State v. Bunton - Convictions Vacated Due to Biased Juror

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April 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Bunton

Court of Appeals of Utah

• Citations: 2026 UT App 59

• Docket Number: Case No. 20240392-CA

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (28.3K)

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Combined Opinion

2026 UT App 59

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
BRIAN KEITH BUNTON,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20240392-CA
Filed April 16, 2026

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Adam T. Mow
No. 211907350

Sarah J. Carlquist, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Emily Sopp,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN M. HARRIS
concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Brian Keith Bunton laced mugs of hot chocolate with
ketamine and served them to his wife and young stepdaughter.
Bunton’s wife and stepdaughter both reacted badly to the drug
and sought medical treatment. As these events unfolded, the
stepdaughter disclosed to her mother that she had been sexually
abused by Bunton on numerous occasions. Bunton was charged
with and convicted on multiple counts of aggravated sexual abuse
of a child, as well as one count each of child endangerment and
surreptitious administration of a substance.

¶2 Bunton appeals on multiple grounds, claiming that the
district court erred in failing to excuse a biased juror and
State v. Bunton

admitting DNA evidence, that he received constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to
object to the admission of a recorded conversation, and that he
was prejudiced by cumulative error. We address only the juror
bias issue because we agree that the district court erred in failing
to strike a biased juror for cause and therefore vacate the
convictions on that basis and remand the case for a new trial.

BACKGROUND 1

Alleged Sexual Abuse

¶3 On March 19, 2021, Bunton made three mugs of hot
chocolate: one for him, one for his wife (Mother), and one for his
stepdaughter (Stepdaughter), who was thirteen at the time.
Unbeknownst to Mother or Stepdaughter, two of the mugs were
laced with ketamine. Bunton later asserted that he had acquired
the ketamine from a friend and intended to use it as a “love
potion” to provide Mother with a “euphoric sexual experience.”
He claimed that he accidentally gave one of the ketamine-laced
mugs to Stepdaughter, who drank it before Bunton realized his
mistake. Ater consuming the drink, both Mother and
Stepdaughter became so ill that they thought they were going to
die. Both of them made their way out of the house and lay on the
lawn, where they said their goodbyes to each other. While they
were lying on the lawn, Stepdaughter asked Mother, “What if
[Bunton] did something?” In response to Mother’s and
Stepdaughter’s reaction to the ketamine, Bunton did not call an
ambulance. Instead, he drove the two to the emergency room.
There, doctors determined that whatever had caused the

1. “When reviewing a challenge to a criminal conviction, we recite the facts from the record in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” State v. Moore, 2009 UT App 386, n.1, 223 P.3d 1137 (cleaned up), aff’d, 2012 UT 62, 289 P.3d 48.

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State v. Bunton

symptoms was “transient,” and after Mother and Stepdaughter
started feeling better, they were discharged.

¶4 The morning after being released from the hospital, Mother
asked Stepdaughter what she had meant by the question about
Bunton doing “something.” Stepdaughter then told Mother that
Bunton had sexually abused her multiple times.

¶5 Stepdaughter claimed that Bunton had abused her in the
following ways. First, she said that Bunton had come into her
bedroom while she was watching something on her phone when
she was about eight years old, a few months after Bunton and
Mother had married. She claimed that Bunton stuck his hand up
her shirt and touched her breast and nipple under her bra for a
few minutes. The second act allegedly happened a few months
later when Stepdaughter was watching her tablet in the family’s
TV room. She claimed that Bunton sat down next to her and stuck
his hand down her shorts, inside her underwear, and touched her
vagina. Stepdaughter alleged that Bunton had also slapped her
buttocks on multiple occasions. Stepdaughter claimed that after
Mother had said something about the slapping being
inappropriate, Bunton continued to do it but did so only when no
one else was around. Stepdaughter also revealed that on the night
of the ketamine incident, Bunton had come into her room, sat on
her bed, and stuck his hand up her shirt to rub her back and her
breasts. Stepdaughter further claimed there were “a couple of
[other] incidents” of Bunton touching her breasts, but she could
not remember the specific details.

¶6 The State charged Bunton with three counts of aggravated
sexual abuse of a child for (1) touching Stepdaughter’s vagina, (2)
slapping Stepdaughter’s buttocks, and (3) touching
Stepdaughter’s breast. It was later clarified that the conduct
underlying the charges for touching Stepdaughter’s breast and
vagina occurred between June 2016 and January 2018. And the
conduct supporting the charge for touching Stepdaughter’s

20240392-CA 3 2026 UT App 59
State v. Bunton

buttocks occurred between January 2017 and March 18, 2021,
which was the day before the ketamine incident. Accordingly, the
touching that allegedly occurred during the ketamine incident,
which happened on March 19, 2021, was not charged. However,
the State did charge Bunton with one count of endangerment of a
child and one count of surreptitious administration of a substance
in relation to the ketamine incident.

