. Coleman was the person most directly harmed by respondent’s

incompetence. Continuity of counsel cannot outweigh the right to counsel unburdened by

the consequences of prior misconduct in the very same proceeding.

{¶107} Second, the continued representation of Mr. Coleman by an attorney who

has been sanctioned for misconduct committed in the very case in which he serves as

counsel presents an irreconcilable conflict. Mr. Coleman is entitled to effective legal

representation, and this court cannot have confidence that respondent will provide such

representation given the circumstances. The integrity of Mr. Coleman’s legal interests

requires that he be represented by counsel who has not been sanctioned for misconduct

in this very proceeding.

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{¶108} Third, the removal of counsel in the context of AI-related misconduct is

consistent with the approach taken by other courts. See, e.g., Mavy v. Commr. of Social

Sec., 2025 WL 2355222, *10 (D.Ariz. Aug. 14, 2025), opinion vacated in part on

reconsideration, 2026 WL 91483 (D.Ariz. Jan. 13, 2026) (revoking pro hac vice status on

a specific case for AI-related misconduct); Wadsworth, 348 F.R.D. at 499 (revoking pro

hac vice admission after multiple fabricated AI citations). While this court’s removal of

respondent as counsel is more limited in scope than revocation of bar admission, it is an

appropriate and proportionate response to the misconduct committed in this specific case.

{¶109} Nothing in this order prevents Mr. Coleman from retaining new counsel or

from pursuing any remedies to which he may be entitled, including but not limited to a

new application to reopen supported by legitimate, verified legal authority. The new

application to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the filing of this judgment entry.

{¶110} Respondent shall, within 14 days of the filing of this judgment entry, serve

a copy of this order upon Mr. Coleman, together with a written explanation, in plain and

understandable language, of the nature of respondent’s misconduct and the reasons

respondent has been removed as Mr. Coleman’s counsel. Respondent shall inform Mr.

Coleman that he has the right to retain new counsel or to proceed pro se and shall provide

Mr. Coleman with the contact information for the Ohio Public Defender’s Office and the

Ashtabula County Public Defender’s Office. Respondent shall file proof of such service

and communication with this court within seven days of effectuating the same.

H. Written Apologies to Persons Defamed by the Fabricated Filing

{¶111} The fabricated quotations contained in the application to reopen were not

abstract falsehoods. They attributed specific, inflammatory, and unprofessional

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statements to a real prosecutor—the Ashtabula County trial prosecutor, Dawn

Catalamessa, who conducted the closing argument in the underlying criminal case. Those

fabricated statements, if credited, would have constituted evidence of serious

professional misconduct by the prosecutor, potentially subjecting the prosecutor to

disciplinary investigation, professional embarrassment, and reputational harm.

{¶112} The fabricated quotations also necessarily impugned the integrity of the trial

judge, Judge Thomas E. Harris, who presided over Mr. Coleman’s trial. By alleging that

the prosecutor made inflammatory, improper statements during closing argument, the

application implicitly accused the trial judge of permitting such statements without

correction, sustaining objection, or curative instruction—a failure that, if it had occurred,

would itself constitute reversible error and a breach of the judge’s duty to ensure a fair

trial.

{¶113} Additionally, the application’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel necessarily impugned prior trial counsel, Malcolm Stewart Douglas, and

appellate counsel, Russell Bensing, by accusing trial counsel of failing to object so as to

protect the defendant, and appellate counsel of failing to raise what would have been—

had the fabricated quotations been real—an obvious and meritorious claim of

prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of defense counsel on direct appeal.

