Sharada Sanghi vs Asha Agarwal - Civil Appeal

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• Know your Kanoon - Doc Gen Hub - Counter Argument - Case Predict AI - Talk with IK Doc -... Upgrade to Premium [Cites 8, Cited by 0 ] ### Supreme Court of India

Sharada Sanghi vs Asha Agarwal on 25 March, 2026

Author: Dipankar Datta

Bench: Dipankar Datta

2026 INSC 292 REPORTABLE

                                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                      CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2609 OF 2013

        SHARADA SANGHI & ORS.                                               … APPELLANTS

                                                       VS.

        ASHA AGARWAL & ORS.                                                 … RESPONDENTS

                                                JUDGMENT DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

THE APPEAL

1.          This civil appeal, by special leave granted on 14th March, 2013, assails
   
                       the judgment and decree dated 21st October, 20101 passed by the
   
                       High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad2 of dismissal of a second
   
                       appeal3 preferred by the appellants, thereby affirming the judgment
   
                       and decree of the first appellate court dated 17th January, 2007. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by rashmi dhyani pant Date: 2026.03.25 15:55:02 IST Reason: 1 impugned judgment 2 High Court 3 Second Appeal No. 620 of 2007 1 Appellants4 were directed to seek their remedies by way of a separate
   

   civil suit.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. Facts giving rise to the present appeal, shorn of unnecessary details,

   are these.

2.1 Appellants instituted a suit5 seeking specific performance of an

            agreement for sale dated 15th December, 1986 in respect of

            the northern portion of an immovable property bearing

            Municipal           No. 3-6-996,   situated       at   Himayat   Nagar,

            Hyderabad before the Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court,

            Hyderabad7.

2.2 The suit property allegedly belonged to Smt. Amatul Wahab

            Jaffernnisa Begum, who died on 25th January, 1983. Upon her

            demise, her only son, Abdul Mujeeb Mahmood, succeeded to

            the property. While in possession thereof, he entered into the

            agreement8 for sale with the appellants for a consideration of

            Rs.    4,25,000/-        in   respect   of    a   portion   admeasuring

            approximately 685 square yards.

2.3 Trigger for the suit for specific performance and possession9

            was the alleged failure on the part of Abdul Mujeeb Mahmood - 4 plaintiffs in the original suit 5 O.S. No. 329 of 1988 6 suit property 7 Trial Court 8 said agreement 9 specific performance suit 2 the defendant - to perform his obligations under the said

           agreement.

2.4 By judgment and decree dated 28th October, 1998, the Trial

           Court decreed the specific performance suit, directing the

           appellants to deposit the balance consideration and further

           directing execution of the sale deed through court in the event

           of default by the defendant. The decree attained finality.

   2.5     Appellants thereafter initiated Execution Petition No. 37 of

           1999 before the executing court. A sale deed was executed

           through court on 25th January, 2001, and warrants for delivery

           of possession were issued. Delivery of possession commenced

           through the process of court.

2.6 At that stage, the respondents 1 to 3 (who were not parties to

           the specific performance suit) filed an application10 under Order

           XXI Rules 99 to 101, [Code of Civil Procedure](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161831507/), 190811 asserting

           independent title and possession over portions of the same

           property on the basis of sale deeds dated 5th July, 1990 and

           20th July, 1990, purportedly executed by one Mir Sadat

           Ali acting through a General Power of Attorney12 holder. It was

           claimed that Mir Sadat Ali had derived title pursuant to an

           alleged oral gift made in his favour by the original owner, Smt.

           Amatul Wahab Jaffernnisa Begum. It was vigorously claimed 10 objection petition 11 [CPC](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161831507/) 12 GPA 3 that   the   appellants    had     instituted    two     suits13 seeking

            cancellation of the said sale deeds; however, the said suits

            came to be dismissed for default on 18th October, 1996 and

            27th October, 1998 respectively. Not only that, proceedings

            initiated thereafter for restoration of the two suits also met the

            same fate. Since the appellants accepted the orders of

            dismissal, the issue as to legality and validity of the sale deeds

            by which the respondents 1 to 3 claimed to have acquired title

            attained finality.

2.7 The said respondents also asserted that they were bona fide

            purchasers for value; that the decree passed in the specific

            performance suit was not binding upon them as neither their

            vendors nor they were parties to such suit; and that the

            execution proceedings were vitiated by fraud. They sought

            protection of possession and consequential reliefs.

     2.8    The objection petition was contested by the appellants. The

            executing court conducted a detailed enquiry, permitting the

            parties to adduce oral and documentary evidence. Issues

            relating to title, possession, authority of the alleged vendor,

            validity of documents and prior litigation were examined.