Jury Selection

¶7 As relevant here, one juror (Juror 23) expressed
reservations about whether he could be unbiased in his
deliberations. After the State had finished questioning him, Juror
23—unbidden—initiated this dialogue with the prosecutor:

Juror 23: I do have my own opinions about the . . .
case I guess involving children. And I do have
young children. And I . . . hope I would be able to
maintain my composure I guess is what I’m
saying, because it is a sensitive case when you
have kids. I’m sure you know.
Prosecutor: Yeah. Ultimately, both the State and the
Defense, you know, we are looking for a jury
that’s going to base their decision only on the
evidence that’s presented in court. And so
that’s—
Juror 23: Right.
Prosecutor: —just, ultimately, our question is, can
you satisfy those things and really listen to the
evidence here that’s presented in the . . .
courtroom and base your decision solely on that
evidence?
Juror 23: Okay. Judging by the facts that it’s a . . .
child assault—is that what it was? Sexual assault

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State v. Bunton

on children? I don’t think I’d be able to give an
unbiased opinion on the . . . case.
Prosecutor: Why do you think that?
Juror 23: Why do I think that?
Prosecutor: Yeah.
Juror 23: Because I see my kids every day, and I love
my kids. And I would—I don’t know if I would
reflect back on my kids during the case. And I
just—I don’t know.
Prosecutor: So I guess—
Juror 23: I’m just telling you my—I’m just—
Prosecutor: Yeah.
Juror 23: —telling you my—my truthful, you know,
opinion on it.
Prosecutor: And that’s—
Juror 23: I’m not trying to get out of it or anything.
I’m just trying to . . . .

¶8 The prosecutor then tried to convince Juror 23 that having
children did not constitute grounds for automatic disqualification
of a potential juror for this category of trials:

Prosecutor: And we appreciate your honesty. That’s
what we’re trying to get at. The only thing is, is
that both the State and the Defense deserve a fair
trial. And it’s not like we, you know, the State is
going to receive a fair trial if we have no one
with—you know, all the jurors have no kids, and
they don’t care—
Juror 23: Right.

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State v. Bunton

Prosecutor: —about kids. And they, you know, think
that these kinds of charges aren’t that big of a
deal. I mean, you—
Juror 23: I understand.
Prosecutor: —can understand why—so what we’re
really asking is, is—and we understand you have
children. But you need to kind of set that aside
and not use that as evidence in the case. You need
to view the witnesses and . . . decide whether
they’re telling the truth or not. Is that
something—
Juror 23: Okay.
Prosecutor: —you can do or not?
Juror 23: Then I would do that, yes.
Prosecutor: Okay. I don’t have any further questions.

Bunton’s counsel then followed up with this question:

Bunton’s Counsel: [I]f the evidence presented that it
was a teenager making these allegations, would
that change your ability in any way or your
answers—
Juror 23: Well, I’ve already stated that once it comes
to the case, I would try it as a—or give my
opinion only on the facts. And that’s what I said
at the end there, so.
Bunton’s Counsel: Understood.

¶9 The court then called for discussion on Juror 23. The
prosecutor argued, “I think he was very clear at the end that he
understood. He would base his decision on the evidence.”
Bunton’s counsel responded, “I tried to clarify with him about [a]
teenager maybe being different. . . . But his first answer was saying

20240392-CA 6 2026 UT App 59
State v. Bunton

that, because—he would have a difficult time, because he would
be imagining his own kids. I’m going to ask to strike him for
cause.” The court denied the motion: “I’m going to deny the
motion to strike him. I mean, . . . his answers have . . . left me with
the idea that he can be fair and impartial. I did not expect to get to
that conclusion after initially hearing from him. But since, I . . .
think he can be.”

Trial

¶10 At trial, Mother and Stepdaughter testified consistently
with the events as summarized above. Bunton’s father-in-law also
testified, saying that Bunton had told him about getting the
ketamine, lacing the hot chocolate with it, and accidentally giving
it to Stepdaughter.