{¶114} Respondent shall, within 30 days of the filing of this judgment entry, deliver

written letters of apology to each of the following persons:

(a) the Ashtabula County trial prosecutor who conducted the
closing argument in State v. Coleman, for the false attribution
of inflammatory statements that the prosecutor never made;

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(b) the trial court judge who presided over State v. Coleman,
for the implicit accusation that the judge permitted
uncorrected prosecutorial misconduct; and

(c) the trial attorney and prior appellate counsel for Mr.
Coleman on direct appeal, for the implicit accusations that
they collectively failed to object to, and thereafter raise, a
meritorious claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

{¶115} Each of the four letters shall acknowledge that the statements attributed to

these individuals, or the professional failures attributed to these individuals, in the

application to reopen were false, were generated by an artificial intelligence tool, and were

filed without verification. Each letter shall be accompanied by a copy of this judgment

entry. Respondent shall file copies of the letters and proof of delivery with this court within

seven days of sending the letters.

{¶116} This sanction is not punitive in nature. It is restorative. The persons

identified above were subjected to false allegations of professional misconduct through

no fault of their own. They are owed an acknowledgment that the allegations were

baseless. The integrity of the legal profession demands no less. The letters required by

this order are not compelled expressions of personal contrition. They are corrective

communications requiring respondent to acknowledge objective facts: that specific

statements were falsely attributed to identifiable individuals, that those statements were

generated by an artificial intelligence tool, and that they were filed without verification.

Courts routinely require corrective disclosures as a remedial measure—including

requirements to notify affected persons and tribunals of prior misrepresentations. Such

requirements serve the legitimate interest of correcting the record and restoring the

reputations of persons harmed by false statements submitted to a court. That the

fabricated quotations were ultimately identified and not relied upon does not mean the

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individuals to whom inflammatory misconduct was attributed suffered no harm. The public

filing of an application accusing a prosecutor of making statements she never made, a

judge of tolerating misconduct that never occurred, and an attorney of failing to object to

or raise an issue that did not exist, inflicts reputational harm the moment it enters the

public record—harm that persists until it is formally corrected.

VI. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT

{¶117} Respondent shall comply fully and timely with each sanction imposed by

this order. This court retains jurisdiction to enforce this order and to address any failure

to comply.

{¶118} Failure to comply with any provision of this order may result in contempt

proceedings pursuant to R.C. 2705.02 and this court’s inherent contempt authority.

Contempt sanctions for noncompliance may include additional monetary fines,

imprisonment, or both, as this court deems necessary to vindicate the authority of the

court and to compel compliance.

{¶119} Respondent shall maintain a record of compliance with each provision of

this order and shall, upon request by this court, produce such records for review.

VII. POINTS ADDRESSING THE DISSENTS OBJECTIONS

A. The Alleged “Adjudication of Professional Conduct Violations”

{¶120} The dissent characterizes the majority judgment as attempting to adjudicate

alleged violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. This is a Straw-Man argument.

This judgment does not purport to discipline respondent under the Rules of Professional

Conduct. It does not suspend his license, place him on probation under Gov.Bar R. V, or

impose a sanction reserved solely to the Supreme Court of Ohio. This entry identifies

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standards of conduct respondent violated and, with this in mind, this court utilizes its

inherent authority to impose sanctions due to the admitted violations.

{¶121} Every court that exercises inherent sanctioning authority articulates the

foundation of an attorney’s wrongdoing in support of the sanctions. Identifying an

attorney’s misconduct and proceeding to sanctions is not tantamount to a disciplinary

proceeding. Courts, vindicating the integrity of the judicial process, commonly exercise

this authority via disqualification, fee-shifting, and show-cause/contempt orders. There is

a distinction between referencing the Rules of Professional Conduct and administering

discipline under those rules. This judgment does the former, only the Supreme Court of

Ohio can do the latter. See supra ¶ 71-73.

B. Ohio Cases Support this Court’s Actions

{¶122} The dissent reads the case law cited by the majority too narrowly. The

Supreme Court of Ohio’s holdings are not so limited.

{¶123} In Mentor Lagoons, 31 Ohio St.3d 256, the Court held that a trial court has

the “‘inherent power to regulate the practice before it and protect the integrity of its

proceedings,’” including the “‘“authority and duty to see to the ethical conduct of

attorneys.”’” Id. at 259, quoting Royal Indemn. Co., 27 Ohio St.3d at 33-34, quoting Hahn,

95 Wash.2d at 34. The Court emphasized that “[t]his power is distinct from the

exclusive authority of the Supreme Court of Ohio over attorney disciplinary proceedings,

and does not conflict with such power.” (Citation omitted.) Mentor Lagoons at 259-260.

