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March 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Armstead

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 999
• Docket Number: 25AP-475

• Judges: Dingus

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (59.3K)

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Syllabus

On appeal from a criminal sentence, imposed pursuant to a guilty plea, that included a non-mandatory two-year prison term for felonious assault and a mandatory one-year prison term for a firearm specification attached to the felonious-assault offense. Because the felonious assault offense had an attendant firearm specification, a prison term was required by R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) as interpreted in State v. Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772. Because the prison term was required by R.C. 2929.13(F)(8), it was a "mandatory prison term" as defined in R.C. 2929.01(X). The trial court erred in designating the two-year prison term for felonious assault as non-mandatory. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Armstead, 2026-Ohio-999.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 25AP-475
(C.P.C. No. 24CR-3374)
v. :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
William D. Armstead, Jr., :

Defendant-Appellee. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on March 24, 2026

On brief: Shayla D. Favor, Prosecuting Attorney, and
Seth L. Gilbert, for appellee. Argued: Seth L. Gilbert.

On brief: Elizabeth R. Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and
Mallorie A. Thomas, for appellant. Argued: Mallorie A.
Thomas.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
DINGUS, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, State of Ohio, appeals a judgment of the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas, which imposed an aggregate prison term of 15 to 20.5 years
following a guilty plea by defendant-appellee, William D. Armstead, Jr., to involuntary
manslaughter, robbery, felonious assault, and one firearm specification. Included in
Armstead’s sentence was a two-year prison term for felonious assault and a one-year prison
term for the attendant firearm specification. The trial court held that Armstead’s two-year
term was mandatory, meaning the trial court was required to impose a prison term, but
Armstead’s service of the sentence was non-mandatory, meaning that the two-year term
would generally be eligible for reduction through judicial release or other statutory
No. 25AP-475 2

measures. We conclude that we are obligated to reverse the trial court’s sentencing decision
pursuant to State v. Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} The charges in this case arose from a juvenile complaint against Armstead.
After the juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction, the state indicted Armstead on counts of
felony murder, aggravated robbery, and felonious assault, along with accompanying three-
year firearm specifications. The state alleged that Armstead and two codefendants were
involved in an altercation with two other individuals at a gas station, during which all three
of the codefendants brandished firearms and one of them fatally shot A.C.
{¶ 3} Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Armstead pleaded guilty to
involuntary manslaughter, robbery, and felonious assault, along with a single, one-year
firearm specification. The parties jointly recommended prison terms of 11 to 16.5 years for
involuntary manslaughter, one year for robbery, two years for felonious assault, and one
year for the firearm specification. The parties agreed that the sentences would be served
consecutively to one another, but they did not agree that service of the two-year term for
felonious assault was mandatory as a result of the corresponding firearm specification.
{¶ 4} In deciding the issue, the trial court referenced a recently decided case from
the Supreme Court of Ohio, Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772, which held that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8)
requires a trial court to impose a prison term, rather than community control sanctions, for
a conviction on a felony offense that has an attendant firearm specification. The trial court
interpreted Logan to mean that the sentence for felonious assault was “required but not
mandatory.” (June 2, 2025 Tr. at 5.) The court therefore held that Armstead’s service of
the two-year term was not mandatory. The trial court otherwise imposed the parties’ jointly
recommended sentence, totaling 15 to 20.5 years.
{¶ 5} The state filed a timely notice of appeal, and the matter is now before this
court.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 6} The state assigns the following sole assignment of error for our review:
The trial court’s imposition of a non-mandatory prison term
on Count Three is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.
No. 25AP-475 3

