United States v. Omari Andrews, Jr. — Affirms Firearms and Drug Trafficking Conviction

Jump To

Top Caption [Combined Opinion

                  by St.Eve](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10843501/united-states-v-omari-andrews-jr/#o1)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

April 15, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Omari Andrews, Jr.

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-1904

• Judges: St.Eve

• Opinion

• Authorities (29)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (23.9K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by St.Eve

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

No. 25-1904
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

OMARI ANDREWS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 23-cr-00170 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 26, 2026 — DECIDED APRIL 15, 2026

Before EASTERBROOK, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Omari Andrews, Jr.,
of possessing four firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime. Andrews challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for
his firearm conviction and the admission of certain expert tes-
timony. The district court rejected both arguments when it de-
nied Andrews’s post-trial motions. We affirm.
2 No. 25-1904

I. Background
A joint federal and local law enforcement investigation
suspected that Omari Andrews, Jr., supplied drugs to a gang
in Skokie and Evanston, Illinois. On five occasions, law en-
forcement conducted controlled buys of cocaine, heroin, and
fentanyl from Andrews. Officers then obtained a warrant for
Andrews’s arrest, and a search warrant for an apartment in
Mount Prospect, Illinois (the “Palm Drive apartment”). An-
drews jointly occupied the Palm Drive apartment with his
mother, who leased it, his younger brother, and other family.
In March 2023, law enforcement arrested Andrews. Dur-
ing the arrest, officers found nine small plastic bags contain-
ing heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, and a cocaine base in Andrews’s
pockets. Officers then searched the Palm Drive apartment,
where they found more drugs and items associated with drug
production and trafficking. They also found four firearms:
(i) a Glock 19, (ii) a Glock 27, (iii) a Glock 19X, and (iv) an AR-
style pistol.
While in custody, Andrews called his parents on a rec-
orded jail phone. During the conversation, Andrews asked his
parents, “you think they gonna hit me with a 922(c),” to which
his father responded, “how many you had in [the] house?”
Andrews replied, “[t]here was four … they wasn’t together
like one, you know what I’m saying? They was [in] different
rooms.”
A grand jury indicted Andrews on seven counts. Counts
one through five charged him with distribution of a con-
trolled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1), reflecting the five con-
trolled buys. Count six charged him with possession with in-
tent to distribute a controlled substance, § 841(a)(1), reflecting
No. 25-1904 3

the drugs found in Andrews’s pockets. Count seven charged
him with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug traf-
ficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(A), listing the four firearms
in the apartment. Andrews eventually pleaded guilty to the
first five counts and proceeded to trial on counts six and
seven.
During pretrial discovery, the government disclosed that
its fingerprint analyst, Thomas Kern, analyzed fingerprints on
the Glock 27 and the AR-style pistol (latent prints 3A and 4A,
respectively) and matched both to Andrews’s known finger-
prints. In early July 2024, over a month before trial, the gov-
ernment confirmed it intended to call Kern as an expert at trial
and disclosed Kern’s qualifications, opinions, and the bases
for those opinions.
Andrews did not disclose whether he planned to call an
expert witness by either the July 15 witness list deadline or
the July 30 final pretrial conference. Instead, days before trial
(and well after the July 15 motion in limine deadline), An-
drews moved to exclude, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
Kern’s testimony regarding his analysis of latent print 3A. An-
drews relied on his own expert, who concluded Kern had
“digitally manipulated” latent print 3A. Andrews did not
move to exclude Kern’s testimony on latent print 4A.
The district court denied Andrews’s motion in limine both
as untimely and because Kern’s opinion on latent print 3A
met the requirements of Rule 702. But it allowed Andrews to
call his expert “out of fairness to the defendant,” notwith-
standing that Andrews had not timely disclosed his expert.
The trial continued for five days. The jury heard testimony
from several law enforcement officers who described the in-
vestigation, the search of the Palm Drive apartment, and the
4 No. 25-1904