¶11 The jury acquitted Bunton on the charge of aggravated
sexual abuse related to slapping Stepdaughter’s buttocks, but it
otherwise convicted Bunton as charged.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 Bunton appeals, arguing that the district court erred in
seating a biased juror. A district court has a certain amount of
discretion when deciding whether to grant a motion to excuse a
juror for cause, and we reverse only when a court exceeds the
bounds of that discretion. State v. Ellis, 2020 UT App 119, ¶ 10, 473
P.3d 211. We review the district court’s exercise of that discretion,
however, “in light of the fact that it is a simple matter to obviate
any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and

20240392-CA 7 2026 UT App 59
State v. Bunton

selecting another.” State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 25, 24 P.3d 948
(cleaned up). 2

ANALYSIS

¶13 Bunton argues that the district court exceeded its discretion
when it seated Juror 23 over his counsel’s for-cause challenge.
Under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[n]o person may
serve as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge is convinced the
juror can and will act impartially and fairly.” Utah R. Crim. P.
18(e)(14). “When reviewing the propriety of a denial . . . of a
challenge for cause, we look to the entire voir dire exchange with
the challenged juror.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 41, 299 P.3d
892 (cleaned up). Ordinarily, “to prevail on a claim of error based
on the court’s failure to remove a prospective juror, a defendant
must demonstrate that (1) the court erred when it failed to excuse
a prospective juror for cause, and (2) the error prejudiced the
defendant, or, in other words, that a member of the jury that was
empaneled was partial or incompetent.” Id. (cleaned up). This
means that “a defendant suffers prejudice when . . . denied a fair
trial because a biased juror sat on the jury.” State v. King, 2008 UT
54, ¶ 18, 190 P.3d 1283. In other words, “the presence of a biased
juror, like the presence of a biased judge, is a structural defect in
the constitution of the trial mechanism that defies harmless error
analysis. For these reasons, the seating of a biased juror who

1. Bunton also raises (1) a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the stipulated admission of exhibits containing unredacted recordings of phone calls in which Bunton discussed possible prison sentences and themes of religious repentance and forgiveness with his adult stepson, (2) a claim that the district court erred in allowing certain DNA evidence to be admitted, and (3) a claim of cumulative error. Because we determine that Bunton is entitled to a new trial based on his first claim of error, we need not address these additional issues on appeal.

20240392-CA 8 2026 UT App 59
State v. Bunton

should have been dismissed for cause requires reversal of the
conviction.” State v. Carrera, 2022 UT App 100, ¶ 83, 517 P.3d 440
(cleaned up).

¶14 Our supreme court has articulated the following standard
to determine whether a district court abused its discretion in
declining to remove a prospective juror for cause:

Once statements are made during voir dire that
facially raise a question of partiality or prejudice, an
abuse of discretion occurs unless the challenged
juror is removed by the court or unless the court or
counsel investigates further and finds the inference
rebutted. Rebuttal is accomplished by showing that
a juror’s statement was merely the product of a light
impression and not one that would close the mind
against the testimony that may be offered in
opposition.

State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 27, 24 P.3d 948 (cleaned up). Applying
this standard to the case at hand, we conclude that the district
court exceeded its discretion when it denied Bunton’s for-cause
challenge to Juror 23.

¶15 Juror 23’s statements during voir dire would cause any
reasonable person to suspect that he could not act impartially. Just
as his individual voir dire was wrapping up, Juror 23
spontaneously disclosed, “I do have my own opinions about the
. . . case I guess involving children. And I do have young children.
And I . . . hope I would be able to maintain my composure . . . .”
Obviously aware that Juror 23’s disposition was problematic, the
prosecutor asked him if he could “really listen to the evidence
here that’s presented in the . . . courtroom and base [his] decision
solely on that evidence”—essentially begging Juror 23 to give it
the old college try and make his best effort. Juror 23 remained
unconvinced and came back with an unvarnished answer: “I
don’t think I’d be able to give an unbiased opinion on the . . . case.”

20240392-CA 9 2026 UT App 59
State v. Bunton

And he even provided insight into his thought process: “Because
I see my kids every day, and I love my kids. And . . . I don’t know
if I would reflect back on my kids during the case. And I just—I
don’t know.”

¶16 This was a clear and unequivocal expression of actual bias.
“The most characteristic feature of prejudice is its inability to
recognize itself. It is unrealistic to expect that any but the most
sensitive and thoughtful jurors (frequently those least likely to be
biased) will have the personal insight, candor and openness to
raise their hands in court and declare themselves biased.” State v.
Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1984). But that is exactly what we
have here—a juror with the insight, candor, openness, and
fundamental integrity to offer an unsolicited admission that he
would be unable to set aside his personal feelings about child
sexual abuse such that he could be an impartial factfinder.

¶17 The question then becomes whether the prosecutor’s
subsequent questioning sufficiently rebutted this inference. The
short answer is that it didn’t. Rather than investigating the depth
of the bias, the prosecutor engaged in a line of questioning that
suggested to Juror 23 that the State could not “receive a fair trial”
if jurors with children were excluded. The prosecutor told Juror
23 that he should “kind of set [having children of his own] aside”
and just “decide whether [the witnesses at trial were] telling the
truth or not.” Given this take on the situation, Juror 23 eventually
acquiesced, stating, “Then I would do that, yes.”