III. Discussion
{¶ 7} In its sole assignment of error, the state asserts that Armstead’s non-
mandatory prison term for felonious assault is contrary to law because it does not comply
with the terms of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Logan, 2025-
Ohio-1772. The state argues that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) required the trial court to impose a
prison term, and because a prison term was required, it constituted a “mandatory prison
term” as defined by R.C. 2929.01(X). Statutory construction presents a legal issue, which
we review de novo. State v. Straley, 2014-Ohio-2139, ¶ 9.
A. Felony Sentencing Statutes
{¶ 8} The sentence for Armstead’s felonious-assault conviction, like any felony, is
governed by an expansive constellation of sentencing statutes. In addition to considering
the purposes of sentencing, the seriousness of the offense, and recidivism factors in R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12, the trial court must look to R.C. 2929.13 for guidance on the type and
extent of sanctions to impose. See State v. South, 2015-Ohio-3930, ¶ 13. If the court
imposes a prison term, it must choose a duration that is authorized in R.C. 2929.14. See id.
at ¶ 16. If the court imposes community control sanctions, it must comply with the rules
provided in R.C. 2929.15 to 2929.18. See State v. Conway, 2004-Ohio-1222, ¶ 35 (10th
Dist.). The court must also keep in mind the general rules governing concurrent and
consecutive sentencing, R.C. 2929.41, and maximum sentences, R.C. 2929.144, among
others. And here, the trial court must specifically consider the statutes governing felonious
assault, R.C. 2903.11, and the corresponding firearm specification, R.C. 2941.141. The
framework for the parties’ dispute primarily lies in the interplay between provisions in R.C.
2929.13 and 2929.14.
{¶ 9} R.C. 2929.14 provides ranges of minimum and maximum prison terms for
felony offenses by degree, R.C. 2929.14(A), as well as rules for consecutive sentencing, R.C.
2929.14(C). The bulk of the statute’s text, however, details the specialized prison terms that
a trial court must impose with respect to specifications and special conditions. See, e.g.,
R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) (firearm specifications attached to any felony offense); R.C.
2929.14(B)(8) (known-pregnancy specification attached to certain assault offenses); R.C.
2929.14(K) (violent-career-criminal firearm specification attached to any violent felony
offense by a violent career criminal). Many of these specialized provisions are referenced
No. 25AP-475 4

in R.C. 2929.13, which a trial court must consult to determine whether it may or must
impose a prison term or other sanctions in the first place.
{¶ 10} R.C. 2929.13 begins by granting a trial court the broad discretion to impose
any of the sanctions provided in R.C. 2929.14 to 2929.18. R.C. 2929.13(A). It also provides
general guidance and presumptions for or against types of sanctions to be imposed for
various felonies, see, e.g., R.C. 2929.13(B), (C), and (E), including first- and second-degree
felonies, R.C. 2929.13(D).
{¶ 11} As an exception to the above guidance, a trial court must impose a prison
term under certain circumstances. R.C. 2929.13(F) (“mandatory-sentence provision”); see
State v. Johnson, 2008-Ohio-69, ¶ 10 (referring to R.C. 2929.13(F) as the mandatory-
sentence provision). The list of offenses and circumstances in the mandatory-sentence
provision is a long one, but it can be broken down into two main categories. The first
category requires a prison term for offenses under specific circumstances. R.C.
2929.13(F)(1) to (7), (10) to (12), (15) to (17). Most relevant to this case, a prison term is
required for certain felonies, including felonious assault, R.C. 2903.11, if the specific statute
governing that felony “requires the imposition of a prison term.” R.C. 2929.13(F)(4). The
second category within R.C. 2929.13(F) requires a prison term “with respect to a portion of
the sentence imposed pursuant to” certain provisions in R.C. 2929.14 that relate to
specifications. R.C. 2929.13(F)(8), (9), (13), (14), and (18) to (22). Most relevant here, a
trial court must impose a prison term for any felony “with respect to a portion of the
sentence imposed pursuant to [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a),] for having the firearm.” R.C.
2929.13(F)(8).
{¶ 12} For all categories, R.C. 2929.13(F) forbids the reduction of the prison term
through judicial release, earned-credit eligibility, and any rules governing pardons, parole,
probation, and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction in general. R.C.
2929.13(F), citing R.C. 2929.20, 2967.193, 2967.194, and R.C. Chs. 2967, 5120. The statute
provides limited exceptions to this prohibition if a specific exception applies from the
statutes governing judicial release, R.C. 2929.20, jail-time credit, R.C. 2967.191, or parole
eligibility, R.C. 2967.13. R.C. 2929.13(F).
No. 25AP-475 5