     2.9    By an order dated 30th January, 2006, the executing court

            dismissed the objection petition, recording findings that the

            said   respondents   had       failed   to   establish   any   valid   or 13 O.S. Nos. 892 and 893 of 1990 4 independent title; that the alleged power of attorney and oral

            gift were not proved; that municipal and revenue records

            supported the appellants’ case; and that the respondents 1 to

            3 were not entitled to resist execution of the decree.

     2.10 Aggrieved           by   dismissal    of   their   objection   petition,   the

            respondents 1 to 3 preferred an appeal14 before the Additional

            Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad15. Vide judgment and

            decree dated 17th January 2007, the Appellate Court allowed

            the appeal and set aside the order of the Executing Court. The

            Appellate Court held that since the respondents were not

            parties      to    the   specific   performance       suit   and   claimed

            independent title, the decree passed therein was not operative

            against them, and that the appellants were required to institute

            a separate suit to establish their rights as against the

            respondents.

2.11 Appellants carried the decree in the above-referred second

            appeal before the High Court, raising substantial questions of

            law relating to the scope and effect of adjudication under Order

            XXI Rules 99 to 101, [CPC](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161831507/).

JUDGMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT

1. The Appellate Court framed the following points for consideration: 14 C.M.A. No. 15 of 2006 15

Appellate Court 5 i. Whether the petitioners have right and title to the petition schedule property
and have right to resist the execution proceedings taken out by the respondents
1 to 3 in view of the dismissal of OS No 892 of 1990 and OS No 893 of 1990?

ii. Whether the petitioners are bound by the Decree in favour of the respondents
1 to 3 in the OS No 329 of 1988, in which the execution proceedings are taken
up?
iii. To what relief?

1. It is not necessary to delineate here what the detailed findings were,

   which the Appellate Court returned. Suffice it is for the present case

   to note the answers to the aforesaid questions.

2. While answering the first point, the Appellate Court proceeded to hold

   that dismissal of O.S. Nos. 892 and 893 of 1990 for default and the

   subsequent applications seeking restoration of the said two suits also

   having been dismissed for default, such dismissal had become final

   and “it operates as resjudicata under Sec 11 CPC against the

   respondents”.

3. We also find the following passage from the Appellate Court’s

   judgment:

"Res judicata pro veritate accipitur" is the full maxim which has, over the years,
shrunk to mere "res judicata". Section 11 CPC contains the rule of
conclusiveness of the judgment which is based partly on the maxim of Roman
jurisprudence "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" (it concerns the State that
there be an end to law suits) and partly on the maxim "nemo debit bis bis vexari
pro una et eadem cause" (no man should be vexed twice over for the same
cause). The section does not affect the jurisdiction of the court but operates as
a bar to the trial of the suit or issue, if the matter in the suit was directly and
substantially in issue (and finally decided) in the previous suit between the same
parties litigating under the same title in a court, competent to try the subsequent
suit in which such issue has been raised.

---

   In the present case, the respondents did not claim all the reliefs that are
   essential for affective (sic, effective) adjudication of their claim in OS No 329 of
   1988 and hence, cannot be permitted to raise the same plea now. 6 ***

   The respondents having allowed the suits to be dismissed for default and having
   allowed te (sic, the) dismissal to become final, tries to get the same relief by
   executing the decree against the petitioners, though themselves or their
   purchasers are parties to the said decree. …

1. On the second point, the Appellate Court held that:

In view of my findings in Point No 1, the petitioners are not bound by the decree
in OS No 329 of 1988. The respondents have to necessary file a fresh suit against
the petitioners, seeking their relief. The Trial Court has erred in appreciating the
material on record and arrived at an erroneous conclusion. The order and
Decree of the Trial Court are liable to be set aside.

IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
8. The impugned judgment is short and cryptic, which could have led to

 grant of leave. It dismissed the second appeal at the admission stage

 holding that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The

 High Court affirmed the view of the Appellate Court that the decree in

 the specific performance suit was not binding on the respondents 1 to

 3 and that the appellants must seek their remedies by way of a

 separate suit.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS

1. Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel appearing for the

   appellants, contended that both the Appellate Court as well as the High

   Court fell into manifest error in interfering with the well-reasoned order

   of the Executing Court.

2. Developing his submissions, Mr. Ahmadi urged that the sale deeds

   dated 5th July, 1990 and 20th July, 1990, purportedly executed in 7 favour of the respondents 1 to 3, were clearly hit by the doctrine of lis

   pendens embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882

   since the specific performance suit was pending on the date of such

   transfers. According to him, any alienation made during the pendency

   of the suit could not defeat the rights flowing from the eventual decree.

