Jump To

Top Caption Lead Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of Washington v. Shmuel Sarliker

Court of Appeals of Washington

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 59925-2

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.4K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two

March 17, 2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59925-2-II

Respondent,

v.

SHMUEL SARLIKER, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

LEE, J. — Following a jury trial, Shmuel Sarliker appeals his conviction for first degree

criminal trespass. Sarliker argues that the State failed to prove that he knew entering or remaining

in Robert McConkey’s trailer was unlawful based on his history of entering the trailer. Because

the nature of Sarliker’s entry into McConkey’s trailer was different than prior occasions and

because Sarliker remained in McConkey’s trailer to assault McConkey, a reasonable trier of fact

could find that Sarliker knew entering or remaining in McConkey’s trailer was unlawful.

Accordingly, we affirm Sarliker’s conviction for first degree criminal trespass.

FACTS

A. BACKGROUND

McConkey owns property on Trosper Road in Tumwater. There is a structure on the

property, but McConkey lives in a fifth wheel trailer on the property. Sarliker lived in the separate

structure and had been McConkey’s tenant for approximately five years.
No. 59925-2-II

McConkey and Sarliker generally had a friendly relationship. Sarliker would step inside

McConkey’s trailer to visit with McConkey if the trailer door was open and McConkey was

present.

On May 26, 2023, around 2:30 a.m., McConkey, then 91 years old, called 911 requesting

aid. McConkey told the 911 operator that his neighbor was “beating on [him].” 2 Verbatim Rep.

of Proc. (VRP) (Aug. 13, 2024) at 295. Several police officers responded. When the officers

arrived at the property, they heard yelling from a “blue residence” on the property where Sarliker

lived. 2 VRP (Aug. 13, 2024) at 226. Officers went there first.

Sarliker answered the door. Officers noted Sarliker had “blood splatter all over . . . his

shirt [and] on his face.” 2 VRP (Aug. 13, 2024) at 226. He had also wrapped one of his hands,

which had been bleeding from a cut, in a towel. Sarliker was loud and agitated, and told the

officers “that he had just fought his neighbor and that he was teaching him a lesson on who he was

dealing with” because his neighbor had pulled a knife on him. 2 VRP (Aug. 13, 2024) at 227.

Officers then contacted McConkey inside McConkey’s trailer. The entrance to

McConkey’s trailer has two doors: a screen door and an outer opaque door. When the officers

arrived, the outer door was open while the screen door was shut. McConkey was sitting in a chair

and was covered in blood. McConkey’s face had “significant lumps, bleeding” and swelling, and

his “left eye appeared . . . pretty swollen, drooping.” 2 VRP (Aug. 13, 2024) at 231, 232. An

officer also observed a pocketknife on a shelf next to McConkey that appeared to be within

McConkey’s reach. The pocketknife had blood on both the handle and the blade.

After talking with both Sarliker and McConkey, law enforcement determined that Sarliker

was the primary aggressor and placed him under arrest. Both McConkey and Sarliker were

2
No. 59925-2-II

transported to the hospital. McConkey suffered lacerations and significant bruising to his face,

which required several stitches and staples. McConkey also had a fractured nasal bone and was

admitted to the hospital for observation.

An officer drove Sarliker to the hospital. After Sarliker was advised of his Miranda1 rights,

Sarliker volunteered to the officer that he had punched and headbutted McConkey, “that he was

glad that law enforcement arrived,” and “it was a good decision” to arrest him. 2 VRP (Aug. 13,

2024) at 242.

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State charged Sarliker with second degree assault and second degree burglary. The

matter proceeded to a jury trial. Both McConkey and Sarliker testified.

1. McConkey’s Testimony

McConkey testified that in early morning of May 26, 2023, he had been asleep in his

recliner. Suddenly, the door slammed open and someone began “pounding on [McConkey’s] face

and screaming at [him].” 2 VRP (Aug. 13, 2024) at 276. According to McConkey, the person

screamed, “‘Die, die, die, die’ over and over.” 2 VRP (Aug. 13, 2024) at 278. McConkey

recognized Sarliker’s voice. Sarliker beat him for approximately one or two minutes. McConkey

stated that he never touched the pocketknife during the incident with Sarliker.

McConkey also testified that his television is on 24 hours a day. He generally struggles

with rising from his chair. Additionally, McConkey stated he does not keep any firearms in his

trailer.

1
See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

3
No. 59925-2-II

Prior to the incident, Sarliker would stop by McConkey’s trailer to visit. McConkey

testified that it was not uncommon for Sarliker and other visitors to step inside McConkey’s trailer

if his door had been open during the day. However, it was not customary for visitors to enter

McConkey’s trailer during the night or if his door was closed.

1. Sarliker’s Testimony

Sarliker testified on the day prior to May 26, Sarliker and McConkey were working on a

raccoon trap. The trap failed to work properly, and McConkey was upset with Sarliker. Then, late

that night, Sarliker assisted another tenant, who was an electrician, to “connect some wiring” near

McConkey’s trailer. 3 VRP (Aug. 14, 2024) at 424. Afterwards, Sarliker noticed a light on in

McConkey’s trailer and that McConkey appeared awake, “standing watching TV.” 3 VRP (Aug.

14, 2024) at 424.

McConkey’s outer door was slightly ajar and his screen door was shut. Sarliker loudly

called out, “‘I come in peace,’” pushed open the outside door, opened the screen door, and entered

the trailer. 3 VRP (Aug. 14, 2024) at 451. Sarliker said “‘I come in peace’” because he knew

McConkey had been upset about the failed raccoon trap. 3 VRP (Aug. 14, 2024) at 427. Once

Sarliker stepped inside, he saw McConkey standing a couple feet away, facing him and holding a

knife, pointed in Sarliker’s direction. McConkey did not say anything to Sarliker.

