Ross v. U-Haul Co. - Appeal Dismissed, Contract Claim Dismissed, Civil Rights Claim Viable

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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Ross v. U-Haul Co. of California CA2/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B348327

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

Filed 3/26/26 Ross v. U-Haul Co. of California CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

LINDSAY ROSS, B348327

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24AVCV01648)
v.

U-HAUL COMPANY OF
CALIFORNIA,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephen T. Morgan, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Lindsay Ross, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Burger, Meyer & D’Angelo, William D. Burger, Jr., Charles
T. Meyer and Kenneth S. Miller for Defendant and Respondent
U-Haul Company of California.

Plaintiff Lindsay Ross filed a lawsuit against U-Haul
Company of California (U-Haul) asserting, in his first amended
complaint, causes of action for breach of contract and violation
of his civil rights. He alleged that U-Haul breached an equipment
rental agreement with him for impermissibly discriminatory
reasons.
On April 8, 2025, the trial court sustained U-Haul’s demurrer
to the breach of contract cause of action without leave to amend and
to the civil rights cause of action with 30 days leave to amend. Ross
moved for reconsideration of the order.
On May 12, 2025, Ross lodged a proposed second amended
complaint with the court, asserting a new cause of action for fraud.
He later moved for leave to file that complaint.
On May 19, 2025, the court denied Ross’s motion for
reconsideration, and on July 3, 2025, denied his motion to file
the proposed second amended complaint because it did not conform
with the court’s order sustaining U-Haul’s demurrer.
On July 9, 2025, Ross filed a notice of appeal from a
“[j]udgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer,”
which Ross indicated had been entered on May 13, 2025. There is
no such judgment. On August 26, the trial court stayed proceedings
retroactive to July 9.
On September 12, 2025, the trial court entered a judgment
of partial dismissal, indicating Ross’s breach of contract cause of
action was dismissed with prejudice. The partial dismissal stated
that no judgment would be entered as to Ross’s civil rights cause of
action “at this time.”

2
DISCUSSION
An appealable judgment or order is generally a jurisdictional
prerequisite to an appeal. (Hedwall v. PCMV, LLC (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 564, 571.) Under the “ ‘ “one final judgment” ’ ” rule,
“an appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to resolve
to finality all the causes of action pending between the parties.”
(Ibid.) Nor can appeal be taken from a ruling sustaining a
demurrer. (Ibid.) Such an order is reviewable on appeal from
the final judgment in the action. (Lopez v. Brown (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 1114, 1133.)
Here, there is no final, full judgment; Ross’s cause of action
for civil rights violations remains viable. Even though the time
given for leave to amend has expired, Ross has not asked nor the
trial court denied leave to file a properly tailored albeit untimely
amended complaint.
Absent a final judgment, we may not hear Ross’s appeal.

3
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed without prejudice to appellant
appealing again once there is a final judgment disposing of all
causes of action. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.

4