The dissent quotes this language but reads it as limiting a court’s authority to

disqualification. The Supreme Court, however, did not limit the authority to

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disqualification—it described the authority as a general power, the use of which for

disqualification is merely one application.

{¶124} Similarly, in Royal Indemn., the Court stated that “disciplinary proceedings,

contempt sanctions[,] and court revocation of pro hac vice privileges are distinct, but not

exclusive methods of addressing attorney misconduct,” and “the appropriateness of one

is not dependent on the availability of the another.” Id. at 620. The dissent reads this as

a mutually exclusive, closed list—three methods, no more. The Court’s point, however,

was the opposite: Multiple avenues for addressing misconduct coexist without eliminating

one another. The same observations can be attributed to the dissenting opinion’s

characterization of the opinions in DiCuccio, 2018-Ohio-2320 (10th Dist.), and Gamble,

2025-Ohio-2381 (12th Dist.). See supra ¶ 48-50.

C. The Gov.Bar R. V Exclusivity Argument Proves Too Much

{¶125} The dissent additionally asserts that Gov.Bar R. V is “the exclusive

mechanism for disciplining attorneys in Ohio” and the majority's approach usurps that

framework. But if the identification of professional-conduct violations in the course of a

sanctioning proceeding constitutes an unauthorized exercise of disciplinary authority,

then no Ohio court could articulate the basis for a contempt finding, a disqualification

order, or a frivolous-conduct fee award in any case where the misconduct at issue also

implicates the Rules of Professional Conduct. See supra at ¶ 44-46.

{¶126} Further, and significantly, the sanctions imposed in this matter are not

disciplinary sanctions. The majority fully understands and appreciates that disciplinary

sanctions, such as a license suspension or monitored probation, are within the Supreme

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Court of Ohio’s jurisdiction. This entry does not purport to trespass on those preserves.

See supra at ¶ 52 and ¶ 75.

D. The “Statewide Reach” Objection

{¶127} The dissent asserts that, somehow, the notification and certification

requirements would “interfere with the legal authority of other Ohio courts.” This entry

does not direct other courts to act or refrain from acting in any way. Rather, it simply

imposes obligations on respondent—an attorney who appeared before this court and

admittedly committed misconduct during the course of this court’s proceedings. The

sanctions at issue are measures directed at respondent and do not impact the function

or proceedings of other tribunals.

E. The Due Process Objection

{¶128} The dissent also claims that the sanctions “deprive respondent of even a

vestige of substantive or procedural due process.” To the contrary, respondent was

served with a show-cause order. See supra at ¶ 5. He filed a written response. He was

represented by counsel at an oral hearing at which he admitted his misconduct. He was

afforded an opportunity to file a post-hearing brief (and also granted additional time to file

a reply brief). See supra at ¶ 6-20. Respondent received all process he was due,

particularly in light of his admissions before the hearing panel. The majority recognizes

that the underlying proceedings are not akin to the process required under Gov.Bar R. V;

nevertheless, this only establishes that the instant matter is not an attempt to usurp those

proceedings. This matter proceeded to establish, acknowledge, and vindicate the integrity

of the judicial process in this court. Respondent was the beneficiary of the panoply of

procedural and substantive due process securities the Constitution and the judicial

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system can offer. It would be difficult to imagine what additional procedural safeguards

the dissent might demand.

F. The Issue of “Crisis”

{¶129} The dissent finally objects to the majority’s characterization of an

“[e]merging [c]risis of AI [m]isconduct” and alleges the majority uses the crisis to justify

overreach, i.e., the dissent asserts the majority’s view is a mere Machiavellian way for the

ends to justify the means. This is an improper characterization.