3. Mr. Ahmadi next submitted that the courts below committed a serious

   jurisdictional error in allowing the application preferred by the

   respondents 1 to 3 under Order XXI Rule 101 of the CPC and, yet,

   directing the appellants to institute a separate suit. Such a direction,

   it was argued, runs contrary to the express scheme of Order XXI Rules

   97 to 101, CPC which confers ample power upon the executing court

   to adjudicate all questions relating to right, title or interest in the

   property arising between the parties, or even “any person” resisting

   delivery of possession, whether or not bound by the decree. Reliance

   was placed on the decision of this Court in Shreenath v. Rajesh16, to

   buttress the proposition that a party ought not to be driven to a

   separate suit once such adjudicatory power is available in execution.

   Paragraphs 11 and 13, to which our attention was drawn, reads thus:

1. So, under Order 21 Rule 101 all disputes between the decree-holder and any such person is to be adjudicated by the executing court. A party is not thrown out to relegate itself to the long-drawn-out arduous procedure of a fresh suit. This is to salvage the possible hardship both to the decree-holder and the other person claiming title on their own right to get it adjudicated in the very execution proceedings. We find that Order 21 Rule 35 deals with cases of delivery of possession of an immovable property to the decree-holder by delivery of actual physical possession and by removing any person in possession who is bound by a decree, while under Order 21 Rule 36 only symbolic possession is given where 16 (1998) 4 SCC 543 8 the tenant is in actual possession. Order 21 Rule 97, as aforesaid, conceives of cases where delivery of possession to the decree-holder or purchaser is resisted by any person. “Any person”, as aforesaid, is wide enough to include even a person not bound by a decree or claiming right in the property on his own including that of a tenant including a stranger. ***

1. So far sub-clause (1) of Rule 97 the provision is the same but after the 1976
   Amendment all disputes relating to the property made under Rules 97 and 99 are
   to be adjudicated under Rule 101, while under unamended provision under sub-
   clause (2) of Rule 97, the executing court issues summons to any such person
   obstructing possession over the decretal property. After investigation under
   Rule 98 the court puts back a decree-holder in possession where the court finds
   obstruction was occasioned without any just cause, while under Rule 99 where
   obstruction was by a person claiming in good faith to be in possession of the
   property on his own right, the court has to dismiss the decree-holder's
   application. Thus even prior to 1976, right of any person claiming right on his own
   or as a tenant, not party to the suit, such person's right has to be adjudicated
   under Rule 99 and he need not fall back to file a separate suit. By this, he is saved
   from a long litigation. So a tenant or any person claiming a right in the property
   on the own, if resists delivery of possession to the decree-holder, the dispute
   and his claim has to be decided after the 1976 Amendment under Rule 97 read
   with Rule 101 and prior to the amendment under Rule 97 read with Rule 99.
   However, under the old law, in case order is passed against the person resisting
   possession under Rule 97 read with Rule 99 then by virtue of Rule 103, as it then
   was, he was to file a suit to establish his right. But now after the amendment one
   need not file suit even in such cases as all disputes are to be settled by the
   executing court itself finally under Rule 101.

2. Inviting our notice to the findings recorded by the Executing Court, Mr.

   Ahmadi submitted that the respondents 1 to 3 had failed to establish

   any semblance of right, title or interest in the suit property. He

   emphasized that their claim rested upon the sale deeds executed by a

   GPA holder of one Mir Sadat Ali. The latter, in turn, claimed title on the

   strength of an alleged oral gift. He argued that such oral gift was a

   mere afterthought which was neither registered, nor proved through

   cogent evidence, nor supported by examination of any attesting

   witness. Significantly, in O.S. No. 671 of 1991, a competent court had 9 declared that no such oral gift had been made in favour of Mir Sadat

   Ali. That decree having attained finality, Mir Sadat Ali could not have

   conveyed any valid title, nor could he have authorised execution of

   sale deeds through a GPA. The original sale deeds and the power of

   attorney were, in any event, not produced before the court.

3. Elaborating further, Mr. Ahmadi submitted that under Mohammedan

   law, a valid gift requires (i) a clear declaration by the donor, (ii)

   acceptance by the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession. In the

   present case, none of these essential ingredients stood satisfied. The

   original owner admittedly continued in possession; hence, the very

   basis of the respondents’ claim was legally untenable.

4. It was further submitted that dismissal of O.S. Nos. 892 and 893 of

   1990 for default could not operate as res judicata, the suits having not

   been adjudicated on merits. In any event, no plea of res judicata had

   been raised by the respondents in accordance with law.

5. Lastly, it was urged that in a suit for specific performance, only the

   parties to the contract are necessary parties. The High Court,

   according to Mr. Ahmadi, erred in proceeding on the premise that since

   the respondents or their alleged vendors were not parties to the

   specific performance suit, the decree therein would not bind them.

   Such reasoning, he submitted, overlooks both the doctrine of lis

   pendens and the settled principle that a transferee pendente lite is

   bound by the decree passed in the suit.

