John Doe v. University of Southern Indiana - Pseudonym Use Denied

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April 15, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

John Doe v. University of Southern Indiana

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-2245

• Judges: Hamilton

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (20.8K)

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Combined Opinion

                        by [David Frank Hamilton](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/1343/david-frank-hamilton/)

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 24-2245
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN INDIANA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Evansville Division.
No. 3:21-cv-00144-TWP-CSW — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.

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ARGUED JULY 29, 2025 — DECIDED APRIL 13, 2026

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Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and ST. EVE,
Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. We consider here an adult
plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym in a lawsuit under Title IX of
the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681,
which broadly prohibits sex discrimination in education
programs or activities receiving federal funding. Plaintiff-
appellant “John Doe” was a student at the University of
Southern Indiana (USI) in the 2020–21 academic year. He was
2 No. 24-2245

the subject of a Title IX complaint accusing him of sexually
assaulting another student. A hearing panel heard testimony
from John, from the complaining student (we call her “Jane
Doe”), and several other witnesses. The panel wrote that the
issue was “whose version of events is more credible, as the
details of each are irreconcilable.” The panel found that Jane’s
account was more credible—in part because, in the panel’s
view, her account had been “consistent over time” while
John’s account had changed. The panel found by a
preponderance of the evidence that John had committed
“Rape and Forcible Fondling.” John was suspended from the
university for three semesters in 2021. He has not returned
since and has no intention of returning in the future.
After the hearing panel’s decision, John quickly filed this
lawsuit, which defendants removed to federal court. He has
alleged that USI discriminated against males, including him,
in violation of Title IX; that USI and other defendants
deprived him of protected liberty and property interests
without due process; and that defendants intentionally
inflicted emotional distress on him through outrageous
conduct. The district court denied John’s request for a
preliminary injunction, and this court affirmed. Doe v.
University of Southern Indiana, 43 F.4th 784 (7th Cir. 2022).
John then learned through discovery that Title IX officials
at USI created memoranda of early conversations with John
and Jane. Those memoranda showed at least arguably (1) that
John’s account actually was consistent over time and (2) that
Jane’s account was not consistent over time. USI had not
disclosed those records to John or to any Title IX
decisionmakers, thus calling into question the foundation for
the hearing panel’s decision on the merits. In Title IX cases,
No. 24-2245 3

however, federal courts do not conduct any direct appellate
review of such decisions by educational institutions. The
district court ultimately granted summary judgment for
defendants on all of plaintiff’s claims.
John has filed three appeals from decisions of the district
court in Nos. 24-2245, 24-2318, and 24-2771. We consolidated
the three appeals for argument before one panel. This appeal,
No. 24-2245, challenges the district court’s order denying
plaintiff the right to litigate under a pseudonym while
keeping his real name confidential.
Before we issue any decision on the jurisdictional or merits
issues, we must confront the logically prior procedural issue:
whether plaintiff may proceed under the John Doe
pseudonym or whether he must instead proceed in this court
using his real name. Magistrate Judge Wildeman ordered
plaintiff to litigate under his real name. District Judge Pratt
considered and overruled plaintiff’s objection to that order.
Doe v. University of Southern Indiana, 2024 WL 3410801 (S.D.
Ind. July 11, 2024). The district court stayed its order,
however, pending this appeal, so briefing and argument in
this court have proceeded under the pseudonym.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal on the pseudonym
question as an appeal from a collateral order, and we review
that decision for an abuse of discretion. Doe v. Village of
Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 2016). “There is no abuse
of discretion ‘if the district court “applied the correct legal
standard and reached a reasonable decision based on facts
supported by the record.”’” Id., quoting Doe v. Elmbrook School
Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 721 (7th Cir. 2011), aff’d en banc in relevant
part, 687 F.3d 840, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting in turn Pruitt
v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
4 No. 24-2245

We have explained in many opinions why there is a strong
presumption in favor of requiring adult parties to litigate
under their real names in federal court. E.g., Roe v. Dettelbach,
59 F.4th 255, 259–60 (7th Cir. 2023); Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d
at 377; Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2005); Union Oil
Co. of California v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567–68 (7th Cir. 2000);
Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Wisc., 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th
Cir. 1997).
We have applied this presumption to Title IX cases even
though they often involve complaints and findings about
accusations of sexual assault and other sensitive subjects. Doe
v. Trustees of Indiana University, 101 F.4th 485 (7th Cir. 2024);
Doe v. Loyola University Chicago, 100 F.4th 910 (7th Cir. 2024).
Still, our decisions in these cases have left room to proceed
under a pseudonym if a party can show a “substantial risk of
harm—either physical harm or retaliation by third parties,
beyond the reaction legitimately attached to the truth of
events as determined in court.” Indiana University, 101 F.4th at
491. We have declined to allow use of pseudonyms to avoid
embarrassment. Id.
The district court found that plaintiff had not shown that
he faced a substantial risk of such harms. Plaintiff argues both
that he satisfies the substantial risk of harm standard
articulated in Indiana University and Loyola Chicago and that
we should reconsider and broaden that standard. We are not
persuaded on either score.
In terms of satisfying the Indiana University and Loyola
Chicago standard, first, plaintiff is not a minor. He contends,
however, that disclosure of his identity would put him at risk
of physical harm. He bases this assertion on vile social media
posts that threatened him and his mother with death or
No. 24-2245 5