{¶130} The observation that AI related misconduct is proliferating in courts across

the country is not a mere rhetorical statement, it is an empirical fact. The point of the

“crisis” discussion is not that a crisis justifies extraordinary powers, but that the ordinary

inherent authority of courts must be applied to new forms of misconduct as they evolve

and arise. The submission of AI-generated fabrications to a court is a relatively new

phenomenon, but the court’s authority to address fraud upon a tribunal is ancient.

{¶131} The dissent’s closing point—that “integrity in the courts should start with

courts and judges exercising authority within lawful bounds”—is one with which the

majority fully agrees. This court has exercised its authority within lawful bounds and

afforded the respondent with fundamental procedural protection. We differ with the

dissent’s limiting estimation of our authority under the circumstances.

VIII. CONCLUSION

{¶132} The rapid integration of artificial intelligence into the practice of law presents

both extraordinary promise and extraordinary peril. AI tools, when used responsibly and

under appropriate supervision, have the potential to improve access to justice, increase

efficiency, and enhance the quality of legal services. But when AI tools are used without

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verification, without supervision, and without the exercise of the independent professional

judgment that is the hallmark of competent legal representation, the results can be

devastating.

{¶133} This case illustrates the peril. An attorney who, by his own counsel’s

admission, was sophisticated in his understanding of AI tools permitted a non-attorney

staff member to use a public generative AI platform to prepare an appellate filing. The AI

tool fabricated transcript quotations—attributing specific, inflammatory statements to a

real prosecutor that were never spoken. The attorney filed the document without verifying

its contents. When the fabrications were identified, he did not correct the record. He

appealed this court’s denial of the tainted application to the Supreme Court of Ohio

without disclosing the fabrications. He proffered an AI policy that itself appeared to have

been generated by AI, complete with unfilled placeholder brackets. Two months after a

sanctions hearing, a filing in another court bore the unmistakable hallmarks of unchecked

AI output, including a ChatGPT prompt embedded in the text of a legal brief.

{¶134} This court does not write to condemn the use of artificial intelligence in the

practice of law. To the contrary, this court recognizes that AI is an inevitable and

potentially beneficial feature of modern legal practice. But the use of AI does not relieve

an attorney of any of the obligations imposed by the Rules of Professional Conduct, by

the rules of court, or by the oath of admission to the bar. An attorney who files a document

containing AI-generated content is responsible for that content, fully and without

qualification. The duty to verify, the duty of candor, the duty of competence, and the duty

of supervision cannot be delegated to a machine.

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{¶135} The sanctions imposed herein are proportionate, individually justified, and

collectively designed to serve the purposes for which the court’s sanctioning authority

exists: to compensate for harm, to deter future misconduct, to protect the integrity of the

judicial process, to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice, and to

ensure that the practice of law remains a profession grounded in truth, accuracy, and

candor.

ROBERT J. PATTON, J., concurs,

JOHN J. EKLUND, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with a Dissenting Opinion.

---

JOHN J. EKLUND, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with a Dissenting Opinion.

{¶136} I agree that Respondent’s conduct should be referred to the Office of

Disciplinary Counsel, and I concur in our imposing a $2,000.00 fine paid to the Ashtabula

County Prosecutor’s Office for frivolous conduct. However, I respectfully dissent from the

remainder of the Decision.

{¶137} Today, without statutory or rule-based authority, and without binding

precedent to support doing it, we assert authority to act as the investigator, factfinder, and

judge to adjudicate whether an Ohio lawyer has violated various Rules of Professional

Conduct. The only basis for our doing so is asserted to be a court’s “inherent authority.”

{¶138} That courts have “inherent authority” cannot reasonably be gainsaid. Ceol

v. Zion Industries, Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 286, 289 (9th Dist. 1992) (Courts “possess

inherent power to do all things necessary to the administration of justice and to protect

their own powers and processes” through the imposition of sanctions “against parties or

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their attorneys when the judicial process is abused.”). However, its parameters are

defined, in the absence of some federal constitutional mandate, by the laws and historical

record of the state that constituted and governs the court. Yet, our ruling is grounded

largely on federal court decisions addressing the authority of federal courts and non-Ohio

state court decisions addressing the authority of non-Ohio state courts. These

precedents do not bind us, much less define the scope of our authority.