drugs and firearms they found in the apartment. The jury also
heard the recorded jail phone call between Andrews and his
parents. In addition, it heard from Kern, who started by de-
tailing his background, experience, and qualifications. Kern
testified he matched latent prints 3A and 4A to Andrews’s
known fingerprints. Regarding his analysis of latent print 3A,
Kern explained he used Adobe Photoshop to adjust the angle
of the photograph of the fingerprint because it allowed him to
better analyze the fingerprint. Andrews’s expert later testified
he had “never seen” the technique Kern used and did not
think it was scientifically validated. He explained he could not
match latent print 3A to Andrews’s known fingerprint nor
could he exclude the possibility that they matched.
The jury convicted Andrews on both counts and found he
possessed all four firearms. Andrews moved for acquittal and
for a new trial, challenging only his § 924(c) conviction. The
district court denied both motions and sentenced Andrews to
123 months in prison. Andrews appealed.
II. Discussion
Andrews raises two arguments on appeal. First, he con-
tends the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove he
possessed the four firearms recovered at the Palm Drive
apartment. Second, he claims the district court erred in admit-
ting Kern’s latent print 3A testimony under Rule 702. We con-
sider each in turn.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Andrews challenges the sufficiency of the evidence after a
jury verdict, so we view the evidence “in the light most favor-
able to the government and draw all reasonable inferences in
its favor.” United States v. Anderson, 988 F.3d 420, 424 (7th Cir.
No. 25-1904 5

2021). We owe deference to the jury, United States v. Jones, 79
F.4th 844, 853 (7th Cir 2023), and will not “reweigh the evi-
dence nor judge the credibility of witnesses,” United States v.
Moshiri, 858 F.3d 1077, 1082 (7th Cir. 2017). “If there is a rea-
sonable basis in the record for the verdict, it must stand.” Id.
Accordingly, we overturn a verdict only where “no rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the of-
fense beyond a reasonable doubt”—a “nearly insurmounta-
ble” standard. Anderson, 988 F.3d at 424 (citation modified).
The jury found Andrews guilty of “possess[ing] a firearm”
“in furtherance of [a drug trafficking crime].” 18 U.S.C.
§ 924 (c)(1)(A)(i). A jury may find that a defendant either “ac-
tual[ly]” or “constructive[ly]” possessed a firearm. United
States v. White, 95 F.4th 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 2024). Here, the
government presented evidence to demonstrate “construc-
tive” possession, which allows the jury to “deem[]” that a de-
fendant possessed a firearm “even when he [did] not actually
have immediate, physical control of the objects.” United States
v. Morris, 576 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2009). The government
can prove constructive possession either through the defend-
ant’s “exclusive control” of the location where officers found
the firearm, United States v. Katz, 582 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir.
2009), or, where a defendant “jointly occupies [the] resi-
dence,” by showing a “substantial connection” between the
defendant and the firearm specifically, United States v. Griffin,
684 F.3d 691, 697 (7th Cir. 2012). To satisfy the latter, the gov-
ernment must demonstrate “proximity coupled with [] some
other factor” tying the defendant to the firearm. United States
v. Davis, 896 F.3d 784, 790 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Griffin, 684
F.3d at 696). These factors include “connection with [the fire-
arm], proof of motive, a gesture implying control, evasive
6 No. 25-1904

conduct, or a statement indicating involvement in an enter-
prise.” Id. (quoting Griffin, 684 F.3d at 696).
Because Andrews “jointly occupie[d]” the Palm Drive
apartment, the government had to prove his nexus to the fire-
arms. The government easily proved the required “substan-
tial connection.” Start with the jail phone call. Andrews raised
the possibility of a § 924(c) charge (mistakenly calling it
“922(c)”), Andrews’s father asked “how many you had in the
apartment,” (emphasis added), and Andrews confirmed both
that there were “four” firearms and that they were in various
locations around the apartment. On this evidence, a reasona-
ble juror could easily find Andrews had a “substantial con-
nection” to the firearms. See White, 95 F.4th at 1078 (defendant
demonstrated “awareness” of firearm where law enforcement
“asked him about the firearm without showing or describing
it to him” and “[defendant] seemed to know exactly what gun
[the officer] was talking about”); United States v. Richardson, 60
F.4th 397, 399 (7th Cir. 2023) (defendant “confirm[ing]” fire-
arm was “in the same place that it’s always in” on jail phone
calls supported constructive possession).
Andrews offers alternative interpretations: the call was
about the charges he faced, he had just attended his arraign-
ment and was simply reporting what law enforcement found,
and his “acknowledgment” of the “four” firearms does not
prove possession. But our job is not to reweigh the evidence,
and a juror could reasonably infer from the phone call that
Andrews was describing his “four” firearms in the apartment.
Moreover, the phone call was not the only evidence the
government presented. Kern told the jury he analyzed latent
prints 3A and 4A and matched them to Andrews’s known fin-
gerprints. Section 924(c) requires evidence that the defendant
No. 25-1904 7