B. Application of R.C. 2929.13 and 2929.14 to Armstead’s Sentence
{¶ 13} Armstead’s felonious assault offense is a second-degree felony. R.C.
2903.11(D)(1)(a). R.C. 2929.13 generally provides that a second-degree felony carries a
presumption in favor of imposing a prison term, though the trial court may impose a
community control sanction if it makes findings to rebut the presumption. R.C.
2929.13(D). For the offense of felonious assault, R.C. 2929.13 requires a prison term “if
[the felonious assault statute itself] requires the imposition of a prison term.” R.C.
2929.13(F)(4). Nothing in the felonious assault statute requires a prison term under the
circumstances present here. See R.C. 2903.11.
{¶ 14} For a second-degree felony, R.C. 2929.14 allows an indefinite minimum
prison term ranging from two to eight years plus a tail of 50 percent of the chosen minimum
term. R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a). However, because a 50 percent tail already applied to
Armstead’s prison term for involuntary manslaughter, the trial court could not add a 50
percent tail for felonious assault pursuant to provisions in the statute governing maximum
sentences. R.C. 2929.144(B)(2). Following the dictates of both R.C. 2929.144(B)(2) and
2929.14(A)(2)(a), the trial court imposed a two-year prison term for Armstead’s felonious-
assault conviction.
{¶ 15} For the firearm specification at issue here, R.C. 2929.14 requires the trial
court to impose a one-year prison term. R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(iii). Additionally, R.C.
2929.13(F)(8) requires a prison term for “[a]ny offense, other than [carrying concealed
weapons], that is a felony, if the offender had a firearm on or about the offender’s person
or under the offender’s control while committing the felony, with respect to a portion of the
sentence imposed pursuant to [R.C.2929.14(B)(1)(a)] for having the firearm.”
{¶ 16} Ohio’s appellate courts previously disagreed both internally and with one
another as to whether R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) applied to the firearm specification or to the
underlying felony. See, e.g., State v. Clinksdale, 2023-Ohio-4146, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.)
(specification); State v. White, 2011-Ohio-2364, ¶ 74 (10th Dist.) (felony); State v. Logan,
2023-Ohio-1135, ¶ 46 (8th Dist.) (specification); State v. Sharpley, 2018-Ohio-4326, ¶ 16-
17 (8th Dist.) (felony). Given the clear divide between the half of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) that
requires a trial court to impose a prison term on any “offense . . . that is a felony” and the
other half that requires a prison term “with respect to a portion of the sentence” imposed
No. 25AP-475 6

on a specification, one may reasonably argue that the latter category only applies to
specifications and not to the underlying felony offenses. One may also argue that the latter
category only applies to specifications, given that the General Assembly knows how to
differentiate between requiring a prison term for a felony that has an attendant
specification and requiring a prison term for the specification itself. Compare R.C.
2929.13(F)(16) (requiring a prison term for the offense of kidnapping and similar offenses
if there is an accompanying specification under R.C. 2941.1422 for furtherance of human
trafficking) with R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) (requiring a prison term with respect to the
specification under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) if the defendant committed a felony while
possessing a firearm). However, Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772, requires us to conclude
otherwise.
C. Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772 and R.C. 2929.13(F)(8)
{¶ 17} In Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772, the defendant pleaded guilty to a felony offense
and a one-year firearm specification. Id. at ¶ 5. The trial court imposed a one-year prison
term for the firearm specification, and two years of community control for the underlying
felony. Id. The state appealed and argued that the trial court should have imposed a prison
term for the felony under R.C. 2929.13(F)(8). Id. at ¶ 6. The Eighth District Court of
Appeals disagreed and held that R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) only applies to the sanction that a trial
court must impose on the firearm specification. Id. at ¶ 23. The Eighth District noted that
agreeing with the state’s position “would read the last phrase of R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) ‘with
respect to a portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)]’ for having
the firearm—out of the statute.” Id. at ¶ 23, quoting State v. Logan, 2023-Ohio-3353, ¶ 20
(8th Dist.). The Supreme Court disagreed with the Eighth District and reversed the trial
court’s sentencing decision, holding that “R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) requires a trial court to
impose a prison sentence on an offender convicted of a felony offense that has a
corresponding firearm specification.” Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772, at ¶ 25.
{¶ 18} The Supreme Court primarily based its decision on the mandatory-sentence
provisions in R.C. 2929.13(F) by viewing them in the context of the community control
provisions in R.C. 2929.15. Id. at ¶ 19-22. Specifically, R.C. 2929.15 authorizes a trial court
to impose community control sanctions “[i]f in sentencing an offender for a felony the court
is not required to impose a prison term.” R.C. 2929.15(A)(1). Because the language of R.C.
No. 25AP-475 7