{¶139} The first question, then, is whether the cases we cite and rely on (or

anything else) support the proposition that this Court’s inherent authority includes the

authority to adjudicate violations of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.

{¶140} We reference the contempt powers of the Court, finding Respondent’s

behavior to be “contemptuous and committed in violation of Civ.R. 11 and . . . sufficient

to warrant sanctions under the court’s inherent and contempt authority as well as Civ.R.

11.” (Decision at ¶ 87).

{¶141} A finding of contempt is subject to review on two levels: “[f]irst, the

contemptuous conduct must be examined to see whether it constituted a direct or indirect

contempt. Second, the trial court’s treatment of the matter must be analyzed in order to

ascertain whether the contemnor was dealt with under the court’s civil or criminal

contempt powers.” In re Cox, 1999 WL 1312688, *3 (11th Dist. Dec. 23, 1999). We do

not engage in any examination or discussion of whether the contemptuous behavior

before us constituted direct or indirect contempt, nor do we determine whether the

sanctions imposed have been imposed as either civil or criminal sanctions. Although we

find Respondent’s conduct contemptuous, it is unclear to me that we find him in contempt

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at all. Instead, we appear to merely invoke the language of contempt for the imprimatur

of authority it bestows.

{¶142} More concerning, we invoke Civ.R. 11 as a basis for our authority to issue

sanctions. However, Civ.R. 11 only applies to original actions before this Court. See

State ex rel. Ware v. Vigluicci, 2024-Ohio-5492, ¶ 7. It does not apply to conduct in

appellate proceedings. In re Estate of Garza, 2016-Ohio-5531, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.); State v.

Baker, 2023-Ohio-855, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). Despite a footnote saying otherwise, we do not

sit as a trial court over appellate proceedings to reopen an appeal. See App.R. 26(B);

Eleventh Dist.Loc.R. 1; Decision at ¶ 48, fn. 1. Nor do I find the Ohio state precedent we

rely on to be compelling. As outlined below, neither Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 31

Ohio St.3d 256 (1987), Royal Indemn. Co. v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 27 Ohio St.3d 31

(1986), DiCuccio v. Lindsmith, 2018-Ohio-2320 (10th Dist.), nor Gamble v. Gamble,

2025-Ohio-2381 (12th Dist.), addressed what we decide today. See Decision at ¶ 47-50.

None of them condoned a definition of an Ohio court’s “inherent authority” to include the

power to find that a lawyer has violated the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct and to

impose any sanction for doing so. Why not? Because none of the lower courts in those

proceedings had deigned to find such a violation and to impose any sanction based on

it (whether under the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Professional

Conduct).

{¶143} Conduct that justifies a court invoking its “inherent authority” could also

warrant official discipline under the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules for the

Government of the Bar and, I believe, vice versa. See Royal Indemn. at 34. That does

not mean that a tribunal other than the Ohio Supreme Court can adjudicate and punish

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violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct any more than it means that the Supreme

Court can hold a lawyer in contempt for conduct before an inferior court.

{¶144} So, the Ohio cases we cite and rely on do not support the sweeping

pronouncements we make today.

{¶145} Mentor Lagoons, 31 Ohio St.3d 256, is a case with a very narrow ruling, but

we apply it expansively. It did not address a trial court’s finding that an attorney violated

any ethical rule, much less issuing sanctions for it. Instead, the case addressed “whether

a trial court may summarily refuse to allow an attorney to testify in a case in which he is

representing a litigant on the grounds that such testimony may be in violation of the Code

of Professional Responsibility.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 257-258. The Ohio Supreme

Court noted that DR 5-102 was not a “flat prohibition” against a lawyer testifying on behalf

of the client. Id. at 258. The Court held that the ethical rules did not render such testimony

inadmissible and that a trial court’s refusal to allow a lawyer to testify can constitute

prejudicial error. Id. at 259.