10

1. Resting on the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Ahmadi prayed that upon

   setting aside of the judgments of the Appellate Court and the High

   Court, the executing court’s judgment be restored.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

1. Mr. Raval, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the

   respondents 1 to 3, advanced elaborate submissions in support of the

   impugned judgment.

2. Mr. Raval submitted that the respondents have been in settled

   possession of the suit property since 1990 by virtue of registered sale

   deeds. The validity of these sale deeds had already been put in issue

   by the appellants in earlier proceedings and the challenge thereto did

   not succeed. Appellants having allowed those proceedings to lapse and

   attain finality, cannot now be permitted to reopen the same issues in

   the guise of execution proceedings. His submissions, in substance, are

   as follows:

18.1 The contention of the appellants that the sale of the property

in favour of the respondents is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens

is misconceived. The doctrine operates only against the parties

to the suit and those claiming under them. Neither the

respondents nor their vendors were parties to the proceedings

in O.S. No. 329 of 1988, nor do they claim through any of the

defendants therein. In such circumstances, the doctrine has no

application and cannot be invoked to invalidate the

respondents’ purchase.
11
18.2 Reliance placed by the appellants on Order XXI Rule 102, CPC is equally misplaced. The provision contemplates a situation

where a judgment debtor transfers the property after the

institution of the suit to a person who thereafter obstructs

execution. In the present case, the respondents did not derive

title from the judgment debtor. Their title flows from

independent registered sale deeds. The foundational

requirement for invoking the rule is, therefore, absent.

18.3 Appellants themselves had instituted two independent suits,

O.S. No. 892 of 1990 and O.S. No. 893 of 1990, seeking to

challenge and set aside the very sale deeds under which the

respondents claim title. Both suits, however, were dismissed

for default, and even the applications filed for their restoration

were dismissed. In view of Order IX Rule 9, CPC, the appellants

are barred from instituting a fresh proceeding on the same

cause of action. Having failed to pursue the remedies they

themselves invoked, the appellants must be taken to have

abandoned the challenge to the sale deeds and cannot now

attempt to question their validity indirectly in execution.

18.4 Having regard to the above, the principles of res judicata,

constructive res judicata and issue estoppel are clearly

attracted. Appellants consciously chose their remedy, initiated

proceedings and then allowed them to be dismissed. The law

does not permit a litigant to reopen issues which have already 12 been concluded or which ought to have been pursued in earlier

proceedings.

1. Mr. Raval further contended that the present execution proceedings

themselves are misconceived. The execution petition has been filed on

the strength of the decree passed in O.S. No. 329 of 1988. However,

the decree does not contain any operative direction for delivery of

possession. In the absence of such a decree, a proceeding seeking

possession through execution is unsustainable.

1. It was also urged that the appellants have not approached the Court

with clean hands. While prosecuting O.S. No. 329 of 1988, they failed

to disclose the existence of the registered sale deeds executed in

favour of the respondents, though they were fully aware of them. More

significantly, even after instituting O.S. No. 892 of 1990 and O.S. No.

893 of 1990 seeking cancellation of those very sale deeds, the

appellants did not inform the trial court in the earlier suit about the

pendency of these proceedings. This, according to the respondents,

amounts to suppression of material facts.

1. Lastly, it was submitted that the appellants have also [placed reliance

upon](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/255914/) a decree passed in O.S. No. 679 of 1991. However, that decree

was passed against a person who had already died before the

judgment was pronounced. A decree against a dead person is a nullity

in the eye of law and has no legal effect. Such invalidity can be raised

at any stage, including in collateral or execution proceedings. Reliance 13 placed by the appellants on such a decree is, therefore, wholly

untenable.

1. It was, accordingly, prayed that the appeal be dismissed. ISSUES INVOLVED

1. Having noted the factual canvas and the arguments advanced on

   behalf of the parties, the following issues fall for determination:

A. Whether the Appellate Court was right in returning the finding that

the claim of the appellants was hit by res judicata and the High Court

was right in affirming such finding?

B. Whether the conduct of the appellants is such that the same would

disentitle them to any relief?

ANALYSIS
24. Our answers to the issues ought to be prefaced by a brief reference to

certain relevant facts once again.

1. In the present case, it is not in dispute that while the specific

   performance suit was pending adjudication, the appellants instituted

   O.S. Nos. 892 and 893 of 1990 seeking cancellation of the sale deeds

   in favour of the respondents 1 to 3 and their vendors in respect of the

   very same subject property. In those suits, it was specifically averred

   in paragraph 4 that the appellants had entered into the said agreement

   and had already instituted the specific performance suit, which was

   pending consideration. It was further pleaded that they were forcibly

   dispossessed by the respondents 1 to 3 and their vendor on 07th July, 14 1990, and that the sale deeds dated 05th July, 1990 and 20th July,

   1990 were concocted documents. What the appellants themselves

   asserted was that effective relief in the specific performance suit could

   not be granted unless the defendants’ title was negatived and

   possession restored.

