Greg Hogue v. State of Arkansas - Life Without Parole Sentence Challenge

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April 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Greg Hogue v. State of Arkansas

Supreme Court of Arkansas

• Citations: 2026 Ark. 83

• Docket Number: Unknown

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.6K)

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Combined Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. 83
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. CR-25-575

Opinion Delivered: April 23, 2026
GREG HOGUE
APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE
PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT, SIXTEENTH DIVISION;
V.
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL AND FOR ORAL
STATE OF ARKANSAS ARGUMENT
APPELLEE [NO. 60CR-94-904]

HONORABLE KAREN D.
WHATLEY, JUDGE

AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.

NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Associate Justice

Greg Hogue appeals the circuit court’s denial of his petition to correct an illegal

sentence, arguing that his sentence for life in prison without parole violates Arkansas’s

constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishments. See Ark. Const. art. 2, § 9.

Hogue acknowledges that—because he was eighteen when he committed capital murder—

he cannot rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, which created an

Eighth Amendment prohibition on mandatory life sentences for juveniles. 567 U.S. 460,

465 (2012). Instead, he asks the court to extend Miller’s protections because other

jurisdictions have done so. We reject that request for two reasons.

First, we have held that these types of claims are not cognizable on a petition to

correct an illegal sentence. See Mister v. State, 2022 Ark. 35, at 7, 639 S.W.3d 331, 336

(rejecting an Eighth Amendment claim on a petition to correct an illegal sentence). Illegal
sentences exist only when a defendant receives a sentence outside the permitted statutory

range or when the circuit court acts without jurisdiction. Id. at 5, 639 S.W.3d at 335.

Hogue’s constitutional argument does not fall into either category. As such, it is better

suited for a habeas proceeding. See Hobbs v. Gordon, 2014 Ark. 225, at 8, 434 S.W.3d 364,

369 (entertaining a Miller claim on habeas).

Second, even assuming his claim was cognizable, it would still fail because nothing

in the Arkansas Constitution requires a categorical expansion of Miller. On the contrary,

this court has previously interpreted our constitution consistent with its federal counterpart.

Kelley v. Johnson, 2016 Ark. 268, at 14, 496 S.W.3d 346, 357. And Hogue does not explain

how textual or historical differences compel the more protective categorical rule that he

seeks. See Gamble v. State, 2026 Ark. 44, at 11.

Nor does the authority Hogue cites from other jurisdictions alter the analysis. At

most, Hogue cites cases extending Miller based on data indicating that there is little

neurological difference between a seventeen-year-old juvenile and an eighteen-year-old

adult. See People v. Taylor, ___ N.W.3d __, __, 2025 WL 1085247, at *5 (Mich. 2025).

But that data existed at the time the Supreme Court decided Miller. See Miller, 567 U.S. at

472 n.5 (citing portions of an amicus brief arguing brain development continues into an

individual’s twenties). So that data is not a basis for extending Miller’s holding, and we

reaffirm our previous refusal to extend Miller.1 See Gibbs v. Payne, 2023 Ark. 29, at 1, 660

1
Rather than compelling an expanded categorical rule, the data Hogue references
suggest Miller should not have set a categorical rule prohibiting mandatory life sentences at
all—arbitrarily shielding “young killers, giving them a greater chance to reform themselves
at the risk that they will kill again.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 502 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Indeed, at most, Hogue’s argument merely underscores why legislatures are better equipped

2
S.W.3d 579, 581 (rejecting claim to extend Miller); Benton v. Kelley, 2020 Ark. 237, at 3,

602 S.W.3d 96, 98 (same); Burgie v. State, 2019 Ark. 185, at 3, 575 S.W.3d 127, 128 (same).

Affirmed; motion denied.

BAKER, C.J., and HUDSON and WOOD, JJ., concur.

COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Justice, concurring. I join the majority opinion

with the exception of the footnote. It is entirely unnecessary to comment on the wisdom

of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), to

resolve this appeal. However, as this court does delve into Miller, I feel compelled to defend

that decision.

The Miller court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that

mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders.

Citing prior juvenile cases and the fact that children are constitutionally different from adults

for purposes of sentencing, the Supreme Court recognized that “youth matters in

determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of

parole.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 473. In fact, Miller stands for the sound proposition that juveniles

should not automatically receive life without parole sentences. Miller’s holding is spot on.

The majority’s concern that Miller should not have set a “categorical rule” for those

under age eighteen is misplaced. Miller “does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of

offenders or type of crime.” Id. at 483. Rather, Miller requires sentencing that contemplates

individualized reflection of the juvenile’s circumstances. Judges and juries are still free to

to handle these complicated and dynamic issues and that—absent constitutional text
dictating otherwise—courts should defer to those decisions. See id.

3
sentence juvenile homicide offenders to life imprisonment after considering the facts of each

individual case. The Supreme Court has merely allowed for consideration of the juvenile’s

age and attendant age-related characteristics, the juvenile’s home environment, the

circumstances of the homicide offense (including the extent of the juvenile’s participation

in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him or her), and

the possibility of rehabilitation. See id. at 477–78. The Miller court “require[s] [the sentencer]

to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against

irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 480.

I respectfully concur.

RHONDA K. WOOD, Justice, concurring. I join the majority’s analysis and result.

I concur because I would restrain from the suggestion in footnote 1 that the Supreme Court

should not have reached the result in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, (2012). Miller doesn’t

apply to Hogue, and we have declined requests to extend it. There is no reason to say more.

Greg Hogue, pro se appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: David L. Eanes, Jr., Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

4