{¶146} Certainly, the Court noted that a trial court’s inherent authority includes the

“authority of dismissal or disqualification [of a lawyer] from a case if an attorney cannot,

or will not, comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

But, it also cautioned that this part of the lower court’s inherent authority was “distinct

from the exclusive authority of the Supreme Court of Ohio over attorney disciplinary

proceedings and does not conflict with such power.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

{¶147} Likewise, in Royal Indemn., 27 Ohio St.3d 31, the Ohio Supreme Court

never said a lower court’s “inherent authority” supplants the exclusive province of the

Ohio Supreme Court over disciplining lawyers. See id. at 33. The trial court had revoked

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the pro hac vice status of an attorney for purposefully misleading opposing counsel about

the existence of certain requested discovery documents. Id. at 36. The trial court found

that the “misrepresentations amounted to egregious misconduct which could taint and

diminish the integrity of future proceedings.” Id. The trial court neither adjudged an ethical

violation nor acted to sanction one.

{¶148} The Ohio Supreme Court did say that an attorney may be subject to

disciplinary proceedings falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ohio Supreme Court

for the same conduct that led to a contempt citation or the revocation of his
pro hac vice admission by the trial judge. . . . Therefore, revocation of pro
hac vice admissions, disciplinary procedures and contempt sanctions are
separate and distinct methods of addressing attorney misconduct, and the
appropriateness of one is not dependent on the availability of another.

Id. at 34.

{¶149} Royal Indemn. does not support our findings of violations of the Ohio Rules

of Professional Conduct or the expansive suite of sanctions we purport to impose today.

Nor do DiCuccio, 2018-Ohio-2320 (10th Dist.), or Gamble, 2025-Ohio-2381 (12th Dist.).

They both addressed only the assessment of attorney fees or financial sanctions for

frivolous conduct. DiCuccio at ¶ 26, 30; Gamble at ¶ 26. Neither case determined that

an attorney had violated an ethical obligation or imposed a sanction unrelated to the

financial burden caused by the frivolous conduct, as today’s judgment does.

{¶150} We need not, and do not, use this case to define comprehensively an Ohio

court’s “inherent authority.” But, whatever it is, it does not include the authority to

adjudicate a lawyer’s alleged violation(s) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Ohio has

a framework, promulgated by our Supreme Court pursuant to power bestowed by our

State Constitution and enabled by our state legislature, for addressing such allegations.

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See Gov.Bar R. V. That framework provides for extensive investigation, multiple levels

of review clothed in procedural and substantive due process, evidentiary hearings,

recommendations, and, ultimately, consideration and decision by the Supreme Court.

And that framework, by its terms, mandates that “all . . . proceedings for the discipline of

. . . attorneys . . . shall be brought, conducted, and disposed of in accordance” with its

terms. Gov.Bar R. V(2)(A). It is the exclusive mechanism for disciplining attorneys in

Ohio. We cannot and should not usurp that legal framework under the guise of exercising

some amorphous “inherent” authority.

{¶151} Respondent filed a motion that asserted as fact things that are palpably and

demonstrably untrue and swore to the Court by affidavit that they were true. He failed to

withdraw the filing when it was rightfully and undeniably challenged. In doing so, he

falsely aspersed fellow officers of the court and a trial court judge. His actions are a

paradigm of contumacious indecorum and disrespect for the judicial process and this

Court. We should sanction him; however, we cannot and should not adjudicate his

culpability under the Rules of Professional Conduct.

{¶152} My dissent is further fueled by our purporting to impose sanctions on

Respondent that go beyond what we are legally empowered to do. I do not question the

imposition of the $2,000.00 fine paid to the Ashtabula County Prosecutor’s Office for

Respondent’s conduct, nor do I question our referring Respondent’s conduct to the Office

of Disciplinary Counsel (although I do not understand why we need to announce it in a

decision). But, we proceed to order, for example, Respondent (1) to serve upon any court

in which he appears or practices a copy of our Decision; (2) to include a signed verification

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with any filing he makes in any Ohio Court; (3) to complete continuing legal education;

and (4) to write apology letters to a judge and lawyers.