2. At the cost of repetition, the subsequent course of proceedings in O.S.

   Nos. 892 and 893 of 1990 is also necessary to be taken note of. Both

   suits ultimately came to be dismissed for default.

3. The record reveals that O.S. No. 892 of 1990 was transferred to

   another court and notice of such transfer had been duly served upon

   the advocate on record for the appellants. To contest the suit, a written

   statement was filed by the defendants therein. However, there was

   non-appearance on behalf of the appellants resulting in the suit being

   dismissed for default on 18th October, 1996.

4. As regards O.S. No. 893 of 1990, the record indicates that it was not

   transferred and continued before the same Court. In that suit as well,

   a written statement had been filed. Nonetheless, owing to the

   appellants’ non-appearance, it too was dismissed for default on 27th

   October, 1998. The material fact remains that O.S. No. 893 of 1990,

   pending before the Trial Court, was dismissed for default on 27 th

   October, 1998 - a day prior to the decree dated 28th October, 1998

   being passed in the specific performance suit.

15 NOT RES JUDICATA

1. At the outset, we record our inability to concur with the reasoning of

   the Appellate Court, which has since been affirmed by the High Court,

   that dismissal of a suit for default would, by itself, operate as res

   judicata within the meaning of Section 11, CPC to bar adjudication of

   proceedings initiated by the appellants for execution.

2. Section 11 postulates that the matter must have been “heard and

   finally decided”. Dismissal of a suit for default, not being a decision on

   merits, cannot ordinarily be regarded as a final adjudication so as to

   attract the strict application of Section 11, CPC.

3. Issue-A is thus answered in favour of the appellants.

CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANTS

1. Though res judicata is not applicable here, we find the Appellate Court

   to have referred to the maxim nemo debet bis vexari, si constet curiae

   quod sit pro una et eadem causa. With this principle in mind coupled

   with the fact that the relief of specific performance, as it stood prior to

   the 2018 Amendment of the Specific Relief Act, 196317, was

   discretionary in nature (based on equitable principles and

   considerations of fairness, good faith, and the conduct of the parties),

   we move forward to examine whether the case of the appellants falter

   on application of these principles.

17 1963 Act 16

1. According to Black’s Law Dictionary18, the said maxim means that no

   one ought to be twice troubled, if it appears to the court that it is for

   one and the same cause of action. In simple terms, once a dispute

   relating to a particular cause has been brought before a competent

   court, the same party cannot be allowed to raise the very same issue

   again in another proceeding (emphasis ours) or at a later stage. The

   rule is meant to prevent repeated litigation over the same matter and

   to ensure finality in judicial decisions. It protects parties from being

   subjected to multiple proceedings based on the same cause. As we

   read and understand the maxim, it is different from res judicata in the

   sense that its application in a given situation does not require a

   decision on merits to be rendered in the earlier round of proceedings

   before the court.

2. In S.C.F. Finance Co. Ltd. v. Masri and another (No.3)19, the Court

   of Appeal reiterated that where a litigant, having had the opportunity

   to establish a case, declines to proceed and submits to dismissal, he

   may, save in exceptional circumstances, lose the right to agitate the

   same issue in subsequent proceedings. The principle succinctly stated

   is that a party who has had the opportunity of proving a fact in support

   of his claim and chooses not to rely on it, cannot thereafter seek to

   raise it before another tribunal. Elaborating the principle and placing

   reliance on Khan v. Goleccha International Ltd20, it was held thus: 18

Seventh Edition 19 [1987] 2 WLR 81 20 [1980] 1 WLR 1482 17 First, for the general principle (Ord v Ord [1923] 2 KB 432 at 439, [1923] All ER
Rep 206 at 210 per Lush J; I need not narrate the facts): “The words 'res judicata'
explain themselves. If the res—the thing actually or directly in dispute—has
been already adjudicated upon, of course by a competent Court, it cannot be
litigated again. There is a wider principle, to which I will refer in a moment, often
as covered by the plea of res judicata, that prevents a litigant from relying on a
claim or defence which he had an opportunity of putting before the Court in the
earlier proceedings and which he chose not to put forward …” I turn straight to
the wider principle ([1923] 2 KB 432 at 443, [1923] All ER Rep 206 at 212): ‘The
maxim 'Nemo debet bis vexari' prevents a litigant who has had an opportunity of
proving a fact in support of his claim or defence and chosen not to rely on it from
afterwards putting it before another tribunal. To do that would be unduly to
harass his opponent, and if he endeavoured to do so he would be met by the
objection that the judgment in the former action precluded him from raising that
contention. It is not that it has been already decided, or that the record deals
with it. The new fact has not been decided; it has never been in fact submitted to
the tribunal and it is not really dealt with by the record. But it is, by reason of the
principle I have stated, treated as if it had been’.