¶18 “It is not enough if a juror believes that he or she can be
impartial and fair.” Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 33. Indeed, a statement
from a juror expressing an intention “to be fair and impartial loses
much of its meaning in light of other testimony and facts which
suggest a bias. Accordingly, the court, not the juror, must
determine a juror’s qualification.” Id. (cleaned up). Here, Juror
23’s agreement—after some persuading—that he would “kind of
set . . . aside” his personal misgivings and try to determine if the

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State v. Bunton

witnesses were telling the truth does not change the fact that he—
explicitly and spontaneously—stated that he did not “think [he
would] be able to give an unbiased opinion on the . . . case.”

¶19 Rebuttal of bias must show that the juror’s prior statement
was merely the product of a “light impression.” Id. ¶ 27 (cleaned
up). It was not enough for Juror 23 to eventually state that he
thought he could be fair when he assented to the prosecutor’s
question. “While jurors ordinarily might place more weight on a
judge’s comments than those of the State, the State’s
representative commands similar respect, and with that respect
the same inherent danger exists that, when improperly prompted,
a juror will attempt to say the ‘right’ thing or otherwise please the
prosecutor with certain responses.” State v. Williams, 2018 UT App
96, ¶ 28, 427 P.3d 434. Here, the questioning by the prosecutor
wasn’t designed to find out if Juror 23 was truly biased; instead,
its purpose was to convince Juror 23 that he really wasn’t biased.
But the suggestive questioning here to get the answer the
prosecutor wanted did little to address the glaring issue of Juror
23’s self-professed bias.

¶20 Even when the prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate him,
Juror 23 never backtracked on his assertion of personal bias. The
prosecutor asked him if he could “really listen to the evidence
here that’s presented in the . . . courtroom and base [his] decision
solely on that evidence.” And Juror 23 responded in no uncertain
terms, saying that he didn’t “think [he’d] be able to give an
unbiased opinion on the . . . case.” The prosecutor pressed on and
asked him if he could “view the witnesses and . . . decide whether
they’re telling the truth or not.” Juror 23 said he “would do that.”
And when Bunton’s counsel followed up, Juror 23 went only so
far as to say that he would “try” to “give [his] opinion only on the
facts.” This is a far cry from any kind of assertion that he would
not be biased. And these prompted concessions fall far short of
providing a reasonable basis to overcome Juror 23’s unabashed
and forthright initial assertion that he had no confidence in his

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State v. Bunton

ability to proceed in an unbiased fashion in a case of this nature.
On the contrary, these admissions do very little to address Juror
23’s original confession of bias and his expressed uncertainty as
to whether he could maintain his composure. 3

1. To be clear, our conclusion that Juror 23 was biased is not based on the fact that he had children. He was biased because he said— out loud and without being prompted—that the fact that he had children made him biased. Not everyone who has children feels this way. Accordingly, our conclusion that Juror 23 was biased in no way suggests that everyone who has children is ipso facto barred from jury service in child-abuse-related cases. But people who have children and who feel—because of their parental sensitivities—that they can’t be fair and impartial in child-abuse- related cases are barred from jury service in such cases. This bar arises not because they have children but because they feel that they can’t be fair and impartial owing to their parental status. Accordingly, the State’s concern that it cannot get a fair trial if people with children are barred from the jury pool is unfounded. It doesn’t matter if a juror is a parent, but it makes all the difference if that juror expressly, spontaneously, and adamantly maintains that he or she cannot be unbiased owing to the juror’s parenthood. Hence this is a question not of parental status but of a person’s state of mind. “A prospective juror’s status, whether that be professional, social, or whatever, is not by itself a sufficient ground for disqualifying the juror”—rather, it is that prospective juror’s “state of mind, in which could inhere some bias, prejudice, or preconception, that would render the person partial and hence unfit as a juror.” Hernandez v. State, 742 A.2d 952, 962 (Md. 1999) (cleaned up). “Short of those instances where there is a demonstrably strong correlation between the status in question and a mental state that gives rise to cause for disqualification, mere status or acquaintance is insufficient to establish cause for disqualification of a prospective juror.” Dingle v. State, 759 A.2d 819, 825 (Md. 2000) (cleaned up).

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State v. Bunton

¶21 Because Juror 23’s initial, unsolicited admission of bias was
not sufficiently rebutted by his assent to the prosecutor’s
persuasive suggestions, the district court exceeded its discretion
in denying the motion to strike. And because a biased juror sat on
the panel, Bunton was prejudiced, so we must vacate his
convictions. See Carrera, 2022 UT App 100, ¶ 83.

CONCLUSION

¶22 The district court exceeded its discretion in denying the
motion to strike Juror 23 for cause. On that basis, we vacate
Bunton’s convictions and remand this matter for a new trial.

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