possessed at least one firearm, and the fingerprints provided
evidence from which a juror could conclude Andrews con-
structively possessed at least two of the firearms in the apart-
ment. See United States v. Thornton, 463 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir.
2006) (defendant’s fingerprint on magazine “tied [him] quite
closely to the gun”); cf. United States v. Maxwell, 143 F.4th 844,
858 (7th Cir. 2025) (DNA on firearm supported possession).
Even if we accept, for argument’s sake, that the district
court should not have admitted latent print 3A, we are still
left with latent print 4A. Although Andrews offered his ex-
pert’s competing interpretation of latent print 4A, competing
expert testimony does not support an insufficient evidence ar-
gument. Rather, we view the testimony in the government’s
favor. Cf. United States v. Taylor, 637 F.3d 812, 815–16 (7th Cir.
2011) (“[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a
criminal conviction, we do not reweigh the evidence ….”);
United Sates v. Brewer, 143 F.4th 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2025) (same).
Here, that means accepting latent print 4A matches An-
drews’s fingerprint, tying Andrews to the AR-style firearm.
This too is sufficient evidence.
Andrews asks us to make inferences, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, and reweigh evidence, all in his favor. But that is not
the standard we apply. The government presented over-
whelming evidence that Andrews constructively possessed
the firearms in the Palm Drive apartment.
B. Federal Rule of Evidence 702
Andrews separately contends the district court erred in
admitting Kern’s testimony regarding latent print 3A because
Kern’s analysis was unreliable under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702. Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert
8 No. 25-1904

testimony, setting out the requirements “[a] witness who is
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education” must demonstrate to testify, including that
the proffered testimony is “the product of reliable principles
and methods.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(c). Under Rule 702 and Daub-
ert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the
district court takes on a “gatekeeping” function and must en-
sure “the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony.”
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 152 (1999). We
review de novo whether the district court “properly applied
the framework in Rule 702 and Daubert.” United States v.
Godinez, 7 F.4th 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2021). If it did, we review for
abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to admit or ex-
clude the expert evidence. Id. If it did not, our review is de
novo. Id. (citing Kirk v. Clark Equip. Co., 991 F.3d 865, 872–73
(7th Cir. 2021)).
Contrary to Andrews’s contention, the district court’s
analysis satisfies Rule 702 and Daubert. Andrews challenged
the reliability of Kern’s methodology, and the district court
reasoned that Kern’s experience provided a sufficient basis
for the reliability of his use of Photoshop. This is perhaps con-
cise but nowhere near a failure to apply Daubert or the “con-
clusory, one-sentence ruling” against which Godinez warns. 7
F.4th at 637. Accordingly, we review for abuse of discretion.
Andrews first challenges the lack of a Daubert hearing, but
district courts enjoy “broad latitude” to “decide[] how to de-
termine reliability.” Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 142; see also
Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir.
2009) (“[T]he law grants the district court great discretion re-
garding the manner in which it conducts [the Rule 702] eval-
uation ....”). “Whether a Daubert hearing is necessary … lies
No. 25-1904 9