physical harm back in 2021, when the events were fresh and
the Title IX proceedings were going forward in the university.
The district court rejected this argument, noting in 2024 that
the messages were several years old, that plaintiff’s true
identity was known to some of those posting, that no harm
had come plaintiff in the intervening years, and that there was
no other evidence indicating any intent to follow through on
those threats years later. The evidence also showed that
plaintiff had left the Midwest and had no intention of
returning to USI.
We find no error or abuse of discretion in the district
court’s evaluation of the issue of physical danger. Nor is there
any indication of danger of retaliation in the form of “private
responses unjustified by the facts as determined in court.” See
Indiana University, 101 F.4th at 493. Plaintiff thus cannot satisfy
the standard we adopted and applied in Indiana University
and Loyola Chicago.
Plaintiff argues further that the Indiana University and
Loyola Chicago standard has been too narrow and that we
should allow use of a pseudonym to protect a party’s mental
health. There is evidence that plaintiff contemplated suicide
in the midst of the proceedings but was helped by another
student who sought help from USI officials. Dkt. 415 at 11. The
contemplation of suicide is a stark reminder that the issue
here involves more than embarrassment. Title IX proceedings
and the events that lead to them can have devastating
consequences, whether the situation and identities of those
involved are publicized or not.
We are not persuaded, however, that we should broaden
the Indiana University and Loyola Chicago standard to protect a
party from risks that publicity would harm his mental health.
6 No. 24-2245

As the First Circuit acknowledged in Doe v. Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, federal lawsuits can be stressful and
“frequently invade customary notions of privacy and—in the
bargain—threaten parties’ reputations.” 46 F.4th 61, 70 (1st
Cir. 2022) (vacating and remanding district court’s denial of
leave to use pseudonym). But the lines between
embarrassment, stress, and degrees of mental illness are not
sharp. If there is any mental health exception for the strong
presumption against use of pseudonyms, and we are not
saying there is, plaintiff’s evidence of risk to his mental health
was not so compelling that the district court abused its
discretion in denying use of a pseudonym here.
Further, each side argues that the strength of its position
on the merits of the case favors its position on plaintiff’s use
of a pseudonym. Plaintiff points out that Title IX proceedings
within universities and colleges are supposed to be
confidential, a factor the First Circuit held must be weighed
in deciding on the use of a pseudonym in a Title IX lawsuit.
See Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 46 F.4th at 74–76. He
contends that the defendants have admitted they concealed
evidence, thus violating his rights under Title IX and
effectively forcing him to go to federal court for a remedy. As
he sees the case, it’s not fair to allow defendants’ violations of
Title IX to force him to surrender the anonymity that applied
in the university proceedings.
Defendants, on the other hand, point out that the hearing
officers ruled against plaintiff, finding him responsible for a
sexual assault. Defendants note that even victims of sexual
assault are not necessarily entitled to anonymity in Title IX
litigation in federal court. Defendants argue that this plaintiff,
having been found after a hearing to have committed a sexual
No. 24-2245 7

assault, should not be entitled to greater rights to anonymity
than a victim would have.
We reject both sides’ reliance on the merits of their
positions as a basis for deciding on the use of a pseudonym.
We are reluctant to adopt a test for pseudonyms that would
depend on or even consider the merits of a party’s claims or
defenses, such that a district court would need to take an early
look at the merits of the case to decide the pseudonym issue.
The use of a pseudonym must be decided, at least initially,
close to the beginning of a lawsuit, well before a court can
ordinarily provide a reliable assessment of the merits.
Moreover, while decisions about using a pseudonym can be
appealed as collateral orders, that is so only because such
orders must “resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action.” Massachusetts Inst. of Technology,
46 F.4th at 65, quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006)
(emphasis added). It would be incongruous, if not downright
self-contradictory, to say that the resolution of just such a
collateral issue should depend on an assessment of the merits
of the case.
The bottom line in this appeal is that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff the use of a
pseudonym, and its order to that effect is AFFIRMED. To
resolve this matter, we follow the path we did in Indiana
University and Loyola Chicago. We will not immediately use
plaintiff’s real name in the public record. He is entitled to
choose between dismissing these appeals under Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 42 or having this court proceed to
decide the merits of these appeals in a decision that would use
his real name. Accordingly, we will keep all three appeals
under advisement for now. If plaintiff wishes to dismiss the
8 No. 24-2245

appeals and avoid public disclosure of his name in these
proceedings, he shall file a motion to dismiss all three appeals
under Rule 42 no later than May 13, 2026. See Indiana
University, 101 F.4th at 493; Loyola Chicago, 100 F.4th at 914.