{¶153} All of these sanctions exceed the “authority” we invoke to impose

them. “Inherent” and contempt authority are, at bottom, tools “vested in courts to manage

their own affairs.” (Emphasis added.) Link v. Wabash RR. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962).

I am unable to divine how compelled filings and verifications in other courts around the

state, compelled continuing education, or compelled letter writing manages our

affairs. Moreover, our contempt authority is, I believe, the authority to hold persons or

entities in contempt and to punish accordingly. I am unaware of any circumstance in

which a court can impose contempt sanctions on someone without having held them in

contempt.

{¶154} Moreover, the reach of these orders is virtually statewide and arguably

interferes with the legal authority (inherent or otherwise) of other Ohio courts. These

orders purport to do nothing short of regulating and policing the practice of law throughout

Ohio, which is the exclusive province of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Ohio Const., Art. IV,

§ 2(B)(1)(g).

{¶155} Perhaps most importantly, our findings and resulting sanctions deprive

Respondent of even a vestige of substantive or procedural due process to which the

Rules of Professional Conduct, the Rules for the Government of the Bar, and common

decency entitle him.

{¶156} This overreach is not justified by any “Emerging Crisis of AI Misconduct” or

a “crisis of integrity in the courts.” Decision at ¶ 76-78. The integrity of or in the courts

depends, as it always has, on the same things on which the integrity of any human

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institution depends: The human beings who function within them. The mechanisms,

devices, or other tools they use do not cause mischief. All of them can be used for good

or for ill; the character of the user is what makes the difference.

{¶157} Integrity in the courts should start with courts and judges exercising

authority within lawful bounds. Today, in my view, we overstep those bounds. To do so

in the name of a “crisis” is to suggest that “the ends justify the means.” That is a way to

foster a crisis, not avert it.

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JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the decision of this court, this court imposes the following

sanctions:

A. Monetary Sanction: $2,000 Fine, With Credit for $2,000 Already Paid

Respondent shall pay a monetary sanction in the amount of $2,000. Respondent

shall receive credit for the $2,000 payment already made to the Ashtabula County

Prosecutor’s Office pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement.

B. Referral to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel

This court refers respondent’s conduct to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the

Supreme Court of Ohio (ODC) for investigation.

The administrator of this court shall send a copy of this judgment entry, with a

notation of referral, to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel via electronic mail upon its filing.

C. Service Upon Courts and Judges for Two Years

For a period of two years from the date of this judgment entry, respondent shall

serve a copy of this judgment entry upon the presiding judge or administrative judge of

every court in which respondent files a new appearance, enters a new case, or otherwise

undertakes representation. Such service shall be made within 14 days of respondent’s

first filing in each such court. Respondent shall file proof of such service with this court

within seven days of serving each judge.

D. Certification and Verification Requirements for Future Filings

For a period of two years from the date of this judgment entry, every filing submitted

by respondent to any Ohio court shall include a signed certification that:

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(a) all citations to legal authority contained in the filing have
been independently verified by the attorney of record as being
real, accurately quoted, and still valid;

(b) all quotations attributed to any person, transcript, or
document have been verified against the original source by
the attorney of record;

(c) all factual representations contained in the filing have been
verified by the attorney of record as having evidentiary
support in the record or other reliable source;

(d) to the extent any portion of the filing was drafted with the
assistance of a generative artificial intelligence tool, the
attorney of record has disclosed the use of such tool and has
independently verified all AI-generated content; and

(e) the attorney of record has personally reviewed the entire
filing for accuracy, completeness, and compliance with all
applicable rules.

E. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

Within 150 days of the filing of this judgment entry, respondent shall complete no

fewer than six hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) specifically focused on the

following topics: (a) the ethical use of artificial intelligence in the practice of law; (b) the

professional responsibility implications of AI-generated content; (c) attorney supervision

of nonlawyer assistants in the context of AI tools; and (d) candor toward the tribunal and

the duty to verify filings. These CLE hours shall be in addition to, and not counted toward,

respondent’s regular biennial CLE requirements.

Respondent shall file proof of completion with this court within seven days of

completing the required CLE. Respondent’s counsel indicated at the August 28, 2025

hearing that respondent had voluntarily completed some CLE courses related to AI. While

this court acknowledges and credits respondent’s voluntary efforts, the CLE required by

this order is a separate, mandatory obligation that must be fulfilled in its entirety.

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F. Striking of the Application to Reopen

The application to reopen filed by respondent on May 19, 2025, is hereby stricken

from the record of this court.

G. Removal of Respondent as Counsel for Malikhi Jermaine Coleman

Respondent is hereby removed as counsel for Malikhi Jermaine Coleman in this

case and in any related proceedings. Respondent shall take no further action on behalf

of Mr. Coleman in this court.

Nothing in this order prevents Mr. Coleman from retaining new counsel or from

pursuing any remedies to which he may be entitled, including but not limited to a new

application to reopen supported by legitimate, verified legal authority. The new application

to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the filing of this judgment entry.

Respondent shall, within 14 days of the filing of this judgment entry, serve a copy

of this order upon Mr. Coleman, together with a written explanation, in plain and

understandable language, of the nature of respondent’s misconduct and the reasons

respondent has been removed as Mr. Coleman’s counsel. Respondent shall inform Mr.

Coleman that he has the right to retain new counsel or to proceed pro se and shall provide

Mr. Coleman with the contact information for the Ohio Public Defender’s Office and the

Ashtabula County Public Defender’s Office. Respondent shall file proof of such service

and communication with this court within seven days of effectuating the same.

H. Written Apologies to Persons Defamed by the Fabricated Filing

Respondent shall, within 30 days of the filing of this judgment entry, deliver written

letters of apology to each of the following persons:

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(a) the Ashtabula County trial prosecutor who conducted the
closing argument in State v. Coleman, for the false attribution
of inflammatory statements that the prosecutor never made;

(b) the trial court judge who presided over State v. Coleman,
for the implicit accusation that the judge permitted
uncorrected prosecutorial misconduct; and

(c) the trial attorney and prior appellate counsel for Mr.
Coleman on direct appeal, for the implicit accusations that
they collectively failed to object to, and thereafter raise, a
meritorious claim of prosecutorial misconduct.

Each of the four letters shall acknowledge that the statements attributed to these

individuals, or the professional failures attributed to these individuals, in the application to

reopen were false, were generated by an artificial intelligence tool, and were filed without

verification. Each letter shall be accompanied by a copy of this judgment entry.

Respondent shall file copies of the letters and proof of delivery with this court within seven

days of sending the letters.

COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT

Respondent shall comply fully and timely with each sanction imposed by this order.

This court retains jurisdiction to enforce this order and to address any failure to comply.

Failure to comply with any provision of this order may result in contempt

proceedings pursuant to R.C. 2705.02 and this court’s inherent contempt authority.

Contempt sanctions for noncompliance may include additional monetary fines,

imprisonment, or both, as this court deems necessary to vindicate the authority of the

court and to compel compliance.

Respondent shall maintain a record of compliance with each provision of this order

and shall, upon request by this court, produce such records for review

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THE CLERK OF COURTS IS INSTRUCTED to STRIKE Malikhi Jermaine

Coleman’s May 19, 2025 application to reopen from the record of this appeal.

THE CLERK OF COURTS IS FURTHER INSTRUCTED to SERVE Malikhi

Jermaine Coleman, PID#A811-740, North Central Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 1812,

670 Marion-Williamsport Road, East, Marion, OH 43301, with a time-stamped copy of this

decision and judgment entry.

JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI

JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON,
concurs

JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND,
concurs in part and dissents in part
with a Dissenting Opinion

THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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