within the district court’s discretion.” Godinez, 7 F.4th at 637.
A “district court need not conduct a Daubert hearing, ‘where
[] reliability … is properly taken for granted,’” United States v.
Johnson, 916 F.3d 579, 587 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States
v. Tingle, 880 F.3d 850, 854 (7th Cir. 2018)), and there is no
“specific form” a “Daubert inquiry” must take, Kirstein v. Parks
Corp., 159 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir. 1998).
Put simply, a district court need not hold an evidentiary
hearing sua sponte when considering a Rule 702 challenge,
nor is a district court’s failure to do so sua sponte categorically
an abuse of discretion. Cf. United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252,
266 (7th Cir. 2018) (“District judges are not required to under-
take each step of the Rule 702 analysis when no party specifi-
cally requests it, and they generally do not err in admitting
expert testimony as a result.”); see also United States v. Owens,
162 F.4th 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2025) (“District courts need not
conduct [Rule 702] inquiries sua sponte ....”). This is not to
suggest the failure to hold a hearing can never amount to an
abuse of discretion. But the Daubert analysis is “tied to the
facts of a particular case,” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150 (citation
modified), so there is no default approach or “definitive
checklist or test” to a district court’s Rule 702 responsibilities,
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
Here, the district court did not err by not holding a hear-
ing. Andrews never requested an evidentiary hearing. Nor
did he even challenge the admissibility of the expert testi-
mony until the eve of trial—well after the deadline to do so.
And he relied on his own untimely expert. Further, the relia-
bility of fingerprint analysis generally is well-settled, and
Kern’s analysis was relatively straightforward. See United
States v. Glover, 479 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2007).
10 No. 25-1904

Andrews’s challenge to the district court’s ruling on the
untimeliness of his objection fares no better. Although the dis-
trict court found Andrews’s objection untimely, it neverthe-
less ruled on the merits of his motion. Regardless, we have
previously explained that a district court may “require pre-
trial presentation [of evidentiary objections] to avoid side-
tracking the trial” and district courts “common[ly]” do so “for
expert witnesses.” United States v. Acox, 595 F.3d 729, 733 (7th
Cir. 2010).
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in de-
ciding that Kern’s use of Photoshop was a reliable methodol-
ogy. An expert’s experience can suffice to satisfy Rule 702(c)’s
threshold. United States v. Parkhurst, 865 F.3d 509, 516 (7th Cir.
2017) (“Training and experience are proper foundations for
expert testimony.”); Artis v. Santos, 95 F.4th 518, 526 (7th Cir.
2024) (“[I]t is no secret that an expert need not wear a lab coat
nor cite peer-reviewed studies to reliably lend his expertise to
the trier of fact—experience is an equally valuable teacher.”).
Kern testified on his years of experience as a fingerprint ana-
lyst, his training generally in Photoshop, the “academic foun-
dation” of this technique in other forensic fields, and the com-
mon practice in forensic analysis of borrowing techniques
from related forensic fields. And the district court found his
experience established the requisite reliability under Rule 702.
We see nothing wrong with the district court’s reliability
determination. Because Kern’s experience supported the reli-
ability of his testimony, Andrews’s “criticisms … are fodder
for cross-examination, not grounds for exclusion.” Artis, 95
F.4th at 527 (challenge to expert’s reliance on “informal
sources” went to “weight of [expert’s] testimony” not “its ad-
missibility”). Consider United States v. Protho, where an expert
No. 25-1904 11

“testified on the image enhancements he made to [] surveil-
lance videos and on the subjects captured in those videos.” 41
F.4th 812, 822 (7th Cir. 2022). We affirmed the district court’s
reliability finding because of the expert’s “extensive experi-
ence and specialized expertise in reviewing visual evidence.”
Id. And, in United States v. George, we explained that because
fingerprint analysis generally is reliable, challenges to the
analysis of partial fingerprints go to the “weight and credibil-
ity” of the evidence, which are best left for the “finder of fact,”
particularly where the defendant covered the issue on cross-
examination. 363 F.3d 666, 672–73 (7th Cir. 2004).
The same is true of Andrews’s challenge to Kern’s testi-
mony. “Expert testimony is still testimony, not irrefutable
fact, and its ultimate persuasive power is for the jury to de-
cide.” United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667, 703–04 (7th Cir.
2020). Kern’s experience provided a sufficient basis for the
district court’s decision, and the court appropriately deter-
mined that Andrews’s challenge went to the weight of Kern’s
testimony—a question for the jury, not the court. Moreover,
Andrews’s cross-examination of Kern and his expert’s testi-
mony brought the concerns he had with Kern’s analysis be-
fore the jurors as well. There was no error in denying An-
drews’s motion and allowing the jury to resolve this issue. *