According to Sarliker, McConkey took a step towards him. Sarliker, fearing that

McConkey was going to stab him, pushed McConkey such that McConkey fell backwards into his

chair. Then Sarliker punched McConkey in the face twice and headbutted him. Sarliker did not

leave McConkey’s trailer after pushing him down because he was worried that McConkey would

shoot him with a rifle propped up near his front door. Sarliker stopped beating McConkey once

4
No. 59925-2-II

he saw the amount of blood and decided to go home. Sarliker stated that the police were already

at his home when he arrived.

Sarliker also testified that he would go to McConkey’s trailer often. McConkey had never

had a problem when Sarliker had previously walked into McConkey’s trailer.

1. Verdict and Sentencing

The jury found Sarliker guilty of second degree assault (Count I). The jury also found

Sarliker guilty of first degree criminal trespass (Count II).2 Sarliker was sentenced to 17 months

on Count I and 364 days on Count II, with both sentences to be served concurrently, along with

18 months of community custody.

Sarliker appeals.

ANALYSIS

Sarliker argues that the State failed to prove that he committed first degree criminal

trespass.3 Specifically, Sarliker asserts that the State failed to demonstrate that Sarliker knew

entering or remaining in McConkey’s trailer was unlawful based on his history of entering

McConkey’s trailer without objection from McConkey. We disagree.

A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In criminal prosecutions, the State must prove every element of a crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Roberts, 5 Wn.3d 222, 230-31, 572 P.3d 1191 (2025); U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. This court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of

2
The jury had been instructed on first degree criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of
second degree burglary.
3
Sarliker does not challenge his second degree assault conviction on appeal.

5
No. 59925-2-II

evidence de novo. State v. Zghair, 4 Wn.3d 610, 619, 567 P.3d 1 (2025). When a claim of

insufficient evidence is raised on appeal, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the

State and consider whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dreewes, 192 Wn.2d 812, 821-22, 432 P.3d 795 (2019).

The defendant admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences are drawn in

favor of the State. Roberts, 5 Wn.3d at 237; Dreewes, 192 Wn.2d at 821-22. Circumstantial and

direct evidence are considered equally reliable. Roberts, 5 Wn.3d at 237.

B. CRIMINAL TRESPASS

1. Legal Principles

A person is guilty of first degree criminal trespass “if he or she knowingly enters or remains

unlawfully in a building.” RCW 9A.52.070(1). A person acts with knowledge if “[h]e or she has

information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist

which facts are described by a statute defining an offense.” RCW 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii). To “enter

or remain unlawfully” means to enter or remain upon premises where an individual is not

“licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to so enter or remain.” RCW 9A.52.010(2). “Premises”

includes any buildings or dwellings. RCW 9A.52.010(3).

It is a defense to criminal trespass if the defendant “reasonably believed that the owner of

the premises, or other person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him or her

to enter or remain.” RCW 9A.52.090(3).

1. Sufficient Evidence Supports Sarliker Knowingly Entered or Remained Unlawfully

Sarliker argues that based on his history of entering McConkey’s trailer unannounced on

prior occasions, Sarliker reasonably believed he could enter McConkey’s trailer on May 26, 2023.

6
No. 59925-2-II

In support of his contention, Sarliker points to McConkey’s trial testimony, in which McConkey

testified that Sarliker had previously walked into his trailer unannounced.

However, the record shows that McConkey only allowed individuals to enter his trailer

during the day if he was home and if the door was open. McConkey testified that Sarliker never

came into his trailer at night. Furthermore, the record shows that the outer door to McConkey’s

trailer was mostly closed, and Sarliker had to push it open, then open the screen door, which had

been fully closed, in order to enter the trailer. Thus, Sarliker’s entry into McConkey’s trailer at

2:30 a.m. on May 26 was different than Sarliker’s past entries into the trailer. And McConkey did

not invite Sarliker inside. Accordingly, because the nature of Sarliker’s entry was different than

past entries and because Sarliker did not have permission from McConkey to enter, the record

shows that Sarliker did not possess a reasonable belief that he was permitted to enter McConkey’s

trailer. Therefore, a reasonable trier of fact could find that Sarliker unlawfully entered

McConkey’s trailer. RCW 9A.52.010(2); Dreewes, 192 Wn.2d at 821-22.

Moreover, even if Sarliker reasonably believed he was licensed to enter McConkey’s trailer

at 2:30 a.m., Sarliker cannot have reasonably believed he was licensed to remain in McConkey’s

trailer to assault McConkey. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State,

the record shows that almost as soon as Sarliker entered McConkey’s trailer, before McConkey

could say anything,4 Sarliker punched McConkey in the face twice and headbutted him. And,

when all reasonable inferences are viewed in favor of the State, a reasonable inference arises that

4
There are conflicting accounts as to whether McConkey was asleep or awake, sitting or standing,
or holding a knife or not. Ultimately, whatever McConkey’s initial state may have been is a
credibility determination for which we defer to the trier of fact and does not change our analysis.
Roberts, 5 Wn.3d at 237.

7
No. 59925-2-II

McConkey did not give Sarliker permission to assault him. Therefore, even if Sarliker reasonably

believed he was licensed to enter McConkey’s trailer at 2:30 a.m., assaulting McConkey while in

the trailer amounted to remaining unlawfully in the trailer.

Thus, based on evidence in the record, a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a

reasonable doubt that Sarliker entered or remained unlawfully in McConkey’s trailer. RCW

9A.52.070(1). Accordingly, we affirm Sarliker’s conviction for first degree criminal trespass.

CONCLUSION

We affirm Sarliker’s conviction for first degree criminal trespass.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Lee, J.
We concur:

Glasgow, J.

Maxa, P.J.

8