Hiya v. United States — Affirms Denial of Bail Pending Extradition

Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Hiya v. United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 26-267

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (17.2K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

26-267
Hiya v. United States

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,
in the City of New York, on the 24th day of April, two thousand twenty-six.

PRESENT:
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
BETH ROBINSON,
Circuit Judges.
JED S. RAKOFF,
District Judge. *

---

ERAN HIYA,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v. No. 26-267

• Judge Jed S. Rakoff, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellee.

---

For Petitioner-Appellant: JUSTINE A. HARRIS, Harris Trzaskoma LLP,
New York, NY.

For Respondent-Appellee: DANA R. MCCANN, Assistant United States
Attorney, for Jay Clayton, United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, New York, NY.

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Jeannette A. Vargas, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the January 22, 2026 order of the district court

is AFFIRMED.

Eran Hiya appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for bail

pending extradition. Hiya faces charges in Israel, where allegedly – as head of a

criminal syndicate called the “Hiya [G]ang,” App’x at 569 – he conspired to

assassinate a rival gang leader. After a magistrate judge certified him for

extradition, Hiya (i) filed a still-pending habeas action challenging that

certification, and (ii) sought bail in the interim, which the district court denied after

2
concluding that Hiya both posed a flight risk and a danger to the community. We

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and

issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.

When reviewing a “detention challenge, we examine the district court’s

factual determinations for clear error,” United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 317

(2d Cir. 2004), and will affirm unless we are “left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed,” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234,

242 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, district courts apply

“a more demanding standard” “for persons involved in extradition proceedings

. . . [than] for ordinary accused criminals awaiting trial,” since granting bail in

extradition cases risks frustrating “the treaty obligations of the United States.” Hu

Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 920; see Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 62 (1903)

(“The demanding government . . . is entitled to the delivery of the accused[,] . . .

and the [responding] government is under obligation to make the surrender[,] an

obligation [that] it might be impossible to fulfil if release on bail were permitted.”).

We have therefore recognized “a presumption against bail in [extradition cases],”

Hu Yau-Leung, 649 F.2d at 920, with release warranted “only in the most pressing

circumstances, and when the requirements of justice are absolutely peremptory,”

3
United States v. Leitner, 784 F.2d 159, 160 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Because “there [is] no statute providing for . . . bail in cases of foreign

extradition,” we have developed common-law standards governing such requests.

Wright, 190 U.S. at 62. Under those standards, a petitioner seeking bail must

(i) show “special circumstances” justifying relief, id. at 63; and (ii) satisfy – at the

very least – the traditional criteria for bail, i.e., that he does not pose a risk of flight

or a danger to the community, cf. Leitner, 784 F.2d at 160–61 (explaining that “the

[alleged] violent” crimes and “risk of flight warrant[ed] the denial of bail” pending

extradition). 1

Here, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Hiya posed a

flight risk. It explained that Hiya (i) “ha[d] every incentive to flee,” because he

faced over a decade in prison on a litany of Israeli charges alleging that he had

attempted to bomb a rival gang leader’s car; (ii) “ha[d] the resources to flee”; and

(iii) “lack[ed] strong ties to this community” because his “wife and children d[id]

1The government also contends that (i) the foreign-fugitives statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3184, prohibits
bail after the district court has certified a party for extradition, but see Hu Yau-Leung, 649 F.2d at
915–20 (affirming post-certification grant of bail); and (ii) the “difficult standards for release that
apply in habeas proceedings” govern Hiya’s bail request, Gov’t. Br. at 17 (internal quotation
marks omitted). We need not reach either issue because we conclude that the district court’s
analysis passes the ordinary test for bail pending extradition.

4
not live in the United States,” and he generally “resid[ed] in a Turkish compound

with private security.” App’x at 503–04. The district court also emphasized that

Hiya “is alleged to be the head of a criminal . . . syndicate,” “may well have access

to illicit assets, as well as the knowledge of how to obtain falsified travel

documents,” and was indicted in the United States on charges of “unlawfully

apply[ing] for and procur[ing] U.S. citizenship” by falsifying records and

affidavits. Id. at 505. Finally, the district court stressed that, at the time of his

arrest, Hiya had passports and identification documents from several other

countries, including from Poland and Turkey, which further reflected his ability

to flee.

Hiya nonetheless argues that the district court erred by refusing – out of an

excessive concern for “international comity” – to “evaluate the weight of the

evidence” before the Israeli court. Hiya Br. at 12–13 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Notwithstanding his concession that 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g) – the criminal

bail statute – “does not technically govern extradition proceedings,” he maintains

that constitutional due process “mandate[s]” that courts go through all of section

3142(g)’s factors (including the weight of the evidence) when reviewing requests

for bail pending extradition. Id. at 13–14 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 5
739, 755 (1987)). But we need not address that argument because the district court

relied on a wide range of garden-variety factors to determine that Hiya posed a

risk of flight. Consequently, even if it could be argued that the district court erred

when it declined to consider the weight of the evidence before the Israeli court – a

question we do not reach – any error was harmless. See United States v. Montalvo-

Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 722 (1990) (a nonconstitutional error is harmless “unless the

court concludes from the record as a whole that the error may have had a

substantial influence on the outcome of the proceeding” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

Hiya also asserts that the district court overlooked a “condition[] . . . that

could reasonably assure” that he would not flee, i.e., the “use of a private security

firm.” Hiya Br. at 2. But Hiya concedes that we have forbidden courts to consider

exactly that condition, which would create “a two-tiered bail system in which

defendants of lesser means are detained pending trial while wealthy defendants

are released to self-funded private jails.” Id. at 20 (quoting United States v. Boustani,

932 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2019)). Hiya contends that this rule does not apply “where

the defendant is deemed to be a flight risk primarily because of his wealth.” Id.

(quoting Boustani, 932 F.3d at 82). The district court here, however, expressly

6
considered this exception and held that it did not apply because Hiya’s “personal

wealth would not have altered [its] decision,” and was thus neither “a but-for

cause of [its] decision” nor a factor on which it “rel[ied] heavily.” App’x at 549.

Having carefully reviewed the record below, we find that the district court

correctly characterized its own conclusions: as discussed above, it considered the

nature of Hiya’s alleged crimes, his weak ties to the United States, his passport-

fraud-related indictment, and several other factors. It is thus “clear that the

[d]istrict [c]ourt did not rely primarily on [Hiya’s] personal wealth in finding that

he posed a flight risk” – even if that “wealth was one of many factors [it]

considered.” Boustani, 932 F.3d at 83.

---

We have considered Hiya’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. For these reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

7