• Andrews did not challenge latent print 4A. And we do not know how

much weight the jury afforded latent print 3A as opposed to latent print
4A and other evidence at trial. Because the district court did not err in ad-
mitting Kern’s testimony, we need not reach the harmlessness of any er-
ror. See Godinez, 7 F.4th at 641 (harmless error applies to Rule 702 review).
But we note this to highlight the stretch of Andrews’s argument.
12 No. 25-1904

C. Circuit Rule 30
We end with a comment on Circuit Rule 30. Rule 30(a) in-
structs an appellant to file with his brief “an appendix con-
taining the judgment or order under review and any opinion,
memorandum of decision, findings of fact and conclusions of
law, or oral statement of reasons delivered by the trial court.”
Rule 30(b) continues, explaining the appendix must also in-
clude “[c]opies of any other opinions, orders, or oral rulings
in the case that address the issues sought to be raised.” Fi-
nally, Rule 30(d) requires counsel certify compliance by in-
cluding a written statement as well.
Andrews’s counsel certified that “all of the materials re-
quired by parts (a) and (b) of Circuit Rule 30 are contained in
the [] appendix.” That was true with respect to Rule 30(a), but
not with respect to Rule 30(b). Much of Andrews’s Rule 702
argument turns on the district court’s oral ruling denying his
motion in limine at the start of trial—i.e., an “oral ruling[] …
that address[ed] … issues sought to be raised.” Cir. R. 30(b).
Yet Andrews’s appendix did not include the relevant portion
of the trial transcript. At oral argument, counsel expressed
surprise that Rule 30 required inclusion of the district court’s
oral ruling, which suggested counsel had not read Rule 30(b),
despite counsel’s certification of compliance.
Counsel must comply with Rule 30 in its entirety. The rule
“allows us to know—indeed to review—what the appellant
challenges on appeal.” United States v. Matthews, 140 F.4th 893,
899–900 (7th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he ‘[f]ailure to supply necessary
documents goes to the heart of this court’s decisionmaking
process.’” (quoting Hill v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., 90 F.3d 220, 226
(7th Cir. 1996))). Although it was not difficult to find the dis-
trict court’s oral ruling denying Andrews’s Rule 702 motion,
No. 25-1904 13

in other cases, failure to comply with Rule 30 can have more
profound effects. See id. (“We figured it out on our own, pour-
ing through the record and locating each ruling we under-
stood the defendants to be challenging.… We did what de-
fense counsels’ appellate briefs failed to do.”); United States v.
White, 472 F.3d 458, 465 (7th Cir. 2006) (“This court’s workload
increases dramatically if an appeal is transformed into a scav-
enger hunt in search of a copy of the judgment below or the
transcript page where a challenged decision was explained by
the district court.”).
More fundamentally, “[f]alse representations to the court
of appeals have consequences.” United States v. Boliaux, 915
F.3d 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2019). In civil cases, false certification
can lead to summary affirmance or dismissal. Id. In criminal
cases, we have sanctioned counsel. Id. (collecting cases). While
we decline to sanction counsel here, we have removed coun-
sel from the list of lawyers who we appoint under the Crimi-
nal Justice Act. This exclusion is not permanent; counsel may
reapply after a year and with sufficient explanation of coun-
sel’s error and the measures counsel has since taken to ensure
compliance with Rule 30.
To conclude, we once again underscore the importance of
Rule 30 and of counsel’s obligation to ensure the truth of rep-
resentations made in court. We also underscore for Andrews
that his counsel’s error did not prejudice him. We reviewed
the missing oral ruling as part of considering his arguments
on appeal.

The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.