---

Finally, Brightman LJ dealt with an argument put forward that, while an order by
consent at first instance founded on an admission made by one party could lead
to res judicata, an order by consent on appeal dismissing the appeal could not
on the ground that an appellate court could not properly interfere with the
decision of an inferior court without proper judicial consideration. Brightman LJ
continued ([1980] 2 All ER 259 at 267, [1980] 1 WLR 1482 at 1491):

“I refer back to what Lush J said in Ord v Ord [1923] 2 KB 432 at 443, [1923]
All ER Rep 206 at 212: The maxim 'Nemo debet bis vexari' prevents a litigant
who has had an opportunity of proving a fact in support of his claim or
defence and chosen not to rely on it from afterwards putting it before
another tribunal’. In this case [the plaintiff] had his opportunity, in support
of his appeal on the previous occasion, of establishing that money was
lent. He chose not to establish that position. His counsel got up in court
and deliberately abandoned it. So it seems to me that he loses his right of
establishing that same position before another tribunal.”
35. In this context, reliance may also be placed upon Barber v.

Staffordshire County Council21, wherein it was observed that an

    order dismissing proceedings, even without a detailed consideration

    on merits, may, in appropriate circumstances give rise to estoppel, if 21 [1996] 2 All ER 748 (CA) 18 a party having put forward a positive case declines to pursue it and

   allows the matter to be dismissed. The Court emphasised that such

   dismissal is not a mere administrative act but a judicial determination

   capable of attracting estoppel.

1. The Latin maxim referred above was recently considered by this Court

   in Amruddin Ansari (Dead) Through Lrs v. Afajal Ali22 in the

   context of Section 11 CPC, emphasizing that an issue once finally

   decided by a competent court cannot be reopened. While that

   interpretation was in the strict statutory sense, the peculiar facts of

   the present case and the conduct of the parties justify a broader

   application of the maxim to uphold finality and prevent repeated

   litigation on shifting grounds. Such a purposive approach is consistent

   with comparative jurisprudence, including S.C.F. Finance Co. Ltd.

   (supra) and Barber (supra).

2. We now proceed to apply the above discussed principles to the present

   case. It is undisputed that the appellant instituted the specific

   performance suit in the year 1988, when the field was governed by

   the unamended provisions of the 1963 Act. Two years later, they

   instituted the two suits (O.S. Nos. 892 and 893 of 1990) for

   cancellation of the sale deeds, which were allowed by the appellants

   to be dismissed for default.

3. The dismissal of both suits (O.S. Nos. 892 and 893 of 1990), in such

   situation, despite the issues raised therein being central to the dispute 22 2025 SCC OnLine SC 912 19 over title and possession of the subject property, is a material

   circumstance which cannot be overlooked while assessing the overall

   conduct of the appellants. These proceedings were not incidental or

   collateral; they directly concerned the competing claims over the suit

   property. Though the dismissal was not on merits but on account of

   non-prosecution, the rival claims remained undetermined because of

   the appellants themselves.

4. Once a suit is dismissed for default owing to the absence of the plaintiff

   but when the defendant is present, the legal consequences

   under Order IX Rule 8, CPC come into operation. In such a situation,

   the remedy available to the plaintiff is circumscribed by [Order IX Rule

   9 of CPC](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161831507/), which expressly bars the institution of a fresh suit on the

   same cause of action. The only course open to such a plaintiff is to

   seek restoration of the earlier suit by demonstrating sufficient cause

   for his absence on the date of dismissal.

5. It is further borne out that even the restoration applications, one of

   which was filed admittedly after a significant delay of 308 days,

   ultimately came to be dismissed for default and the orders passed

   therein have attained finality. In course of the restoration proceedings

   arising out of O.S. No. 893 of 1990, the appellants had moved an

   application to bring on record the legal heirs of Mir Sadat Ali; however,

   no effective steps were taken to pursue the matter to its logical

   conclusion. The cumulative effect of these events is that the appellants

   not only permitted the original suits to be dismissed for default but 20 also allowed the restoration proceedings to meet the same fate. Such

   repeated non-prosecution cannot be simply brushed aside as a lack of

   initiative to carry proceedings forward; on the contrary, it manifests

   that the appellants intended to steal a march (over the defendants in

   such suits) by resorting to dubious methods, deliberately avoiding

   direct proceedings and instead securing orders through proceedings

   wherein they were not parties.

