Kulmann v. U.S. Postal Serv. — Second Circuit Affirms Mail Claim Dismissal

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Kulmann v. U.S. Postal Serv.

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-1106-cv

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

25-1106-cv
Kulmann v. U.S. Postal Serv.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40
Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 24th day of April, two thousand
twenty-six.

PRESENT:
EUNICE C. LEE,
BETH ROBINSON,
Circuit Judges,
ERIC R. KOMITEE,
District Judge. ∗
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Linda Kulmann,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 25-1106

∗ Eric R. Komitee, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,

sitting by designation.
United States Postal Service,
Waterbury Branch, Brandon,
Manager, Tony, Mail Carrier,

Defendants.

---

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Linda Kulmann, pro se, Southbury,
CT.

FOR DEFENDANTS: No appearance.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District

of Connecticut (Omar A. Williams, Judge; Robert M. Spector, Magistrate Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

Linda Kulmann, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s

judgment sua sponte, meaning on its own initiative, dismissing her complaint for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Kulmann sued a branch of the United States

Postal Service (“USPS”), a mail carrier, and a post office manager, alleging that

they failed to deliver her mail. A magistrate judge recommended dismissing

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the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Before Kulmann objected

and before her time to do so expired, the district court adopted the

recommendation and dismissed Kulmann’s complaint. The district court

subsequently observed that Kulmann had filed her objections in the wrong case

and permitted Kulmann additional time to correctly file her objections.

Kulmann moved to alter or correct the record, and filed her objections. The

district court reviewed her objections, but again adopted the magistrate judge’s

recommendation and dismissed Kulmann’s complaint without prejudice and

without leave to amend for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied

as moot Kulmann’s motion to alter or correct the record. We assume the parties’

familiarity with the remaining facts, the procedural history, and the issues on

appeal. 1

We review de novo the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. See Digitel, Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 239 F.3d 187, 190 (2d

Cir. 2001). Because Kulmann “has been pro se throughout, [her] pleadings and

1
We deny Kulmann’s pending motion to alter the record on appeal and for default for
failure to appear. We also deny Kulmann’s pending motion for referral to the U.S.
Office of the Inspector General.

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other filings are interpreted to raise the strongest claims they suggest.” Sharikov

v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2024).

The district court’s first dismissal order was premature, but any error was

harmless because the district court later permitted Kulmann to file her objections,

and then properly considered those objections before again concluding that it

would adopt the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismiss Kulmann’s

complaint.

As to the district court’s second dismissal order, the court was correct that

sua sponte dismissal of Kulmann’s complaint was warranted. To the extent

Kulmann sought damages, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

because her claims were barred by sovereign immunity. 2 “The waiver of

[federal] sovereign immunity is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction.”

Presidential Gardens Assoc. v. United States ex rel. Sec’y of Housing and Urban

Development, 175 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999). And “the Postal Service enjoys

federal sovereign immunity absent a waiver.” Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S.

2
In her objections to the report and recommendation, Kulmann clarified that the private
attorney she referenced in her complaint was not a defendant in this action.

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481, 484 (2006).

“Although the Postal Reorganization Act generally waives the immunity

of the Postal Service from suit by giving it the power ‘to sue and be sued in its

official name,’ the statute also provides that the [Federal Tort Claims Act

(“FTCA”)] ‘shall apply to tort claims arising out of activities of the Postal

Service[.]’” Id. (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 409 (c)) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Under the FTCA, “the United States may be liable if postal

employees commit torts under local law,” id. at 485, but not for claims “‘arising

out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter,’”

id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (b)). This exception includes suits for “the

intentional nondelivery of mail.” U.S. Postal Serv. v. Konan, 146 S. Ct. 736, 746

(2026). Kulmann alleged that USPS employees intentionally failed to deliver

her mail and incorrectly marked her residence as “vacant.” Such activities fall

within the FTCA’s postal exception. See Konan, 146 S. Ct. at 742. (“Both

‘miscarriage’ and ‘loss’ of mail under the postal exception can occur as a result

of the Postal Service’s intentional failure to deliver the mail.”). Accordingly,

Kulmann’s claims for damages were barred by sovereign immunity.

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The district court was also correct that Kulmann could not bring claims

based on the federal criminal statutes she cited. “[I]n our federal system crimes

are always prosecuted by the Federal Government.” Conn. Action Now, Inc. v.

Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 86–87 (2d Cir. 1972). Thus, the district court did

not err in dismissing Kulmann’s claims based on federal criminal statutes,

though the dismissal of these claims is with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). Eliahu

v. Jewish Agency for Israel, 919 F.3d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of

plaintiffs’ claims based on “federal mail fraud statutes” under Rule 12(b)(6)

because there is no “private cause of action”).

Although the district court did not address whether Kulmann sought

prospective injunctive relief, she failed to plausibly allege that the defendants

were violating federal law. “The ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions

by state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long

history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to England.”

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015). Here,

Kulmann appeared to claim that a private attorney involved in cases regarding

her late father’s estate was conspiring with the USPS employees to deprive her

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of mail and therefore impede her ability to participate in the court cases.

However, Kulmann’s complaint failed to plausibly allege that the USPS

employees were failing to deliver her mail as part of a scheme to deprive her of

access to the courts. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.”).

Finally, the district court properly denied Kulmann leave to file an

amended complaint because amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v.

Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (denying a pro se litigant’s request to

amend her complaint where repleading would not cure the substantive issues,

and thus, would be futile).

We have considered all of Kulmann’s arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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