2929.15(A)(1) signifies an either-or dichotomy between prison and community control, a
trial court cannot impose both types of sanctions on the same offense. Logan, 2025-Ohio-
1772, at ¶ 20, discussing State v. Anderson, 2015-Ohio-2089. The Supreme Court
determined that the sanction for a specification and the sanction for the underlying offense
both constitute sanctions for the same offense. Id. at ¶ 12. Thus, when a prison term is
required for a specification, a trial court would also have to impose a prison term for the
underlying offense to avoid running afoul of the either-or dichotomy in R.C. 2929.15(A)(1).
Id. at ¶ 21-22.
{¶ 19} Logan does not explicitly hold that a prison term imposed on an underlying
felony, pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)(8), meets the definition of a “mandatory prison term”
as defined in R.C. 2929.01(X). Subject to exceptions not applicable here, “[m]andatory
prison term” is defined as “the term in prison that must be imposed for the offenses and
circumstances set forth in divisions (F)(1) to (8) or (F)(12) to (21) of section 2929.13 and
division (B) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2929.01(X)(1). Accordingly,
when a trial court is required to impose a prison term under R.C. 2929.14(B) or specific
provisions within R.C. 2929.13(F), that term is mandatory.
{¶ 20} Had Logan stopped its analysis with the relationship between R.C.
2929.13(F)(8) and the general rule for imposing community control in R.C. 2929.15, this
court would not necessarily need to hold that Armstead’s prison term for felonious assault
constitutes a “mandatory prison term” under R.C. 2929.01(X). Unlike Logan, the trial
court here did not attempt to impose a combination of prison and community control
sanctions for Armstead’s felonious assault offense and firearm specification, and so we need
not worry about reconciling R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) with the either-or dichotomy of R.C.
2929.15(A)(1).
{¶ 21} However, Logan did not stop at interpreting R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) in the
context of the statute’s relationship with the community control statute, R.C. 2929.15.
Logan held more broadly that R.C. 2929.13(F) creates mandatory sentencing requirements
for felony offenses only, and not specifications, because the general language at the
beginning of division (F) states that “ ‘the court shall impose a prison term or terms . . . for
any of the following offenses,’ ” and the more specific language in R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) begins
with a reference to “ ‘[a]ny offense.’ ” (Emphasis in orginal.) Id. at ¶ 13, quoting R.C.
No. 25AP-475 8

2929.13(F)(8). Despite the fact that Logan framed felony and specification sentences as
combined sanctions for one offense in the context of the rules governing community control
in R.C. 2929.15(A)(1), id. at ¶ 20, it held that the reference to “offenses” at the beginning of
R.C. 2929.13(F) and in R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) required the conclusion that the statute “applies
only to the underlying felony, not to the firearm specification.” Id. at ¶ 15. Thus, in
accordance with Logan, R.C. 2929.13(F)(8) applied to Armstead’s underlying felonious-
assault conviction rather than to the attendant firearm specification. And because
Armstead’s two-year prison term for felonious assault is a “term in prison that must be
imposed for the offenses and circumstances set forth in divisions (F)(1) to (8) or (F)(12) to
(21) of section 2929.13,” it constitutes a “mandatory prison term” as defined in R.C.
2929.01(X)(1).
D. Mandatory Imposition Versus Mandatory Service
{¶ 22} Both the trial court and Armstead find a distinction between a prison term
that is “mandatory” because a trial court was required to impose it, and a prison term that
is “mandatory” because a defendant must serve the term without any reduction by other
statutory provisions such as those governing judicial release, R.C. 2929.20, or jail-time
credit, R.C. 2967.191. We do not find support for this distinction in the felony sentencing
statutory scheme.
{¶ 23} The phrase “[m]andatory prison term” is defined in R.C. 2929.01(X) and
nowhere else in the Revised Code. The definition in R.C. 2929.01(X) relates solely to the
trial court’s sentencing duties and not to the defendant’s service of the sentence. Thus, the
fact that a prison term is “mandatory” does not, by itself, necessarily mean that it is
ineligible for reduction. However, when sentence-reducing statutes such as R.C. 2929.20
indicate that their provisions do not apply to a “mandatory prison term,” we must conclude
that their provisions do not apply to any “term in prison that must be imposed” under R.C.
2929.14(B) and portions of R.C. 2929.13(F), including R.C. 2929.13(F)(8). R.C.
2929.01(X)(1); see also State v. Friend, 2025-Ohio-3270, ¶ 96-97 (7th Dist.). And
irrespective of the various meanings we could give to the word “mandatory” in general, any
prison term imposed under R.C. 2929.13(F) is largely ineligible for reduction under that
statute’s own specific terms:
[T]he court shall impose a prison term or terms . . . and except
as specifically provided in [R.C. 2929.20, 2967.191, or 2967.13]
No. 25AP-475 9

. . . shall not reduce the term or terms pursuant to [R.C.
2929.20, 2967.193(A)(2) or (3), or 2967.194], or any other
provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised
Code.
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.13(F).
{¶ 24} Accordingly, Armstead’s two-year prison term for felonious assault is a
“mandatory prison term” under R.C. 2929.01(X) because it is required by R.C.
2929.13(F)(8). The two-year prison term is subject to the sentence-reduction limitations
provided in R.C. 2929.13(F), and it is otherwise subject to any criminal statutory provision
that purports to apply to a mandatory prison term. The trial court’s decision to designate
Armstead’s prison term for felonious assault as non-mandatory was therefore contrary to
law, and we sustain the state’s sole assignment of error.
IV. Disposition
{¶ 25} Having sustained the state’s sole assignment of error, we reverse the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. We remand this matter to the
trial court for resentencing on Armstead’s conviction for felonious assault.
Judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
BEATTY BLUNT and MENTEL, JJ., concur.