6. It is clear as daylight that the very institution of the said suits by the

   appellants demonstrates their awareness of the claim of the

   respondents 1 to 3 in respect of the suit property. The defence that

   the respondents 1 to 3 had raised was also within the knowledge of

   the appellants, since the written statements in the suits had been filed

   by the former. Having derived clear knowledge of the competing

   claims, surfacing from the pleadings, the appellants cannot later claim

   ignorance or treat them as unimportant. It becomes apparent that the

   appellants were aware of the legal title claimed by the respondents 1

   to 3 and despite such knowledge, chose not to implead either them or

   their vendors as parties in the specific performance suit. This omission,

   coupled with the failure to properly pursue the earlier suits or seek

   their restoration after dismissal by pursuing further remedy available

   in law, is a relevant circumstance while assessing the bona fides and

   overall conduct of the appellants.

7. In this backdrop, it becomes important to emphasize that the

   increasing influx of litigation appears to be driven less by a pursuit of 21 justice and more by an attempt to delay proceedings, harass

   opponents, and consume valuable judicial time. The judicial process is

   designed to resolve genuine disputes and not facilitate repetitive or

   frivolous claims. Parties who initiate or persist in vexatious or frivolous

   proceedings must remain mindful that such conduct risks facing

   judicial disapproval and may warrant appropriate orders, including

   dismissal with costs, so as to prevent abuse of the process of the court.

8. Contextually, it is apposite to refer to S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v.

Jagannath23, where this Court touched upon the obligation on the

   part of a plaintiff to come to court with clean hands and held that a

   person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the

   court; he can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

1. This Court in [Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam v. Raj Kumar Rajinder

   Singh24](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25681951/) considered a somewhat similar situation in the light of

   principles of estoppel, acquiescence and waiver. It was observed that

   a party cannot be permitted to take inconsistent stands in successive

   proceedings after having abandoned an earlier plea and allowing it to

   attain finality.

2. While a dismissal for default may not constitute res judicata in the

   strict sense under Section 11, CPC, the conduct of the appellants in

   abandoning the earlier suits, after having raised a positive case

   therein, attracts the broader principles akin to nemo debet bis vexari, 23 (1994) 1 SCC 1 24 (2019) 14 SCC 449 22 si constet curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa. A litigant who set

   the ball rolling for decision on an issue later elects not to pursue it

   cannot be permitted to revive the same dispute at a later stage,

   particularly in collateral or execution proceedings, and that too by

   seeking to obtain an order behind the back of the contestants.

3. To permit such a course would be to allow an abuse of the judicial

   process. The maxim interest republicae ut sit finis litium reminds us

   that it is in the public interest that litigation must come to an end.

   Courts cannot allow parties to reopen or indirectly challenge issues

   which they have chosen not to pursue earlier.

4. Quite apart, it would also not be unfair to criticise the conduct of the

   appellants as amounting to an abuse of the process of the court.

   Having allowed their earlier challenge to the sale deeds to attain

   finality, they cannot now seek to reopen the same issue in execution.

   Such attempt is impermissible. The process of the court cannot be

   used to revive what has already been consciously abandoned. This

   position stands squarely covered by the decision of this Court in [K.K.

   Modi v. K.N. Modi25](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1777887/), wherein it was authoritatively held that re-

   litigation of an issue already raised, or capable of being raised,

   constitutes an abuse of process, even if the strict requirements of res

   judicata are not satisfied. This Court held thus:

43.The Supreme Court Practice 1995 published by Sweet & Maxwell in
paragraphs 18/19/33 (p. 344) explains the phrase “abuse of the process of the
court” thus:

25

(1998) 3 SCC 573 23 “This term connotes that the process of the court must be used bona fide and
properly and must not be abused. The court will prevent improper use of its
machinery and will in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from
being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation.
… The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an
abuse of process are not closed but depend on all the relevant
circumstances. And for this purpose considerations of public policy and the
interests of justice may be very material.”

1. One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of the court is
   relitigation. It is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to justice and
   public policy for a party to relitigate the same issue which has already been tried
   and decided earlier against him. The reagitation may or may not be barred as res
   judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be reagitated, it also amounts to an
   abuse of the process of the court. A proceeding being filed for a collateral
   purpose, or a spurious claim being made in litigation may also in a given set of
   facts amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Frivolous or vexatious
   proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of the court especially
   where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The court then has the power
   to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the
   court from being wasted. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of the court's discretion
   whether such proceedings should be stopped or not; and this discretion has to
   be exercised with circumspection. It is a jurisdiction which should be sparingly
   exercised, and exercised only in special cases. The court should also be
   satisfied that there is no chance of the suit succeeding.

2. In the case of Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) 2 All ER 255] the Court had to
   consider different proceedings on the same cause of action for conspiracy, but
   supported by different averments. The Court held that if the plaintiff has chosen
   to put his case in one way, he cannot thereafter bring the same transaction
   before the Court, put his case in another way and say that he is relying on a new
   cause of action. In such circumstances he can be met with the plea of res
   judicata or the statement or plaint may be struck out on the ground that the
   action is frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court.

3. In Mcllkenny v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force [(1980) 2 All
   ER 227] the court of appeal in England struck out the pleading on the ground that
   the action was an abuse of the process of the court since it raised an issue
   identical to that which had been finally determined at the plaintiffs' earlier
   criminal trial. The Court said even when it is not possible to strike out the plaint
   on the ground of issue estoppel, the action can be struck out as an abuse of the
   process of the court because it is an abuse for a party to relitigate a question or
   issue which has already been decided against him even though the other party
   cannot satisfy the strict rule of res judicata or the requirement of issue estoppel.

(emphasis ours)

1. In the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, this Court cannot ignore such

   conduct where a party plays fast and loose with the court. Allowing

   proceedings touching upon title to be dismissed for default, while 24 continuing to pursue relief in another proceeding concerning the same

   property, raises concerns as to procedural fairness. Equity frowns upon

   selective prosecution. A party cannot act recklessly with the judicial

   process, invoking it as per his convenience and abandoning it when

   inconvenient, only to resurrect advantage in execution.

2. A profitable reference can also be made to Order XXIII Rule 1, CPC where the underlying principle is that when a plaintiff once institutes

   a suit in a court and thereby avails of a remedy given to him under

   law, he cannot be permitted to institute a fresh suit in respect of the

   same subject matter again after abandoning the earlier suit or by

   withdrawing it except with the permission of the court to file a fresh

   suit. Reliance may be placed on [Sarguja Transport Service v. State

   Transport Appellate Tribunal26](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1994144/), where this Court explained that

   such a bar does not arise from Section 11, CPC (since there is no

   “hearing and final decision”), but from public policy embedded in Order

   XXIII Rule 1 thereof. The object is to prevent a litigant from repeatedly

   invoking the court’s jurisdiction on the same cause of action,

   abandoning the proceeding when it suits him, and then re-agitating

   the same matter again. This Court therein held as follows:

1. The Code as it now stands thus makes a distinction between “abandonment” of a suit and “withdrawal” from a suit with permission to file a fresh suit. It provides that where the plaintiff abandons a suit or withdraws from a suit without the permission, referred to in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code, he shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim. The principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code is that when a plaintiff once institutes a suit in a court and thereby avails of a remedy given to him under law, he cannot be permitted to 26 (1987) 1 SCC 5 25 institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter again after abandoning the earlier suit or by withdrawing it without the permission of the court to file fresh suit. Invito beneficium non datur — the law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does not desire. Whoever waives, abandons or disclaims a right will loose it. In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the court by instituting suits again and again on the same cause of action without any good reason the Code insists that he should obtain the permission of the court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII. The principle underlying the above rule is founded on public policy, but it is not the same as the rule of res judicata contained in Section 11 of the Code which provides that no court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly or substantially in issue has been directly or substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court. The rule of res judicata applies to a case where the suit or an issue has already been heard and finally decided by a court. In the case of abandonment or withdrawal of a suit without the permission of the court to file a fresh suit, there is no prior adjudication of a suit or an issue is involved, yet the Code provides, as stated earlier, that a second suit will not lie in sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code when the first suit is withdrawn without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3) in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the court.

(emphasis ours)

1. It would, thus, be contrary to public policy too, as enunciated in Sarguja Transport Service (supra), to permit the appellants to reap

   the benefits of the decree for its execution against the respondents 1

   to 3 and have them dispossessed from the property.

2. We, therefore, answer issue-B against the appellants.

CONCLUSION

1. In the absence of any exceptional circumstance, the appellants stand

   precluded to reap the benefit of the decree through execution

   proceedings having chosen not to pursue O.S. Nos. 892 and 893 of 26 1990. The same was rightly interdicted and thwarted by the Appellate

   Court.

2. In view of the foregoing discussion, and notwithstanding our

   reservations with regard to certain aspects of the reasoning assigned

   by the Appellate Court and the cryptic nature of the impugned

   judgment of the High Court, we are in agreement with the ultimate

   conclusion reached by the Appellate Court, which has finally been

   affirmed by the High Court.

3. Having regard to the conduct of the appellants, the finality attached to

   the earlier proceedings, the settled principles of law discussed above

   and the utter abuse of the process of court on their part, we are of the

   considered opinion that no case is made out for interference.

4. The impugned judgment is, thus, upheld but for reasons other than

   those assigned therein. As a sequel thereto, the appeal fails and is

   dismissed. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.

5. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

………………………….……………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)

                                      …………………..……………………J.
                                      (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

New Delhi,
March 25, 2026.

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